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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the accessing of finance by entrepreneurs in the Beijing 
area of China using a bespoke survey of 452 entrepreneurs which was gathered by the 
researcher.  Human capital theory along with theories of finance such as the pecking 
order theory, and agency theory provide the theoretical contextualisation of the 
research.  Within human capital theory, innovation is the key variable which is 
investigated.  Innovations in: (i) products, (ii) processes, (iii) work practices or 
workforce organisation, (iv) supply and supplier relations, (v) markets and marketing, 
(vi) administration and office systems, and (vii) product distribution are investigated 
which allows a comprehensive study which is more faithful to Schumpeter’s earlier 
writings.  
 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the research.  Chapters 2 will provide the theories 
of entrepreneurship.  The companion chapter 3 will provide a review of the theories of 
finance and empirical studies of access to finance by small businesses.  Chapter 4 
completes the triumvirate and overviews credit rationing and constraints.  Chapter 5 
details the methodology used in the rest of the dissertation and the data set which was 
gathered by the researcher. 
 
The empirical contribution of the dissertation is presented in chapters 6 to 8.  In each 
of the three empirical chapters the key focus of attention is upon seeing whether 
innovators fair worse, and are disadvantaged in comparison to their non-innovating 
counterparts.  This analysis includes bivariate analysis and then multivariate 
regression techniques which allow innovation to be investigated in models which 
simultaneously controls for the characteristics of the businesses and the entrepreneurs.  
 
Chapter 6 investigates the use of sources of finance at the start-up stage of the 
businesses. Chapter 7 investigates the applications for external finance, whether or not 
the finance was successfully accessed, and also the levels of awareness of sources of 
finance.  Chapter 8 investigates the amount of external finance sought, the amount of 
external finance received and the ratio of sought to received external finance. 
 
Chapter 9 concludes the dissertation on the access to finance in Beijing.  In this 
chapter a summary of the dissertation findings will be presented.  Additionally, the 
chapter will provide a series of discussions on the implications of the empirical results 
for theory, practitioners, government, policy and the entrepreneurial and small 
business community in Beijing, China, and beyond. 
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction and Overview 
1.1 Introduction 
There has been a substantial amount of previous research which has explored 
and attempted to quantify the prevalence of credit rationing to small businesses in 
developed nations (Miller, 1962; Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 
Levenson and Willard, 2000; Russo and Rossi, 2001; Beck, 2007; Blumberg and 
Letterie, 2008). However, there has been substantially less research into credit 
rationing in developing or emerging nations (Baydas et al., 1994; Pruteanu, 2004; Wu 
and Tan, 2005; Okurut et al., 2005) and within this area of research there are 
comparatively few studies where the entrepreneur is the unit of analysis when 
investigating businesses’ access to finance, and where a quantitative econometric 
methodology has been adopted.  In order to increase our understanding of credit 
rationing and access to finance, this study utilises a bespoke set of data from 
entrepreneurs in Beijing, China.  The study has several implications for small business 
research and also practitioners and policy makers, as well as entrepreneurs and would-
be entrepreneurs in both Beijing and other regions of China. 
 The objective of this study was to investigate the extent to which, over the 3 
years between 2004-2006, entrepreneurs who were owners and the main decision 
makers of small businesses with up to 500 employees in Beijing were able to access 
external finance, particularly bank finance, which they required for working capital 
and long-term investment projects.  Particular attention is paid to human capital 
theory and whether there are differences between innovators and non-innovators in 
terms of access to finance in the following areas.  Firstly, the utilisation of sources of 
 2 
finance at the start-up stage, which is explored in the first empirical chapter.  As 
China moves to become a more completely free market economy, it is important to 
see the take up rate or prevalence of each of the possible sources of finance at the start 
up stage.   
Secondly, applications for external finance by source, and whether or not the 
applications were successful by source, and the levels of awareness of sources of 
finance, which are analysed in the second empirical chapter.  Again it is important 
within the context of a radically changing economy to identify to which sources of 
finance the entrepreneurs are actually making applications and the extent to which 
they are successful.  Finance is the life blood of any business and hence it is important 
to gauge the success and failure rates of attempts to seek external finance.  However, 
hand in hand with the aforementioned, it is important to see to what extent 
entrepreneurs are aware of each of the full portfolio of financial providers in China.  
Such information will be important to entrepreneurs and policy makers alike.   
Thirdly, the percentage of money received from that sought, the amount of 
money sought, and lastly, the amount of money received.  This companion set of 
analysis takes the research forward by looking at external finance collectively.  There 
is very little previous research which has not only quantified the amount of external 
finance sought and received in local currency terms, but also as a relative ratio.  This 
allows us to see the demand for external finance and the extent to which entrepreneurs 
get a high, or a low proportion of the finance sought. 
These objectives are pursued within a quantitative research methodology of a 
large-scale study of entrepreneurs in Beijing.  A large sample allows the utilisation of 
sophisticated econometric models to establish whether or not there are differences 
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between innovators and non-innovators; also the extent to which other characteristics 
of the entrepreneurs and the businesses are important variables. 
There has been much debate upon what constitutes a small and medium sized 
enterprise (SME), and in particular what is the appropriate upper size limit (Storey, 
1994).  In the UK, an SME has an official upper size limit of 250 employees, but 
other scholars such as the Cambridge researchers Cosh and Hughes have continued to 
use 500 employees as an upper limit.  However, in China, there is no standardised 
figure. An SME can have an upper limit of up to 2000 employees in industrial sectors, 
3000 employees in building industries, 500 employees in retail and wholesale 
industries, 3000 employees in transport and logistics industries and 800 employees in 
hospitality industries (Law of the People’s Republic of China on Promotion of Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprises, 2003) 1
 
. In order to allow more meaningful 
comparisons with previous western studies and at the same time tempering the 
abundance of labour in China, it was decided to put 500 employees as the upper limit.  
 This is the overall introduction chapter of the dissertation.  Section two 
provides a brief overview of the contributions of small businesses to China.  Section 
three informs the reader of the development of entrepreneurship in China over the last 
three decades.  Section four presents the focus and purpose of the study.  Finally, 
section five presents the dissertation structure and that completes the chapter. 
 
                                                            
1 On 29th June 2002, President JIANG Zemin pronounced: “The Law of the People's Republic 
of China on Promotion of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, adopted at the 28th meeting 
of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress of the People's Republic 
of China, is hereby promulgated and shall go into effect as of 1st January 2003.” 
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1.2 The Contributions of Small Businesses to China 
There is a lack of consensus upon the exact economic and non-economic 
contributions provided by entrepreneurs and new businesses in developed nations 
(Johnson, 2007).  There is a similar debate raging on developing or emerging nations 
particularly China which is the focus of this study (Van Stel et al., 2005). With the 
launch of the ‘open door’ policy in 1978, China made a great leap forward from the 
previous planned or command economy, and throughout the 1990s and through the 
first decade of the new millennium the People’s Republic of China has enjoyed 
unprecedented growth and become a much more market based society (Peng, 2000; Li 
and Matlay, 2006; Zhou and Li, 2007; Li et al., 2009; He, 2009). Clearly, 
entrepreneurs and small businesses have an important role in continuing this 
economic development (Carree et al., 2007).   
In a nation of over one billion people (the population of China was 1.32 billion 
at the end of 2008) where labour is abundant and employment creation is a challenge 
for the Chinese government, entrepreneurial small businesses clearly have a part to 
play in reducing unemployment, creating jobs and alleviating poverty (Storey, 1982; 
1994).  Moreover, entrepreneurial businesses are catalysts for wealth creation and the 
businesses, entrepreneurs and employees alike can provide tax revenue for the 
Chinese government for policy initiatives to continue development and advancement.  
Moreover, small businesses are seen as the seedbeds from which future large 
businesses will grow.  Such businesses would provide a welcome substitute and / or 
replacement for the state owned enterprises which have had to rationalise employment 
in the period in which private ownership of the means of production has again 
returned to China.  
 5 
 
1.3 The Development of Entrepreneurship in China during the Last Three 
Decades 
Chinese private businessmen have been cautious ever since the disastrous 
events of the 1950s that liquidated all individual and private businesses, despite the 
continuing assurances and enforcement of property rights since then (Guthrie, 2009). 
Moreover, they probably have good enough reasons to fear political and policy 
changes during economic reforms, as the central government maintained an 
ambiguous attitude towards problems related to private property and corporate 
ownership rights (Cong, 2009). In addition, the Constitution of 1988 grants the state 
the power to exercise guidance, supervision and control over the private sector of the 
economy (Zhang, 2008). However, “only the capable and flexible Chinese were able, 
without fuss, to give up the nearly sanctified standpoints of an ossified Communism 
and Marxism and to reconstitute the system according to market economy and 
entrepreneurial principles (Kraus, 1991 pp.21)”. 
Chinese economic reform began in the 1980s and the reconstruction of the 
private sector set in motion a remarkable process of re-stratification and development. 
Emphasis on this was reported at the XIIIth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party 
in October 1987 by Zhao Ziyang, who at the time was Secretary General of the 
Central Committee of the Party and he stated: “the sole criterion for the economy is 
not its level of public ownership, but the level of its productivity.” In order to promote 
productivity, he also said: “the State should encourage the non-public sector of the 
economy, that is the private sector, to expand (Zhao, 1987 pp.5)”. 
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Even though China was reluctant to pass legislation to protect private property 
in the 1980s, due to the sensitive nature of the term “Private Ownership”, courageous, 
hard working entrepreneurs took the plunge and became the driving force of 
economic development (Peng, 2000). Unfortunately, because China had operated as a 
planned economy for decades before the economic reforms kicked in, the debilitating 
nonchalant attitudes and the lack of efficiency in organizations had impeded the 
development of entrepreneurship in China to a significant degree (Zapalska and 
Edwards, 2001; Zhou and Li, 2007).  Given the low level of managerial skills of the 
decision-makers within Chinese enterprises even today, there is still large scope for 
improvement in terms of organizational capabilities in order to enhance the 
performance of the Chinese private sector (Li et al., 2009). Having said that, the 
successes that have been achieved by these small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) so far and the contributions they have made to the Chinese economy should 
be highlighted.     
The 1990s was a period of booming activity for SMEs and entrepreneurship in 
China.  Utilising a broad definition, there are currently about 40 million SMEs in 
China and they have accounted for approximately 99%, 60%, 40% and 60% in total 
numbers of enterprises, turnovers, official tax income and exports, respectively. SMEs 
are not only employing 75% of the labour force, but also creating almost 90% of the 
new jobs (National Administration of Industry and Commerce, 2003). It is well 
documented that SMEs have become a major driving force in China’s unique brand of 
economic growth (Li and Matlay, 2006). It needs to be noted that 85% of SMEs are 
private firms, among which 15.2% are technology-based enterprises (China SMEs 
Yearbook 2000; Jiang, 2007). Without doubt, SMEs are playing and will continue to 
play a vital role in the national economy.  
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As can be seen in figure 1.1, with average annual growth rate at 11%, the 
absolute number of enterprises increased from 18 million to 38 million in the short 
period of just 10 years. The designer of Chinese reform and opening-up, Deng 
Xiaoping, when he visited South China in 1992, provided both firm assurance for the 
principles of a market economy and significant encouragement to private 
entrepreneurs (Guthrie, 2009). Thereafter, private sector funds were invested with 
more confidence and from the institutions’ point of view, bank loans were released 
relatively easier. Hence, the dramatic growth results until 1995 confirmed an ever 
stronger willingness for development from top to bottom. However, the pressure from 
an obviously inflated currency forced the Chinese government to intervene in order to 
keep the economic heat and inflation rate under control (Yu, 2001). Actions such as 
the strictly controlled size of loans and a tight monetary policy made the financial 
environment rather tense for entrepreneurial firms (Gao, 2002).  
Figure 1.1: The change in number of small firms 1990-1999 
 
(Also quoted in Gao, 2002) 
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Peng (2004) asserted that whether a formal institution can achieve the desired 
results depends to a large extent on whether it is supported by informal institutions 
such as customs, traditions and codes of behaviour. The author would always stand by 
the argument of preserving the essentials of cultural independence and many worthy 
aspects of the great heritage of China (Kraus, 1991). The conjunction of a sound 
market-based economic system and pride in their heritage is the all important driving 
force behind the actions of individuals (including entrepreneurs, employees, policy 
makers and any stakeholders) which eventually result in economic activities.  
The Chinese private sector has entered an affluent and flourishing era since 
2000. By that year, private enterprises already employed 30% of the Chinese labour 
force and contributed 40% to the national output (National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, 2000). The newest figures available to the researcher, for 2007, revealed that 
private enterprises in China were growing at a rate of more than 20% per annum and 
contributing 70-80% of the annual national GDP growth (China Xinhua News 
Agency, 2007). In more developed regions offering favourable business environments 
to entrepreneurs, for instance along the southern coast of China, including Zhejiang 
province, the average private sectors’ output comprises 65% of the total regional GDP 
(He, 2009). The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Study (2007) measured the 
percentage of adults aged between 18 to 64 who had been involved in new ventures as 
an indication of the population’s prevalence in entrepreneurship. The results show that 
China was ranked first in the world. In view of the surprising but encouraging result, 
it is obvious that Chinese entrepreneurs are providing fuel to the enormous engine of 
China’s economic growth. This view draws our attention to the most important men 
and women of this thesis, the Chinese entrepreneurs.
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1.3.1 The background of Chinese entrepreneurs 
As summarised in Peng’s (2000) book, the very complex population of 
entrepreneurs can be simplified into four groups whose members have similar 
backgrounds. These four groups are farmers, “gray” individuals, cadres of former 
government officials and professionals. His coverage might not be fully 
comprehensive, yet it certainly identified typical characteristics of each type of 
entrepreneur and therefore gave us clues to the business activities they performed, 
strategies they were likely to undertake and networking approach they adopted.  It is 
important that the reader is aware of these distinct types of Chinese entrepreneurs.  
However, in this dissertation the selection of the entrepreneurs was not based upon 
these four types of background.  Further clarification is provided in the Methodology 
Chapter.  
 
1.3.1.1 Farmers 
Farmers are considered to be a long-standing entrepreneurial force in China. 
The reason for this is that their substantially disadvantaged social and financial 
position, compared to industrial workers in the early days of China, denied them a 
sense of security in the stable orbit of state socialism, and therefore, they relied more 
on themselves or family members. Gradually, some of them became organised and 
attempted to grow beyond their family holdings. The Hope Group is the largest 
private company currently in China with an annual turnover exceeding $20 million 
and specialises in animal feed, vegetables, meat, and food processing (Au and Sun, 
1998; Peng, 2000). Its success is a direct consequence of the Chinese farmers’ steady, 
hard-working nature and the land and food shortages China will always face bearing 
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in mind the size of its population (Choe et al., 1996; Nee, 1989; 1991; Peng, 2000). 
Overall, despite the size of successful farmers’ companies which can grow into firms 
as big as the Hope Group, they are in society still less visible to urban entrepreneurs. 
To an extent, the consistent and unassuming nature of the entrepreneurial farmers is 
also revealed. 
 
1.3.1.2 “Gray” individuals 
To discuss “gray” entrepreneurs or even to define them is a difficult and 
troublesome task. However, most of them nowadays are indeed entrepreneurs in the 
classical sense as asserted by Burt (1997 pp.342): “Persons who add value by 
brokering the connection between others.” Typically, they make good use of their 
wide social networks to gather insider information (which is superior to publicly 
available information) from parties who either actively or passively are involved in a 
transaction to discover and exploit entrepreneurial opportunities (Peng and Heath, 
1996; Peng, 2000). Valuable information can be collected but is not limited to sources 
such as finance institutions, the government, foreign investors and local investors. The 
characteristics of, if we prefer, the colour of “gray” entrepreneurs in China, is not so 
radical and extreme as the frequently criminal behaviour of entrepreneurs in Russia in 
the 1990s, but instead it is more akin to those entrepreneurs who were more involved 
with policy or who took advantage of legal loopholes (Batjargal, 2007).  
To them, the law is only ‘black and white’ on paper, but when it comes to the 
interpretation or enforcement, the law becomes grey (Liu, 2005). Because of the fact 
that “gray” entrepreneurs often built up their “empire” from nothing and went through 
extremely hard times in their lives, psychologically, they tend to have a strong belief 
 11 
that they can control their own fate and are more willing to take risks and deal with 
the ambiguities within the Chinese system (Peng 2000). 
 
1.3.1.3 Cadres of former government officials 
From a strategic point of view, together with the privatisation of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs), cadres in special positions have the incentive to set up businesses 
and therefore conveniently to take advantage of state property, or to put it bluntly, to 
steal from the state or from the people, as per communism (Chen et al., 2006). They 
not only maintain extremely good relationships with their colleagues in order to be 
able to access valuable information and resource in the government, but it is also 
common that they are part of the society of the “gray” economy (Rashid, 1997). Thus, 
in China, the power of these ties acts as social capital, the value of which is almost 
impossible to calculate.  
Peng (2000 pp.174) said that: “They can be better viewed as rational, 
opportunistic individuals driven by strong self-interest.” However, as the economy 
progresses more and more towards a market-based one, the already small number of 
cadre-entrepreneurs will in fact diminish further.  
 
1.3.1.4 Professional 
As soon as the economic climate improved and the education system was back 
in order after the damaging 10-year Cultural Revolution, more and more professionals 
joined the ranks of entrepreneurs. They should be and are indeed widely supported 
and encouraged by the government, as well as by the general public. Entrepreneurs 
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from professional backgrounds are considered to be virtually the ultimate fuel for the 
development of the private sector in China.  Controversially, the occupational surveys 
of Chinese private enterprises carried out by the Department of United Front of the 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of 1993 (11.1%), 1997 
(3.9%), 2000 (10.4) and 2002 (3.8%) show a trend of huge fluctuations in terms of the 
proportion of the total number of entrepreneurs that is made up by qualified 
professionals. These proportions are included in parentheses in the previous sentence.  
Chen et al. (2006) suggested one explanation for the sudden changes, that of being 
due to a possible trade-off effect of choosing and balancing between the prestigious 
status of being a business owner versus the loss of security, power and resources of 
having a professional career. However, as with all entrepreneurs, the real motives of 
this specific group of entrepreneurs is hard to identify, as is the scale of their 
sustainability, in light of the historical fluctuations reported above.   
To sum up, the Chinese version of the market economy concept does not 
equate exclusively with Western capitalism and certainly departs from traditional 
socialist thoughts. The already embedded social and organisational structures and 
local cultures are simply the rules to follow. It is argued by Gibb and Li (2003 pp.417) 
that “highly decentralised structures allowing differentiation, complexity and 
associated ambiguity may be a necessary condition for substantial stimulation of 
MSME (Micro, Small and Medium Sized Enterprise) development.” 
 
1.4 The Focus and Purpose of the Study 
This study has explored the prevalence of credit rationing in Beijing.  The key 
emphasis has been to see whether innovating businesses compared to non-innovating 
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businesses are able to access external finance.  More specifically, this study has 
extended research beyond previous studies by utilising a broader range of types or 
facets of innovation, beyond the narrow areas of product and process innovation 
which has received a disproportionate amount of attention, and applying this to access 
to finance. Another aim in pinpointing different types of innovation in this study 
which is pertinent to a Chinese audience is to purposely raise the awareness of the 
areas in business where innovative activities can be exercised, that are outside the 
more traditional and restricted viewpoint of innovation. It is clear that the fulfillment 
of this aim makes practical sense to Chinese entrepreneurs, practitioners and policy 
makers and benefits the society as a whole.  
The focus with regard to innovators and non-innovators and access to finance 
centres upon a) the utilisation of sources of finance at the start-up stage, which is 
explored in the first empirical chapter, b) applications for external finance by source, 
and whether or not the applications were successful by source and the levels of 
awareness of sources of finance, which are analysed in the second empirical chapter, 
and c) the percentage of money received from that sought, the amount of money 
sought, and lastly, the amount of money received. 
 The study aimed to collect and explore an adequate data set, designed in a 
robust manner, where the number of harvested questionnaires would be of sufficient 
size to make the analysis statistically robust.  The primary data used in this study 
comes from a survey of businesses with up to 500 employees located in Beijing.  
Databases of two local Inland Revenue Offices were used as a sample framework. 
After slimming down numbers of firms to be surveyed according to the selection 
criterion, three batches of surveys, totalling 1200 questionnaires were identified.  
Liaising with the Inland Revenue officials, the researcher sought clarification of who 
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the owner or main decision-maker was in the business. Because of the range and 
depth of the questions asked in the survey and the quality of the responses, the 
researcher was reasonably convinced that the decision-maker was the person who 
actually completed the questionnaire.  
The 1200 questionnaires were sent to the short-listed entrepreneurs. During 
the six month survey, 457 responses were received, of which 5 were unusable as the 
numbers of employees in the business exceeded the 500 employee upper limit and so 
were eliminated. To ensure the quality of the responses, a telephone line was available 
for questions from the respondents during business hours and a series of telephone 
prompts, which not only helped to boost the response rate but also offered 
opportunities to clarify ambiguities which may have existed. Due to the sensitivity of 
the survey questions, crucial figures were cross-checked with the database that is held 
at the local Inland Revenue Offices to verify the validity, reliability and authenticity 
of the respondents. Implicit within this approach is checking that the respondent 
entrepreneur is the owner or the decision-maker in the business.  A healthy response 
rate of 37.67% was achieved.  This rate is considerably higher than similar studies on 
finance and entrepreneurship or small businesses (Storey, 1994).  The final sample 
consisted of 261 manufacturing and 191 service sector firms. 
 
1.5 Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation is organised into five parts, made up of nine chapters.  Part 
two contains three chapters.  Chapter two will provide the theories of 
entrepreneurship.  The following companion chapter will provide a review of the 
theories of finance and empirical studies of access to finance by small businesses and 
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chapter four overviews credit rationing and credit constraints.  Taken together, 
chapters two to four provide the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis relating to 
entrepreneurship and to access to finance, as well as the identification of the relevant 
and pertinent previous studies which have had a strong bearing upon how the 
researcher identified the research gaps which this thesis is alleviating.  Part three 
consists solely of chapter five, the methodology chapter.  This provides the stepping 
stone to allow the mechanisms of the study.  Part four comprises three empirical 
chapters which are a blend of bivariate and multivariate regression analysis.  These 
chapters provide the bulk of the new contributions of the thesis.  Part five, chapter 
nine, provide the concluding chapter. 
Chapter two will provide the theoretical framework from entrepreneurship and 
small business research.  Following an introduction, the chapter will review human 
capital theory, with particular attention placed upon the specific human capital of 
innovation.  The chapter also elucidates social capital theory and the limitations 
concerning the collection of empirical evidence for social capital theory for this study. 
Chapter three presents the core theoretical material on finance.  It examines 
the market efficient hypothesis and then moves to present issues revolving around 
asymmetric information issues and agency theory.  Then the capital structure is 
examined, with or without taxation and an extended discussion about possible 
determinants is also included in the exposition.  After the access to both internal and 
external sources of finance are explained, the dissertation moves on to present the 
pecking order theory, which has endeavoured to order sources of finance by 
preference.  An illustration of policy influences and various financial support from the 
Chinese government to small businesses in China completes the chapter.  
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Chapter four develops the material presented in the previous chapters, and 
focuses upon exploring credit constraints and credit rationing with particular reference 
to the possible financial constraints and difficulties which can be encountered by 
entrepreneurs and small business in Beijing.  The phenomenon of credit rationing is 
discussed with particular attention to market anomalies which result from information 
asymmetry and the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.  The Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) position on credit rationing is then illustrated and is tempered against 
the various criticisms which were raised against the model and which have provided 
an impetus to take the theory forward.  The discussion progresses to relationship 
lending and the importance of collateral in lending decisions.  The literature on 
previous empirical research on credit rationing, particularly in developing and 
emerging nations, completes this chapter. 
Chapter five presents the methodology, the reasoning behind the choice of 
research methods adopted and the actual research itself which has been applied in 
subsequent chapters.  The chapter provides the reader with an outline of the time 
frame of the study, as well as the theoretical structure which has been utilised.  
Additionally, the reasoning for the researcher adopting a quantitative rather than a 
qualitative research methodology, why the survey was chosen as the method of data 
collection and why Beijing was selected to be the geographical location of the study is 
covered.  The selection of the sample and some of the reasons why other available 
methods were not used, are presented in section five.  This then leads to providing 
insights into the data collection instruments and, in particular, the creation of a 
quantitative survey.  Section seven indicates the measures of the variables to be 
utilised in the empirical chapters.  It is important to pilot and test questions and 
surveys and section eight overviews the steps which were undertaken to ensure that, 
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as far as humanly possible, the questions and the data which has been harvested are 
safe and robust, and that the results are valid.  Section nine indicates the difficulties 
encountered in getting responses back.  This is followed by the data presentation and 
analysis steps which needed to be taken on board before undertaking the empirical 
analysis in chapters six to eight.  The problems encountered in undertaking the 
fieldwork are also presented 
Chapter six is the first of three empirical chapters.  This chapter has the 
objective of analysing entrepreneurs’ access to start-up capital and the influence of 
innovation in accessing start-up capital in Beijing.  The chapter provides a 
combination of cross-tabulation analysis of the innovation and control variables of the 
businesses and the entrepreneurs against the use of start-up finance, and the mean 
percentage of start-up finance by source.  This is complimented with multivariate 
regression analysis which allows the influence of innovation upon start-up finance to 
be examined within models while controlling simultaneously the control 
characteristics of the businesses and the entrepreneurs. 
Chapter seven commences with a detailed overview of the overall levels of 
applications for external finance – by source, and bivariate analysis against innovation 
and the control variables which capture the characteristics of the businesses and the 
entrepreneurs.  This is followed by analysing whether firms were successful in their 
applications for external finance and utilises the same bivariate methodology which 
was applied to applications for finance.  The third strand of the bivariate analysis 
looks at the awareness of external sources of finance.  This allows the reader to have a 
good grasp of the applications for external finance, whether or not these applications 
were successful, and also the awareness of the range of external sources of finance.  
Subsequently the analysis is taken forward by applying econometric model techniques.  
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In chapter eight, the analysis moves on to investigate the demand and the 
supply of credit in Beijing using a sub-sample of 384 firms (those who had applied for 
external finance).  In practical terms, the chapter explores the relationship between 
innovation and the control characteristics of the businesses and the entrepreneurs 
against: (i) the amount of external finance sought, (ii) the amount of external finance 
received, and (iii) the ratio of ‘sought’ to ‘received’ external finance.  As with the 
previous chapter six, on sources of finance at start-up, chapter eight again utilises a 
blend of cross-tabulations and multivariate regression analysis.  The cross-tabulation 
analysis presents bivariate results of the characteristics of innovation and the control 
variables against the three measures of finance indicated above.  The multivariate 
regression analysis involves the applying of tobit regression techniques to the 
percentage of finance received from that sought, and OLS regression models of the 
amount of money sought, and the amount of money received. 
Chapter nine concludes the dissertation on the access to finance in Beijing by 
small businesses.  In this chapter, a summary of the dissertation findings will be 
presented.  Additionally, the chapter will provide a series of discussions on the 
implications of the empirical results for theory, practitioners, government, policy and 
the entrepreneurial and small business community in Beijing and where applicable 
throughout China. 
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Chapter 2: 
 
Human Capital, Social Capital and Innovation 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Shane and Venkataraman (2000) emphasised two related processes that 
signify the existence of entrepreneurship, which are the discovery of entrepreneurial 
opportunities and the exploitation of such opportunities (specifically referred to an 
opportunity that had been acted upon rather than just contemplated).  We know very 
little about specific qualities of the entrepreneur or the firm or any social process that 
may enhance the ability to discover and accomplish opportunities. Therefore, a 
direction is given to researchers to make sure they perform studies to build sound 
empirical longitudinal observations leading to better understanding of both human and 
social capital that can influence entrepreneurial activities (Davidsson and Honig, 
2003). There is a lack of studies focusing on the entrepreneur as the unit of analysis to 
assess small businesses’ financing problems, and studies where a quantitative research 
approach has been adopted. 
The argument that firms founded by entrepreneurs with greater human capital 
outperform others is not new in the literature and there is evidence to support 
relationships between the founders’ human capital and the likelihood of firms survival 
and growth (Gimeno et al., 1997; Colombo and Grilli, 2005). “Successful exploitation 
of a new business opportunity generally requires the integration of complementary 
context-specific knowledge” (i.e. technological, managerial and/or marketing 
knowledge) (Colombo and Grilli, 2005 pp.800), which are precisely parts of 
individuals’ human capital.  
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A distinction is made in the literature to split human capital into two domains: 
general (sometimes also referred to as generic) human capital and specific human 
capital. Human capital theory is by far the most intuitive and well-established theory 
upon which it is suitable to base a wide variety of research projects (Ucbasaran et al., 
2004). Human capital theory highlights the core of entrepreneurship, the entrepreneur, 
therefore it is specifically appropriate as the basis for entrepreneurship research, 
offering a wide selection of usable variables. (Westhead and Wright, 1998; Ucbasaran 
et al., 2003; Westhead et al. 2005a; 2005b).  
Furthermore, entrepreneurs’ human capital influences the likelihood of 
obtaining outside finance (Westhead, 1995). It is recognised that high human capital 
individuals are more competent to escape financial constraints and carry on 
developing the firm to benefit the economy as a whole. As the investigation into the 
possible difficulties encountered by entrepreneurs in gaining access to finance is the 
main objective of this study, the researcher is keen to base her research on human 
capital theory and feels confident that this is the most sensible route to take from 
designing to accomplishing the whole research project. Drawing on earlier insights on 
the relationship between R&D, innovation and firm value from Schumpeter (1934) 
and Griliches (1981), human capital has long been recognised as the engine of 
innovation and sustainable growth of a firm (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1998; 
Nelson, 2005; Messinis and Ahmed, 2009). The ‘technological and value dimensions 
of an innovation’ is a particularly useful indicator of the integration of the ‘cognitive 
skills’ and the ‘market value’ of human capital resources possessed by a firm 
(Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004 pp.443). It then offers possibilities to scholars to 
obtain new estimates of human capital as a latent factor through assessments of the 
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innovativeness of a firm and make ‘valuable cognitive skills’ identifiable (Hanushek 
and Kimko, 2000; Messinis and Ahmed, 2009).  
Innovation as the knowledge-intensive side of economic activity and as one of 
the fundamental elements of entrepreneurship will be addressed with relation to 
human capital theory. In fact, innovation stems from human capital reserves 
conditional on the availability of finance to facilitate innovative projects (Westhead 
and Storey, 1997). An innovators’ borrowing pattern “reflects an aggressive attempt 
to innovate and forge ahead in high technology markets where development costs are 
high” (Oakey, 1984 pp.116). Because the cost of external financing is considerably 
greater than the opportunity cost of internally generated funds, resorting to the latter 
type of capital becomes an apparently sensible choice for entrepreneurs taking into 
consideration the limited ability of innovators to convince lenders to release funding 
(Fazzari et al., 1988).   
Putnam (2000) defined social capital as the connection between individuals, 
their social networks, their norms of reciprocity, and the existence of trust to maintain 
such connection. Similarly, Cohen and Prusak (2001) described social capital as a 
mechanism to bring people who bear mutual understanding and shared values 
together and to bind the group. In spite of different versions of the definition of social 
capital (Arrow, 2000; Keefer and Knack, 2005; Knight and Yueh, 2008), it is 
generally agreed that there are numerous benefits to an entrepreneur who has a high 
level of social capital in areas such as access to information, knowledge acquisition, 
market influence and control, opportunity discovery, and so forth (Burt, 1992; Shane 
and Venkataraman, 2000; Cohen and Prusak, 2001; Adler and Kwon, 2002). The 
quality, relevance and timeliness of information transferred through social networking 
are critical to entrepreneurial activities (Coleman, 1988; Powell and Smith-Doerr, 
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1994; Uzzi, 1997; Podolny and Page, 1998), particularly in the context of a 
transitional economy (i.e. China) where asymmetric information often directly 
translates into business opportunities.  The connection culture of China, also called 
“Guanxi” is well known to the western world (Park and Luo, 2001; Knight and Yueh, 
2008; Anderson and Lee, 2008). As a matter of fact, firms’ survival and success are 
hugely dependent on the entrepreneur’s social capital in China (Xin and Pearce, 1996; 
Luo and Chen, 1996). It is therefore worthwhile to study social capital theory from the 
Western perspective, as the views would be more objective.   
The chapter is organised as follows. The review of the human capital theory 
and the proxies that are to be included in the survey are discussed in detail in section 
two. This is followed by an extensive discussion of innovation in relation to human 
capital theory, and then the subject moves onto the measures of innovation, as well as 
some financing issues which specifically can apply to innovative firms. Thirdly, 
social capital theory is reviewed to offer a different aspect of the views of the benefits 
and risks associated with social capital. Finally, a brief review of the development of 
entrepreneurship in China in the last two and a half decades finishes the main part of 
the chapter. This part of the dissertation focuses light upon the uniqueness and 
worthiness of pursuing entrepreneurial studies in China, and it is also the motive 
behind this research project. A conclusion then completes the chapter. This is a 
precursor for the reader of the next literature review chapter, which is devoted to 
covering the theories of finance.      
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2.2 Human Capital Theory 
Human capital is the capital that belongs to a person or a group of people and 
it bears a sense of accumulation through time (Wang and Yao, 2003). In 
entrepreneurship, scholars considered human capital as “inputs” of an individual into 
a business in exchange for “outputs” such as the decision to become self-employed, 
the size of the firm they own (Bates, 1990), the survival of the firm (Brüderl et al., 
1992) and the performance of the firm (Bosma et al., 2004). One definition of human 
capital presented below shows the broadness of the scope of human capital theory 
which it encapsulates.  
Human capital is ‘generally understood to consist of the individual’s 
capabilities, knowledge, skills and experience of the company’s employees and 
managers, as they are relevant to the task at hand, as well as the capacity to add to this 
reservoir of knowledge, skills and experience through individual learning’ (Dess and 
Picken, 1999 pp.8). It is assumed that broad labour market experiences and all forms 
of education (including formal, learning at work, training and any non-formal 
education) can increase one’s human capital (Becker, 1964). With mixed feedback 
from various research studies, management experience, previous 
business/entrepreneurial experience and labour market experience are significantly 
related to entrepreneurial activities, when gender and industry variables are controlled 
for (Robinson and Sexton, 1994; Bates, 1995; Gimeno et al., 1997).    
The fact that there is ‘no substitute for knowledge and learning, creativity and 
innovation, competencies and capabilities’ (Rastogi, 2000 pp.196) has resulted in a 
shift in emphasis in terms of the view of what contributes to firms’ competitive 
advantages. Academics and practitioners are now favouring the argument that 
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knowledge based internal resources should be recognised as key to the sustainable 
effectiveness for firms’ operations (Wright et al. 2001). Human capital, being an 
‘invisible asset’ (Itami, 1987), is clearly a bundle of valuable, rare and hard to imitate 
resources that is held inside an organisation, and it is really what competitive 
advantage is dependent upon in the modern world (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994). 
Although traditionally important resources, such as raw materials, technology and 
economies of scale are still important, they are increasingly easy to copy by other 
players in the market. Thus, it is asserted that if human capital is not equally 
distributed in the market, that is to say that some firms possess particular talents, 
experience and connections, when others do not, the ownership of such human capital 
can be a source of sustainable competitive advantage (Snell et al., 1996).  
In the context of small business economics, the entrepreneur’s own stock of 
human capital (i.e. education, prior business experience, reputation, connections, 
managerial skill, and so on and so forth) would be of critical importance to the 
performance of the company (Pfeffer, 1994; Rauch and Frese, 2000). Human capital 
as a form of resource to the entrepreneur can enable them to achieve the seemingly 
unachievable in a rather efficient manner (Brüderl et al., 1992). The engagement, 
devotion and determination of the entrepreneur to be successful in business can ensure 
all of his/her skills and expertise are invested in the organisation and be effectively 
utilised to generate the best possible outcome.  
Small entrepreneurial ventures tend to be controlled by their owner-managers 
in terms of making any organisational decisions more than in larger or older firms 
(Meyer and Zucker, 1989). Because the entrepreneur’s quality, skills and experience 
play a dominant role in dictating the direction of a newly formed business, it is 
essential to look into the entrepreneur’s human capital reserves and his/her traits to 
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reveal what exactly will make a difference among this group of ‘special’ people 
(Brüderl et al., 1992; Cooper et al., 1994; Gartner, 1990).   
With the intention to seek predictions for new ventures’ future performance, 
researchers have explained how a model which captures factors of initial human and 
financial capital that can be observed at the time of start-up is useful with some 
degree of confidence (Cooper et al., 1994). Although some human capital variables 
are not easily changed, the advantages and/or risks associated with each can be 
assessed. As crucial as the initial financial capital, human capital, being part of the 
entrepreneur’s contribution to the new venture, impacts upon how firms evolve (Bates, 
1985). Therefore, if well utilised, that is to say if the potential problems or 
weaknesses associated with a certain type of human capital can be identified and so 
modified accordingly, it is believed that human capital plays a vital role in improving 
a firm’s future prospects (Cooper et al., 1994). Boeker (1989) noted that the way a 
firm is founded could have important impacts on the future strategic choices of the 
entrepreneur and leave an imprint on the firms’ development later on (Kimberly, 1979; 
Boeker, 1989). In other words, the initial resources that are available to the 
entrepreneur at the start-up stage of his/her new venture, which specifically include 
human and financial capital, would not only decide the range of strategies he/she may 
adopt to run the business but may also act as a buffer against any unexpected events 
(Cooper et al., 1994).     
In addition to human capital (skills, behaviour and knowledge), there must 
also be social capital (valuable relationships and networks) and organisational capital 
(structures, processes and culture), which together complete the concept of intellectual 
capital of a business (Ulrich, 1998; Nerdrum and Erikson, 2001). The common factor 
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that links all of the aforementioned forms of capital together is knowledge, which is 
looked at in the next section.  
 
2.2.1 Knowledge 
When an opportunity comes into existence in the market place, individuals 
with more knowledge or higher quality human capital are better placed to perceive 
them and make profit out of this opportunity (Ucbasaran et al., 2003; Ucbasaran et al., 
2004).  “Human capital theory maintains that knowledge provides individuals 
increases in their cognitive abilities, leading to more productive and efficient potential 
activity” (Davidsson and Honig, 2003 pp. 305).  
The brain is the most complex construction of all. Knowledge is something 
that can be gained by every one of us 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, sometimes even 
without our noticing it is happening. Stewart (1997) stressed that every company 
depends increasingly on knowledge which includes from patents, processes, 
management skills, experiences, market awareness, management skills to literally any 
intellectual capital that could be part of the intangible asset of the company (Stewart, 
1997). On this basis, scholars have paid a substantial amount of attention to issues of 
knowledge generation, leverage, transfer and integration in the human capital 
literature (Wright et al., 2001).  
A distinction between tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge was often made 
in the literature that attempted to conceptualise and characterise knowledge (Nonaka, 
1994). Tacit knowledge is often referred to as ‘know-how’, and it consists of non-
codified components of an activity, whereas explicit knowledge is normally referred 
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to as ‘know-what’ and dictates information conveyed in procedures, processes, 
written documents and is taught in educational institutions (Davidsson and Honig, 
2003; Polanyi, 1967). All of these forms of knowledge are obtainable through a 
process of entrepreneurial preparation (Cooper and Mehta, 2006).  Knowledge as a 
unique form of capital will influence an entrepreneur’s ability to withstand 
unexpected shocks to the firm and for an entrepreneur to take appropriate actions 
when needed (Cooper et al., 1994). It is also true that making entrepreneurial 
decisions requires the person to be able to utilise both types of knowledge and 
efficiently interact his/her knowledge within the social context (Davidsson and Honig, 
2003).   
The researcher intends to base her empirical research on one of the most 
intuitive and well-established theories in economy and many other areas of studies – 
human capital theory – especially innovation. Measures of human capital that are 
included in the survey design are classified under two main categories– general and 
specific human capital, which are examined in the next section.     
 
2. 3 Measures of Human Capital 
It is commonly acceptable in previous studies to categorise human capital into 
general human capital and specific human capital (Florin and Schultze, 2000).  
General human capital can be acquired through different forms or levels of education 
and general experience (Pennings et al., 1998). Specific human capital, on the other 
hand, places emphasis on skills and/or knowledge gained in a particular context or 
employment opportunity or industry. Because the specific human capital is embedded 
inside the entrepreneur and is not transferable or imitable, it to a degree represents the 
 28 
entrepreneur’s quality and capability to lead his/her business, and it is closely linked 
to the choice of activities of the operation (Gartner et al., 1999).   
 
2.3.1 General human capital 
The distinction between general and specific human capital was made by 
Becker (1993). “General human capital relates to skills and knowledge that are easily 
transferable across a variety of economic settings” (Ucbasaran et al., 2008 pp. 155). It 
was found that measures of general human capital could influence both firms’ 
survival and growth (Cooper et al., 1994). Traditionally, general human capital is 
measured by factors such as individual’s age, gender, education, work experience and 
parental background (Becker, 1975). It appears that education, gender and work 
experience are the most important general human capital factors that could potentially 
influence the performance of the entrepreneur, therefore these will now be discussed 
in depth.  
 
2.3.1.1 Education  
Formal education is known to contribute to the accumulation of explicit 
knowledge to entrepreneurs and it is an important indicator of an individual’s level of 
general human capital. Researchers have shown that the level of education could 
possess nonlinear effects upon the probability of an individual becoming an 
entrepreneur (Bellu et al., 1990; Davidsson, 1995). Matlay (2008) found that the need 
for entrepreneurship education does not automatically match outcomes in terms of 
entrepreneurial skills, knowledge and attitudes. Empirical results were presented to 
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show that the diversity of educational background of Chinese university students gave 
explanations to various entrepreneurial intentions (Wu and Wu, 2008). The positive 
relationship between education and the performance of an entrepreneur is also well 
documented (Evans and Leighton, 1989; Honig, 1996; Reynolds, 1997). It was noted 
that this positive relationship is more significantly found in the cases of male 
entrepreneurs who received higher education (i.e. he attended college or university) 
(Bates, 1995; Honig, 1998), and in general, education of all levels was particularly 
important to female entrepreneurs (Bates, 1995).   
In contrast, Butler and Herring (1991) asserted that education could be 
negatively related to the performance of self-employed individuals. In addition, 
scholars also found that education might have no or even negative effects upon 
entrepreneurial activities (Greene, 2000).  
In spite of the mixed views presented above, it is generally accepted that a 
good level of education should equip the entrepreneur with superior access to social 
networks compared to individuals who had received very limited education (Lange 
and Topel, 2006; Huang et al. 2009). Hence, through social networking, it is quite 
possible for well-educated entrepreneurs to have a better access to resources 
(particularly financial resources), to elevate opportunity recognition and so to 
safeguard their success (Anderson and Miller, 2003; Davidsson and Honig, 2003). 
In term of channels of education, education can of course take different forms 
and they need not necessarily be formal. For instance, learning that took place on the 
job, training courses, vocational qualifications, apprenticeships and any forms of 
education that are not a part of traditional formal educational structure would broaden 
the scope of the entrepreneur’s human capital and enhance one’s explicit knowledge 
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(Schultz, 1961; Mincer, 1974; Corazzini, 1967). In addition to the level of education, 
the performance of businesses in relation to their owner-manager’s gender has been 
the centre of the debate in numerous studies (Watson, 2002; Gatewood et al., 2009).   
 
2.3.1.2. Gender  
Many previous researchers have found that female-owned businesses 
generally underperform male-owned businesses (Du Rietz and Henrekson, 2000). 
However, after more thoughtful measures of performance were adopted, Watson 
(2002) proved that female entrepreneurs are likely to be equally productive and 
effective in doing business as their male counterparts. He had also proposed an 
explanation for the possible divergence of performances found in earlier research and 
he suggested the fact that the approaches (or business models) women adopt to run 
their businesses are likely to be different from those of men could explain the lower 
output level in absolute numbers generally delivered by female-owned enterprises 
(Watson, 2002).  
Two schools of thought were commonly cited in the area of study of male 
versus female entrepreneurs. The liberal feminist view suggests that because women 
are overtly discriminated against for important resources (i.e. women are more likely 
to be credit rationed), and women are also deprived of choices of opportunities in life 
(i.e. education and business experiences), small and medium sized enterprises run by 
female entrepreneurs will exhibit poorer performances than those of male 
entrepreneurs (Fischer et al., 1993). Alternatively, a social feminist theory viewpoint 
asserts that men and women are naturally different; in other words, they are two very 
different species, and thus it may not be the difference in capability that resulted in 
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varied performance outcomes, rather, the approaches adopted by women are in 
general less effective (Fischer et al., 1993). Apparently, Watson (2002) was quite 
happy to have taken a social feminist view in pursuing his research.  
Having said that, it is not uncommon to find in real life that women are 
associated with lower levels of human capital in terms of education and training 
(Becker, 1993). It is also generally true that there are fewer opportunities made 
available to women to develop specific skills or enhance experiences (Watson, 2002), 
women are likely to end up doing business in less risky and mainly services industry 
sectors (Fletschner, 2006; Muravyev et al., 2007), and most importantly women 
encounter much greater difficulties in assembling resources (Becker, 1993; Verheul 
and Thurik, 2001). However, it is worth noting that women seeking equity financing 
are actually clustered in the appropriate industries (industries that are attractive to 
financiers, such as venture capitalists) and women utilise both formal and informal 
social networks in their search for capital (Gatewood et al. 2009). It is also recognised 
that, due to family considerations, women’s career choice are less likely than male 
entrepreneurs to concentrate solely on pursuing economic goals (Brush, 1992).  
Overall, gender is an important general human capital observation and is 
worth investigating in depth to reveal the role different gender plays in the 
development of entrepreneurship and in our ever-changing society. In addition to 
general human capital factors, there are more specific human capital indicators 
relating to the business context to be discussed in the next section.  
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2.3.1.3 Age 
On the one hand, it is claimed that younger owner-managers, who are 
energetic and ambitious, are more likely to aim at firm growth than older owner-
managers, especially those who are getting closer to the retirement age (Storey, 1994).  
On the other hand, older owner-managers’ experiences in business and their practical 
skills could impact positively on the performance of the company, yet relatively 
slower growth rates were also observed than firms controlled by younger owner-
managers (Barkham et al., 1996).  
Older entrepreneurs are known to be more experienced in doing business 
(Aldrich, 1999).  Experiences relating to business ownership (Bates, 1990; Cooper et 
al., 1994), information processing, management skills, financing skills, and so on, 
represent elements that constitute the entrepreneur’s human capital. However, Cressy 
(1996) claimed that an individual’s human capital will increase with age until the 
person is middle-aged before it starts to diminish over time. This is seen as the ageing 
process. Generally, knowledge and experiences accumulate with age. In the next 
following two sections, the researcher is looking at entrepreneurs’ work experience 
and business ownership experience in more detail.  
 
2.3.1.4 Work experience   
The level of work experience obtained by an individual will partly determine 
how well this individual is capable of integrating the ‘old’ knowledge already 
obtained with the ‘new’ knowledge that is associated with the new task.  The better 
and more often this integration process is performed, the better the intellectual 
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knowledge can be accumulated to enhance the human capital (Ucbasaran et al., 2008).  
Therefore, work experience is considered to be a key indicator of general human 
capital (Castanias and Helfat, 2001). Davidsson and Honig (2003) have further 
suggested that past work experiences can assist individuals to adapt to a new 
environment and deal with unfamiliar situations, and can potentially lead to higher 
productivity (Parker, 2006).    
The positive relationship between previous work experience and the likelihood 
of an individual becoming an entrepreneur suggests that this form of human capital is 
directly linked to the ability, the adaptability of an individual and the successful rate 
of running an enterprise (Ucbasaran et al., 2008). Work experience has often been 
measured in terms of the number of years of experience of work; however, the nature 
of the skills and knowledge acquired is not mentioned (Evans and Leighton, 1989; 
Brüderl et al., 1992). Two alternative measures of work experience have been 
considered by Gimeno et al. (1997), one being the number of full-time jobs held in the 
past to indicate the broadness of one’s knowledge bank, and the other being the 
achievements obtained in previous jobs to highlight the quality of knowledge learned. 
Although a more diverse range of knowledge is more likely to be obtainable from a 
number of jobs rather than from a single post, arguments against the number of prior 
full-time jobs held as an indicator of work experience raised the issue that frequent 
job changes may lead to weak knowledge and skills of an individual in each area of 
the work (Mincer, 1974, Ucbasaran et al., 2008).    
Previous work experience related to a managerial role is regarded as a good 
indication of the quality of one’s general human capital, which could well be 
leveraged to opportunity identification and the whole entrepreneurial process to 
pursue business objectives (Bates, 1990). In the next section, specific human capital 
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factors which are more entrepreneurial oriented are investigated. These 
entrepreneurship-specific human capitals would effectively differentiate entrepreneurs 
from the general crowd.    
 
2.3.2 Specific human capital (Entrepreneurship-specific human capital) 
Adapted from Gimeno et al. (1997) and taking the view of Becker (1993), 
Ucbasaran et al. (2008) proposed the following definition of specific human capital. 
“Specific human capital relates to skills and knowledge that are less transferable and 
have a narrower scope of applicability” (Ucbasaran et al., 2008 pp.155). For instance, 
the most renowned form of specific human capital – prior business ownership 
experience - would allow experienced entrepreneurs to benefit from broader social 
networks and be more effective in establishing new social ties if needed (Mosey and 
Wright, 2007).   
 
2.3.2.1 Business ownership experience 
Prior business ownership experience differs to other forms of human capital in 
the sense that it is the most direct way to gain episodic knowledge of entrepreneurship, 
which is considered by many people – a mystery (Spender, 1996). The entrepreneur is 
the final decision maker of the company and takes full responsibility for his/her 
actions. Furthermore, the entrepreneur bears the ultimate risk of financial loss and/or 
reputation damage, and so the role as a business owner is going to be challenging. 
Hence, a much more complex combination of a very broad scope of knowledge is 
required from a successful entrepreneur, so that the knowledge can be leveraged into 
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the day-to-day operations and business strategies to identify opportunities and pursue 
goals (Shane and Khurana, 2003). In practice, valuable relationships with competent 
managers and potential investors come with business ownership experience regardless 
of the entrepreneur’s academic discipline, age, gender, etc (Mosey and Wright, 2007). 
Business ownership experience can also assist entrepreneurs to create new resource 
combinations and business models that had never been practiced before (Parker, 
2006), and the innovation of each new combination (successful or not) captures the 
essence of entrepreneurship at the root.  
Various studies have asserted that entrepreneurs are not homogeneous entities 
and are of different types: novice, serial and portfolio (Birley and Westhead, 1993; 
Hall, 1995; Westhead and Wright, 1998). Yet, which factor is the best to use to divide 
entrepreneurs into various types in a sensible way? Prior business ownership 
experience is the answer and the ownership includes businesses that were created by 
the entrepreneur (Reynolds et al., 1994), inherited (Westhead, 1997) and purchased 
(Robbie and Wright, 1996). In the order of the various levels of prior business 
ownership experience the entrepreneur has encountered or achieved, different types of 
entrepreneurs are defined as follows. Novice entrepreneurs are those “individuals with 
no prior business ownership experience but are presently having shares in businesses 
they have inherited, purchased, acquired or founded” (Ucabasaran et al., 2001 pp.59). 
Serial entrepreneurs are those “individuals who had closed or sold previous business 
in which they had shares and presently have shares in a new business they have 
inherited, purchased, acquired or founded” (Westhead et al., 2005a pp.394), whereas 
portfolio entrepreneurs are defined as those “individuals with prior business 
ownership experience and shares in several businesses they have inherited, purchased, 
acquired or founded” (Westhead et al., 2005c pp.111).  
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Westhead et al. (2005a pp.394) specifically gave the meaning of habitual 
entrepreneurs as those “individuals with prior business ownership experience who 
have the capacity to start new businesses and launch new products”.  They also 
showed in this paper that portfolio entrepreneurs (who own a number of businesses 
simultaneously as a portfolio), are more experienced in gathering information, 
spotting opportunities and have a greater capacity to process relevant information to 
turn opportunities to real profits than less experienced business owners (Westhead et 
al., 2005b). In addition to opportunity identification and exploitation, experienced 
entrepreneurs, for instance habitual entrepreneurs, will find prior business ownership 
experience is beneficial to them in terms of building reputation, cash management, 
networking skills, information search, crisis handling, developing expertise and many 
more, (Cooper et al., 1995; Shane, 2000). Prior ownership experience can make the 
entrepreneur more alert than novice entrepreneurs in a business environment 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2006).     
It was noted that experienced entrepreneurs have better access to business 
opportunities compared to their inexperienced counterparts even if they are not 
actively looking for such opportunities (Kirzner, 1973). Because of this close link 
between the prior business ownership experience of an entrepreneur and the ability of 
opportunity identification and pursuit, it is an important element of entrepreneurial-
specific human capital (Gimeno et al., 1997; Chandler and Hanks, 1998).  
To sum up, the general and specific human capital profiles of entrepreneurs 
have a long history of being considered by scholars (Brüderl et al., 1992; Gimeno et 
al., 1997; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003; Ucbasaran et al., 2008). The cognitive 
dimensions of entrepreneurship within a human capital framework have received an 
increased level of attention in recent years (Ferrante, 2005). For the purpose of this 
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study, measures of human capital were designed to capture a broad conceptualisation 
of human capital and still keep the later analysis intuitive. The researcher was limited 
to both time and the scope of the study (financing being the core of the research), as 
well as the length of the questionnaire and the number of questions which could be 
included to construct variables; therefore, not every conceivable measure of human 
capital was incorporated in the survey. This notwithstanding, a special type of human 
capital and arguably the key entrepreneurial measure - innovation - was extensively 
explored in the empirical chapters in relation to finance to reflect a gap in the 
literature and to advance our understanding of entrepreneurship in Beijing, China.   
  
2.4 Innovation 
2.4.1 Conceptualizing innovation 
Innovation as a field of research has been hugely influenced by the work of 
Joseph Schumpeter. He defined five types of innovation, namely: (i) introduction of a 
new product or a qualitative change in an existing product and/or process; (ii) process 
innovation new to an industry; (iii) the opening of a new market; (iv) development of 
new sources of supply for raw materials or other inputs and (v) changes in industrial 
organisation (Schumpeter, 1934; OECD, 1997 pp.28). Later, the Oslo Manual 
concentrated on the first two of Schumpeter’s types of innovation and attempted to set 
a benchmark for future research methodologies in innovation studies (Rogers, 1998).  
The Oslo Manual presented a definition of a technological product innovation as the 
introduction of “a new or improved product whose characteristics differ significantly 
from previous products” and a technological process innovation as the adoption of 
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“new or significantly improved production methods, including methods of product 
delivery” (OECD, 1997 pp. 49).  
Dewar and Dutton (1986 pp.1422) adapted the definition of innovation 
proposed by Zaltman et al. (1973 pp.10) and defined this as: “an innovation is an idea, 
practice, or material artefact perceived to be new by the relevant unit of adoption”. 
They further defined “technical process innovation that contains a high degree of new 
knowledge (radical innovations) and a low degree of new knowledge (incremental 
innovations)” respectively (Dewar and Dutton, 1986 pp.1422). Similarly, but with 
different terminologies expressed from a different angle, a novel innovation is defined 
as an innovation that is new to the market, and this novelty is usually solely concerned 
with outputs, whereas an incremental innovation is only considered new to the firm 
(Freel, 2003).  
Innovation in the context of entrepreneurship highlights the function of the 
recognition and realization of new economic opportunities (Schumpeter, 1912; 1942), 
in the sense that opportunities arise with potential products and production processes 
in many aspects of the business, not limited to the production cycle. In fact, 
Schumpeter’s view on innovation implicitly delivers a message of risk and 
uncertainty as integral parts of entrepreneurship (Audretsch et al., 2008).  
Definitions that take into account the complexity of innovations often see 
innovation as a process of interactive learning and it is likely to be true that “the more 
complex the learning process, the more interactions it probably requires” (Johnson 
and Lundvall, 1993 pp.75). Following the work of Lundvall (1995), innovation can no 
longer be viewed as the simple outcome of independent decision-making at firm level, 
but rather it is suitable to be viewed as “an interactive, cumulative and cooperative 
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phenomenon, which incorporates more than simple phased dyadic or bilateral 
interactions between users, industry and the science base” (Freel, 2003 pp.751).  
It is easily recognised from the inconclusive selection of definitions of 
innovation mentioned above, that there is no consensus of a generally accepted 
definition of innovation. In fact, innovation involves far too many factors and could 
be investigated in various contexts and settings based on numerous principles and can 
also be studied in conjunction with related theories (i.e. human capital, social capital, 
networking, etc.).  In practice, researchers must adopt the definition that is most 
appropriate for the purpose of the study and accept the fact that respondents can have 
varied interpretations. It is however widely accepted that knowledge generation 
enhances regional economic performance (Lucas, 1988). Yet, to achieve economic 
development takes more than new knowledge creation, and in fact it is greatly 
determined by the competence and the willingness of innovative entrepreneurs to 
convert or translate knowledge into new products and processes (Audretsch et al., 
2008).     
 
2.4.2 Innovation and human capital 
Innovation comprises knowledge based entrepreneurial opportunities and the 
passage to actually carry out innovative projects to develop new products, processes 
or technologies, is another part of the entrepreneurs’ role in exploiting such 
opportunities (Audretsch et al., 2008).  A firm’s innovative technology spills over 
automatically to other market players once the technology is utilised in production, 
thus knowledge generation is an important driver of economic performance (Romer, 
1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991).  
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Successful innovative activities (i.e. inventions that become incremental to the 
production function), foster overall productivity and efficiency at all levels, micro and 
macro, to firms, regions, countries and the global village (Prais, 1995). Robson et al. 
(2009 pp.332) posits that “an innovative and thriving SME sector offers the potential 
for a country to generate employment, develop its domestic economy, and engage in 
international trade.” Practically, innovation is recognised as the most critical process 
to enable businesses attain competitive advantages in this modern era among local and 
international competitors, yet this process is incredibly costly. The United States and 
the OECD countries spend more than $2.2 billion everyday on R&D (Razgaitis, 2003). 
This already large amount, however, does not include money spent on ‘soft’ 
innovations, including process innovation, marketing, distribution and so on and so 
forth. Logically, entrepreneurs want good enough reasoning to justify such substantial 
levels of expenditure and want to make sure the money is well spent. Nevertheless, 
evidence has long shown that the returns from invention are highly skewed, with 
failure a common outcome (Åstebro, 2003).  
Academic studies of innovation have so far been dominated by research on the 
secondary sectors of the economy, such as the high-tech manufacturing sector (Drejer, 
2004; Von Tunzelmann and Acha, 2004).  Since there is a serious omission given the 
dominance of the primary sectors in developing countries (Robson et al., 2009) and 
economically significant innovations are equally likely to be carried out in tertiary 
sectors of the economy (i.e. from key service sectors and/or in terms of process 
developments), more conclusive quantitative studies that cover as many facets of 
innovation as possible are demanded (Howells et al., 2006).   
According to Acs and Gifford (1996), as the firm grows, more attention is paid 
to trying to maintain the profitability of the existing production line rather than 
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investing in new product innovation. Furthermore, if the firm decides to conduct 
product improvements and new product innovation simultaneously, the obsolescence 
of the current product line will decide the share of resources allocated to each 
operation (Acs and Gifford, 1996). “R&D spending appears to be encouraged in 
youthful industries where a strong science base is present and where the government 
makes substantial contribution to technological knowledge” (Levin et al., 1985 pp.23).   
Concerning the market structure that is the most suitable to innovation, 
neoclassical theories of innovation have suggested that technical change is better 
promoted in competitive markets that consist of many small firms, whereas 
Schumpeter argued in his 1942 book that large firms operating in imperfect markets 
are most conducive to innovation (Schumpeter, 1942). Acs and Audretsch (1987) 
performed a study to test whether the determinants of innovation in large and small 
firms are different and concluded that in addition to R&D activities, which are 
apparently more relevant to larger firms, certain market structure characteristics also 
promote innovation and the results were irrelevant to firm size.     
Innovation cannot be feasible without adequate human capital and there are 
three forms of human capital to consider. Firm-specific human capital refers to skills 
and knowledge that are valuable only within a specific firm, and for this reason the 
impact of firm-specific human capital on the level of innovative activities in a wider 
society is limited due to its restricted transferability to other firms (Grant, 1996). On 
the other hand, industry-specific human capital pertains to knowledge and experience 
derived within a specific industry. According to previous research, industry 
experience is certainly beneficial to firm performance and growth (Siegel et al., 1993) 
and can take a rather important part in promoting innovative activities within an 
industry, provided that major players in that industry exchange quality knowledge and 
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information between each other (Bianchi, 2001). Hence the communication of 
knowledge and the innovation carried out on this basis is for the advancement of the 
industry as a whole rather than purely for the benefit of an individual firm. The tacit 
nature of industry-specific know-how that is only understandable to industry experts 
forms a protective boundary for the investments made by entrepreneurs towards 
innovative activities (David, 1975), and so to a degree protects economic return for 
these major players within the industry.  
Intuitively, scholars then discussed the possibility of ‘cultural’ and / or 
‘regional’ development of innovativeness, where people may be willing to exchange 
tacit knowledge on some sort of mutual grounds (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999). Any 
incremental knowledge to the general public is a desirable thing after all. Policies to 
counsel small firms to cooperate for innovation should be implemented with caution, 
as there may be an inverted U-shaped relationship between innovation performance 
and the extent to which firms access external know-how (Laursen and Salter, 2006).    
Really and truly, the raw talent, the ability and core competences to innovate 
and be creative, is generated from individual-specific human capital more than 
anything else (Robertson and Langlois, 1995; Freel and Harrison, 2006). In the field 
of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs’ human capital ranges extremely broadly and in 
fact it reflects years of accumulation of education and experience of all forms and 
unique ways of gathering and processing information (Pennings et al., 1998). 
Individual-specific human capital of the entrepreneur and of his/her employees can be 
considered as the initiator as well as the booster for innovative activities. The human 
capital factors relating to overall educational attainment, knowledge bank, economic 
resources and the physical well-being of the entrepreneur is therefore going to be the 
focus of attention and will be introduced one at a time to control the seven facets of 
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innovation that are investigated in this study. Innovation is at the heart of all of the 
hypotheses which are tested in the empirical chapters of the dissertation.  It is 
important that the reader is made aware of the lack of consensus within the 
entrepreneurship, and indeed specialist innovation and R&D literature upon exactly 
what innovation is, but also the conundrum of how innovation can be measured.  The 
next section looks at measures of innovation.  
 
2.4.3 Measures of innovation  
The existing literature on the determinants of innovation has identified a good 
range of factors associated with innovation, but most of the studies have proven to be 
inconclusive (Robson et al., 2009). Many studies of innovation have adopted 
‘technicalist’ views that narrowly looking at the technological innovative activities of 
product development and process advancement. The approach is likely to omit many 
innovative activities that are worthy of consideration (NESTA, 2006). For example, 
the neglected ideological innovations such as novel management practices need to be 
added as a dimension of innovation in the research design (Hausman, 2005; Robson et 
al., 2009).  
Allowing a more comprehensive reckoning of the topic of innovation, 
Schumpeter (1912)’s broad view on innovative activities in different areas of 
businesses is adopted to construct the seven facets of innovation for the purpose of 
this study. Innovations in (i) products, (ii) processes, (iii) work practices or workforce 
organisation, (iv) supply and supplier relations, (v) markets and marketing, (vi) 
administration and office systems, and (vii) product distribution are to be addressed 
individually. Separately, respondents where requested to indicate whether they had 
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introduced innovations which were new to the market or only to the firm, so that the 
relative newness of the innovations is also measured.     
 
2.4.4 Financing innovation 
Small firms are typically efficient and flexible in the way they run their 
businesses; however, resources-wise, they are often disadvantaged and constrained 
(Hewitt-Dundas, 2006). As discussed at the beginning of this section, the cost of 
innovation is undoubtedly high and the likelihood of achieving a positive return from 
innovative activity is low (Åstebro, 2003; Freel, 2000a; Freel and Robson, 2004). 
“Innovation tends to result in growth and efficiency, but not immediately in more 
profits” (Heunks, 1998 pp.266). In spite of the fact that innovation is core to 
entrepreneurship, (Marvel and Lumpkin, 2007) and it can potentially enhance a firm’s 
market position and widen a firm’s business opportunities, conditions need to be met 
to facilitate innovation. Obviously, in addition to human capital, the availability of 
funding is the next in line.  
It is all well and good to have risk capital injections once the innovative 
project is taking shape, but what about the infant stage of the business? Where do 
innovative entrepreneurs source start-up capital?  Seed and early-stage entrepreneurs’ 
tend to have a few strong personal connections and brokers, whereas a wider network 
of professional advisors, incubators and prior-stage financiers, is largely absent 
(Dossani and Desai, 2006). Sensibly, motivations to innovate come from the financial 
advantages gained from current monopoly profits (Acs and Gifford, 1996). In other 
words, the experienced successful innovators are better positioned to finance future 
innovative projects. This experience is seen as another form of specific human capital 
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to the entrepreneur (Westhead and Storey, 1997). Financing innovation using internal 
funds may be advantageous for two reasons. Firstly, it is known to be extremely hard 
to convince lenders who do not possess specialist knowledge about the innovation to 
fund such projects from the beginning and to bear the probability of failure, which is 
more often than not very high (Van der Panne et al., 2003). Secondly, when an 
invention is waiting to be patented usually at the development stage of the innovation 
project, trying to obtain external financing increases the exposure of the information 
about the invention to the outside world through leaks and so is prone to imitation 
(Mukoyama, 2003; Zhou, 2006).  
As far as the use of external finance at the start-up stage is concerned, public 
funding is an appropriate starting point for entrepreneurs (Moore and Garnsey, 1993; 
Dossani and Desai, 2006; Mason, 2009). Risk capital is still one of major players to 
support innovative ventures to start up (Global Venture Capital Survey, 2005). Due to 
the relatively large capital requirement for innovative activities, every possible source 
of finance has to be taken into account, both internally and externally (Hussain et al., 
2006).  Inspired by the above discussion, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H1: Entrepreneurs engaged in innovation are more likely to report a higher usage 
of their own savings as a source of finance at start-up compared with 
entrepreneurs not engaged in innovation. 
H2: Entrepreneurs engaged in innovation are more likely to report higher usage 
of external sources of finance at start-up compared with entrepreneurs not 
engaged in innovation. 
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Several empirical studies show that both access and costs of finance hinder the 
growth of technology-based firms (Giudici and Paleari, 2000).  Hyytinen and 
Toivanen (2005) found that SMEs face an upward-sloping capital supply curve under 
an imperfect capital market as the firm’s increased use of external financing results in 
the marginal cost of capital to increase and eventually push the curve bent upwards. 
This finding is consistent with the argument that financial constraints hold back 
innovation and growth (David et al., 2000; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002).  
Banks are perceived to assign a high-risk status to SMEs; entrepreneurs who 
want to pursue innovative projects are expected to find it even harder to gain access to 
finance (Moore and Garnsey, 1993; Westhead and Storey, 1997). Moore (1995 pp.24) 
suggests that “there is no clear relationship between…innovation and profitability”, 
together with the huge sunk costs (Symeonidis, 1996) associated with innovative 
investment, innovative firms’ ability to repay borrowings are questioned from a 
lender’s perspective. Thus, in addition to the capital requirements, innovative firms 
are more prone to liquidity constraints (Acs and Audretsch, 1990). Studies have found 
that innovators are likely to seek more external finance and are more likely to be 
credit rationed (Freel, 2007). SMEs who lack technical supports, are weak in risk 
management, and are inexperienced with laws and regulations of innovation tend to 
find it is almost impossible to raise the requisite finance to even start the innovative 
project, not to mention the follow up funds that guarantee smooth and continuous 
progress (Hewitt-Dundas, 2006).  Innovative ventures have to bear a high level of 
uncertainty (which widens the information gap which already exists between the firm 
and private finance providers), thus inducing the shortage of enterprise funding 
further (Moore and Garnsey, 1993). Two hypotheses result from the above discussion: 
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H3: Innovative ventures will possess a greater likelihood of having applied for 
external funding compared to non-innovating ventures 
H4: Innovative ventures will possess a greater likelihood of having been refused 
access to external finance compared to non-innovating ventures. 
Access to finance is an important prerequisite for establishing and developing 
a business (Christensen, 2007). Inevitably, it is the responsibility of the entrepreneur 
to be fully aware of the funding terms, positions and preferences of all possible 
finance providers toward projects involving different level of risks. However, 
enhancing the mutual awareness and coordination at the crossroads of innovation and 
finance is no easy task (Peneder, 2008). Apart from formal sources of finance, 
innovative ventures often appear to be attractive to risk capital providers (consisting 
of informal sources such as venture capitalists, and angel investments). A simple 
definition of risk capital is “capital in which repayment of the principle and expected 
return on capital are at least partly uncertain” (Dossani and Desai, 2006 pp.57). 
Because risk capital financiers own much more specialized information (particularly 
relevant to technology advancements), their lending decisions are much more 
strategic and so more likely in favour of innovative ventures which could offer fruitful 
potential for returns (Mason, 2009). In the light of the above concerns, a hypothesis 
designated to the awareness of risk capital is developed: 
H5: The non-innovative ventures are less likely to be aware of, and to complete 
applications for, risk capital, compared to innovators. 
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Overall, looking into the two fundamental drives to initiate innovation may by 
and large simplify and clarify the ambiguities associated with innovation. According 
to Acs and Gifford (1996), innovations are either demand-pull or technology-push. 
Hence, knowing the initiatives of the innovation should be helpful to the entrepreneur 
to assess an innovative project more carefully from the start and so prepare for 
foreseeable difficulties lying ahead. Demand-pull manifests a higher and safer 
potential income from innovation, whereas technology-push manifests enhanced 
ability of an entrepreneurial firm to innovate (Crepon et al., 1998; Nemet, 2009). 
Therefore, being innovative is good so far as the business objective coincides with the 
motivation of innovation, since the project is more likely to be efficiently carried out 
and be successful (Li et al., 2006). To complete the discussion of innovation and to 
incorporate this important concept into the Chinese context, previous studies on 
innovation in China are presented in the next section.  
 
2.4.5 Innovation in China 
China, is one of the largest transitional economies in the world, and it is 
experiencing a transitional period switching from former centrally planned innovation 
regime to a more market-driven system, and this is particularly true for the private 
sector businesses (Li, 2009a). To quantify the achievement in the area of innovation 
in China in recent years, new production development serves as a good indicator. The 
number of finished new products recorded at the National Statistic Bureau of China 
for the year 2002 was 59,788 products and this number increased by 14.8% to 68,633 
a year later (National Statistic Bureau of China, 2004). Since the launch of the open 
door policy, Chinese provinces are administered independently, in terms of 
 49 
formulating economic and social development policies within their geographical area 
(Liu and White, 2001; Gu and Lundvall, 2006). Furthermore, cultures, customs and 
conventions of different regions in China can vary vastly, for both historical and 
social reasons, which could potentially influence both entrepreneurial and innovation 
processes (Li, 2009a). Thus, innovation studies performed in China need to be treated 
region by region as independent innovation systems (Edquist, 2005).  
Innovation capacity variations across regions in China were assessed by Li 
(2009) for a transitional period from 1998 to 2005 using a stochastic frontier model. 
He found that the widening gap of innovation capacity among regions could be due to 
the withdrawal of injections of technology from universities to businesses that 
resulted in a reduction of innovation efficiency. Siu et al. (2006) carried out in-depth 
personal interviews of 43 Chinese, 26 Hong Kong and 28 Taiwanese small businesses. 
Because these businesses would be operating under different market settings, it is 
interesting to investigate the differences in new product development pursuits. Their 
findings suggest that government intervention and business approaches impact 
substantially upon the new product development process. They also performed a 
comparative study between Chinese and Western practices when it comes to 
innovation. They discovered apparent differences in behaviour and believe that an 
understanding of such differences requires knowledge about the culture and 
operational environment of these businesses.  
It is also worth bearing in mind that government intervention remains of 
critical importance among Chinese enterprises, especially so for SMEs (Anderson et 
al., 2003). Government R&D spending is a great method to induce R&D activities in 
the private sector and so achieve overall technology advancement (Hu, 2001). Having 
to cope with years of turbulence in the private sector in China, Chinese entrepreneurs’ 
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superior alertness and ability to respond quickly to market signals and to react to 
market demand are essential to the success of the undertaking of innovative projects 
(Siu, 2001).  
Li et al. (2006) surveyed eight provinces of China from February to July 2002.  
In total, 850 enterprises were in their sample and 603 usable observations were 
gathered. Drawing from the management literature, they made a distinction between 
entrepreneurial-oriented innovation (viewed as a learning and selection mechanism 
that engenders exploratory and risk-taking behaviour, pp.336) and market-oriented 
innovation and they made an attempt to explain the impact of these two forms of 
innovation upon new product developments through the mechanisms of personal and / 
or output control.   
An empirical study utilising a sample of 104 valid responses collected from 
three areas in China (Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta and Jingjintang 
Economic Zone) was performed aimed at gaining insights into the performance of 
China based subsidiaries of multinational companies (Zhang et al., 2009). Their 
findings suggest that subsidiaries with better performance are generally associated 
with good use of knowledge about competition, are keen to develop moderate 
innovative products, smooth communication with various functional departments and 
product development groups, codified knowledge, and having a supportive culture 
within the firm. 
Taken into the unique set of market conditions that there are in China, 
innovation and imitation strategies on new product developments were examined 
(Zhou, 2006). Empirical results were derived from a cross-industry survey of 298 
usable respondents collected out of a sample of 1000 manufacturing firms that  
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spanned across a diverse range of manufacturing industries (i.e. chemical, furniture, 
food, plastic, electronics) in three cities in China (Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou). 
He asserted that innovation strategy is more favourable within a market with uncertain 
demand, rapid technology changes and intensified competition, which are exactly the 
characteristics of this economic growth period in China. He also proved that 
innovation leads to better new product performance compared to imitation.  
Clearly, in order to promote innovative activities in the economy and so to 
fertilise the development of entrepreneurship, the functioning of communities and 
societies is vital (De Clercq and Dakhli, 2004). Storper (1995, pp.203) stated that: 
“the innovative milieu is essentially a context for development, which empowers and 
guides innovative agents to be able to innovate and to co-ordinate with other 
innovating agents.” The success of such milieus hugely depends on entrepreneurs’ 
social capital (Maillat, 1998). Knack and Keefer (1997) studied 29 market economies 
and found social capital was positively related to economic performance. Freel and 
Harrison (2006) pointed out that cooperation and networking are seen to be the means 
to not only preserve the behavioural advantages of small businesses but also to help to 
mitigate the extent of material constraints. Studies that account for the relationship 
between networking and cooperation among high-technology ventures have been 
relatively commonplace in recent years (Tödtling and Trippl, 2007; Xu and 
McNaughton, 2006). Hence, the understanding of the concept of social capital and its 
effect upon innovation and entrepreneurship offers another dimension to the research. 
In the next section, social capital theory will be discussed.   
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2.5 Social Capital Theory 
 Social capital is another of the key elements of entrepreneurship, in the sense 
that it is a crucial resource of the entrepreneur that can be withdrawn to boost the 
probability of success in many aspects of the business. These aspects could be 
connected but not limited to knowledge accumulation (Yli-Renko et al., 2001), the 
successfulness of innovation (Cooke and Wills, 1999), internationalisation (Keeble et 
al., 1998), entrepreneurial opportunities recognition and exploitation (Arenius and De 
Clarcq, 2005), and so on. Scholars have extensively explored the nature of social 
capital in entrepreneurial networks (Coleman, 1990; Cooke and Wills, 1999; Tsai and 
Ghoshal, 1998; Anderson and Jack, 2002; Shane and Stuart, 2002; Davidsson and 
Honig, 2003). Very precisely, social capital is defined as “a social relational artefact 
produced in social interactions…and it represents a pool of goodwill residing in a 
social network and it can be envisaged as a revolving mutual fund of traded and un-
traded interdependencies (Anderson et al., 2007 pp.245).”  In simpler terms, social 
capital is seen as “resources embedded in a social network accessed and used by 
actors for actions” (Lin, 2002 pp.25) and can also be referred to as the ability of actors 
to extricate rewards from their social structures, networks and memberships (Lin et al., 
1981; Portes, 1998; Batjargal and Liu, 2004). It is a multidimensional concept that can 
occur both at individual and at firm level (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). 
Within the variables created and used in the empirical analysis chapters, 
capturing suitable measures of human capital has been extremely challenging.  
Accordingly, the reader needs to be aware that the social capital construct is not ideal.  
The remainder of this section in outlining the multidimensional nature of social 
capital clearly signals the difficulties in developing social capital measures. 
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Extended family members, community networks, or organisational 
connections are the traditional social capital owned by individuals and are seen to 
supplement ones’ human capital and financial capital in pursuing entrepreneurial 
ventures (Bourdieu, 1983; Coleman, 1988; 1990). To enable social connections to 
work in favour of the running of the business, the strength of ties between parties 
within that social circle need to be “meaningful and consequential”(Cook and 
Whitmeyer, 1992 pp.118; Burt, 2000). In other words, these ties can potentially have 
significant impacts on entrepreneurs’ accessibility to key resources (Jack, 2005). 
Research of networks can involve a wide range of considerations, including network 
size, structure, impacts, interactive processes, benefits, skills, behaviour, and risks 
(Van Deth, 2003; Coviello, 2005).  Even though networks have admittedly important 
theoretical and practical values in entrepreneurship studies, the diverse nature and the 
lack of a consensus in the approaches adopted to study the concept has proven to be 
less practical and meaningful to the understanding of the phenomena (Jack, 2010).  
It is argued that ‘trust’ acts as an enhancer to the strength of the networking in 
the social circle, and it is recognised that the existence of ‘trust’ is often a result of 
obligation or threat of censure (Coleman, 1988). Hence, ‘trust’ only bonds 
beneficiaries together when the obligation still holds. For example, ‘trust’ plays a key 
role in lender-borrower relationships where both parties expect a mutual benefit from 
maintaining their relationship/fulfilling the loan contract (Saparito et al., 2004). 
Unfortunately, there is no single universally agreed definition of ‘trust’ and ‘trust’ 
takes different forms within different disciplines (Welter and Smallbone, 2006). The 
dimensions of trust are both diverse and debatable and can take forms of personal 
trust (Zucker, 1986; Chen and Barnes, 2007), institutional trust (Williamson, 1993), 
inherited (Coleman, 1988; Nguyen et al., 2005), calculus trust (Lewicki et al., 2005) 
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and unconditional trust (Jones and George, 1998; Howorth and Moro, 2006). Because 
‘trust’ is not a theme that is going to be developed as an integral part of this research 
project, it is not specifically defined in the context of this dissertation.  
Another important advantage of building a strong social capital reserve lies 
with the bridging and bonding mechanism social capital has to offer (Putnam, 2000). 
Exchange of information and the shared benefit of resources to external networks can 
be helpful to the entrepreneur to access critical resources that are normally scarce to 
others (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Putnam, 2000). Weak ties as opposed to close ties (i.e. 
family ties) mean loose relationships between individuals. A weak form of extended 
network is commonly found in a group of self-employed individuals who have a 
common interest in an area of business in order to maintain the flow of information, 
for instance, information about potential jobs (Granovetter, 1973). This argument is 
particularly true for the building trade. Some entrepreneurs join trade clubs or 
maintain memberships to gain access to industry-specific information, especially to 
keep on top of the latest technological innovations (Anderson and Jack, 2002).  
The researcher included proxies for family business in the survey observation 
for three reasons. First, a family tie is believed to be the closest form of tie between 
people as it is by blood. Secondly, it is a Chinese tradition that family members quite 
often offer free (or at least very cheap) supports of all kinds (i.e. finance, premises, 
connection, etc) to their relatives, especially at the start-up stage of a new venture, in 
exchange for unquestioning loyalty (Lee, 1996). In some situations, for instance when 
the local community is very close, senior members of a family almost feel obliged to 
help out the younger generation (Zapalska and Edwards, 2001). Last but not least, 
such strong family ties in a business context provide an incomparable sense of 
security and confidence to the entrepreneur, in the sense that ideas are shared 
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collectively and a wider and easier access to resources is available at the 
entrepreneur’s disposal (Sheh, 2001). Thus, the entrepreneur can make sure that 
his/her personal qualities and capabilities are fully utilised in achieving economic 
goals for the venture.  
However, strong ties (i.e. family ties or partnership) can be restrictive when 
one’s accumulation of personal resources grows to a certain level. Contradictions 
often occur when the entrepreneur makes strategic decisions (i.e. to take dramatic 
actions to expand or diversify). Although the intention is to take the firm to the next 
level, opinions are not easily agreed across all members with close ties and so a weak 
form of social capital becomes more attractive (Cook and Whitmeyer, 1992). It is also 
argued that networking investments in general may lead to diminishing marginal 
resource returns, which can include returns in the form of financial, informational, 
emotional and/or contact support (Semrau and Werner, 2009).    
The typical ways of forming weak ties are results of association based on 
friendship or advice (Paxton, 1999). From an entrepreneurial perspective, social 
capital provides channels leading on to opportunity identification, information sharing 
and access to resources (Greene and Brown, 1997). Information is not readily 
available to everyone and is usually insider information to the owners of resources. In 
the event of asymmetric information, social capital becomes increasingly important to 
the entrepreneur who is prepared to nail the deal at the best time (Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000). Things happen unexpectedly, and therefore timing is vital.    
Social capital may be used to explain the phenomena that entrepreneurs often 
start businesses that are familiar to themselves somehow (Cooper and Dunkelberg, 
1986). The connections could come from former occupations or families and close 
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friends who are also business owners. Basically, entrepreneurs rely on social capital to 
discover opportunities and successfully fulfill their firm’s needs at different stages of 
the business cycle (Arenius and De Clarcq, 2005). Bridging and bonding social capital 
enables the entrepreneur to efficiently and effectively evaluate opportunities and 
facilitates the procurement and utilisation of resources necessary for opportunity 
exploitation (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986). A rich endowment of social capital can 
effectively enhance information flows and resources allocations (Anderson and Jack, 
2002). After recognising benefits associated with social capital, the serious issue of 
the risks of relying on social capital are to be looked at next.  
 
2.5.1 Risks of relying on social capital  
One of the most distinctive beliefs of the Chinese philosophy is that there are 
two sides to every coin. The possession of a high level of social capital is by and large 
beneficial to the entrepreneurs, however, entrepreneurs may face a few risks 
associated with the over reliance on social capital and can potentially lose their 
individuality.  
First of all, as mentioned earlier, the ties may not only bind, but also can blind 
(Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994 pp.393). In other words, there are situations when the 
flow of information can actually be reduced. For instance, new ideas are only 
exhibited to linked group members and consequently opportunities remain static 
(Gargiulo and Bernassi, 1999). As a result, it could be hard to introduce something 
new.  
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Secondly, the bonding of friendship and/or membership obligations may force 
entrepreneurs to enter into second best (or not entirely beneficial contracts in the 
worst scenario) business contracts within the social circle (Portes, 1998), whereas 
there are better opportunities that cannot be exploited and this over embeddedness can 
be discouraging to entrepreneurial activities (Uzzi, 1997). Thus, inefficient allocation 
of resources appears which could be harmful to the firm and also to the economy.    
Lastly, building and maintaining social connections are very costly and do not 
always promise a payoff in economic terms, because much of the reward for social 
interactions is intrinsic (Arrow, 2000). Zhang and Fung (2006) discovered that 
membership of an organisation or club does not appear to be significantly influential 
to the performance of Chinese enterprises.  The efforts and time devoted to enhancing 
social capital may not be suitable to everyone (Knight and Yueh, 2008) and cannot be 
measured precisely (Fernandez et al., 2000). Social groups form naturally according 
to ideas, values, norms, rules and background. In fact, social capital establishment is a 
very complex issue and may come with unaffordable commitment and or obligations 
to individuals who do not naturally belong to the group (Hansen, 1998). Although it is 
never said, Chinese entrepreneurs sacrifice a considerable amount of financial capital 
as well as other forms of resources to open up new channels of connections and can 
eventually find themselves worse off in real terms (Park and Luo, 2001). Social 
capital entails obligations and costs (Yang, 1994) that must be repaid at some point.   
In essence, when information is distorted in a transitional economy, the social 
network (Guanxi) becomes unavoidable to facilitate economic exchanges and 
administrative barriers (Park and Luo, 2001). Chinese entrepreneurs are engaged in 
extensive networking activities in order to gain an edge over competitors (Kao, 1993; 
Tsui and Farh, 1997). It is generally accepted that a good relationship with local 
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governments can be crucial for the entrepreneur if he/she wants to seal a deal during a 
negotiation (Pye, 1995). However, during a period of economic reform, due to the 
unstable nature of the society, social capital management is vital to ensure that 
‘guanxi’ is indeed reciprocal and so a positive return can be expected from 
investments made to cultivate networks (Park and Luo, 2001). 
Despite the fact that social capital (guanxi) is an integral part of Chinese 
business culture, to actually identify and quantify the mechanisms by which it 
functions, in other than the most general terms, is extremely difficult.  The researcher 
has the undoubted advantage that, being a native of Beijing, she has a natural 
understanding of the culture.  Asking questions about such a sensitive, even taboo, 
aspect of business – the networks of contacts, the informal sources, financial and 
other, - would not only deeply offend the respondent but also seriously put at risk the 
response rate of the survey.  Because of this difficulty in gathering data on social 
capital, it is not included in the empirical section of the study. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The purpose of Chapter 2 is to construct an intuitive and firm foundation to tie 
empirical findings of this thesis to well-received entrepreneurship theories, including 
human capital theory, innovation studies and social capital theory. Materials covered 
in this chapter play integral parts in the designing stages of the survey research. This 
literature review chapter signposts the reader to fundamental variables that have 
influence upon the access to finance of SMEs. More importantly, as the empirical 
findings are focused on financing issues related to innovative small business ventures, 
in-depth knowledge and debate of innovation is specifically dealt with in the review.  
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The chapter started by presenting reviews of arguably three of the most 
important elements of entrepreneurship, namely human capital, innovation and social 
capital. The traits, characteristics, knowledge, ability, capability, innovativeness, 
creativity, connections and many more special factors associated with the 
entrepreneur and their business model are fully captured within these aforementioned 
theories. In fact, these theories are the foundation for any entrepreneurial ventures and 
are unique from one person to another and from one venture to another (Davidsson 
and Honig, 2003; Mosey and Wright, 2007).  
The understanding of the aggregate essence of human capital, innovation and 
social capital has made entrepreneurship such an interesting and exciting subject 
which can be full of surprises. At the same time, policy-makers and practitioners need 
to study these theories in order to obtain fundamental knowledge of SMEs and their 
leaders (Lundstrom and Stevenson, 2005). Entrepreneurs need to adapt to ever-
changing business environments, and so do the regulators.  
In addition to human and social capital, none of the entrepreneurial ideas or 
innovations can be facilitated without financing. SMEs are often found to be 
financially constrained and are disadvantaged over their larger counterparts (Berger 
and Udell, 2006; Beck, 2007; Ruis et al., 2009). The researcher is therefore seeking to 
explore the practical reasons and theoretical explanations behind the restrictive nature 
of finance availability faced by SMEs by performing an extensive review of the 
theories of finance in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: 
Theories of Finance 
3.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this PhD study is to explore financing difficulties SMEs 
encounter in China, thereby gaining an understanding of a good range of theories in 
finance which are fundamental to this research. They set a theoretical framework, 
which allows the researcher to raise questions and construct arguments sensibly. More 
importantly, variables that are relevant to research questions can be correctly 
identified through theoretical thinking and so can be designed into the survey 
questionnaire later. Chapter 3 is designated to the insights of relevant theories of 
finance and acts as a foundation for the entire thesis.   
The researcher will start the discussion by presenting the most important 
hypothesis in finance – the Market Efficiency Hypothesis, which will naturally lead 
us onto asymmetric information issues and the agency theory afterwards. Then, the 
capital structure is examined with or without taxation, and an extended discussion 
about possible determinants is also included.  After the access to both internal and 
external sources of finance is explained, the researcher moves on to the pecking order 
theory which attempts to order sources of finance per preference. Finally, the 
illustration of policy influences and financial supports from the Chinese government 
to SMEs in China concludes this chapter.  
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3.2 Market Efficiency 
The notion of market efficiency was first stated by Hayek (1945) and quoted 
in (Danthine and Donaldson, 2005 pp. 347) who celebrated “the virtues of the market 
as a formal and precise context in which the valuable pieces of information held by 
heterogeneously informed market participants are aggregated and freely transmitted to 
all via the trading process”.  Fama (1970) further illustrated a similar view in the term 
of the strong form efficiency, defined as a situation where market prices fully reflect 
all publicly and privately available information.  Fama (1970) also introduced the 
notions of weak form efficiency, covering situations where market prices only fully 
and instantaneously reflect historical prices, and of semi-strong form efficiency that 
covers situations where market prices reflect all public information.   
The concept of market efficiency is paramount to finance. At the same time, 
economists more often refer market efficiency to operational efficiency of the 
economy as a whole. In other words, they concern the way resources are allocated or 
employed to facilitate the functionality of the market (Dimson and Mussavian, 2000).  
More specifically, if the capital market is efficient, or the economic society is 
really operated by way of a pair of “invisible hands” (Adam Smith, 1776), finance 
providers should be able to value sufficiently what entrepreneurs’ have to offer.  
According to their evaluation, they should then make their decisions on whether or 
not the finance could be offered and at what rate. Depending on the risk attitude of 
different finance providers, risky and less risky projects all stand a chance of 
attracting sufficient investment as long as the project is viable. Therefore, the market 
should not present a gap in the allocation of finance. 
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Having said that, in his book Adam Smith also stressed that quite considerable 
structure was required in society to enable the invisible hand mechanism to work 
efficiently. He gave two crucial assumptions that were to be held before the economy 
could be left to run by itself. Firstly, property rights must be strongly protected, and 
secondly, there must be widespread adherence to moral norms. When referring to 
‘moral norms’, he specifically meant that the prohibitions against theft and 
misrepresentation were vital. In order to exchange goods and services, contracts must 
be enforceable, people must have good access to information to assess the products 
and services on offer, and finally the law must hold to rule (Adam Smith, 1776). It is 
then obvious to us that the societies people live in nowadays have many moral 
loopholes and the system itself is far from satisfactory by Adam Smith’s standard. 
Therefore, till today, even the most developed countries, such as the UK and USA, 
have settled for a predominantly free market approach with assistance from 
government interventions.  
The Chinese economy has recently undergone a considerable transition, from 
central planning towards a more mixed market economy. Much of this followed the 
‘open door’ policy of 1978, which was intended to open world markets to Chinese 
goods, and to open China to world markets and foreign investment (Anderson et al., 
2003; Garcia-Fontes, 2005).  The economic reforms associated with the ‘open door’ 
policy re-legitimised private enterprise, allowing individuals to own the means of 
production and exploit their labour to earn a living in a privately trading economy. 
Some argue that private entrepreneurs in China have gone through stages, of strict 
prohibition, tolerance, accommodation and encouragement (e.g. Peng, 2004). 
Currently, encouragement and accommodation are to the fore. For instance, on the 
XVth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Secretary-General Jiang 
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Zemin suggested that the CCP should actively recruit private entrepreneurs since they 
represent advanced productive forces (Peng, 2004). The “crossing the river by feeling 
the stones” reform mentality, proposed by Deng Xiaoping, meant that market reforms 
have been gradualist, with partial reforms introduced as localized experiments and 
allowed to spread gradually (Anderson et al., 2003). Therefore, from the researcher’s 
point of view, we would not be exaggerating if we say that although the improvement 
of efficiency throughout the special economic and political system in China is 
noticeable, the private sector still suffers from a weak form of market efficiency, as 
more often than not, information is not shared for public consideration.  
The degree of market efficiency varies across economies. In reality, many 
previous studies have shown that in most developing countries, one of the major 
challenges for small business entrepreneurs is to gain access to finance (Levy, 1993; 
Parker et al., 1995; Abor and Biekpe, 2006; Zhao, 2008). There is also evidence that 
small business entrepreneurs, in both developed and developing countries, have 
experienced some difficulties in obtaining bank loans (Levitsky and Prasad, 1987; 
Berger and Udell, 2002; Shao, 2004; Wu et al., 2008). Banks are thought to assign 
high-risk status to small firm credit proposals and are, accordingly, less likely to 
provide financing to such businesses. This argument is most commonly made with 
reference to developed economies, though it has also been made with reference to 
emerging or transitional nations such as China (Chow and Fung, 2000). Giving an 
example of how well information is transferred from top to bottom, Zuo and He (2010) 
found that the capital market in China does not respond efficiently to any monetary 
policy changes. They particularly pointed out that the interest rate had not been used 
well as a balancing tool on many occasions due to problems associated with 
institutional settings (Zuo and He, 2010). 
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Information transparency of SMEs is significantly weaker than larger 
enterprises that are publicly listed (Uchida et al., 2006; Cong, 2009).  This is one of 
the most severe factors that has contributed towards the SMEs’ encountering financial 
disadvantages. The information set is a vital determinant of market prices and the 
market acts as an intermediary for information transmission.  Therefore, it is essential 
for firms to convey firm-specific information to the market, especially but not limited 
to the time when the finance is needed. Provided the demand side has made the move 
first and information is readily available for evaluation, the supply side is less likely 
to be in a position to look for further excuses not to fulfill the financing gap in the 
market. As a result, a more efficient market is achieved.  
As information is already been brought to the spot light and it is one of the 
main controversies inducing market failures, information asymmetry is discussed in 
the next section. 
 
3.3 Information Asymmetry 
Since Akerlof (1970), asymmetric information is referred to as a situation 
where one or a subgroup of agents owns superior information and because this 
privately held piece of information is not absorbed in the market, it can potentially 
lead to a market failure where the market does not efficiently allocate resources.  In 
the equity market, investors may be suspicious of the exact value of the underlying 
stock due to the lack of information transparency, which could be the result of 
improper institutional settings, untruthful disclosures and misrepresentation of the 
publications provided by firms (i.e. accounting and earnings manipulation) and/or 
weak enforcement of professional ethics upon practitioners (Such as in Enron and 
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WorldCom Cases).  Investors therefore believe that the better-informed stockholders 
would only agree to sell at a price higher than the fundamental value of the firm and 
any rises in share prices are the result of speculative activities (Danthine and 
Donaldson, 2005).  In the extreme case, the market value evaporates dramatically and 
it is hard to restore the investors’ confidence again.  The information problem 
contributed towards explaining the fact that capital raised by companies in equity 
markets is such a small proportion of total firm financing (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 
1993).   
Asymmetric information may also explain the credit-rationing phenomenon, 
where lenders are confronted with a demand for funds larger than they can 
accommodate, and hence to increase the interest rate levied on the loan balance 
demand and supply.  Doing so, the lender literally discriminates against a group of 
applicants in an unfavourable way.  Asymmetric information comes into play when 
the lender does not hold enough information about the applicants and their proposed 
projects in order to evaluate the risk that the lender is likely to tolerate (Danthine and 
Donaldson, 2005 pp. 338).  However, the creditor can be worse off by lending to 
riskier borrowers at higher rates and eliminating low risk projects due to a high hurdle 
rate (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
However, to prepare and convey information related to every project the 
entrepreneur is considering doing is far too expensive and time consuming, and it may 
not even be economically feasible to request all SMEs to prepare and convey 
information to the public with full or part disclosures included in their annual reports 
as their larger counterparts do. The significant costs they are deemed to incur in 
providing such information to outsiders may further hinder the willingness of 
entrepreneurs to carry out such practices, especially when not knowing whether a 
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higher proportion of their needs for extra finance are likely to be fulfilled when 
including such information with the loan application.   
The costs associated with the preparation of financial reports in line with all 
relevant rules and regulations, so that the accounts can be seen as showing a “true and 
fair” view, are indeed very expensive for SMEs. The fact that the audit exemption 
thresholds were raised to the level of net turnover of not more than £6.5m (increased 
from £5.6m) for small firms and £25.9m (increased from £22.8m) for medium sized 
firms, applicable to accounting periods that began on or after 6 April 2008 in the UK 
in accordance with the Companies Act 2006 has shown the compliance cost burden to 
SMEs. Although all registered companies are requested to file their accounts every 
year, it is clear that the government intention is to ensure the cost to small firms of 
producing financial information is proportionate to their level of business activities 
and is kept to a sensible level of expense for compliance.   
In contrast, the attitude towards solving information problems for SMEs in 
China is somewhat different from the Western countries. Despite the fact that all 
parties, including the bank, the entrepreneur and the authority, admit that information 
asymmetry is the most serious problem that affects the success of loan applications, 
particularly for SMEs, none of the parties involved is willing to initiate a positive 
move by building a sense of ‘trust’ among each other as a bridge to achieve better 
communication (You et al., 2003; Zheng and Zhao, 2009).  
From the banks’ point of view, financial statements provided by SMEs are not 
accurate enough and many incidences revealing ambiguous ownership rights to 
enterprises make it even harder for the bank to believe the borrower is actually worthy 
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of credit (Cong, 2009). To make matters worse, banks’ screening, evaluating and 
monitoring methods are inadequate.  
‘The report on the current issues of Chinese Small and Medium Sized 
enterprises’ financing and the inquiry into the credit guarantee system 2009’ 
published by Renmin University of China and The Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology of the P.R.C. raised a few noticeable problems relating to the 
lack of information transparency which greatly affects the access to bank loans to 
SMEs in China (Renmin University and Fullertong Guarantee, 2009).  Firstly, 
information being held by various government departments (such as the Taxation 
authority and the Customs) and also Inter-bank information which are considered to 
be official and more credible could be utilized in establishing a credit rating platform 
designated to SMEs. Secondly, the legal framework concerning subjects such as, the 
degree to which firm-specific information should be revealed and the protection of 
confidentiality of such information, should be in place and known to the public. By 
doing so, a sense of assurance could be given to both the lender and the borrower 
from the authorities.     
Since bank loans are the main source of SME’s finance, it is necessary to 
address the relationship between the entrepreneurs and the creditors (where the 
entrepreneur acts as the agent of the creditor). The information problem must also be 
taken into consideration, as it is inevitable to the successfulness of debt contracts and 
the terms of the loans (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
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3.4 Agency Theory 
Agency theory must be carefully considered within the SME context, because 
most SMEs are privately owned, so managers are very likely also the owner of the 
SMEs. In this case, there are actually no agency costs between managers and 
shareholders. However, agency conflicts between shareholders and lenders may be 
particularly severe, as Van der Wijst (1989) and Ang (1992) denote. Lenders want to 
make sure that the entrepreneurs act in accordance with their contractual obligations, 
and particularly in paying back the loan and the interest.  With very limited control 
over the firms and information problems, the interests of the lender (the principle) and 
the entrepreneur (the agent) cannot be identical (Storey, 1994). The agency problem is 
also one of the reasons why SMEs prefer internal funds to debt financing. 
Agency problems in the form of information asymmetry, moral hazard and 
adverse selection are more likely to arise between SMEs and external providers of 
capital. In the financial context, moral hazard is “invoked to oppose policies that 
reduce the losses of financial institutions that have made bad decisions. In particular, 
it is used to caution against creating an expectation that there will be future bail-outs” 
(Summers, 2007 Financial Times 24th September).  Akerlof (1970) first noted the 
adverse selection problem – sometimes referred to as the lemon problem, which arises 
from the inability of traders/buyers to differentiate between the qualities of certain 
products. Moral hazard and adverse selection problems may be greater for SMEs 
because of their hesitation to reveal private information to outsiders.  
Similarly, the persistence of asymmetric information, to mitigate agency 
problems, monitoring could be costly. The trust between the lender and the borrower 
is not easily established either. The existence of these problems for small firms may 
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well explain the greater use of collateral in lending to small firms as a way of dealing 
with agency problems (Chittenden et al., 1996).  
The supply side of the story having been explored in the earlier sections, other 
factors determining the demand are to be considered next. Influenced by institutional, 
economical and ideological factors, the composition and the preference of firm’s 
finance may vary. In the next section, the researcher is moving onto another important 
theory in finance, namely capital structure, to explore this milestone theory in its 
original form, after taxation is introduced, the capital structure that is typical to SMEs, 
and the determinants of capital structure for SMEs.  
 
3.5 The Capital Structure  
Capital structure is broadly speaking a mix of debt and/or equity that funds the 
operations of a company. Equity is held as shares of stock in a company and 
shareholders are in effect owners of the company. Debt can be an arrangement 
directly between the lender and the borrower on agreed repayment terms, or 
alternatively a “bond” can be created, thus allowing the transfer of ownership of 
future repayments to new bondholders. Although it is possible to create securities 
bearing elements of both equity and debt, the chances that SMEs to issue convertible 
debt are extremely small, therefore for the sake of simplicity, such complication is 
avoided.   
By studying the capital structure in relation to SMEs, the researcher is hoping 
to identify the likely determinants of SME capital structure, to discover the role 
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entrepreneurs’ behaviour and choice play in financing decisions and to gain a deeper 
understanding of the side who seeks finance.   
 
3.5.1 The original Modigliani and Miller’s (M&M) proposition I 
To allow further investigation of a firm’s capital structure, an important 
assumption must be addressed, which is the notion of a perfect market. A perfect 
market is one in which there are neither taxes nor transaction costs and the numbers of 
buyers and sellers are sufficiently large, and any individual’s controllable finance is 
small relative to the size of the market and therefore cannot affect the market prices 
through trading. Under the assumption of a perfect capital market, Modigliani and 
Miller (1958, 1963) demonstrated that a firm’s capital structure was irrelevant to its 
market value and the value of the firm solely depends on the firm’s asset capacity to 
generate profits. This theorem was later generalized in Stiglitz (1974), who argued 
that, in the absence of taxes, the lower cost of debt compared to equity would be 
exactly offset by the increase in cost of equity as debt increases (due to higher risk), 
and therefore the cost of capital remains constant.  If the cost of capital does not 
change, the different combinations of debt and equity should be indifferent to each 
other, thus ‘capital structure irrelevance’ holds. Having said that, M&M proposition I 
relies on investors being able to borrow money at the same interest rate as companies, 
as if they cannot, companies can increase their market value simply by increasing 
their borrowing.  
Ever since the original M&M’s proposition was introduced, capital structure 
has been known as one of the most perennial puzzles in finance (Myers, 1984). A 
substantial boost of research works in the development of a capital structure 
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theoretical framework within which the irrelevance theory is questioned and revised 
were carried out by many scholars, who developed their own theoretical aspect and 
sculptured their own piece in the capital structure puzzle. For better or worse, as 
Myers (2003) notes, the present theories of capital structure are conditional and are 
relevant in different settings. This is well documented in empirical studies of capital 
structure, which have found support for all theories. Firms’ behaviour seems to be a 
hybrid of the proposed theoretical foundations. 
M&M’s simple but strong statement about capital structure was a great 
starting point. From this, assumptions behind the proposition can be weakened 
conveniently and the phenomena can be studied in isolation. For instance, topics such 
as the introduction of transaction costs, bankruptcy costs and the creation of a new 
financial instrument aimed at making short-term abnormal returns before it is copied 
in the market were considered yet these concerns do not propose major issues to 
capital structure. Taxes, however, once introduced, can change the result dramatically. 
The researcher is going to look into this matter further in the next section.  
 
3.5.2 Capital structure after introducing taxation  
When taxation was introduced in the model, the benefit of the deductibility of 
the interest paid on debt for tax purposes, made debt a cheaper choice of external 
finance. These tax advantages, also referred to as the ‘tax shields’, is given to debt 
rather than equity. When the model was modified to include corporation tax, M&M’s 
proposition show that the value of the firm increased linearly with the increase in the 
amount of debt borrowed (Brealey and Myers, 1991). Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
thus concluded in their proposition II that firms should borrow as much debt as 
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possible. However, the financing behaviour of companies cannot be explained by 
M&M proposition II. Scholars were then motivated to do further modifications to the 
model.  
Miller (1977) has argued that the advantage of the ‘corporate tax shield’ is 
reduced by the effect of personal taxes on investors. In addition, the cost of financial 
distress (typically an example being bankruptcy cost) increases with added debt. 
Mathematically, as debt increases, the corporate tax shield increases and is added to 
the firm’s value, but the probability of financial distress increases too, thus the present 
value of the cost of financial distress increases and is deducted from the firm value. 
Consequently, the value of the firm is maximised when the present value of the tax 
savings only just compensates for the increase in the present value of the cost of 
financial distress (Myers, 2001), in other words there is a trade-off. Following the 
same logic as the discussion above, Miller presented the “static trade-off theory” in 
his 1977 paper; however he also stated that there is at the end of the day no simple 
formula for the optimum capital structure of a firm. A trade-off is a difficult balance 
to strike between the tax advantages of firm’s borrowing (adjusted for investors’ 
personal taxation liabilities) and the costs of financial distress.   
Another cost associated with debt financing which is hard to quantify is the 
agency cost. As managers are frequently known to have incentives to spend company 
money for their own benefit instead of purely working on behalf of the shareholders, 
debt financing can limit the free cash available to managers and thus reduce the 
agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, if the debt becomes too large, 
the conflict between shareholders and debtors is triggered. Because of the limited 
liability nature of companies nowadays, under such circumstances, both the agency 
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cost and the bankruptcy cost are significantly raised (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Although theories have given us guidance about what we might discover in the 
capital market, and evidence has supported some modifications of M&M’s 
propositions, studies concentrating on the capital structure of SMEs are really what 
matters to this study and are interesting to explore in details.   
Berger and Udell’s (1998) financial growth model tried to explain the change 
in financial needs from the SMEs’ perspective through the business stages of start-up, 
growth and continued expansion and other scholars in later studies often adopted this 
financial growth cycle as a sensible view of small business capital structure (Gregory 
et al., 2005).  Even though many scholars have examined the capital structure 
decisions from the perspective of small businesses (for instance, Poutziouris and 
Chittenden, 1996; Berger and Udell, 1998; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Gregory et al., 
2005), empirical research based on China has remained scarce. The researcher intends 
to present the best of the very limited body of empirical researches which have 
focused their studies on the topic of capital structure of SMEs in China in the next 
section.   
 
3.5.3 Previous researches in SMEs’ capital structure in China   
In emerging markets, where capital markets suffer from considerable numbers 
of imperfections and anomalies, the assumption of a perfect market cannot hold and 
rational behaviour from investors cannot be expected. It is also widely accepted that 
the capital structure decisions made in small businesses are different from their larger 
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counterparts for the obvious reason of information asymmetry we discussed earlier 
(Wu et al., 2008). Because the supply of finance to SMEs is generally limited in 
China, firms are not free to adjust their leverage ratio when they feel the change could 
be beneficial, as such adjustments are constrained by the financing sources available 
to them (Wu and Yue, 2009). Historical influences have also left an impact in the 
capital market which tends to act in favour of state-owned enterprises rather than 
SMEs, thus SMEs have often found themselves being discriminated against and had 
to suffer a lack of access to external funding, especially long-term financial support 
(Wu et al., 2008).  
A research group headed by Hanchun Lin conducted two separate surveys on 
the financing condition of 2000 SMEs in 1998 and subsequently of 14000 SMEs. The 
first survey suggested that 75% of the SMEs studied funded their business using 
capital originated from self-accumulation, 53.5% of the firms took out bank loans and 
most of the loans were issued by state-owned commercial banks (Wang, 2004). The 
sample range of the second survey was widened, yet results remained very similar 
(Wang, 2004).  
A later survey however on a much smaller scale survey was carried out in 
2006 and investigated the access to different sources of capital at start-up and showed 
that 73.3% of the firms utilised owner’s personal savings as initial capital, 63.3% of 
firms had to borrow from friends and family, bank loans were accessible to 56.7% of 
the sample, 28.3% of the firms had capital injections from business partners and 
23.3% of firms obtained initial capital from external parties (presumably from 
business angels, informal channels, etc.) (Wu et al., 2008).  From the empirical 
evidence, although the results are consistent and confirm the still tough financing 
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environment for SMEs in China, regrettably, much welcomed enlargement of debt 
financing provided by banks was not seen to be significant.   
Considering the tax shield impact on capital structure, Wu and Yue (2009) 
presented interesting and profound results, after examining an unique circumstance in 
China, immediately after the central government scrapped the Local Government Tax 
Rebate (LGTR) policy, this effect gave scholars an opportunity to study the 
exogenous effect of a tax increase on capital structure to firms who received LGTR 
and to compare the changes with firms whose tax rate remained constant as they were 
not receivers of such tax rebate (Wu and Yue, 2009). They found first of all, an 
increase in corporate tax would lead to higher leverage, thus the result is in line with 
the theory which suggests firms with higher tax rates should use more debt (Graham, 
2003). Secondly, they suggested that the actual level of increase in leverage after the 
tax is raised depends on firms’ access to bank loans (Wu and Yue, 2009).   
In the following sections, the researcher would like to try to identify an 
inconclusive list of determinants of capital structure taking into account the special 
circumstances of Chinese SMEs. The researcher has purposely selected a list of 
possible determinants, as the factors on the list are either very specific to SMEs or 
tells a controversial story to the audience.  
 
3.5.4 Determinants of capital structure for Chinese SMEs 
3.5.4.1 Firm size  
It is claimed by many scholars (see Warner, 1977; Smith and Warner, 1979; 
Ang et al., 1982; Pettit and Singer, 1985) the size of the firm is important to its capital 
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structure. They pointed out that the larger the firm, the more diversified their risks and 
thus the less likely they are to fail. Therefore size can be an inverse proxy for the 
probability of bankruptcy, which is a major cost to be taken into account for both 
investors and owner-managers in the financing decision-making process.  
Gregory and Tenev (2001) concluded from a survey of over 600 Chinese 
SMEs conducted in 1999 that the firm size does have a relative importance in 
determining the sources of finance firms gained access to and therefore to a degree 
determined the firms’ capital structure. They also found that the smallest firms would 
rely heavily on informal finance if they needed external financing and this group 
tended to decrease in number when the size of the firm became larger. Yan (2010) 
carried out an empirical analysis with a panel data from 2004 to 2007, including all 
Chinese listed SMEs in the manufacturing industry (sample of 202 firms) and found 
evidence to support a positive relation to firm sizes and the level of debt. Liu and Tian 
(2009) further confirmed that SMEs in China still face severe ‘size discrimination, 
and this problem is harsher for smaller sized firms than for medium sized firms.  
 
3.5.4.2 Industry  
It is an interesting question to ask whether or not ‘industry’ plays a part in 
determining capital structure for SMEs (Jordan et al., 1998).  An example was given 
by Myers (1984); he picked a very profitable firm operating in an industry with low 
growth. In other words, the firm would have a very healthy level of retained profit on 
its balance sheet, but a lack of positive NPV (Net Present Value) projects to invest in. 
Clearly, the firm is bound to have a low debt ratio and it would not make any sense 
for the firm to borrow more just to bring itself in line with the industry average debt 
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ratio. The implication was as Myers illustrated, that if the logic was valid, the average 
debt ratio should vary from industry to industry because of different asset types, asset 
risks and the need for external finance. A sensible inference was then made by Myers 
to say the fundamental differences across industries lie with its assets, its need for 
funds and its growth potential. Therefore, industry is not a meaningful determinant for 
capital structure. 
However, Harris and Raviv (1991) argued that firms within an industry have 
more things in common and there should be a persistent difference in industry debt 
ratio over time. Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) then added that industry factors are not 
nearly as important as firm specific factors in terms of their impact on capital 
structure. It is particularly true for SMEs who often operate in niche markets, as 
influences from a broad industry are greatly reduced (Jordan et al., 1998).   
Various ways of industry classification was experimented within Wu et al. 
(2008), for instance, protected versus non-protected, or manufacturing versus non-
manufacturing; they were not able to establish a relationship between industry and the 
change in leverage.  
 
3.5.4.3 Profitability    
Views on profitability being a determinant of a firm’s capital structure is 
divided as the predictions tend not to be consistent. The conflicting predictions of 
profitability’s impact upon leverage have a few different sets of versions of 
explanations. Pecking order theory suggests that profitable firms have convenient 
access to retained earnings, which is placed at the top of the pecking order, thus more 
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profits means firms are less likely to access outside sources for extra finance (Myers, 
1984). Jensen (1986) however asserted that there is a positive relationship between 
profitability and leverage because debt has a function of reducing free cash flow, and 
therefore can be used as a form of corporate governance control, and consequently 
reduces the agency cost between owner and managers. Taking the trade-off theory 
point of view, firms that are capable of generating more profit are exposed to lower 
risks of financial distress and hence have incentive to use debt financing to take 
advantage of the tax shields (Miller, 1977; Myers, 2001). Empirical evidence 
presented by Yan (2010) and Hutchinson (2003) both supported the pecking order 
theory by finding a negative coefficient on profitability to leverage. A firm’s internal 
capital reserve is hugely dependant on its profitability and because SMEs are often 
financially constrained, firms with potential to grow may naturally choose to utilise 
their internally generated funds before sourcing external finance (Myers, 1977). The 
researcher is moving on to the topic of how growth potential impacts on firms’ capital 
structure in the following section. 
 
3.5.4.4 Growth potential 
Weston and Brigham (1981) applied a life cycle approach to explain SMEs’ 
financial structure. The SMEs have different financing choices and preferences in 
different stages of their life cycle. In the initial stage, SMEs are seen using owners’ 
own resources to finance the project. In the growth stage, larger variations in the value 
of the firm that are caused by growth are often interpreted as greater risk. That is why 
a firm that has considerable growth opportunities will be considered a risky firm and 
will face difficulties in raising debt capital at favourable terms. This then leads the 
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firm into the problem of liquidity constraints, which would follow from an over-
reliance on short-term finance. The over-reliance on short-term finance would result 
from the lack of availability of long-term funds, such as bank loans or equity issues.  
Furthermore, a firm in the steady stage with predictable and stable cash flows 
can be financed with debt more easily than a firm with growth potential (Psillaki and 
Mondello, 1996). Myers (1977) argues that firms with growth potential will tend to 
have lower leverage. On the other hand, growth will push firms into seeking external 
financing, as firms with high growth opportunities are more likely to exhaust internal 
funds and require additional capital. From this point of view, growth is expected to 
have a positive relationship with leverage, as Michaelas et al. (1999) have already 
shown. 
Setting the preference of sources of finance in a brand new order, Fluck (1999) 
suggests that firms will issue outside equity, or convertible debt first, then use their 
retained earnings, and finally issue long-term debt or outside equity to satisfy their 
subsequent financing needs given a implied life-cycle pattern of firm financing. 
Interestingly, this pattern differs from the Myers's (1984) pecking order theory in one 
most important aspect: the firm’s initial financing choice. 
Overall, growth potential seems to have an impact on firms’ capital structure 
somehow. Yan (2010 pp.7) suggested that “growth might be a more important 
determinant for SMEs depending on which industry they operate in, whether they 
have access to the capital market and whether they are micro, small or medium-sized”. 
Hutchinson (2003) recorded that growth is not a very important determinant of SME 
borrowing - either short-term or long-term and this might be the case where SMEs 
limit their growth to the finance they have available internally, which is consistent 
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with the pecking order theory. Similarly, Liu and Tian (2009) found an insignificant 
positive relationship between growth and leverage. In contrast, Yan (2010) concluded 
after studying 202 Chinese SMEs that, in general, firms with growth potential 
included more debt in their capital structure, yet it is far less profound than profit, 
asset structure, size and age.     
 
3.5.4.5 Accessibility to sources of finance  
Small businesses face a major challenge in resolving the information 
asymmetry problems, thus influencing their choice and access to external finance 
(Berger and Udell, 1998; Cassar and Holmes, 2003). The use of external finance by a 
start-up business is further impeded by the presence of adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems caused by their lack of proven track record and prior business 
reputation (Huyghebaert, 2003; Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 2007). Wu and Yue 
(2009) found empirical evidence to show that the leverage ratio was adjusted more 
easily when the firm had a high level of access to bank loans. In other words, their 
study suggests that the accessibility to finance can be a determinant of capital 
structure.  In the Chinese context, social capital/connections of the entrepreneur is an 
unusual but vital determinant for the accessibility to debt financing in particular.    
As far as the equity capital market is concerned, a reasonably well-structured 
and regulated stock market floatation platform should enable SMEs to restructure 
their capital composition and offers equity financing as an alternative to borrowing if 
the entrepreneur chooses. As equity finance is a type of long-term financing, access to 
the equity market can also improve the liquidity situation of SMEs by freeing up 
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short-term debt to a healthy and sustainable level, hence allowing floated firms to 
raise finance in a more balanced way in the future (Hutchinson, 2003). 
In the next section, the researcher explores in isolation each source of finance 
available to SMEs and their access to it. Sources of finance are organised into two 
sub-groups: internal sources and external sources. The advantages and disadvantages 
of each type of finance and in what circumstances it is likely to be employed by the 
entrepreneur are also discussed.  
 
3.6 Sources of Finance 
 The access to finance together with property rights are the two most important 
barriers for firms’ growth (Cull and Xu, 2005). A fascinating and concrete illustration 
of the liquidity constraints proposition was presented by Adam Smith, who said, using 
a small grocery story as the background, the owner-manager “must be able to read, 
write, and account, and must be a tolerable judge too of perhaps, fifty or sixty 
different sorts of goods, their prices, qualities, and the markets where they are to be 
had cheapest. He must have all the knowledge, in short, that is necessary for a great 
merchant, which nothing hinders him from becoming but the want of a sufficient 
capital (Wealth of Nations, bk.1, chap. 10, pt. 1; quoted in Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994).”  
While it is commonly accepted that the problem of the higher cost of external 
finance compared to internal finance problem is more severe for small firms (Chow 
and Fung, 2000), an extended careful consideration of the sources of external finance 
available when money is needed is then crucial in the decision making process. 
Internal and external sources of corporate funding are discussed separately below. 
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3.6.1 Internal sources of finance 
3.6.1.1 Personal savings and retained profit 
Entrepreneurs who invest personal savings, often referred to as their self-
accumulations, into their business venture show their bravery to risk their own capital 
and also their determination to be good at what they are going to do. The amount of 
money needed to start a business venture is often larger than their years of self-
accumulation; this capital investment is considered one of entrepreneurs’ major 
contributions into the business venture.  
In many instances, entrepreneurs have to sell or integrate their personal assets 
to fund the beginning and the growing stages of their businesses (Van Auken et al., 
1996).  Since money is always tight at startup, it is very common that homes are used 
as offices or factories to start with; one can imagine the disturbance there must be to 
the life of the entrepreneur’s family (Landstrom and Winborg, 1997). If there is 
surplus of cash in the business, the retained earnings would be used for working 
capital, to purchase fixed assets and for the acquisition of raw materials before they 
consider withdrawing cash for their personal disposal.      
Because small businesses suffer from severe liquidity constraints, dividend 
payments are rare, in fact, it is hard enough for owner-managers to maintain adequate 
working capital to run small businesses (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). Evidence shows 
that entrepreneurs always satisfy the requirement of working capital before they can 
comfortably expand their business activities as most bankruptcy cases are the results 
of a shortage of working capital (Nissanke, 2001).  
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After they have risked all and survived the initial turbulent stages of the 
business, to expand business capacity further demands more finance. The bigger the 
faster the firm grows, the larger the amount of money likely to be sought.  Personal 
savings again at this stage still remains at the top of the ‘pecking order’, being the 
cheapest source of finance, and so entrepreneurs are tempted to utilize internally 
generated funds first before approaching external finance providers (Myers, 1984).  
 
3.6.1.2 Family and friends 
Family ties and friendships are the most precious form of social capital that 
entrepreneurs own in China. The benefit and support they receive from family 
members and friends is hard to quantify but certainly crucial, especially at the startup 
stage of the business.  Basu and Parker (2001) noted that borrowing money from 
family and friends are different from bank loans, although small in nature and usually 
short-term, at low or no interest rates and no pressure on repayments make this form 
of finance incredibly cheap and suitable when firms experience liquidity constraint. 
Basically, family and friends do not lend money for profit, but they are looking for 
some benefits later if there are any (Basu and Parker, 2001). Another characteristic of 
loans from family and friends is that they are generally offered without screening as 
private information about the entrepreneur is assumed to be known and the loan 
offered is based on trust and social ties, thus information asymmetry does not prove to 
be problematic in this arrangement (Casson, 2003; Hernandez-Trillo et al., 2005). 
At the formation stage of the business, the capital requirement for the small 
business is modest and finance from internal sources, such as the entrepreneur’s 
personal savings, gifts and loans from friends and relations may suffice (Nissanke, 
 84 
2001). However, from the very start of the business, the pressure is on internally 
generated sources of capital. This pressure can only keep increasing; as the business 
grows costs of production and distribution will increase too, more importantly it is 
crucial to ensure an adequate amount of working capital for day to day operations and 
the firm’s survival.  Once internal sources of finance are exhausted, or simply by 
choice, entrepreneurs would at some stage try to obtain financial support from 
external sources. The following section examines the external sources of finance that 
are available and any access issues related to each of them for SMEs in China.  
 
3.6.2 External sources of finance 
3.6.2.1 Bank loans 
Allen et al. (2005) indicated that corporate bonds account for less than 1% of 
GDP in China, therefore, it is reasonable to infer that the public bond market is almost 
non-existent for SMEs and SMEs mainly rely on bank loans for debt financing (Wu 
and Yue, 2009).  Because commercial banks have the resource, experience and 
vehicles to provide a wider range of products of credit nature than other financial 
institutions, the vast majority of small businesses claim commercial banks as their 
primary loan providers and more often the first point of contact to gain access to 
external finance (Riding et al., 1994; Berger and Udell, 1998).  
Currently, the Chinese banking industry is still dominated by four state-owned 
specialised banks (the Agricultural Bank of China, the People’s Construction Bank of 
China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and the Bank of China). They 
are under the supervision of the Central bank, namely the People’s Bank of China 
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(PBC). This state banking system does not only function as the financial intermediary 
for the capital market, but also as a quasi-fiscal institution, with the PBC setting both 
the monetary policies and the prudential regulations for China. 
Similar to other transition economies, Chinese banks are mainly owned or 
greatly controlled by the state (Berger et al., 2006); nevertheless, decentralisation and 
devolution reforms have been going on since January 1984 when the mono-bank 
system was first switched to a two-tier banking system. However, because the lending 
bias in favour of large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has always existed (Perotti, 
1993), bank loans were never fully accessible to SMEs. Factually, the increasing 
demands for financial services (for instance short/long term commercial credits) 
resulting from the rapid emergence of non-state sectors, was one of the factors which 
induced the reform of the financial system (Laurenceson and Chai, 2003).  
The planned economy had left China with an unsound banking system, which 
inhibits bankers to allocate resources efficiently. All state banks are virtually insolvent 
with large non-performing loans (NPLs) sitting on the balance sheet. Due to the lack 
of information transparency between the bank and the entrepreneurs, banks do not 
generally trust the financial information provided by small businesses. To make 
matters worse, banks themselves are suffering from inefficient and inadequate risk 
assessment procedures and technologies which will restrict their ability to evaluate 
and process information to a large extent and, therefore as a result, very few bankers 
would be motivated to release loans to the private sector. It may sound outrageous but 
it is perfectly true, the loan officer will be held personally responsible for any 
defaulted loans he/she had approved to lend to the private sector, yet bears no 
responsibilities whatsoever when such large amounts of NPLs owed to them by SOEs 
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remained unsettled (Chang et al., 2009). It is clear that to be able to successfully raise 
finance from banks, SMEs have to work something rather special. 
Due to the urge to secure a stable supply of credit, short-term or long-term, 
cultivating a good relationship with a few banks can be tricky, time and money 
consuming for small firms but unavoidable (Chow and Fung, 2000; Berger and Udell, 
1995; Ennew and Binks, 1995). Despite all of the efforts put into building good 
connections with banks, when it eventually comes to business, SMEs are never 
guaranteed a payback or support from the bank. Nonetheless, relationship lending is 
still by far the most effective way of improving SMEs’ access to debt financing.  
In the meanwhile, foreign banks have demonstrated their ardent determination 
to enter the Chinese market in any conceivable way (Leggett, 2002; He and Fan, 
2004). Given the example of Citibank’s purchase of a portfolio of outstanding 
accounts receivables from Ericsson at a discounted price in August 2002, even though 
the size of the bid was not the centre of the issue, these headlines make people aware 
of the new opportunities and acknowledge to the public that emerging private banks 
and foreign banks are potential realistic targets of sources of finance for entrepreneurs. 
Empirical studies had suggested that firms that have a higher proportion of 
non-tradable shares have a higher level of access to bank loans (Wu and Yue, 2009) 
and there is evidence that the share of bank loans within external sources of finance 
increases with firm size (Gregory and Tenev, 2001).  Although commercial banks 
appeared to be the second most important source of finance for larger SMEs, after 
internal finance, only 29 percent of surveyed firms had secured bank loans in the 
years of study, that is from 1995-1999 (Gregory and Tenev, 2001), hence there is a 
large scope for improvement in terms of bank financing. 
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The Chinese central bank (the People’s Bank of China) sets a base rate for all 
commercial banks and has only allowed minor discretion in adjusting the interest rates 
actually charged to their clients according to risk assessments. Therefore, despite the 
much higher demand for funds than the capital supply available to SMEs (Jiang and 
Zhan, 2005), banks cannot raise interest rates to sufficiently compensate the higher 
risk they have to bear to lend money to SMEs. This is not really helpful to the flow 
and desirable allocation of the funds there are in the market (Wu and Yue, 2009).  As 
a result, relationship lending and the ability to provide financial guarantors are 
increasingly important to entrepreneurs.   
 
3.6.2.2 Informal credit market 
Given that the real rate of return for bank deposits is extremely low, those who 
are willing to take risks for higher returns will attempt to act as financial 
intermediaries outside the formal system. Similarly, to many other countries, where 
the financial service sectors are repressed, a credit market parallel to the formal 
banking industry has developed in China (Tam, 1991; Luk, 1993; Tsai, 2002; 
Goodstadt, 1987). 
Informal investment is the dominant external financing source for new 
ventures in some concentrated parts of China (for instance in Zhejiang Province). 
Small enterprises can rely on borrowing from the informal credit market for both 
short and long term financial needs. Yet, owing to the lack of a credible lending 
system, debtors/investors who operate in those informal financing channels also 
encounter many problems (Tam, 1986; Mckinnon, 1994; Chow and Fung, 2000).  
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Nevertheless, there are ‘well-organised’ unofficial agents, even though they 
are very difficult to identify and quantify, who have the ability to supply financing at 
local levels through the ‘curb market’ (Tsai, 2002). ‘Well-organised’, here, means that 
their operations are backed by local political protection and selective enforcement of 
national regulations according to Tsai (2002) who undertook the first extensive study 
of informal financing in China. Her study was based on 374 respondents (60 percent 
response rate) gathered over a period of two years. This study had bravely touched 
this sensitive and relatively un-researched but nevertheless important subject area, 
despite the fact that everyone was aware of the existence of informal financing 
channels. In fact, in some Chinese regions (i.e. in Shanghai), for generations 
entrepreneurs have traditionally borrowed from the informal credit market and they 
are able to gain sufficient finance whenever there is need for it (Chow and Fung 2000). 
Lin and Sun (2005) modeled a theoretical framework including heterogeneous 
borrowers and heterogeneous lenders from both informal and formal financial 
institutions and tried to prove that the separation and co-existence of both informal 
and formal credit system was a result of optimising behaviours of all parties. 
According to their paper, information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers can 
properly account for the extensiveness and characteristics of informal financing.  
It is understandable that it would be incredibly hard for smaller firms to obtain 
loans from elsewhere rather than the informal sources who tend to be local and can 
lend the money to them based on connections. As a result, smallest firms rely heavily 
on informal financing channels when they are in need of extra finance (Gregory and 
Tenev, 2001). Within a geographical radius and among a group of people who are 
considered ‘locals’, informal rules could be established based on relationships of trust 
through reputation and family ties (Cong, 2009). It is known that informal credit 
 89 
markets can effectively overcome the information asymmetry problem and act as an 
important means to compensate for the gap in the formal capital market (Tsai, 2002; 
Cong, 2009).  
 
3.6.2.3 Venture capital and private equity 
Venture capitalists bring investors and entrepreneurs together in an efficient 
manner to make better investment decisions than limited partners and provide non-
financial assistance to SMEs that in turn enhance their survival (Gupta and Sapienza, 
1992). White et al. (2005) stated that China’s venture capital system was initiated 
from technology policy developments that have gained momentum since the late 
1970s. Unconventionally, the main players in the 1990s until early 2000 were 
government-financed venture capital firms and university-backed venture capital 
firms.  
Before 1992, the main channel for foreign private equity to invest in China 
was through China Direct Investment Funds (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003), whose 
strategy was to build relationship with large SOEs to source good investment 
opportunities. It was also pointed out by White et al. (2005) that although foreign 
venture capitalists and private equity firms were allowed to register as commercial 
enterprises from the 1980s, it was the lack of suitable investment projects that limited 
these firms’ business activities.  
Chinese socialist influences and strong culture created the distinctive social 
and commercial milieu noted by Boisot and Child (1988), Scarborough (1998) and 
Bruton and Ahlstrom (2003). For example, value-added activities provided by venture 
 90 
capitalists, after the funds are injected, are common practice in the West; however, 
Chinese culture promotes resistance to such activities as it is seen as intrusive (Bruton 
and Ahlstrom, 2003). It is also frequent that for entrepreneurs engage in ambiguous 
transactions, that are not intended to be kept in accounts, where personal connections 
matter more than a company’s capabilities (Boisot and Child, 1996; Peng, 2000; Xin 
and Pearce, 1996; Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003). Therefore, it may be more suitable to 
create a venture capital industry with its own idiosyncratic features that is specific to 
the Chinese institutional setting and culture (Bruton et al., 1999). 
Due to inefficient capital markets and asymmetric information, venture 
capitalists who are normally risk seekers found themselves hesitating as it is hard to 
play a bigger part in such an economic society (Hamilton and Fox, 1998; Bukvic and 
Bartlett, 2003; Allen et al., 2005). It is interesting to see how well the venture capital 
industry has grown in China during recent years and what roles they are playing right 
now.  
According to the annual statistics of ChinaVenture, a research agency 
specialising in studies of Venture Capitalists (VCs) in China, the top four sectors 
which attract the most funding from VCs are IT, manufacturing, Internet and 
healthcare. In sum, they had banked over 60% of the total deals. In 2009, 428 
disclosed investments involved a total amount of USD 3.767 billion which 
represented a downward trend of 20% and 24.8% respectively compared with the 
previous year, which is in line with ChinaVenture’s prediction.  VCs continued to 
focus their investments on first-tier cities making Beijing and Shanghai the biggest 
beneficiaries of VCs business activities in China, although there appeared a decline in 
regional concentration.  The analysis by business stages had shown that firms at the 
development-stage (upstarts) demonstrated tolerable risks and foreseeable high 
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returns and therefore were favoured by investors, whereas a decline was witnessed for 
those at expansion and profitability stages.  It is rather promising that in 2009 both the 
number and the combined value of deals secured by Chinese VCs saw a steep increase 
with a share of 25.2% of the total deal value. It is conceivable that resulting from the 
improved legal frameworks and more favourable business environment, Chinese 
institutions will come to the fore and China’s VC market will become more mature.  
In transitional economies, owner-managers of small businesses are often 
forced to rely on high cost, short-term debt finance and have to satisfy unrealistic 
collateral requirements in order to gain access to finance. Therefore needs for 
alternative sources of finance remained strong, if not stronger, considering the fast 
pace of growth China has enjoyed for over 30 years. 
 
3.6.2.4 Business angels 
Informal private venture investors, so called business angels, are becoming an 
increasingly important source for business start-up capital. Business angels are a 
favoured for external finance because they have certain advantages, such as low entry 
barriers, a quick decision-making process, relatively low return requirements and 
more flexible repayment terms (Liu and Chang, 2007).   
The available funding belongs to single or a group of wealthy individuals who 
have been constantly searching for investment opportunities in the marketplace. As 
conditions of the capital market environment have continued to improve and property 
rights have been assured and reassured by the authorities, business angels gradually 
have taken over venture capitalists’ role by way of investing in the smaller initial 
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funding stages that VCs had become less and less interested in. These wealthy 
individuals are to some degree effectively filling the financing gap in the market and 
are proven to be a great support for young, enthusiastic entrepreneurs who are keen to 
dip their toes into the ocean yet find it hard to meet VC’s higher criteria (Zhu, 2006). 
Typically, new graduates wanting to set up an Internet venture, who do not require a 
large sum of capital to get started, will find away to approach angel investors for help 
(Li and Sun, 2006).  
Business angels do not operate without difficulties. Investors have to deal with 
the whole investment process all by themselves, from screening opportunities, 
investment management to post-investment monitoring and eventually the realisation 
of a profit (San José et al., 2005). For instance, business angels face enormous 
dangers of being defrauded of money. When investors choose to invest in a familiar 
industry, previous experience in similar businesses can result in a lack of 
consideration and anticipation, which could then lead to a wrong investment decision. 
However, the opposite is also risky, since investing in a totally unknown sector of the 
market would more or less equate to a gamble. Unfortunately, the legal enforcement 
chain to back up investors is not good enough. In other words, fraudsters can easily 
breach a contract and escape from obligations and liabilities (Liu, 2009).  
Entrepreneurs are more likely to seek funds from business angels after running 
out of the first round funds (typically made up of self-accumulation and borrowings 
from family and friends) before VCs become involved if the business is up for a fast 
expansion (Prowse, 1998). Networking is important to find angel investors for 
projects and an exit mechanism is even more crucial so that they have the means to 
cash out on their investments. Existing exit mechanisms include the public offering of 
shares on a stock exchange, a buy-back from the entrepreneur they had been working 
 93 
with, an acquisition of the angel’s position or of the entire company by a third party 
and finally if things go badly wrong, the settlement in the liquidation process (Farrel, 
1998). In real life, what angel investors really want to see is that the company in 
which they put their capital at risk, is run professionally and is able to create enough 
value to attract future investments from other sources, such as venture capitalists. The 
value of their investment can then be realized once a buyer surfaces or in rare cases 
the company is ready to go public. Hence, angel investors are not so specific at the 
initial injection stage about the exit mechanism, but tend to look to the future. In 
effect, this particular source of finance allows the flexibility the other channels lack.   
Generally speaking, venture investments are made in the following stages of a 
business: the seed stage, the start-up stage, first round, second round, third round and 
the bridge loan stage (Barry et al., 1990; Lerner, 1994; Manigart and Sapienza, 1999). 
Research indicates that in US business angels fund 48% of the firms in their seed 
stage and contribute 20% of the finance at the start-up stage. Their involvement in the 
later stages of the business is less significant than venture capitalists (Liu and Chang, 
2007).  
Unlike venture capitalists, business angels use their own money to invest, 
therefore, are not usually under great pressure to make fast turnaround profit. In China, 
angel investors on average expect an annual return of 32.5% rather than the 40% 
profit venture capitalists are looking for (Jeng and Wells, 2000). Business angels 
usually exit by selling stakes in the company on the private market, while venture 
capitals, especially private equities are aiming for a high return from initial public 
offerings or mergers and acquisition deals. Thus, the lower expectation of business 
angels suits SMEs in their early business stages very well.  
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Angel investors do not only provide finance, they also offer businesses they 
invest in a good source of expertise. Some business angels even go as far as taking on 
a full or part-time post in the company to help the business to get on the right track. 
Business angel investment is still in the minority in China. There are no official 
statistics for the scale of business angel investment in China, yet a survey conducted 
by Qing Ke Co. and Zero2-IPO (two research institutions), and ChinaVenture (Hong 
Kong) shows that business angel investment only accounted for 8% of total venture 
investments in 2004. The contribution of angel investment shines a beacon of light 
through some extremely successful new enterprises that had been funded by angel 
investors and are now giant Internet firms, for example, SOHU (www.sohu.com.cn) 
and SINA (www.sina.com.cn) who followed very similar routes to success. It is 
claimed that because the demands for business angel investment from startups are 
fairly large compared to its market size as it stands today, it is often worthwhile for 
entrepreneurs to have their projects evaluated by professionals to raise the success rate 
of getting finance from business angels (Li and Sun, 2006).  
Since the supply of capital is not a problem, in fact it is increasing, the top 
priorities for the development of the business angel investment market are as follows: 
1) investors should be better equipped with knowledge and skills to identify real 
opportunities and make rational investment decisions. 2) The exit mechanism for 
business angels is at risk due to the immature capital market and lack of legal 
enforcement, therefore, it is the financial regulator’s responsibility to enhance the 
investment environment. 3) A matching network for business angels and 
entrepreneurs would be helpful, while still maintaining a low public profile for the 
angel investors which they have always wished for (Bergemann and Hege, 1998; San 
José et al., 2005).   
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3.6.2.5 Trade credit from suppliers and customers advances payment 
Trade credit exists when the supplier provides goods or services to a customer 
(the entrepreneur in this case) and does not require immediate payment, yet an 
agreement is in place so that the customer is asked to pay within a set period of time 
(typically two weeks, 30 days, 45 days or 60 days depending on the company’s 
invoicing policy) after the goods or services are delivered (Elliehausen and Wolken, 
1993; Cuñat, 2007). Supplier’s credit is vital to small businesses when liquidity is 
extremely constrained, and may be a good source of quick cash in situations when 
firms are unable to raise money through more traditional channels. It is an important 
source of short-term external finance for SMEs (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).  
The severe asymmetric information problem between banks and small 
businesses tends to be minor between the entrepreneur and his/her suppliers. Through 
trading history and established business relations, the entrepreneur’s personality and 
business style is known to the supplier and so when trade credit terms are negotiated, 
information problems can be alleviated by the private information held by suppliers 
about their customers (Burkhart and Ellingsen, 2004). Suppliers, by the nature of their 
relationships with the small businesses, have an information advantage over banks 
and are therefore more able to ensure prompt repayment than banks can (Mateut et al., 
2006). 
A supplier can identify a prospective default more quickly than formal credit 
providers and supplier’s credit is reviewed periodically and can be extended on a 
more regular basis to SMEs with good track records of payment, and usually at no 
 96 
cost and with minimum paper work (Walker, 1985). Hence, small businesses which 
are more likely to be credit rationed and do not have sufficient access to formal 
financing channels tend to rely more on trade credit (Cull et al., 2009). Ge and Qiu 
(2007) have done studies on overdue trade credit and the maturity structure of trade 
credit; they indicated that the greater use of trade credit by non-state owned firms is 
primarily for financing purposes, which partly proved the credit rationing phenomena 
as well. 
On the other hand, customer advances is a form of accrual payment made by a 
customer to the supplier goods or services in anticipation of delivery on a future date. 
A customer may agree to pay in advance for membership fees, loyalty cards and/or 
making advance payments on service contracts (Freear et al., 1995; Kumer, 2008). 
For exporting firms, letters of credit for foreign transactions is also a common form of 
advance payment (Stevenson et al., 1985).  
 
3.6.2.6 Equity  
Equity and bond markets in emerging markets are often not yet developed or 
in their infant stages of development. The establishment of two securities exchanges 
in China, one in Shanghai opened on 26th November 1990 and the other in Shenzhen 
opened on 11th April 1991, is a new economic experiment. Despite the vast 
improvement in the last two decades, the potential funding power that equity markets 
traditionally provide is not yet utilised satisfactorily. This is particularly the case for 
SMEs. The market is still trying to recover from a continuous 13-month slide that 
destroyed almost 75% of market value up to 18th December 2008 (Jiang et al., 2010; 
He et al., 2009). Too many issues need to be addressed before the dysfunctional 
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securities markets can be brought back to life and operate as an attractive funding 
source to entrepreneurs. 
Looking at SMEs in particular, asymmetric information problems have been a 
major contributor to exclude SMEs from bond and equity markets (Chow and Fung, 
2000). In practice, tight regulations and listing rules restrict the majority of private 
enterprises from listing on the exchange. Furthermore, to comply with the rules can be 
very expensive too. It is common knowledge that Chinese entrepreneurs, especially 
family businesses do not favour the idea of diluting ownership and being interfered 
with when making decisions for their own businesses. This cultural shock is not 
impossible to overcome, however very much depends on the existence of an attractive, 
efficient and more mature equity market.  
Entrepreneurs who want to raise funds from the general public have very 
tough requirements to meet and it is a very complicated process.  The following is 
simply a list they have to consider before a listing can be scheduled on the agenda.   
They need to: (i) adopt more transparent reporting methods; (ii) present a value-added 
perspective of their own firm in front of investors; (iii) sharpen corporate finance and 
corporate governance skills; (iv) maximise the intangible asset of ‘network 
capitalism’ by widening the guanxi (connections) circles (Gibb and Li, 2003; Boisot 
and Child, 1996); and (v) any business anticipation should comply with listing rules 
and all relevant regulations. Boutron et al. (2007) offered a similar view with less 
emphasis on SMEs.  
On the other hand, firms which go for listing on international stock exchanges 
(usually the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange or London 
Stock Exchange) show great confidence in their firms’ profitability and future 
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prospects. They perhaps are more likely to have been supported by venture capitalists 
in the earlier stages of their businesses (such as the cases of SOHU and SINA). 
Because foreign investors are better informed about their performance, they are 
willing to tolerate higher risks for higher returns. 
It is exciting to report a piece of good news for Chinese SMEs, which was, at 
the end of 2009, the opening of the Shenzhen-based ChiNext exchange, also known as 
the ‘Growth Enterprise Market’. It has been considered as a breakthrough for China’s 
smaller, technology-focused companies (Lan, 2009). The opening of this specific 
equity market was a breath of fresh air, in the sense that it made equity financing 
more reachable to medium sized enterprises with much lower entry requirements than 
the main board. So far, 90 firms have been listed on the market with very promising 
daily trading volume achieved, which shows the great strength of the Chinese equity 
market has been comfortably extended to this small board (Takeshi, 2009).  
After gaining insights into each of the sources of finance there are available in 
the capital market, it is then interesting to know whether or not firms have a 
preference order to follow when there is demand of finance from a positive NPV 
project. The researcher will move onto another very practical theory in finance in the 
next section, which is the pecking order theory proposed by Myers (1984).  
 
3.7 The Pecking Order Theory 
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984)’s pecking order theory suggested 
that SMEs finance their investment in a hierarchical way. The implications of the 
pecking order theory are that firms rank the sources of finance available to them and 
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will first exhaust internally generated financing before making contacts to external 
financing. Once the internal financing is depleted, debt financing will be the second 
choice followed by equity financing as the last resort. This preference reflects the 
relative costs of the various sources of finance. When internal and external finance are 
no longer perfect substitutes in the presence of imperfection in the capital market, a 
firm’s investment decision will be constrained by the availability of internal funds 
(see Fazzari et al., 1988; Hoshi et al., 1991; Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Athey and 
Laumas, 1994; Chow and Fung, 2000).  
According to Myers (1984), capital structure has no optimal debt ratio and if 
there is, it is insignificant as compared to the cost of external financing. Entrepreneurs 
have superior information about the prospects of the business than outsiders and this 
information problem makes raising external finance a costly practice (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) data suggests that 
SMEs are expected to face a higher cost in accessing external funds compared to 
larger firms. Transaction costs consumed nearly 19% of the gross proceeds of small 
stock issues and about 14% of the proceeds of small debt issues. These costs could 
have created a significant financing hierarchy for the smaller firms (Oliner and 
Rudebusch, 1992). 
As far as the adverse selection problem is concerned, retained earnings avoids 
all of the problems associated with adverse selection. Though debt financing is not 
without problems, equity financing has serious adverse selection problems. Thus, the 
logic for investors is that if equity is riskier than debt they should demand higher rates 
of return for equity investment than on debt (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Frank and 
Goyal, 2003).  
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The reason why equity is at the bottom of the pack is also due to the high cost 
and complicated requirements associated with floating shares on the stock market and 
the possibility of having to sell shares under market value if the Initial Public Offering 
(IPO) turns out to be unsuccessful (Buckland and Davis, 1990).  More importantly, 
small businesses do not favour the use of equity finance because share flotation will 
mean entrepreneurs are giving away part of their ownership of the company to a much 
wider general public and the probability of losing control over their business increases 
(Chittenden et al., 1996). Because the capital required to take over a small business 
that is floated on the market is relatively small, and the share price is a seen as an 
apparent guide price for the value of the firm, a hostile takeover can be exercised 
much easier than attacking a fully enclosed small firm.      
In practice, although firms would like to run with debt ratio equal to zero in an 
ideal situation, that is to finance completely with internal funds, only a very small 
number of older, mature firms are likely to achieve a well-established source of 
internal equity. Young, small and or growing firms, that lack their own resources, will 
have no choice but rely on external financing (Swinnen et al., 2005). Myers’ pecking 
order theory implies that a company’s real debt ratio varies over time, depending on 
its needs for external finance and the availability of cash flow. For instance, a 
profitable firm generating slow growth will end up with a low debt ratio, whereas 
unprofitable firms with fast growth can exhibit high debt ratios. Unfortunately, firms 
are not able to borrow indefinitely. Once they eventually reach full debt capacity, they 
are forced to finance their positive NPV projects with equity to make more profit, if 
profit maximization is the ultimate goal of the company.  
However, a more complex view of the pecking order model suggests that 
when firms take into consideration future growth opportunities, rather than simply 
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looking at short-term profitability, they may favour a low debt ratio and open the 
channel for equity financing, as reserve borrowing capacity is valuable (Myers, 1984). 
Therefore, given the special cognitive style of management in SMEs (Sadler-Smith, 
2004), one will wonder whether the behavioural principle explains more of the 
financing choice of SMEs than the trade-off and the pecking order theory, yet, no 
evidence had been found to support such proposition (Swinnen et al., 2005).  
Evidence from China strongly supports the simple form pecking order theory. 
A survey of more than 600 private enterprises operating in 4 cities in China was 
conducted in 1999 by the International Finance Corporation and the World Bank 
Group. They found 80% of the sample expressed the view that access to finance is a 
serious constraint to their businesses and more than 90% of the start-up capital came 
from the principle owners and their friends and families (Wagle et al., 2000). Further 
investments still heavily depend on internal sources with 62 % of the funding raised 
internally (Gregory and Tenev, 2001).  
If the market is known to be imperfect and it is also clear that financing is the 
most serious obstacle that hinders SMEs development, who is there to make the 
changes for the better? When the ‘invisible hand’ fails to do its job, government 
intervention comes into play.  Being small, SMEs are no doubt hugely influenced by 
monetary measures and the macroeconomic condition of the country in general. 
Therefore, in the next section, the researcher would like to update the reader with 
some examples of recent interventions the Chinese government has introduced in the 
market.   
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3.8 Policy Influences and Financial Support from the Authority 
The role government plays in assisting the development of SMEs is not to be 
ignored. The small business sector, which had long been recognised as the seedbed 
(DTI, 2004) of economies, is like an area of new turf that requires tender and constant 
care from the gardener (the authority). It is the government’s responsibility to work 
the macroeconomic mechanism and ensure that it will bring a fair competitive 
environment for SMEs. Regrettably, the scale had been tilted towards the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) side deliberately by the Chinese government for many years, and 
inevitably, it will take time to alter the policy imbalance and, more importantly, adjust 
attitudes in favour of SOEs in the credit market (Chen, 2006).  
It is recognised that China will need to expand its special funds for SMEs and 
focus allocations on innovation, structural adjustments, emission cuts, market 
expansion and job creation. It is said by Mr. Yizhong Li (Minister of Industry and 
Information Technology of P. R. China) that as a result of segmented distribution 
government support for SMEs was not enough (Li, 2010). To tackle the financing 
difficulties SMEs face, in 2009, the government not only widened credit channels for 
SMEs, but also earmarked 10.89 billion yuan ($ 1.59 billion) from the central budget 
to support SMEs’ development, which is more than double the budget compared to 
2008.  
In response to arbitrary charges (red tape) that had been randomly and 
aggressively levied on small businesses in the past, China has promised to implement 
a strict public notice system aimed at regulating charges collected from SMEs. In 
2009 alone, 100 administration-related charges worth 36 billion yuan were removed. 
Li also said that: “The government is determined and all administrative and 
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governmental charges that were not approved shall be lifted to relieve the burden on 
SMEs” (Li, 2009b).  
Finally a series of preferential fiscal and tax measures will be introduced to 
not only show the initiative of giving full support to SMEs from the authority side, but 
also to be beneficial to small business in real terms. According to a recent 
announcement made by the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of 
Taxation, small low-profit generating enterprises with an annual taxable income less 
than 30,000 yuan ($4,394) can reduce their taxable income by 50% and pay 
corporation tax at a rate of 20 percent from 2010 (Report on the Work of the 
Government, 2010). Financially stressed small businesses would still be able to defer 
social security charges for their employees and be able to pay employee insurances at 
a lower rate until the end of 2010.  
3.9 Conclusion 
A selection of the most important finance theories that are associated with the 
reasoning behind SMEs’ financing difficulties were reviewed in this chapter. It 
covered milestone literatures in finance, including the market efficiency hypothesis, 
information asymmetry, agency theory, the capital structure and the pecking order 
theory. These theories laid a solid foundation for establishing the purpose, the 
direction, the survey questions and the analysing techniques that are most suitable to 
this PhD project. The researcher has also paid particular attention to recent 
government measures that are influential to SMEs’ financing in China aimed at 
linking theories to practices. The next literature review chapter is designated to the 
core problems confronted by small businesses in terms of getting access to finance, 
namely credit constraints and credit rationing. 
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Chapter 4: 
Credit Constraints and Credit Rationing 
4.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter reviewed important theories in finance, with particular 
attention paid to the financing of small businesses. More specifically, Chapter 3 
outlined market efficiency hypothesis, the capital structure, sources of finance and the 
problems associated with access to finance for SMEs. Financial constraints continue 
to be the key hindrance to the performance, growth and development of the small 
business sector. A chapter designated to credit constraint and credit rationing is 
crucial due to the severity of SMEs’ problems of access to finance and is an essential 
part to fulfill the objective of this research, that is to investigate the financial 
constraints experienced by small businesses in Beijing.  
Despite the fact that all relevant parties including policy-makers, finance 
providers, scholars and entrepreneurs are fully aware of the difficulties small 
businesses encounter in accessing external finance, in particular obtaining bank credit, 
the intended goal to solve or simply to ease the discouraging impact of credit 
constraints and credit rationing has been hard to accomplish (De Meza and Webb, 
1992; Sowa et al., 1992; Levy, 1993; Parker et al., 1995; Berger and Udell, 2002; Wu 
and Tan, 2005; Zhao et al., 2006). Credit rationing has been a universal problem in 
both developed and developing nations. It is acknowledged that the challenges 
confronting small businesses in accessing finance have been attributed to the 
problems of information asymmetry (Akerlof 1970) which further leads to the credit 
rationing phenomena (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; De Meza and Webb, 1992; Winker, 
1999; Fioretti, 2005).  
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“The discrepancy between China’s economic structure and financial structure 
is best manifested by the mismatch between the contribution of SMEs to economic 
growth and the amount of credit they have obtained from formal financial 
institutions” (Shen et al., 2009 pp3). Therefore, the researcher was motivated by the 
necessity to investigate to what extent SMEs are credit constrained and how serious 
the problem of credit rationing is in China. Due to the geographical size and regional 
differences in China, it is believed that studies should be performed separately within 
manageable and reasonably selected regions (Li et al., 2005). Hence, this study is 
based in the capital city, Beijing.   
The limited empirical literature on the financing of Chinese SMEs suggests a 
reliance on non-market sources of finance and a perception that restricted access to 
bank finance may be constraining growth and development. This sharpens our interest 
in the demand and supply of credit to Beijing SMEs. It would also be interesting to 
know which particular type of entrepreneur is actually credit rationed (Amano, 1999) 
and what type of firms are more likely or less likely to be credit rationed (i.e. 
innovative firms vs. non-innovative firms). The researcher intends to look for 
empirical evidence to fill gaps in the literature about small businesses financing in 
China.  
The chapter is organised as follows. The researcher first addresses the 
relationship between financial market imperfections and firm investment to give the 
reasoning behind credit constraint. Later the conceptualisation of the concept of credit 
constraints is presented with regards to definitional issues, the credit constraint 
equilibrium and discouraged borrowers. Thirdly, the phenomenon of credit rationing 
is investigated extensively with particular attention paid to the market anomalies 
which resulted from information asymmetry and are associated with lending decisions 
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(namely adverse selection and moral hazard problems).  The credit rationing 
equilibrium model is then illustrated and criticisms of this model are also discussed.  
After addressing relationship lending, the researcher moves on to explain the 
importance of the use of collateral in lending decisions.  Small business 
entrepreneurs’ access to finance is discussed in isolation and three hypotheses are 
developed in this subsection. Next, empirical evidence from studies that focus on 
developing and transitional economies is presented to compensate for the lack of 
previous studies in China. Finally, a conclusion finishes Chapter 4 on credit constraint 
and credit rationing.  
 
4.2 The Relationship between Financial Market Imper fections and Firm 
Investment 
When firms make an investment decision, they face a choice of financing the 
project using internal and/or external funds. Neoclassical theory of firm investment 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958), which was reviewed in chapter 3, said that in a perfect 
market, where there are neither transaction nor information costs, internal and 
external funds are perfect substitutes as far as investments are concerned. Under the 
same assumption, firms should also have unlimited access to sources of finance. 
Hence, there should not be any constraints of a financial nature.  
Nevertheless, this all well and good hope for a perfect market fails by and 
large in the presence of asymmetric information (Myers and Majluf, 1984). SMEs are 
especially vulnerable to information problems as the way small businesses are run is 
characterised by their closely held nature. As a result, insider information, such as the 
profitability and risks associated with investment projects is not properly and 
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completely shared with external finance providers. Typically, once the loan is granted 
to the entrepreneurs, as long as they keep up with interest payments, the creditor loses 
control over how their capital will be used. In addition, loan default costs and 
bankruptcy costs can only make the case worse for the creditor if things do go wrong. 
Thus, to avoid putting their capital in the hands of “lemons”(Akerlof, 1970), not only 
banks but also external finance providers in general, tend to ration credits made 
available to economic sectors that are prone to more serious information asymmetry 
and are deemed to be more risky. Unfortunately, SMEs fall into this disadvantaged 
category.  
Therefore, if finance is inadequate, positive NPV investment projects cannot 
be fully funded. Valuable investments for the economy as a whole will be held back 
by financial constraints, not to mention that if SMEs are considered the engine to 
drive our troubled global economy out of the recession, lack of fuel (finance) is 
certainly detrimental.  
It is often reported that SMEs operating in developing countries or transitional 
economies face severe difficulties in fulfilling the financial needs for their businesses 
(Lin and Sun, 2005; Du and Girma, 2008). This is largely due to the 
underdevelopment of the financial systems and institutional settings, although the 
operation of a parallel informal financial system may compensate to a degree (Stiglitz, 
1990; Arott and Stiglitz, 1990). Firms who wish to snap up opportunities in the 
market, to advance their product and services and/or expand their businesses requires 
external financing. The hard demand for financing investment projects from the 
private sector is not to be ignored. In the next section, a model for financial 
constraints based on the demand and supply for funds is presented with the intention 
of explaining the existence of financial constraints.  
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4.3 The Explanation of Credit Constraints 
Because of the fact that financial markets are not perfect, financing 
investments depends on both the cost of finance and the availability of finance. The 
existence of financing hierarchy, more famously known as the “pecking order” 
defines the pattern of financing preferences when firms want to invest (Myers, 1984). 
Different financing sources have different associated costs. However, simply taking 
the cost of finance into consideration is not enough. The combination of how much 
money a firm wants to raise, and what they can afford to lose (i.e. a stake or some 
control of the business) or pay (i.e. interests and dividends) only depicts the demand 
side of the story. Finance providers’ willingness to invest or lend their money to the 
business is equally if not more important. SMEs’ inability to obtain sufficient finance, 
which can certainly inhibit their growth, is a good example of a supply gap in the 
financial market.  
Pecking order theory argues that internal funds are cheaper than external funds 
and because the financial market is predominantly the source of external finance, the 
availability of cash flow and internal funding options are not discussed here. External 
finance can be in the form of either equity or debt (if convertible debts are not 
considered for simplicity’s sake). Access to equity has long been recognised as a 
problem (Macmillan, 1931; Radcliffe, 1959; Bolton, 1971). More recently, access to 
debt, more specifically the terms on which debt is available to small businesses, raised 
a lot of concerns for policy makers, practitioners and businesses (Binks and Ennew, 
1996). Furthermore, because equity financing is seldom a feasible option for small 
businesses to raise funds, due to its expensive nature and the immaturity of the stock 
market in developing nations, the researcher will place her emphasis in this study on 
debt financing. Therefore, the topic of this section will be credit constraints instead of 
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the more general term - financial constraints, and credit rationing which looks at the 
supply side of the phenomena and is discussed in the following section in this chapter. 
Next, the researcher is going to review definitions and models aimed at explaining 
credit constraints intuitively and identify variables from classic investment models 
that can be included in the survey questionnaire.  
 
4.3.1 Definitions of credit constraints 
Ex-ante credit constraints result in the prevention of entrepreneurial talented 
individuals starting businesses and in profit generating investment opportunities being 
turned down (Boucher et. al, 2006).  On the other hand, ex-post credit constraints 
restrict the liquidity of firms’ cash flow and impact upon the production outcomes 
from investments already made being realised (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1989; 1990). In 
both situations, given debt is a cheaper form of financing than any other source except 
retained profits, credit constraints are seen as a major setback to firms’ formation and 
development.   
Depending on the focus of the studies being carried out, varied definitions of 
credit constraints have been adopted. However, there was a less obvious trend of the 
definition which started as a narrow concept and was gradually broadened to cover 
this problem more realistically. To present a few examples, both Jappelli (1990) and 
Crook (1996) defined a credit constraint as a situation when the borrower’s request 
for credit was rejected completely and/or was expected to be turned down. Later, 
Jappelli et al. (1998) redefined a credit constraint to not only include cases that had 
been turned down by a lender but also cases when the lender was unable to offer as 
much credit as the applicant requested for. A more conclusive and a more detailed 
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definition was recently presented by Fletschner (2008) who argued that a credit 
constraint occurs when a borrower’s request for a loan is completely refused, or only 
a smaller amount is obtained, or the borrower decides not to apply or requests less 
than they wish to borrow because they believe they will not obtain the full amount. It 
was particularly pointed out that businesses could face situations when there is no 
offer of a large amount of a loan in the entire credit market even if they are willing to 
bear a higher interest rate (Guiso, 1998).     
 
4.3.2 Investment and financing equilibrium: an illustration 
As mentioned earlier, if we do not consider the possibility of firms gaining 
access to equity finance and look at all other types of financing collectively, according 
to the pecking order theory and the concept of credit rationing, a graphical model can 
show how firms end up with credit constraint when there is demand for external 
finance (please see figure 4.1).  
Figure 4.1 depicts the demand for and supply of finance when a firm faces 
investment opportunities within a given period of time. On the diagram, d is the 
investment demand curve that represents a firm’s demand for funds. The reason why 
the demand curve is downward sloping can be explained by two arguments. Firstly, 
the marginal return on investment is diminishing, in other words, the firm is assumed 
to invest in the most profitable projects before having to turn to less profitable ones. 
Secondly, as the cost of finance goes up, the demand for finance reduces. 
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Figure 4.1 Demand for and supply of finance 
 
Source: Ninh (2003, pp.73) - Adapted from Hubbard (1998, pp. 196)  
The position of the d schedule is determined by the investment opportunities 
there are available to the firm. This d schedule is a smoothed investment opportunity 
schedule (Weston et al., 1996), in the sense that if the firm has a very small number of 
relatively less risky (less profitable) investment opportunities, d would be close to the 
origin O. Hence, the chances are that these investment opportunities can more or less 
be financed by internal funds (R0A). On the other hand, when the firm is seeking to 
fund a number of riskier and high-return investment projects, the d schedule should 
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shift outwards, thus external financing becomes actively involved in the equation. 
Bank loans and/or informal lenders would contribute to the supply of finance.  
Assuming no tax advantage on the cost of debt, the supply of finance is 
represented by a discontinuous schedule R0ABCDEF. To signify the different level of 
costs associated with different sources of finance, the supply curve is separated in 
sections according to the pecking order theory. The first source a firm will resort to is 
internally generated funds, which is represented on the diagram as a horizontal line 
R0A.  A constant shadow cost (R0) will always occur with the use of internal funds 
(Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). The next source of finance in the financial hierarchy 
is bank credits and the increase in the cost of finance from internal funds to bank 
credits is reflected in the jump from R0 to R1. The supply schedule has also jumped 
from A to B. The upward slope of the funds supply curve BC is due to the fact that as 
the amount of loan borrowed increases, the banks will require and will charge a risk 
premium; thus, higher interest rates will pertain until the point where they begin to 
ration credit (say, R2). The final portion of the supply curve, DF, represents the supply 
of funds offered by informal creditors. Similarly, informal credit markets in general 
are considered more costly than bank credit as they tend to assess and lend to 
applicants who have been rejected by commercial banks, thus the cost of finance 
jumps again from R2 to R3 as a starting point. The interest rate will also rise as the 
amount of the loan borrowed goes up to a level (R4) where credit rationing appears 
and cuts off the supply curve once more. Both formal and informal lenders ration 
credit to avoid a decline in their expected return. The concept of credit rationing 
introduced by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) will be thoroughly discussed in a later section 
in this chapter.  
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As it is illustrated on Figure 4.1, it is also worth noting that the firm can 
finance investment projects up to the level of I0 without seeking external finance. The 
cheapest interest rate banks offer is R1, therefore, it is not financially viable for firms 
to borrow unless the investment rate of return covers this minimum required rate of 
interest. Investment projects that generate low returns, typically between R0 and R1, 
will either be given up by the firm or financed by somehow stretched internal funds 
which will increase the length of the portion of the supply curve (R0A). As a result, a 
sensible inference can be drawn and that is investment decisions are sensitive to the 
availability of internal funds (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002).  
An example of a demand and supply of funds equilibrium (Ie) is shown in 
Figure 4.1 at a position where all three sources of finances (namely internal funds, 
bank credits and informal credits) had been utilised at a given level of demand to 
invest. In other words, an investment and financing equilibrium is found.  
The credit constraint is clearly shown on Figure 4.1.  The equilibrium 
investment Ie is smaller than I*, which is the level of investment a firm should be able 
to accommodate fully at a constant cost of R0 in perfect financial markets where a 
firm can have unlimited access to funds for investment.  
The persistence of credit constraints and credit rationing has been a 
widespread problem across nations, and it could be detrimental to the market 
sentiment and confidence towards a fair and efficient financing environment for 
enterprises (Binks and Ennew, 1996). Entrepreneurs will inevitably face financial 
constraints at some stages during their firms’ business cycle. They need every 
encouragement and support from finance providers to be able to facilitate worthy 
investments and to retain their going concern status. Unfortunately, some of them 
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could be discouraged by their past experience or be affected by the negative sentiment 
in the market. The issue of discouraged borrowers will be investigated next.  
4.3.3 Discouraged borrowers 
Bluntly speaking, in the money market, lenders make money out of borrowers. 
Yet, because lenders’ resources are limited and the security of loan capital that they 
lend to debtors is vital and matters to their own survival, risk is something they have 
to live with and try very hard to assess and mitigate. Once lenders hand over the 
agreed loan amount to the borrower in the form of cash, despite the fact that they are 
very likely holding some forms of securities or collaterals against this loan, when it is 
necessary for them to demand the repayment of the loan for whatever reasons, the 
situation is less than straightforward and often the process is going to be time 
consuming and very costly (Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006; Andreas, 2006). 
Therefore, both demand and supply sides are facing possible discouragement with 
severe information problems at the loan application stage, resulting in bigger 
financing gap in the market.  
Crook (1996, 1999) tried to identify the characteristics of discouraged 
potential loan applicants (individual people), who in practice are more likely to have a 
credit constraint problem. He found a positive relationship between the probability of 
being discouraged with individuals who have missed two consecutive installments in 
the last year, or who is black, or who is Hispanic or who is a single female living on 
her own. In addition, the number of economic dependents appears to be positively 
related to the probability of being discouraged.   At the firm level, studies were 
performed in the US which discovered that two-thirds of the firms that were credit 
rationed between 1988 and 1989 were discouraged from applying by their expectation 
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of rejection and a further 2.17% of total sampled firms experienced delays in 
obtaining external finance (Levenson and Willard, 2000).    It is also recognised that 
smaller firms, especially micro enterprises have virtually no access to the formal 
credit market and also face severe rationing constraints in informal credit markets, 
therefore more prone to become discouraged borrowers (Mushinski and Pickering, 
2007).  
Although the definitions of discouraged borrowers vary depending on the 
investigator’s view point, generally speaking, discouraged borrowers’ decisions of not 
to apply for credit are mainly due to a fear of rejection (Crook, 1999; Kon and Storey, 
2003). This is not only a psychological hurdle, but also a manifestation of market 
imperfections. In real life, potential borrowers who have the need for credit and are 
happy to pay the relevant price, may well be prevented from applying for these credit 
because of the terms and conditions imposed by lending institutions (Atieno, 2001).  
The buy-to-let mortgage in the UK can be used as a good example to illustrate 
the discouraged borrower phenomena as it is something which is closer to everyone’s 
life. A first time buy-to-let mortgage borrower has huge barriers to overcome before 
he/she can successfully secure his/her very first buy-to-let mortgage. The terms and 
conditions typically imposed by mortgage lenders on the potential borrowers are: 
there must be a minimum annual income requirement, they must have a mortgage 
repayment history, must not be a first time buyer, must use their main residence as 
collateral, and must not let to occupants of multiple households. Usually, lenders will 
charge an arrangement fee which is at least double compared to the fee charged for a 
normal residential mortgage (please refer to bank or building society web-sites for 
current figures). Unsurprisingly, new entrants and less experienced landlords are 
discouraged, yet professional landlords will benefit.  
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Even though the way lending institutions handle different types of credits they 
have on offer are different, SMEs that lack track records and do not have collateral to 
put down are more likely to be disadvantaged compared to their larger counterparts 
and so discouraged from borrowing the funds they need. It is necessary to look into 
the issue of credit rationing more carefully now, so that more could be found out 
about the operation and behaviour of SMEs’ most important finance provider, 
commercial banks (Ruis et al., 2009). This leads the researcher on to the next section 
focusing on credit rationing.     
 
4.4 The Concept of Credit Rationing   
Firms’ difficulties in resorting to external finance are increased in an imperfect 
information setting which is typically associated with problems like adverse selection, 
moral hazard, excessive monitoring and enforcement costs of debt contracts (Russo 
and Rossi, 2001). Given that the bank is the most important source of credit for the 
private sector, this is particularly true for smaller and younger firms and suffering 
from severe credit constraints limits SMEs growth capability dramatically 
(Wagenvoort, 2003; Beck et al., 2006).  
Because the expected return to formal lenders (e.g. banks) depends on the 
repayment probability of borrowers, the price (e.g. interest rate of loans) lenders 
charge has to compensate for the risks they bear, unlike in a spot market, where goods 
are paid for immediately at a given price, which equals the expected return to the 
seller. Despite scholars’ continuous efforts, risk premium remains an unsolved puzzle 
in finance (Weil, 1989; Sarig and Warga, 1989; Ewing, 2003). From a lender’s point 
of view, although he/she can charge a higher interest rate to reflect the risk premium, 
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the interest rate itself has a counter-effect on the repayment probability (Hoff and 
Stiglitz, 1990). It is rather clear that there is no easy answer to this dilemma, and as a 
result, credit rationing has become a common phenomenon in credit markets.  
4.4.1 Definition of credit rationing  
Though commonplace and apparently well understood, the term ‘credit 
rationing’ is taken to indicate a variety of conditions in the academic literature. One 
common (perhaps standard) definition of credit rationing is: “the situation where 
some loan applicants are denied a loan altogether, despite (i) being willing to pay 
more than banks’ quoted interest rates in order to obtain one, and (ii) being 
observationally indistinguishable from borrowers who do receive a loan” (Parker, 
2002, p. 163). This has been termed as ‘Type II’ credit rationing (Keeton, 1979). In 
practice, it is difficult to establish, given, among other things, obvious difficulties in 
establishing willingness to pay interest rates above banks’ quoted rates. Accordingly, 
this study is concerned, instead, with Type I credit rationing. In this case, all or some 
firms receive a smaller loan than they would otherwise wish at the quoted interest rate. 
Thus, we define a firm to be credit rationed if, at the prevailing rate of interest, it 
seeks to access a larger amount of credit, but cannot obtain it (Guiso, 1998). Clearly, 
in such circumstances, banks are literally rationing credit on some basis other than 
price. 
In order to complement the argument above and complete the review of this 
subject matter, Table 4.1 shows a few directly quoted definitions of credit rationing 
used by previous studies.   In spite of the different terminologies used in the 
definitions listed in the table 4.1 below, they can still be summarized comfortably into 
the two main streams proposed by Parker (2002) quoted above. 
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Table 4.1 Definitions of credit rationing in previous studies 
Authors (year of publication) Definition of credit rationing adopted 
Baydas et al. (1994) “occurs when lenders grant the loans 
demanded by applicants who are identified as 
creditworthy borrowers while granting loans 
smaller than demanded to some applicants 
and completely rejecting other applicants 
willing to pay the interest rate demanded” 
(pp. 280). 
Turvey and Weersink (1997) “occurs when lenders face a demand for 
credit that exceeds the amount they are 
willing to lend at the prevailing market rate” 
(pp. 202). 
Pruteanu (2004) “occurs whenever borrower’s demand for 
credit is turned down, even if this borrower is 
willing to pay all the price and non-price 
elements of the loan contract” (pp. 59). Taken 
from Freixas and Rochet (1997). 
Nykvist (2008) Credit rationing: “circumstances in which 
either among loan applicants who appear to 
be identical some receive a loan and other do 
not, and the rejected applicants would not 
receive a loan even if they offered to pay a 
higher interest rate” (pp. 394). Taken from 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
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4.4.2 The importance to understand credit rationing  
If we are to consider the financing difficulties small businesses confront in 
their day-to-day operations, we need to study credit rationing for three reasons. Firstly, 
an understanding of the nature of credit rationing will assist us to better anticipate to 
what extent credits are inefficiently allocated (Blumberg and Letterie, 2008). 
Secondly, the entire array of market behaviours, which would be influenced by 
interest rate elasticity and issues of credit allocation, can be explained more logically, 
therefore better understood by policy makers and practitioners (Vandell, 1984). 
Thirdly, investigation into credit rationing in the market will reveal various market 
imperfections and so guide the transmission of monetary policy with the intention to 
ease or solve the problems. Even if the money supply is not important enough to the 
entrepreneurs (as some of them do have sufficient funds to run their businesses for the 
time being), the possible changes in monetary policy due to the effect of credit 
rationing should make everyone cautiously alert (Mateut et al., 2006; Inderst and 
Muller, 2007). 
Some scholars have argued that provided that the price is sticky, monetary 
policy maybe more suitable to be implemented through a rationing channel rather than 
through an interest rate channel (Roosa, 1951; Scott, 1957). However, any restrictive 
monetary policy on money supply tends to restrain bank credits that are available to 
borrowers (Scott, 1957).  
Hodgman (1960) has tried to show that a bank’s decision on the credit supply 
to an entrepreneur could become perfectly inelastic or even backwards bending. In 
other words, once the loan reaches a certain level and a particular interest rate is set 
for a loan, the possibility to increase the price will not induce the bank to extend the 
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size of the loan. Because of the presence of a default risk and the assumption that the 
entrepreneur’s repayment ability is finite, a higher interest rate for the loan will not 
compensate the bank for the increase in default risk, thus the size of the loan has a 
limit too (Hodgman, 1960). The above argument explains why credit supply to an 
individual entity is limited, and the supply of credit is never determined just by the 
demand for it and the price borrowers are willing to pay.  However, Hodgman’s 
proposal has raised numerous criticisms on the grounds that entrepreneurs’ repayment 
ability might be dependent of the size of the loan (Chase, 1961; Miller, 1962). 
Therefore, if banks perform their due diligence and are able to assess investment 
returns more accurately, they would be able to more or less arrive at the same 
conclusion as the entrepreneur about the investment opportunity and so credit is 
unlikely to be rationed. In reality, banks would then complain that they do not have 
access to sufficient information, or information can be deliberately hidden. Thus it is 
not possible for them to be fully aware of the risks they face and credit rationing is an 
inevitable result due to the presence of information asymmetry in a competitive 
market (Arrow, 1963).  
Since the issue of information has been brought into the spot light again, the 
researcher would like to refresh the memory of the reader about the information 
problems entrepreneurs face when sourcing finance. Particular attention is paid to the 
attitude of banks in their decision making process.  
 
4.4.3 Information and banks’ lending decisions 
Previous researchers have made attempts to put credit rationing in the 
information framework and so be explained by the existence of market imperfections 
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(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Williamson, 1986; Ariccia and Marquez, 2004). It is true 
that the knowledge or the possession of information influences people’s actions, 
especially when there are decisions to be made. Information asymmetry arises when 
some people own superior information to the others and therefore not all involved 
parties possess the same attitude towards a common goal. The theoretical groundwork 
outlining the concept of asymmetric information was laid by George Akerlof (1970)’s 
lemons theory, Michael Spence (1973)’s signaling model and Joseph Stiglitz (1975)’s 
screening model. The contribution of these seminal works is that they created debates 
and formed a foundation to enable the development of future researches in almost any 
direction (i.e. in business, finance, management and entrepreneurship). Giving an 
example in the light of recent research in entrepreneurship, when market 
imperfections are carefully studied and thoroughly observed, opportunities to build 
the theoretical foundation for the modeling of sustainable entrepreneurship become 
possible (Cohen and Winn, 2007).    
Akerlof (1970) argued that the seller of a product would have private 
information about the product he sells of which the buyer is not informed, and 
therefore it is possible that the seller has an incentive to sell inferior goods to the 
buyer. As a result, the uninformed party should look for signals that would offer some 
hints to the true quality of the product/service. Taking the labour market as an 
example, hiring a new member of staff is an investment under uncertainty for the 
employer, because the productivity of this employee is not 100% known to the 
employer before it could be identified through a period of service to the firm. Thus, 
this employee’s prior work experience and wage schedules act as signals for quality 
before a job post is offered.(Spence, 1973).  Another technique to help in reducing the 
negative impact of the information problem is by initial screening. Stiglitz (1975) 
 122 
explored the possibility to screen employees’ capabilities and so to distinguish 
productive ones from the others and offer higher wages accordingly. By doing so, 
employees who were considered less productive may be motivated to generate more 
income for the company.  
Although the aforementioned three seminal papers have not specifically used 
the concept of information asymmetry to explain the phenomena of credit rationing, 
they have offered a firm foundation for later researchers to utilise their findings about 
information problems in the market. Credit rationing is a market failure and it occurs 
in a competitive market when finance providers are unwilling to lend to some 
borrowers due to the effect of asymmetric information (Besley, 1994), thus leaving a 
supply gap in the market place (Petrick, 2005).   
Banks’ lending decisions are based on both hard and soft information. Hard 
information is derived from firms’ past financial statements and the credit scoring 
mechanism (Berry et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2005; Berger and Frame, 2007) and soft 
information is assessed from private information about the entrepreneur, through 
previous business relationships and or collected from third parties (Stein, 2002; Cole 
et al., 2004).  
Banks hold imperfect information about their borrowers and face great 
difficulties in distinguishing ‘honest’ and ‘dishonest’ entrepreneurs. In fact, it is very 
hard for banks to estimate entrepreneurial risks and to perform any effective 
monitoring to protect their loan capital (Blumberg and Letterie, 2008; Brown et al., 
2009). Jaffee and Russell (1976) observed that ‘honest’ entrepreneurs would 
deliberately decline a loan offer if they believed that the level of interest rate proposed 
was too high and so the risk of default was also too high, in other words, they would 
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voluntarily ration credits. On the other hand, ‘dishonest’ entrepreneurs are often 
prepared to pay a higher interest rate regardless. In addition, divergent expectations of 
default and different risk attitudes or perceptions of risk between lenders and 
borrowers, together with varied tax treatments and institutional restrictions to 
different firms and or industries can to a degree induce credit rationing too (Vandell, 
1984). 
The decision making process for lending commitment is complicated. 
Although entrepreneurs’ credit records, past financial data and their firms’ 
performance are essential for the assessment of credit worthiness (Fraser et al., 2001), 
banks can also use credit scoring techniques to test the entrepreneur’s quality 
(Hubbard and Gregg, 2001; Berger and Frame, 2007). Information that is available to 
the bank is never enough to assure that the entrepreneur will honour future 
repayments of the loan (Rose, 1995). Information problems are even more severe 
when it comes to small business lending (Sapienza, 2002).  
When the interest rate is low, both good and bad entrepreneurs will seek debt 
financing until the interest rate is raised to a certain level that eventually forces good 
entrepreneurs to leave the market; as a result, only bad borrowers are left and banks 
suffer from adverse selection (Beck, 2007). Another situation, the so-called moral 
hazard, may also occur when banks choose to increase interest rates. In this case, the 
choice of charging a higher interest rate will affect entrepreneurs’ selection of 
investment projects. The tendency to run riskier projects to cover interest payments 
may ultimately lead to a reduction of profitability for the bank. Therefore, on the basis 
of information asymmetry and to avoid aforementioned circumstances, banks will 
naturally prefer to ration credit instead of raising the interest rate (Hoff and Stiglitz, 
1990).   
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Apparently, an increase in interest rates can adversely change the behaviour of 
borrowers and make riskier projects relatively more attractive (Stiglitz and Weiss 
1981). The problems of adverse selection and moral hazard (Stiglitz, 1989) are 
important considerations when forming loan contracts between the bank and the 
entrepreneur, thus the researcher will discuss these two concepts separately in the 
following two sub-sections.   
 
4.4.3.1 Adverse selection  
According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), an increase in interest rate can cause 
two effects on the expected return to the bank. The positive effect is that the expected 
return to the bank will increase with the rise of interest rates. Once the interest rate 
reaches a certain level, a further increase would trigger an effect that works in the 
opposite direction, and it is called the ‘adverse selection’ problem. From banks’ point 
of view, of course they would prefer to lend money to ‘good’ entrepreneurs, yet 
because they are less informed about the profitability and risks of investment projects 
than loan applicants, they have no choice but to increase the interest in order to 
compensate for potential uncertainties (Hyytinen and Väänänen, 2006).  
The action to increase interest rates, depending on the return rate of 
investment projects, can gradually force ‘good’ entrepreneurs to leave the market 
when they feel the pressure from the loan obligation is too large that will induce high 
probability of default (Jaffee and Russell, 1976). As a result, a higher and higher 
proportion of loan applicants who remain in the market are ‘bad’ ones,  the ones the 
banks would not particularly want to choose. Lending money to a ‘bad’ entrepreneur 
who is willing to pay a higher price, yet may or may not honour loan repayments is an 
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adverse selection to the bank (Beck, 2007). In this process, ‘good’ borrowers are 
excluded from the system, and banks are worse off.   The banks’ loss of potential 
revenue can also be a result of entrepreneurs’ choice of investment opportunities. This 
issue leads us onto the next problem, namely the ‘moral hazard’ problem.  
 
4.4.3.2 Moral hazard 
Entrepreneurs’ personalities and traits, although they are not privately held 
information, or at least entrepreneurs would not normally intend to hide such 
information, are not easily observed and quantified by banks. Thus, it is almost 
impossible to have this crucial information converted into hard information and into 
the banks’ decision-making model for loan applications (Hellmann and Stiglitz, 2000). 
In terms of the expected return of the proposed investment project and its associated 
risks, entrepreneurs normally possess such information and banks may not have 
access to adequate information (Jaffee and Russel, 1976). It is a reasonable 
consideration for banks that even though the entrepreneur may have a reasonable 
probability of a success rate for their proposed projects, it is beyond banks’ control 
that the entrepreneur may mismanage and or invest in riskier projects instead once the 
money is received (Brealey and Myers, 1991; Besley, 1994).     
Unfortunately, banks have a very limited set of techniques to stop moral 
wrongdoing being carried out by borrowers from time to time, and demanding a risk 
premium (i.e. charging higher interest rates) can result in honest entrepreneurs leaving 
the market with only the dishonest ones remaining (Amit et al., 1990, Jaffee and 
Russel, 1976). Entrepreneurs’ choices over safer versus riskier investments very much 
depend on how much margin a particular project can generate after deducting loan 
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interest commitments, hence the choice is partly induced by the level of interest rate 
the banks demand (Winker, 1999). A higher interest rate implies a higher loan 
repayment for the borrowers (Bester and Hellwig, 1987). The higher the interest rate 
the entrepreneur has to bear, the more likely he/she should select riskier investments 
in exchange for higher returns, otherwise the loan would not be affordable (Gale and 
Hellwig, 1985), however at the cost of a reduced probability of success (Winker, 
1999).  
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)’s model of credit rationing equilibrium with the 
existence of asymmetric information, accompanied by a graphical demonstration is 
presented in the next section. The researcher believes that the reader should find the 
persistence of credit rationing that is widespread across credit markets more 
understandable after seeing the construction of the model, which explains the exact 
reasoning behind this phenomenon.   
  
4.4.4 Credit rationing equilibrium 
In the credit market, equilibrium is said to be the market point where the 
optimal interest rate is reached, not where demand for credits equals the supply of 
funds (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The optimal interest rate is achieved when the 
banks’ highest level of expected return on loans is achieved. When the credit market 
reaches its equilibrium, which is when expected return on loans is at its peak, banks 
have no reason to lend more money even at higher interest rates as the expected return 
can only diminish. Therefore, if the equilibrium is reached at a point where demand 
exceeds supply, a supply gap will occur.  
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When the interest rate is low, an increase in the interest rate has an immediate 
positive effect on banks’ returns on loans, so long as this increased revenue can 
outweigh the counter effects which resulted from the adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems.  Therefore, banks’ expected returns increase as the interest rate 
increases until it reaches a maximum (a certain level). Once the interest rate goes 
beyond this level, adverse selection and moral hazard effects start to take over and the 
expected return for banks will fall (Craig et al., 2007). Consequently, banks have the 
incentive to ration credit and maintain the interest rate at its optimal level and so 
ignore the excess demand for finance in the market. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have 
attempted to present a graphical illustration of the credit rationing phenomena. The 
researcher has borrowed this diagram and presented it in Figure 4.2 below.  
Figure 4.2 Determination of the bank equilibrium/optimal interest rate 
 
 
                                              ρ  
Source: Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, pp.397) 
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Figure 4.2 demonstrates a credit rationing equilibrium position with 
asymmetric information. The loan demand curve ( LD ) located in the upper right 
quadrant is a decreasing function of rˆ (the interest rate charged by the bank). The 
supply of loans ( LS ) is also a function of rˆ and is plotted in the same quadrant as the 
demand curve. The shape of LS  is determined by the relationship between the bank’s 
expected return (ρ ) and the interest rate charged by the bank ( rˆ ), which is shown in 
the lower right quadrant. Affected by adverse selection and moral hazard problems, an 
increase in rˆ  leads an increase in ρ  up to r* (the interest rate that maximises the 
expected return to the bank – the optimal interest rate). At r* , the supply of loans is at 
its largest and it is also seen that the demand for credit given the rate of r*  exceeds the 
supply of loans. The supply gap is measured by z and signifies credit rationing.  
Credit Rationing will be of type I, if all businesses, both good and bad, apply 
for loans; some successfully secure a loan whereas others are denied without 
particular reasons (Keeton, 1979). In this case, banks are possibly suffering from 
adverse selection problem, as good and bad borrowers are not distinguishable. Credit 
Rationing of a type II nature will occur if all or some businesses applying for a loan 
receive a lower amount than they originally asked for.  
The demand and supply equals at the interest rate of rm . However, rm is not the 
equilibrium interest rate, as banks do not have incentives to raise the interest rate 
beyond the level of r* , where it meets their ultimate objective – profit maximisation. 
As soon as the interest rate surpasses r* , the expected return to banks ( ρ ) starts to 
drop (see lower right quadrant).  
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As discussed in an earlier section, if the bank decides to increase its interest 
rate in its attempt to resolve the excess demand over supply, borrowers who are more 
risk averse will be excluded from the credit market (Hellmann and Stiglitz, 2000), 
leaving only borrowers who are willing to tolerate higher risks (Freixas and Rochet, 
1997). The important issue here is that, although it is good to know that there is no 
lack of borrowers who are more than happy to generate profits for the banks, not all of 
them are banks’ favourites. Therefore, it is probably more effective for banks to ration 
credit and keep the interest rate at a lower level, so that ‘good’ borrowers still remain 
in the market, then to work on ways to identify ‘good’ entrepreneurs and to utilise 
other mechanism in order to enforce the loan commitments (Fafchamps et al., 1994).  
A mix of factors will influence the probability of default on a loan, including 
the terms of the loan, the characteristics of the entrepreneur, the market conditions, 
rules and regulation changes, market imperfection, and many more (Okurut et al., 
2005). Borrowers who are deemed to have a poor financial risk are usually the ones 
who are unable to meet the collateral requirement and / or have poor projected cash 
flows. Banks would almost certainly turn down their loan application and this 
situation is usually referred to as redlining (Parker, 2002). Collateral is apparently a 
vital requirement by the bank to overcome the hurdle of lack of information, and this 
issue will be discussed in subsection 4.6 accordingly.  
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)’s paper began the debate on credit rationing. 
Whether scholars have been supportive (Bester and Hellwig, 1987) or have made 
reservations (De Meza and Webb, 1987), this piece of seminal work provided the 
theoretical foundation for many empirical studies including the empirical chapters 
there are to follow in this thesis.  
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4.4.5 Criticisms of the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model 
Ever since Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) initiated the debate on credit rationing, 
their model has been repeatedly challenged and criticised by other scholars. Some of 
these studies are selected and briefly discussed in this section to offer the reader a 
better picture of the debate.   
De Meza and Webb (1987) challenged Stiglitz and Weiss’s (1981) assumption 
that an increase of the interest rate will automatically induce a rise in the riskiness of a 
borrower’s investment portfolio selection. They examined the effects of asymmetric 
information on the basis of investment projects in aggregation (not in isolation) and 
on the financial structure of the business. Their findings showed that, with 
information asymmetry, the distribution of investment returns played a major role in 
determining the financial structure of the business and the efficiency properties of the 
investments. De Meza and Webb (1987) argued that high interest rates can be 
associated with low risk investments and thus there will not be credit rationing at 
market equilibrium. In the same year, Williamson (1987) argued that the high 
monitoring costs of loans had resulted in the rationing of credit, as loan providers’ 
aim is to maximise their returns.  
Basu (1992) disagreed with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) on the basis that any 
individual borrower would have an estimation of the affordability of the loan; if the 
loan’s repayment probability is low, he/she would not consider a loan with higher 
interest rates. In other words, the borrower’s own judgment will guide them to enter 
or exit the credit market and the total number of risky entrepreneurs will not change 
as they would not be affected by changes in the level of interest rate. However, it is to 
a degree confirmed that the proportion of risky entrepreneurs among the set of total 
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borrowers in the market will increase with the increase in interest rate, as does the 
likelihood of damage caused by adverse selection and moral hazard problems.  
Diamond (1984) asserted that credit rationing should not be the answer for the 
moral hazard problem; rather, the use of a financial intermediary (i.e. the introduction 
of a guarantor) would be more effective. Bester (1985) demonstrated that it is possible 
to tell the level of riskiness of an entrepreneur by using a combination of both 
collateral and the interest rate and concluded that “a signaling equilibrium in the 
credit market necessitates a monotone relationship between the riskiness and the 
preference of different entrepreneurs (Bester, 1985 pp.852)”.  
Banks adopt a number of measures to help in addressing the supply gap and to 
control the adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Relationship lending, 
collateral requirements, restrictive covenants, the acquisition of additional information 
about the entrepreneur him/herself and about the proposed project in order to assess 
the entrepreneur’s capacity to repay the credit facility are common practice for banks 
(Cole, 1998; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Harhöff and Körting, 1998; Black et al., 1996; 
Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008). The next two sections examine the role of relationship 
lending in bank lending decisions. 
Relationship lending is highly regarded by both the bank and the entrepreneur 
as one of the most effective measures to overcome unnecessary misunderstandings 
and this personal banking approach can be very beneficial to small and medium sized 
enterprises.  In view of this, banks need to gather sufficient information through the 
entrepreneur’s social networks and lending relationships (Brown et al., 2009). 
Relationship lending cannot work efficiently in both parties’ interests until a sense of 
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trust between the lender and the borrower is built (Ferrary, 2003; Bharath et al., 2007).  
The next section focuses upon relationship lending.  
 
4.5 Financial Constraints and Relationship Lending 
Relationship lending implies the existence of specific information on the 
borrower (soft information), which is available only to the financial intermediary and 
the borrower him/herself (Diamond, 1984).  Boot (2000, pp.10) described the bank-
customer relationship as “the provision of financial services by a financial 
intermediary over time, enabling it to obtain specific, relevant and private information 
about the client, and evaluating the profitability of these types of investments”. 
Ongena and Smith (2000 pp.224) defined a bank-borrower relationship “to be the 
connection between a bank and customer that goes beyond the execution of simple, 
anonymous, financial transactions”.  The benefits of such a relationship include the 
transfer of proprietary information, a commitment to work together on business 
projects and the provision of efficient financial services. 
In a bank-entrepreneur relationship, small and medium sized businesses are 
often considered opaque, which means it is difficult for lenders to ascertain if firms 
have the capacity to pay and or the willingness to pay (De la Torre et al., 2010). As a 
result of information asymmetry, it is difficult for small businesses to raise adequate 
finance from formal financial institutions. The lack of understanding and trust 
between small firms and their banks may lead to credit rationing. Gatti and Honorati 
(2008) found that SMEs are more likely to be informal (measured as self-reported and 
often lacking tax compliance) and that this informality affects negatively the access to 
external finance.  
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Furthermore, generally speaking, SMEs are not normally in the position to 
issue debts or equity in sufficiently large amounts that would attract enough investors. 
Therefore, the option to raise finance directly from the capital market is normally not 
available to SMEs (Berger and Udell, 1998; Halling et al., 2005). As a result, they  
rely on banks to provide them with credit.  
 
4.5.1 The role of soft information  
For the problem of opaqueness associated with small businesses, relationship 
lending is seen by the conventional view as one of the effective techniques to resolve 
this issue. The common perception is that relationship lending can overcome 
opaqueness because it relies primarily on the accumulation of soft information about a 
small business over time, through multiple contacts with the business, its owner and 
the local community where the business operates (Berger and Udell, 2006).   
Soft information includes assessments of a borrower’s quality compiled from 
past interactions with suppliers, customers, competitors or other local sources. 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000). 
Relationship lending can potentially improve borrowers’ access to credit and better 
the terms of loans (i.e. a lower interest rate charged by the bank). To a degree, 
relationship lending can even compensate for disadvantages of the borrowers, such as 
a shortage of collateral, lack of proven track records and or less impressive past 
financial statements (Bodt et al., 2005). 
The effectiveness of relationship lending is largely determined by the quantity 
and quality of the soft information about the characteristics of the entrepreneur and 
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his/her business that is obtainable by the bank.  Unlike hard information, soft 
information is more qualitative and subject to the interpretation of the gatherer (Scott, 
2004).  The most efficient way to gather soft information is to develop a durable 
relationship between banks and small firms through regular bank transactions 
(Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004). 
The successfulness of relationship lending depends on the characteristics of 
the entrepreneur and the management team, the business itself, the duration of the 
relationship, the scope of financial services provided to the entrepreneur in the past, 
and the economic conditions in which the entrepreneur operates (Boot, 2000). 
As a consequence, relationship lending should improve the bank’s knowledge 
of the characteristics of the firm, its owner and its projects, making it less risky for the 
bank to grant a loan (Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano, 2010). For the 
borrower, this should translate into an increased availability of credit and a lower cost 
of financing (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Boot and Thakor, 1994). 
Several researchers have thoroughly studied the importance of relationship 
lending in terms of the cost of financing, credit availability and collateral 
requirements. Small enterprises with longstanding and strong banking relationships 
tend to have more credit availability (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Degryse and Van 
Cayseele, 2000; Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano, 2010), enjoy lower costs 
of financing (Burger and Udell, 1995; Blackwell and Winters, 1997), and reduced 
collateral requirements (Boot and Thakor, 1994; Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006). 
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4.5.2 The duration of a bank-borrower relationship 
The duration of the relationship between the banks and firms is an important 
measure of the bank-borrower relationship. As the duration of the relationship gets 
longer, the bank has a better opportunity to observe, understand and utilize the soft 
information about its customer and so can overcome the problem of information 
asymmetry effectively (Ongena and Smith, 2000). 
Although small businesses depend mainly on banks for their external finance, 
previous research has shown that banks felt reluctant to lend money to small 
businesses (Peek and Rosengren, 1996; Keeton, 1995). If the firms have a solid, long-
term relationship with the bank, the reluctance would be kept to a minimum. By 
studying the U.S. banks and firms, Boot and Thakor (1994) found that loan rates 
decrease and collateral requirements decline as a relationship matures. Burger and 
Udell (1995) also indicated that both the rate of credit and the probability of the 
lender requiring collateral to secure the loan decrease while the duration of the 
relationship increases. However, Cole (1998) examined the effect of duration and 
scope on the potential lender’s decision in granting credit, and suggested that the 
credit availability increases only in the early part of the relationship, but does not 
increase thereafter. Petersen and Rajan (1994) found a positive link between 
relationship duration and the amount of credit offered by banks to firms.  
Other evidence presented a different picture to what was anticipated. Based on 
the data from German SMEs, Elsas and Krahen (1998) concluded that the cost of 
credit was unrelated to the duration of bank-borrower relationship. Using data from 
Belgium, Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) observed a positive relation between the 
length of the bank-borrower relationship and the interest rates charged.  Arito and 
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Iichiro (2009) found in Japan that the riskiness of borrowers does not automatically 
increase the use of collateral, whereas borrowers who have a long-term relationship 
with their main bank are more likely to provide collateral. 
 
4.5.3 Multiple bank relationships 
If the business maintains more than one bank relationship simultaneously, then 
this business is defined as having a multiple bank relationship.  When a firm has 
multiple bank relationships, it can improve the terms of its financial contracts by 
taking advantage of the competition between banks (Ongena and Smith, 2000). The 
empirical findings on the outcomes of multiple relationships on credit availability, 
cost of financing and collateral requirement are varied. Firms which maintain multiple 
bank relationships need to pay higher interest rates and face more credit constraints 
than those with a single bank relationship (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Cole (1998) 
showed that firms which have multiple bank relationships are more likely to be 
rejected for loan applications compared to those who have a single relationship. The 
availability of credit is also lower to multiple relationship firms (Harhöff and Körting, 
1998). 
However, Houston and James (1995) concluded that firms that have a single 
bank relationship have more credit constraints than those with multiple bank 
relationships. Ongena and Smith (2000) suggested that firms with multiple bank 
relationships tend to end a bank relationship sooner than single bank relationship 
firms, which means that a given bank relationship is less valuable to multiple bank 
relationship firms. However, when a firm is facing financial distress, having multiple 
lender relationships may cause serious coordination problems (Brunner and Krahnen, 
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2008). From the bank’s point of view, it is more likely to enter into a multiple-bank 
lending situation when banks have a lower level of equity (Carletti et al., 2007).  
In addition to relationship lending, the use of collateral is considered an 
effective and more straightforward mechanism. Collateral requirements can be easily 
pledged into the loan contract to enhance the enforcement power for the lender. The 
next section will look at collateral and bank lending decisions.  
 
4.6 Collateral and Bank Lending Decision 
Generally speaking, banks would feel more inclined to relax credit rationing if 
borrowers put up collateral.  There may be two reasons for this. Firstly, collateral acts 
as a safety net for banks in the event of default as banks can seize the collateral to 
reduce the loss on their loan capital. Second, collateral puts pressure on borrowers to 
avoid intentional default (thus reducing the moral hazard problem), because 
borrowers will lose the collateral if they default. Both reasons can reduce lending 
risks for banks and increase the expected return to banks and therefore banks are more 
prepared to relax credit rationing if collateral is agreed in the loan contract (Chen, 
2006; Steijvers et al., 2010). 
Collateral plays a very important role in all loan applications, especially in 
commercial loans. It was documented that 70% of commercial loans secured in the 
US (Berger and Udell, 1990) and approximately 85% of loans granted to small 
businesses in the UK were backed by collaterals (Black et al., 1996). Although not 
always true, the speed and efficiency of lending decisions can be improved with the 
support of collateral.  
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If collateral is used efficiently, the moral hazard problem can be minimised 
(Boot et al., 1991). Since the repayment ability of the borrower is directly 
proportionate to the value of the collateral he/she is willing to pledge in the loan 
contract (Rajan and Winton, 1995) and the borrower is made fully aware of the fact 
that on default of the loan, the bank has the right to repossess the collateral to pay 
back the loan capital (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; La Porta et al., 1998). Therefore, if it 
is assumed that all investors are rational, once they have agreed to put up collateral, 
they should have done their calculations about the cash flow projections of the 
projects and their repayment capability most carefully as they are in effect bearing the 
ultimate risk of the failure by pledging the collateral.  Basically, banks ration credit 
when they are faced with asymmetric information, yet this rationing can be mitigated 
if entrepreneurs are willing to offer collateral to prove their quality (Besanko and 
Thakor, 1987a).  
Bester (1985) believed that if banks simultaneously work on a combination of 
interest rates and collateral requirements when considering their credit offers, they 
could have the capacity to distinguish between entrepreneurs with different risk levels 
and it is possible that credit rationing would not occur. In practice, banks are likely to 
demand a higher price and more stringent collateral requirements for investments with 
lower cash flow projections. Through the self-selection mechanism among borrowers, 
borrowers who are risk averse are more inclined to accept credit contracts that entail 
lower interest rates and higher collateral requirements than borrowers of higher risk 
(Bester, 1985). This is because low risk borrowers may perceive a lower probability 
of losing collateral than their counterparts and hence they are willing to fulfill the 
collateral requirements of a more stringent nature and take advantage of a lower 
interest rate. On the other hand, higher risk entrepreneurs would be interested in loans 
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with a higher interest rate but no collateral (Capra et al., 2001). It may seem plausible 
for banks to resolve the adverse selection problem (Jimenez and Saurina, 2003). 
It may not be totally realistic, however.  There are potentially endless 
combinations of interest rates and collateral requirements to fit every borrower’s 
circumstances and needs. If loan contracts can be tailor-made or there is a large 
enough number of different products in the credit market, no credit rationing should 
arise. The reasons why the aforementioned argument about the role of collateral may 
not be feasible in real life are: (i) writing loan contracts to suit each individual case is 
far too costly for banks and can be extremely confusing to all involved parties, 
including underwriters, loan officers, borrowers and credit control; and, (ii) an 
implicit assumption has to hold in order to allow the practicality of such loan 
arrangements, that is banks are absolutely certain of the value of the collateral and are 
able to seize the collateral when they need to do so (Menkhoff et al., 2006; Inderst and 
Muller, 2007). Depending on the institutional setting and the regulation system of the 
country the bank is operating within, this assumption can be violated if the credit 
market is rudimentary. For instance, for quite a long period of time in China that the 
property rights were not protected and therefore lenders were not in a position to 
accept some forms of assets as security for a loan and even if they did so, it would be 
difficult or impossible to enforce the credit contract in the event of default (Menkhoff 
et al., 2006).  In these cases, even if the entrepreneur has put up collateral, he/she may 
still seek high-risk projects for higher returns, knowing that the lender is unable to 
seize the collateral if he/she should default (Jimenez and Saurina, 2003).  
The worst scenario in a credit market concerning the use of collateral involves 
pseudo collateral, which is a result of regulation failures in verifying property 
ownership. The pledge of pseudo collateral into the market is not only detrimental to 
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lender-borrower relationships, but also made credit rationing remain pronounced. This 
phenomenon can be observed in undeveloped areas with rudimentary regulation 
systems, for instance in countries such as Vietnam, and China (Ninh, 2003; Yin and 
He, 2007).  
There are many factors that are potential hindrances to the effectiveness of the 
use of collateral. Using Africa as an example, pervasive corruption (Biggs and 
Srivastava, 1996), cultural and political considerations (Platteau, 1994), legal and 
monitoring costs (Chan and Kanatas, 1985) and many other inconceivable difficulties 
are associated with the use of collateral. Cadwell and Meagher (1996)  listed four key 
conditions to meet in order to allow an efficient use of collateral. They are: (i) 
protected property rights; (ii) an effective mechanism to enforce contracts; (iii) courts 
and registries systems to do their jobs properly; and (iv) the existence of a suitable 
business and lending environment.    
 
4.6.1 Collateral and the risk of lending 
The view on the relationship between collateral and the risk of lending is 
divided (Boot et al., 1991; Jimenez and Saurina, 2003; Inderst and Muller, 2007). In 
fact, scholars have found arguments for both negative and positive correlations 
between the two (Bester, 1985; Bester, 1994) Banks have in general always been 
cautious about lending to small businesses despite government policy encouragements. 
It may not be fair only to blame banks as they owe a duty of care to the general public 
and so their actions are completely reasonable. As a matter of fact, by writing loan 
contracts, banks are risking at a much wider extent because the loan is in theory 
drawn from depositors’ cash. Nonetheless, to maximise profit, banks need to 
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constantly look for ways to identify quality borrowers and eliminate uncertainties 
arising from the lack of information (Inderst and Muller, 2007).    
Recalling what has already been discussed, researchers have found a negative 
correlation between collateral and default risk (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1986). 
Entrepreneurs with a high-risk profile should be reluctant to pledge collateral that is 
proportionately high in value to the loan amount (Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Bester, 
1985; Boot et al., 1991). The bank can therefore utilise this characteristic of the risky 
entrepreneur as a screening device to find the type of borrower they prefer (Besanko 
and Thakor, 1987b; Boot and Thakor, 1994). After the loan has been granted, 
collateral can also play a part in enforcing adherence to straight investment projects 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1986). The downside associated with this approach though is the 
high monitoring cost, which has negative effects upon the efficiency of the contract 
and eventually can also lead to credit rationing when the cost is too high (Aivazian et 
al., 2004). Others have asserted that even with the availability of collateral, banks may 
be better off rationing credit than tightening collateral requirements, as an increase in 
collateral requirements can result in the same way as an increase of interest rate, that 
is, pushing good borrowers out of the market and triggering the adverse selection 
problem (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).    
In contrast, some scholars demonstrated a positive correlation between 
collateral and the risk of default, when riskier than average entrepreneurs borrow on a 
secured basis. Berger and Udell (1990) stated that on average, secured loans tend to 
be riskier than unsecured loans anyway. It is intuitively true that when riskier 
borrowers are willing to pledge more collateral, it will to a degree prevent their 
opportunistic behaviour, force them to concentrate on the ongoing projects and 
therefore increase their rate of success in doing riskier projects that can potentially 
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generate higher returns (De Meza and Southey, 1996). In an ideal situation, moral 
hazard problems can also be greatly reduced (Black and De Meza, 1992; Bester, 
1994).  
In summary, the existence of asymmetric information will lead to credit 
rationing in credit markets. The basic intuition of the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model 
is that for every moderate increase of the interest rate, banks expected return will 
increase, thus the supply of funds should rise, but only to a certain level, when the 
interest rate maximises the banks’ expected return from loans. Any further increase of 
the interest rate will worsen the quality of the loan applicants’ pool, resulting in 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems, thus reducing the expected return to the 
bank. Rationing credit instead of raising interest rates then becomes the sensible 
action to take for the bank. Both relationship lending and collateral can be effective 
tools to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard problems depending on 
individual circumstances, yet uncertainties arising from asymmetric information 
cannot be completely eliminated.  
 
4.7 Small Business Entrepreneur and Access to Credit   
Small business financing has attracted considerable attention over the last 
three decades (Storey, 1994; Hughes and Storey, 1994; Berger and Udell, 2006). The 
availability and cost of finance matters a great deal to the performance of the 
entrepreneur and in many incidences access to finance determines a firm’s survival 
(Black and Strahan, 2002). The existence of agency costs arising from asymmetric 
information and market imperfections has been well studied (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 
Berger and Udell, 2006). Problems such as adverse selection and moral hazard have 
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threatened the bank-entrepreneur relationship and hindered the formation of trust.  
The persistence of credit rationing, irrespective of credit constraints small firms suffer 
in all stages of their businesses, made this issue quite remarkable (Binks and Ennew, 
1996).     
One of the main objectives of this research is to explore the demand and 
supply of credit in Beijing. Practically, the researcher explores variations in 
entrepreneur and firm-level characteristics by looking into: (i) the amount of external 
finance sought, (ii) the amount of external finance received, and (iii) the ratio of 
‘sought’ to ‘received’ external finance.  
In pursuing this broad agenda and because this study is only explorative, the 
researcher will place her emphasis upon the role of innovation in borrowing and 
lending decisions. Although the selection of innovative firms studied is on the narrow 
side and is not conclusive to cover all ‘types’ of firms, it is not difficult to imagine 
that innovative firms are very likely to be heavily affected by credit constraints. 
Therefore, this special case would be so typical that it will help the researcher to 
‘break the ice’ which would allow future researches in the area of credit rationing in 
China.   
Using product innovation as an example, projected cash flows cannot be 
estimated before a new product reaches the market and receives feedback from the 
end users. (Åstebro, 2003) found that 93% of inventive projects failed to reach the 
market and of all that did reach the market, only 40% were profitable. Hence only a 
tiny 2.8% of the innovative projects can achieve positive returns; this is without 
considering the sustainability of that particular product. If the project fails, any 
research and development costs incurred, which need to be financed somehow, turn to 
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scrap value, which is next to nothing. Therefore, it is believed that the financing of 
early stage innovative firms and innovative firms in general is going to be very 
difficult (SBS 2004/05).  
Hall (1989) presented some difficulties associated with financing innovation, 
including the inability of finance providers to assess the technological validity and the 
possible outcome of the project, the higher monitoring costs due to the extreme 
shortage of information and the high borrowing cost to the entrepreneur due to 
unavoidable heavy use of short-term loans for long-term research. In addition, small 
innovative firms often do not have collateral can be used to secure a loan (Freel, 
2000b). Innovative projects are generally considered risky, and securing finance for 
risky activities is becoming increasingly difficult (Love, 2003). From the above 
discussion, the following hypotheses can be derived: 
 
H6: The innovative ventures will have a lower percentage of money received 
from that sought compared to the non-innovating ventures. 
H7: The innovative ventures’ amount of money sought will be higher than that 
sought by non-innovating ventures. 
H8: The innovative ventures’ amount of external finance obtained will be lower 
than the corresponding value for non-innovating ventures.  
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4.8 Empirical Evidence 
The earlier sections in this chapter have concentrated on two important and 
related concepts in firm financing: credit constraints (taking the demand side 
viewpoint) and credit rationing (taking the supply side viewpoint). The researcher 
would like to summarise this chapter by presenting a section that is designated to 
review the empirical evidence on firm financing in the presence of financial market 
imperfections. Without intentionally taking a viewpoint from either the demand or the 
supply side of finance, but rather looking for empirical evidence that simply tells us 
what is happening in real life, would enable the researcher to see a more complete 
picture. Because an efficient financial market can only be achieved by combined 
efforts of all, and people work wonders when they are united.  
The researcher will place a greater emphasis on those empirical studies that 
focus on developing and transitional economies, since there are similarities in terms 
of financial market characteristics with these of China. Unfortunately, the number of 
empirical studies performed with a background of developing nations is very limited. 
It makes every addition to this field of study worthwhile, including this thesis.  
Bernanke et al. (1996) found that since lending and monitoring costs also have 
economies of scale, it is cheaper for the lender to lend money to larger firms. In fact, 
larger firms tend to apply for larger amounts of loans than their smaller counterparts 
and have much better access to finance. Usually it is easier for larger firms to ‘tick the 
boxes’ loan providers are looking for, for instance, larger firms may have better track 
records, have more acceptable collateral, more human capital facility to manage the 
investment project, better cash flow management, and so on and so forth. Overall, 
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these strengths may help mitigating information problems between lenders and 
borrowers and thus improve firms’ access to finance/credit.  
Levenson and Willard (2000) examined small business financing in the US in 
the late 1980s and concluded that constrained businesses tend to be smaller, younger 
and more likely to be owned by their founders than those who managed to secure 
external finance successfully. Nonetheless, they also found that the total number of 
financially constrained businesses was small; therefore the extent of credit rationing 
cannot be too influential over the sentiment in the market.   
Harris et al. (1994) studied the financing situations of 523 Indonesian firms. 
They adopted ordinary least squares (OLS) and the generalised method of moments 
(GMM) estimators, and both techniques came up with similar results. Their key 
finding was that the coefficient of the cash flow variable is significant and larger for 
smaller firms and is insignificant and smaller for larger firms. These results suggest 
smaller firms suffer from financial constraints more than larger firms do.  
Jaramillo et al. (1996) investigated the impact of financial market 
imperfections upon the investment decisions of 420 manufacturing firms in Ecuador 
during the period 1983 to 1988. This study found that the interest cost was an 
increasing function of debt to capital ratio and the constraint on these firms’ leverage 
was binding. What is more interesting is that this model failed to hold for larger firms 
in the sample, which suggested that market imperfections seem to only affect the 
small firms’ ability to obtain external finance. For instance, the effect of increasing 
costs of borrowing and a leverage ceiling will tend to restrict small businesses only.  
To contradict the seemingly favourable conditions for large firms, because 
large firms often have a more diluted and diversified ownership structure, thus the 
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agency problem may be more severe, as a result their access to finance may also be 
limited on this basis (Schiantarelli, 1996; Lensink et al., 2001).  
Blumberg and Letterie (2002) conducted a survey of 1223 individuals who 
intended to start a business during 1998 and 1999 in the Netherlands. Of these, 994 
people (81.28%) eventually pursued their ambitions of becoming an entrepreneur. An 
analysis was carried out to study 347 respondents who had applied for credit from a 
bank and observed that the rejection rate was about 30%. They also produced a list of 
factors that had affected these start-up entrepreneurs’ access to external finance, 
including home ownership, experience gained in previous jobs, family composition, 
education, nationality, role model, multiple ownership and income level in the past. 
They also noted that a well-written business plan and access to professional advice is 
helpful to improved credibility to the bank.  
Hermes (1995) intended to test whether the Chilean financial reforms were 
successful in terms of mitigating market imperfections. During the ten year period, 
1982 to 1992, data from 86 Chilean firms were gathered. He concluded that firms’ 
investments were sensitive to internal funds, which implied the existence of financial 
constraints. The investment-internal funds sensitivity is greater for firms facing tighter 
financial constraints.  
According to Berger and Udell (1998), banks have access to borrowers’ 
repayment history and historical financial statements of the business. Therefore, the 
older the firm is, the longer track record the bank is able to obtain, which would be 
helpful for a loan application if the record is good. Older firms may have also 
accumulated more assets over the years that are suitable to use as collateral. 
Experience in dealing with lenders can also be valuable to firms. Better still, if a 
 148 
personal relationship had been established with a few banks, the firm should be less 
constrained financially. Concerning the age of the business, Hermes (1995) found that 
the coefficient of the internal funds variable was significantly larger for young firms 
than old firms. This finding implied that younger firms were more financially 
constrained.  
Bigsten et al. (2000) studied the manufacturing sector of six African countries 
in aggregation using panel data, aimed at exploring the extent of credit constraint in 
the manufacturing sector in Africa. They did not find sufficient evidence to suggest 
that firms were credit constrained. In fact, more than half of the firms in the sample 
did not seek credit finance. Of the other half that sought credit, only a quarter 
obtained loans from formal financial institutions. Discouraged borrower concept may 
be used to explain this situation, yet the data did not present a conclusive view on the 
credit constraint problem in Africa.  
Another African study produced by Aryeetey et al. (1994) examined both 
supply and demand of financing small firms in Ghana. They found that there was no 
finance available to start-up firms and so firms would have to rely on internal finance. 
Excessive demand for loans was also observed and could not be fulfilled despite the 
readiness of small firms to pay higher interest rates. Again, the size of the firm 
appeared to be a determinant for access to finance.  
Chang et al. (2010) examined a sample of 40,740 bank loans granted by one of 
the largest Chinese state owned banks during the period between 2003-2006. Among 
these loans, contracts were written between the bank and 4624 firms in total. The key 
finding of this study was that banks’ soft information obtained through relationship 
lending played a significant role in loan default predictions. Soft information was 
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proven to be crucial in assessing the quality of borrowers, and it tended to become 
relatively more important than hard information in situations where longer and 
stronger lending relationships between the entrepreneur and the bank had been formed.  
Hericourt and Poncet (2007) collected firm-level data of 2200 Chinese firms 
during 1999 to 2002. Their findings suggest that privately owned firms are more 
financially constrained than state-owned firms. Injections from foreign direst 
investments (FDI) can ease the difficulty of gaining access to finance for the private 
sector in China. FDI inflows had actually helped to fill the supply gap resulting from 
financial market imperfections.   
  
4.9 Conclusion 
The chapter has reviewed two important concepts in the field of access to 
finance, namely credit constraints and credit rationing. With particular attention paid 
to the impact of information asymmetry and financial market imperfections, the 
market equilibrium positions were investigated for both situations. The different level 
of information being held by two parties involved in the same transaction will result 
in difficulties in proceeding with this transaction efficiently. The information 
advantage of a borrower over the lender can result in a supply gap of finance in the 
market.  
Akerlof’s (1970) market for lemons theory, Spence’s (1973) signaling model 
and Stiglitz’s (1975) screening process laid the groundwork for the concept of credit 
rationing. On the basis of these three papers, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) proposed their 
original credit rationing model that initiated the long lasting debate of this important 
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concept. They further defined problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. All 
above-mentioned seminal works and phenomena have been reviewed in this chapter.  
In addition, the researcher explored the possibility to mitigate information 
problems using techniques such as relationship lending and collateral requirement 
mechanism. Entrepreneurs’ credit accessibility was also studied in the light of the 
existence of market imperfections taking into consideration the characteristics of the 
entrepreneur and his/her firm. Three hypotheses were then proposed on the basis of 
the aforementioned theoretical grounds and were especially related to innovative 
ventures.  
The chapter reviewed the empirical literature on firm financing in the presence 
of financial market imperfections. Special attention was paid to credit constraints and 
credit rationing where possible. Previous empirical studies of China are indeed very 
limited. The empirical evidence reviewed in this chapter covered both developed and 
developing economies, however more emphasis was placed on studies performed in 
developing nations, for their characteristic similarities to the financial market in China.  
This chapter therefore serves as a solid foundation for the empirical chapters 
on financial constraints faced by SMEs. The next chapter presents the methodology 
adopted to carry out this study to deliver empirical findings that are shown in later 
empirical chapters. 
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Chapter 5: 
Research Methodology 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The three previous chapters presented the themes to be developed and tested in 
the dissertation, and in particular reviewed the previous research which has been 
undertaken on small business finance, and the theoretical underpinnings of the 
dissertation - Human capital theory, and the theories of credit rationing and Credit 
constraints. In other words, the front half chapters of the dissertation have provided 
reviews of previous research that have influenced my research design and questions 
and hypotheses which use human capital theory as a theoretical framework to look at 
access to finance in Beijing.  Research objectives are tempered by a need to achieve 
practical and do-able research.  The methodology chapter presents the reasoning 
behind the choice of research methods adopted and the actual research itself, 
presented in subsequent chapters, will reveal whether or not these methods have been 
effective to use.   
The data collection took place between July and December 2007. The 
questionnaire was piloted to a small number of entrepreneurs and finance experts. 
Modifications were then made to take into consideration the feedback received from 
these interviewees.  Then a Survey was conducted in Beijing, China. The databases of 
two local Inland Revenue Offices were used as a sample framework. After skimming 
down the numbers of firms to be surveyed according to the selection criterion, three 
batches of surveys, totalling 1200 questionnaires were sent to the shortlisted 
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entrepreneurs. Prior to the sending of the questionnaires, the researcher liaised with 
officials from the Inland Revenue to, as far as possible, ensure that the person being 
targeted was the entrepreneur who owned the business and was the decision maker. 
During the six month survey, 457 responses were received, of which 5 were 
eliminated as useable as the numbers of employees in the business exceeded the 500 
employee upper limit. To ensure the quality of the responses, telephone Q&As were 
carried out made available during business hours and a series of telephone prompts 
which not only helped to boost the response rate but also offered opportunities to 
clarify any ambiguities which may have existed. Due to the sensitivity of the survey 
questions, crucial figures were cross-checked with the database held at the local 
Inland Revenue Offices to verify the validity, reliability and authenticity of the 
respondents. This check further ensured that the questionnaires had indeed been 
completed by the main decision maker in the business.  A healthy response rate of 
37.67% was achieved. The final sample consisted of 261 manufacturing and 191 
service sector firms. When the questionnaire was piloted, possible research questions 
were explored in the interviews. This has given the researcher insights into what 
matters to the stakeholders. In the following sections of this chapter, the whole 
research methodology of this dissertation is discussed.  The reasoning behind the 
choice of sample, the difficulties that were encountered during data collection and 
hence the methods used, the data analysis techniques and also the limitations of the 
research model are explained. 
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5.2 The Rationale for the Choice of the Study 
The importance of small and medium sized businesses (SMEs) has repeatedly 
been stressed both politically and economically, in academic, practitioner and political 
publications. SMEs have proven to play crucial roles across developed and 
developing countries, alike. Phrases such as ‘the engine for growth’ (Boocock and 
Shariff, 2005), a major driving force for economic development (Szabo, 1996), the 
backbone of the economy (Green, 2003; Wattanapruttipaisan, 2003), have repeatedly 
been used to describe SMEs’ vital position in the modern age and in particular in the 
period of the current crisis in the global economy. It has been argued that somehow 
SMEs could act as the lifeblood for the economy (Luetkenhorst, 2004) and that their 
blossoming in China or in developed nations such as the UK and US could push the 
speed of our much hoped for economic recovery.   
Nonetheless, SMEs are facing more challenges than promises as they look to 
go forward. Although the SMEs sector is a rich data stream and brings interests to the 
academics to study all aspects of their businesses from operational level to policy 
making, the initiative to start this particular research is focused on one paramount 
obstacle SMEs face and that is access to finance (Sowa et al., 1992; Levy, 1993; 
Aryeetey et al., 1994; Chow and Fung, 2000; Hall, 2002). It is not inconceivable that 
in the current economic climate, with unstable political and monetary policies 
worldwide in the financial markets, SMEs would be even more constrained 
financially.  
Furthermore, entrepreneurs’ human capital is considered to be a key resource 
for their businesses. It has been well documented that entrepreneurs’ experience 
impacts hugely on their businesses’ performance and access to resources (Brüderl et 
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al., 1992; Boxall and Steeneveld, 1999; Ucbasaran et al., 2003; Rauch et al., 2005). 
For instance, the choice of the source of finance used as initial capital and the access 
to credit later on in the business cycle can largely be explained by the entrepreneur’s 
business ownership experience (Westhead et al., 2003). The researcher is therefore 
keen to find out whether there are definite links between human capital available to 
the owner/manager and his/her firms financial situation, in the Chinese context or 
more specifically in the region of Beijing. In addition, the use of social capital 
(Guanxi/connections) by entrepreneurs to influence banks lending decisions is worthy 
of investigation (Yeung and Tung, 1996).  
To take the financing issue further and to be practical, the researcher analysed 
the arguably most important entrepreneurial characteristic – innovativeness of a firm 
and made the association with access to finance. Possible gaps are believed to exist in 
the financing of early stage innovative firms in general (SBS 2004/05). The idea of 
the research is to examine the extent of financial constraints to innovative and non-
innovative SMEs with regard to different types of innovation exercised in businesses. 
The study is more faithful to Schumpeter’s view on innovation in his earlier work (in 
particular his 1912 Theory of Economic Development) to achieve a more 
comprehensive understanding on the subject matter. To this end, innovations may be 
in: (i) products, (ii) processes, (iii) work practices or workforce organisation, (iv) 
supply and supplier relations, (v) markets and marketing, (vi) administration and 
office systems, and (vii) product distribution. These various domains of innovation 
are likely to signal varying degrees of technical, market and, ultimately, financial 
uncertainty and risk. 
The lack of research in business financing in developing nations has left us 
plenty of gaps in both the theoretical and empirical research fields. By and large, this 
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is due to the fact that data collection is extremely difficult, especially in developing 
nations such as China. The gathering of sufficient quality data that would allow 
meaningful presentations of empirical results was a milestone of this dissertation. By 
being able to set the background of this study in the capital of empowering China, 
Beijing, was indeed a bonus.  The next section provides the time frame to which the 
data gathered related. 
 
5.3 Time Frame 
In order to offer a sense of continuity in the data and be able to establish trends, 
the study covers a period of three years (January 2004 – December 2006). This 
implies that the sample firms should be registered with Company House before 
January 2004 and have been trading within the stated time frame (2004-2006). The 
researcher sculpted the questionnaire such that, within a convenient time scale and 
with sufficient sensitivity to gain financial data from the owner-managers in Beijing, 
so that the data gathered would cover the longest period of time possible in order to 
give meaningful findings. For example, the size of the firm indicated the growth trend, 
and the yearly innovation expenditure as a percentage of annual turnover enabled 
fruitful potential for further analysis. In regards to seeking finance and the finance 
obtained, the owner-managers could have sought for extra finance anytime within the 
three year period. The number of times the entrepreneur approached an external 
source for finance was also recorded, as was the total amount of money which was 
sought, and obtained. 
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5.4 Theoretical Framework 
Theory and practice are often bundled together and researchers have tried very 
hard to express their logical thinking by way of developing theories. Scholars have 
tried even harder to distinguish between theory and practice to make sure that each  
one of them would be upheld individually. Yet, if theory refers to “a supposition or a 
system of ideas intended to explain something, especially one based on general 
principles independent of the thing to be explained” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s 
Dictionary, 7th Ed.), and empirical findings are used to support or reject proposed 
theories, this says that theory and practice are in fact inseparable. Another definition 
of theory was proposed by Chinn and Kramer (1999 pp. 258) and they saw a theory as 
an “expression of knowledge, a creative and rigorous structuring of ideas that project 
a tentative, purposeful, and systematic view of phenomena.”  
This study is a tentative empirical study that is aimed at explaining some real 
life phenomena, and therefore needs a series of interrelated concepts to guide the 
design, the planning and the exercise of research methodology. Considerations such 
as the choice of variables to be included in the survey, how they should be measured 
and what statistical relationships to look for in the model are mainly based on well 
established theories and previous researches. To be more precise, the aggregation of 
the concepts reviewed in this section serves as the theoretical framework of this study.  
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5.4.1 Financing and information  
The choice of exhausting internal finance (retained earnings) before seeking 
external finance, the so called  ‘pecking order’ theory in finance is apparently 
applicable to small and medium sized enterprises. Empirical evidence has shown that 
start-up businesses mainly use internal sources of finance as their principal source of 
capital and then introduce external sources of finance gradually, following the pattern 
of the business cycle (Acs, 1985; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Aryeetey et al., 1994).  
In advanced economies, banks are major finance providers to businesses. 
Funds provided are in the form of overdraft facilities, short-term loans and long-term 
loans. Even so, banks tend to categories SMEs in their high risk profiles and there is 
still some degree of credit rationing in developed countries. For instance, Oakey 
(2007 pp.224) suggested that in the UK “there persists a sentiment that particular 
niches of the demand side of this market (SMEs’ capital market) are not operating 
efficiently”.  
In China, there is still evidence of ‘financial repression’, that is to say the 
institutional setting, legal requirements and policy tendencies have been restrictive to 
the development of financial intermediaries, particularly for SMEs (Yueh, 2008). As a 
result, SMEs are experiencing severe difficulties in loan applications and it was 
empirically shown that little or no bank financing was obtained by SMEs as late as in 
2006 (Lin, 2007). 
Apart from the inherent risks associated with smaller firms, such as being 
more prone to competition, having smaller economy of scale, through the influence of  
changes in laws and regulation (e.g. increase in minimum wage), information 
asymmetry is detrimental to SMEs credit rating (Berger and Udell, 1995; Zhao, 2008). 
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The problem of information asymmetry makes it rather difficult for banks to evaluate 
effectively  the creditworthiness of the owner mangers of SMEs (Berger and Udell, 
1995; Binks and Ennew, 1997; Frame et al., 2001). The lack of transparency of 
financial information and entrepreneurs’ inability to provide enough information 
about proposed projects to the bank made SMEs unattractive propositions to loan 
officers compared to their larger counterparts  (Danthine and Donaldson, 2005 p.338).  
With the problem of serious information asymmetry, the costs for banks to 
assess SMEs’ loan application, monitoring their repayments and the possibility of 
resulting in the collection of non-performing loans (NPLs) are inevitably high. Hence 
higher interests rates are commonly charged to SMEs and collateral demanded (Bester, 
1994; Besanko and Thakor, 1987a; Black and De Meza, 1992). In return, expensive 
bank credit becomes less attractive to SMEs, which again explains the ‘pecking order’ 
in terms of the preference of sources of finance. 
Building a durable relationship between a bank and an entrepreneur is 
beneficial to the flow of information (Newton, 2000) which also brings along the 
issue of trust and the availability of credit (Scott and Dunkelberg, 1999; Machauer 
and Weber, 2000). The establishment of a good bank-entrepreneur relationship 
implies the transfer of proprietary information, a commitment to coordinate and the 
provision of adequate financial services (Boot, 2000; Gatti and Honorati 2008; De la 
Torre et al., 2010). 
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5.4.2 Human capital theory (HTC) and connections in China 
There might be a ‘pecking order’ when entrepreneurs and owner-managers 
consider financing. Another major influence on the choice of an entrepreneur’s start-
up capital, the type and amount of finance used is the entrepreneurs’ human capital 
(Westhead et al., 2003; Westhead et al., 2005b). In real life, how can we explain 
similar businesses under the same set of circumstances, experiencing totally different 
degrees of financial pressures? HCT is a well established theory (Becker, 1975; 
Westhead, 1995; Brown and Kirchhoff, 1997) that brings entrepreneurs themselves, 
their business obstacles, their actions taken to overcome problems and their 
performances all together. In this study, human capital is measured by the 
entrepreneur’s background, business ownership experience and social network ties.  
Human capital is the particularly important resource one can have in China. 
To a large degree, it will determine whether or not you can run your business 
successfully.  To study entrepreneurship in China, one cannot afford to omit 
consideration of connections (Guanxi), as this is philosophically embedded in the 
culture (Yeung and Tung, 1996). The existence and influence of connections is 
common knowledge, yet whether or not researches can show the real picture of this 
phenomenon, or even reveal the tip of the iceberg is questionable. Therefore, the 
practical way to go forward is to assume that it is there and to correlate human capital 
variables with the degree of financial constraints of the firm. Parts that are 
unexplained may be explained by social connections which are hard to quantify and it 
is also hard to question the entrepreneur. 
Variables included in the survey related to the entrepreneurs’ human capital 
are sex, age, education level, relative role models, family connections and 
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relationships with banks. This study also specifically utilised HCT to investigate 
innovative and non-innovative firms’ financing needs and shows how well these 
needs have been fulfilled; or, in other words, who is more likely to be credit rationed. 
  
5.4.3 Innovative vs. Non-innovative 
Drawing experiences from the UK, the study of SMEs’ innovation was felt to 
be quite important by the researcher, simply for the reason that SMEs as an active 
sector of the economy are well capable to innovate and are not depressed by the fact 
that more resources for R&D are being held by larger companies (Pratten, 1991; 
Hoffman et al., 1998). Some interesting divergent messages were sent by the SBRC 
(1992) in light of finance as a constraint on innovation. It was reported that although 
Cambridge researchers found strong evidence to support the view that access to 
finance was a major constraint on SMEs’ innovative activities (introduction of new 
technology in particular), yet they also found  that most of those who actually sought 
finance did actually get it. As a matter of fact, innovation is now formally on the 
agenda in China, however there are only a very few empirical research studies which 
have looked at access to finance, and none have compared innovative and non-
innovative firms in China using multivariate regression techniques.  
SBS 2004/05 show evidence of possible gaps in the supply of finance for early 
stage technology firms, and for innovative firms in general. It is conceivable that 
innovative firms will tend to encounter more problems than non-innovative firms. The 
failure rate of inventive projects is very high. One recent study of independent 
investors found that 93% of inventive assignments did not reach the market and, of 
the 7% which did reach the market, only a mere 40% were profitable (Åstebro, 2003).  
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Although invention of new technology and raw materials are the most 
important driving force to advance productivity for the future, the researcher preferred 
to adopt a wider view of innovation in this study. ‘Technicalist’ views of innovation 
are narrow in terms of revealing the full impact of innovation on businesses (Freel, 
2003; Howells et al., 2006). There is a tendency in the recent researches to revert back 
to the more comprehensive view of innovation that is proposed in Schumpeter’s early 
works (see Schumpeter, 1912;1934;1942) as innovation has been recognised as a very 
complex process and therefore should not be merely explained by technology 
advancements (Audretsch et al., 2008; Robson et al., 2009). 
Taking Schumpeter’s view, owner-managers were asked to indicate in which 
area(s) they had performed innovative activities in the three year period, 2004-2006, 
and to specify whether the innovation introduced was novel or incremental. The seven 
domains of innovation available for them to select from were: (i) products, (ii) 
processes, (iii) work practices or workforce organisation, (iv) supply and supplier 
relations, (v) markets and marketing, (vi) administration and office systems, and (vii) 
product distribution. The cost of innovation as percentage of annual turnover was also 
gathered. Combined with indicators of financial constraints, particular emphasis was 
placed upon the role of innovation in borrowing and lending decisions to tie in with 
the financing theme of this thesis. 
 
5.5 Operationalisation 
This section outlines the reasoning behind why the researcher has adopted a 
quantitative rather than a qualitative research methodology, why the survey was 
chosen as the method of data collection, why it was decided to base the geographical 
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location of the study on Beijing, how the sample was selected and some of the reasons 
why other available methods were not used. The thinking in the design stage of the 
research strategy for this study is revealed. The main objectives of this research are to 
investigate the sources of finance that are available and been utilised by entrepreneurs 
in Beijing, to identify and evaluate the extent of financial constraints faced by these 
entrepreneurs, to examine barriers to growth including non-financial factors and to 
make plausible recommendations for policies towards the mitigation of these 
obstacles/challenges that entrepreneurs have no choice but to face. Having clarified 
these main objectives, the research strategy used and selections made by the 
researcher are believed to satisfactorily accomplish the purpose. 
 
5.5.1 Quantitative and qualitative research methodologies 
The gaps in both the literature on entrepreneurship in China and more so on 
empirical statistical/econometric studies of SMEs, together with the underlying 
strengths of quantitative research methodologies, has lead to the adoption of a 
fundamentally quantitative method of research for this thesis. In quantitative research, 
a much larger sample set of respondents is required compared to qualitative research. 
Only the gathering of a sufficient amount of data would enable the researcher to 
establish meaningful statistical relationships between variables and so address 
research questions (Aliaga and Gunderson, 2002). Quantitative research has the 
advantages of being objective, controlled, systematic and reliable (Punch, 2005). The 
data set must be collected systematically and be analysed using logically structured 
models to ensure the validity and reliability of the study and, by doing this the 
probability of creating errors is minimized (Muijs, 2004).  
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However, quantitative research is not without its drawbacks. Firstly, gathering 
a large number of respondents is expensive and, making it more difficult, the culture 
in Beijing is very conservative, so does not favour answering questions posed by 
strangers. The researcher will need to strike a good balance between the cost, the 
respect for people’s privacy, the sensitivity of questions to be included in the survey 
and, eventually, the usability of the data. Secondly, skill and effort are required to 
ensure proper management of the sampling and collection process, so that the 
accuracy and validity of the data set is protected.  
Moving on to qualitative research, the quality of quantitative study depends to 
a great extent on the “methodology skill, sensitivity, and integrity of the researcher” 
(Patton, 2002 pp.5).  The techniques used in qualitative study (i.e. observation, 
interviewing, content analysis) entail discipline, knowledge, creativity and diligent 
work (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Qualitative research is designed to go beyond 
figures and into people’s opinions, viewpoints, impressions, likes and dislikes, wishes 
or even feelings (Myers, 2000). It is fantastic to be able to concentrate on small highly 
focused samples, to gain further in-depth insights or feedback on the stories that had 
been told by numbers (results shown by quantitative research). In addition, responses 
from interviewees can open up more possible explanations for the problems the 
researcher is looking at, and, therefore enrich the findings from the results and offer a 
higher degree of flexibility (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994; Padgett, 2008). If 
interviews are well structured, qualitative research complements quantitative research 
in gathering primary data that are otherwise unobtainable and making the final 
findings stronger (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994).  
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In this particular study, due to the fact that three aspects of SMEs challenges 
together with different types of firms were considered, the amount of work involved 
to arrange suitable samples and perform differently designed interviews which 
correspond to each of these three aspects appears to be too time consuming and 
unfortunately costly. Therefore, regrettably, the results of this preliminary study will 
be based purely on quantitative research findings. However, for papers that are due to 
be sent to various journals for publication, if possible, qualitative research will be 
added.  Obviously, papers will be divided by topics to make information more 
condensed; thus it would then be feasible to perform qualitative research accordingly.  
The above section has explained the choice of the basic research strategy of 
this study, which is going to be entirely based upon a quantitative research. The next 
section then discusses the data collection methods used to facilitate the quantitative 
research and why alternative methods were not used.  
5.5.2 The creation of a questionnaire  
Because of the lack of secondary data available and more importantly to be 
faithful to the originality and authenticity of the study, the researcher had no choice 
but to come up with solutions to gather primary data sets for the empirical analysis. 
To perform this task, the researcher designed a questionnaire and administered these 
questionnaires.  
Inspiration was derived from the long established SME surveys which have 
been undertaken by Cambridge researchers (See the Small Business Research Centre, 
SBRC, 1992; CBR, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2007; Bennett and Robson, 1999; 
Robson and Bennett, 2000) and the surveys of Entrepreneurship of Scotland (See 
Freel and Robson, 2004; Robson et al., 2008a) and the surveys of Entrepreneurship in 
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Ghana (Robson and Obeng, 2008; Robson and Freel, 2008). A survey questionnaire 
was prepared taking into account the specific consideration of Chinese culture. The 
design of the questionnaire was based on the inclusion of a usable, explanatory, and 
sufficient selection of variables which would allow the researcher to establish 
statistical relationships between these variables in an attempt to use the primary data 
set to test hypotheses and finally to address the research questions/objectives outlined 
at the beginning of this section. The survey questionnaire was prepared in English and 
translated into Chinese according to Chinese customs and practice and was back-
translated by two academics from Beijing University. It was also piloted. The 
structure of the questionnaire and variables that were included will be discussed in 
detail in later sections in this chapter. Once the questionnaire was created, the method 
of distribution was on the agenda.  
 
5.5.3 Considerations of how to carry out the survey 
The researcher must select a reachable representative sample and adopt the 
most cost-effective approach in gathering the data (McNabb, 2004). There is a menu 
of various methods for empirical research available to choose.  In the order of 
distance to the respondents, there are: in-depth interviews, face-to-face questionnaire 
administration, telephone surveys, postal questionnaires, internet surveys and 
observation. The choice of using a single method, or a combination of two or more 
methods, is determined by for instance, the length of the questionnaire, the scale of 
the survey desired, the cost involved, the time constraints and the achievement of  an 
acceptable response rate. 
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5.5.3.1 Choosing a distribution channels for the survey 
Before arriving at a decision on how the questionnaires are distributed, the 
questionnaire was piloted to a small number of finance experts and entrepreneurs to 
receive feedbacks in terms of the suitability of the questions asked, and for the best 
approaches to follow in order to elicit a greater number of high quality responses. The 
researcher approached several possible distribution channels, including the China 
Association of Industry and Commerce, the China Association of Small and Medium 
Enterprises, the China Construction Bank, the China National Investment & 
Guarantee Co., Ltd and the Beijing Local Taxation Bureau. 
Although the China Association of Industry and Commerce and the China 
Association of SMEs are very reputable and are highly regarded among entrepreneurs 
in promoting business networks, the relationship between the associations and 
entrepreneurs is unfortunately not close enough to guarantee the response rate. It is 
even more difficult to attempt to gain access to the financial data that is crucial to this 
particular research through these two channels, as there is just not enough pressure 
from these two bodies on entrepreneurs to reveal any information of a sensitive nature. 
It is probably more straightforward in terms of constructing a sample 
framework because of the anticipated resistance from entrepreneurs to disclose 
financially related information would be lower, if a bank or a guarantee company is 
willing to cooperate with the data collection process. It is also true that loan 
applications made through this particular bank (note that applications made to other 
banks are likely to be excluded) or guarantor would be recorded and the data could be 
accessible subject to any confidentiality clause. Yet, the most serious problem with 
this source of data is that the final sample is highly likely to be concentrated on SMEs 
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that are desperate for external finance. On the other hand, those who are not as deeply 
financially stressed, or those who did not approach the finance provider due to a lack 
of awareness, are omitted. Therefore, the breadth of representation and the 
completeness of the data set are likely to be affected.    
Turning to the last of the possible sources, there are several reasons to suggest 
that it is the best option for this research project.  The legal enforcement powers of the 
local taxation bureaus, and the database they hold in their systems which is mainly 
financial statistics (i.e. many years of balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of 
all registered firms who trade in its locality) are important. The familiarity of their 
staff with entrepreneurs operating in their territories is a desirable feature, and all 
things taken together the researcher felt questionnaires sent out through this channel 
could promise success. However, to persuade taxation bureaus to cooperate was not 
going to be easy. It was vital not to breach confidentiality between the authority and 
the businesses. Therefore, every firm surveyed was kept anonymous. It was very 
fortunate for the researcher that, through family connections, the tax authorities 
finally agreed to support the data collection.  
It is worth mentioning here, , although all parties approached were willing to 
help and the need for this type of study struck a chord with them, they also expressed 
their serious reservations and concerns. The strong financial theme and inquisitorial 
nature of the survey made the research topic very sensitive and there is also a no 
‘reply culture’ in China. (Gu et al., 2006; Zhuang, 2007) Therefore, even before the 
research had begun, the foreseeable difficulties could not have been more apparent. 
Resistance from the entrepreneurs was well anticipated.  Finally, the database held at 
the local taxation bureau, allowed a valuable opportunity for cross-checking some 
facts and records to ensure the validity of responses.     
 168 
5.5.3.2 Reasons for choosing a postal survey and follow up telephone prompts 
It was greatly appreciated that two local taxation bureaus (each covering its 
specific district in Beijing) agreed to get involved in the survey distribution. However, 
there were conditions attached to their cooperation and involvement. Confidentiality 
of the taxpayers was the top priority to be protected and, as the researcher was not 
employed or instructed by the authority to do the work, the nature of this research was 
in theory a private project. Courtesies and many facilities such as headed paper, 
printed envelopes, a designated office in the taxation bureau and a direct telephone 
line were provided, which was very generous of the tax officers. In addition, it was 
agreed that spare questionnaires would be placed in the reception room of the taxation 
bureau ready for collection and one designated member of staff in the front office was 
in charge of the distribution and the collection of these questionnaires.  
If questionnaires are posted, the response rates are very often lower than face-
to-face interviews (Walsh and Wigens, 2003). In China, a postal survey was 
expensive to undertake because all the postage had to be paid for, as well as the 
professional printing of the questionnaires and the purchase of envelopes both for 
questionnaires and replies.  All of these were costs which had to be paid upfront. It 
was a big advantage to the researcher to be able to use the facilities provided by the 
tax bureaus, thus making this fieldwork semi-official. The utilisation of this 
‘ambiguity’ was the main factor that the researcher had hoped for, to guarantee the 
response rate.  
Because of the anticipated difficulties of this field work, there was no 
provision for an achievable response rate, the researcher was purely and simply doing 
her best persuade entrepreneurs to reply. Follow up telephone calls were made three 
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days, one week and two weeks after the batch of questionnaires was sent out. 
Although time consuming, telephone chasing was not only a technique to improve the 
results, but in this case an absolutely necessity job to do as face-to-face contacts with 
the entrepreneurs would give away the fact that this survey was a private project 
rather than a semi-official one. Again, the ‘ambiguity’ was an advantage to the 
researcher and was well worth securing.  
From some of the conversations in the telephone chasing after three days, it 
was apparent that some entrepreneurs, having decided not to reply, in fact were happy 
to do so after speaking to the researcher; some of these entrepreneurs who had 
disposed of the questionnaires agreed to come into the tax bureau to collect a 
replacement copy; some who were not sure of the situation, become more likely to 
reply after being made aware of this field work by these initial telephone chases.  
The post one week telephone calls concentrated on raising the awareness of 
the value of replying to the survey and to convey the thanks of the authority and the 
researcher herself. More importantly, since the entrepreneurs had already had a 
chance to read the questionnaire, the researcher had an opportunity to explain survey 
specific questions (i.e. single or multiple choices, and questions that required 
respondents to rank options were particularly difficult, in terms of the amounts in 
number terms or in percentage terms, etc.). It was also possible to resolve any 
misunderstanding of the questions and to try to convince more entrepreneurs to reply. 
By that time, the communication between both the taxation bureau’s reception staff 
and the entrepreneurs and between entrepreneurs themselves were extremely helpful 
in stimulating the willingness to respond.     
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After screening the responses received, two weeks after the questionnaire were 
sent out, another series of telephone calls was made, to speak to non-respondents in 
this case and make sure those who were going to reply would do so by a deadline 
which had been indicated in the cover letter sent to them with the questionnaire. They 
had been offered a choice of posting it back to the taxation bureau or to hand it in 
directly at the reception. For those who seemed obviously resistant, a final but careful 
push was given, and it was clear that no further telephone chases should be made as 
the privacy of the taxpayers was to be respected and unwelcome disturbance avoided.  
Learning from the first batch of 400 questionnaires, two further batches of 400 
questionnaires were sent out to take the total to 1200, and telephone chases were 
again performed at sensible time intervals.     
It was a matter of fact that if the researcher had used a postal survey method 
alone, the field work would have failed to deliver an acceptable response rate and the 
researcher would not have gathered sufficient data to perform her study. Thus, in this 
case, the combination of a postal survey and a series of well-planned telephone chases 
served the purpose very well, given the conditions the tax authority had requested the 
researcher to comply with. Because of the special channel the researcher was 
following, she was able to use a stronger survey distribution, as well as to adopt of a 
sensible methodological integration, so more confidence in the representativeness of 
and the generalisation of findings was achieved (Gilmore and Carson, 1996; 
O’Donnell and Cummins, 1999). 
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5.5.3.3 Reasons for not choosing alternative survey methods 
As mentioned in the above section, the confidentiality and privacy terms were 
agreed with the tax authority and, considering the relatively large scale of the field 
study, carrying out face-to-face interviews or questionnaire administration was not 
plausible. In fact, after more thought was given to how to fit the incredibly busy 
timetables and very likely different locations of 1200 entrepreneurs and make it 
convenient for them to be surveyed, it was apparent that this was an impossible task to 
perform. Despite the fact, a face-to-face survey would offer a lower sampling frame 
bias and response bias, so it was not practical to be adopted in this study.  
A telephone survey was another possibility which could be quicker and more 
responsive; however, where the survey questions are lengthy (the survey is 7 pages 
long in this case), it was unfortunately too expensive and too time consuming to do 
(Kempf and Remington, 2007). Secondly, it was going to be difficult to arrange a 
suitable time to speak to the entrepreneurs for a long time if they were on a business 
trip and it was more likely that the survey request would be rejected. It was much 
better to ask them to fill in the survey in the freedom of their own time. Thirdly, 
respondents would have a higher chance of being influenced or biased by the 
interviewer in a telephone conversation.    
 
5.5.4 Choosing a research site (area) 
Data for this study was collected from firms located in Beijing. So far, the 
researcher had seen very few studies performed with specific attention paid to SMEs 
operating in Beijing. The rare exception of a recent large-scale study of 
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entrepreneurship/SMEs in Beijing investigated returnee entrepreneurs on science 
parks (Wright et al., 2008) and the focus of their research is entirely different from 
this PhD study. Clearly, any research that can start filling the gap in empirical 
research of entrepreneurship in emerging markets, especially in China, are welcomed. 
There is no doubt about the importance of Beijing in terms of the economic, political 
and cultural roles it plays in China and even in the world today. People from all over 
the globe, from all backgrounds, want to know more about this ancient city’s past, 
present and future. 
For more than 700 years, Beijing has served as the capital of China and the 
principal seat of government.  Perhaps inevitably, private enterprises in Beijing face 
relatively higher entry barriers as a result of competition from a great many state-
owned enterprises (SOE). Moreover, intense control and monitoring by government 
agencies is thought to result in a discriminatory regulatory environment for SMEs 
(The State Council Document No.32; China Private Enterprises Year Book 2004-2006 
p. 215). This environment, in turn, may limit entrepreneurial opportunities and harden 
attitudes towards risk in comparison to other parts of China (China Private Enterprises 
Year Book 2004-2006 p. 219). The five special economic development zones3
                                                            
2 Document No. 3 or “Policy Directives Regarding Encouraging the Development of Private Sector”, 
issued on 19 February 2005, outlines the role governments should play in encouraging, supporting and 
leading non state-owned businesses. 
, for 
instance, enjoy favourable policies for taxation  and benefit from a wider range of 
subsidies to promote economic development. An old saying may also help explain 
conservatism in Beijing, and not solely with regards to business activities: “Shan Gao 
Huang Di Yuan”. An approximate translation is “Mountain high, Emperor far”. In 
other words, the mountains are so high and the emperor so far away that we will do 
what we want in our local area. To this end, a comparison is often drawn between 
3 Namely ShenZhen, Zhuhai, ShanTou, XiaMen and HaiNan.  
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vibrant Shanghai and subdued Beijing. The most successful Chinese entrepreneur, 
(Sir) Li Ka Shing, raises this issue in his 99 pieces of advice to Chinese entrepreneurs 
(Shang, 2005). 
The release of Document No. 3 (2005) saw the removal of entry barriers for 
private enterprises seeking to operate in previously state or SOE-controlled sectors 
(e.g. finance, insurance, energy, environment protection, education, and healthcare). 
Document No. 3 also enhanced government support for financial services to private 
enterprises (China Private Enterprises Year Book 2004-2006 p. 219). These actions 
fostered better communication between the government and Beijing’s private 
enterprise sector. In 2006 Beijing’s GDP grew by 12%, faster than the national 
average of 10.7%.  This may be partly explained by government spending on 
infrastructure, with over 100 billion Yuan spent every year since 2003 (part of the 
“New World, New China” project for the Olympic Games 2008 – see 
www.bjinvest.gov.cn).  Beijing is also home to a number of research universities and 
research centres (www.bjinvest.gov.cn). With specific regard to the supply side of 
finance, every major indigenous commercial or investment bank either has their 
headquarters in Beijing or has an extensive branch network throughout the city-region.  
Further, credit guarantee companies have been working closely with the China 
Development Bank to assist SMEs financially and to create new financial products 
that are better tailored to the needs of SMEs. 
The lack of data on SMEs activities in Beijing and the lack of previous 
research gave no guidance whatsoever to the researcher of the areas which should be 
concentrated on in terms of the choice of a sample. The rare example of large-scale 
research based in Beijing was carried out by Mike Wright and he selected his sample 
frame within the largest science park (ZSP) that operates on multiple sites in Beijing 
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(Wright et al., 2008). In his case, it was a suitable choice in the sense that returnee 
entrepreneurs, the topic of his study, are highly concentrated in this science park and 
he could have a population of 1003 identified firms to work on. Because the objective 
of this research is of a much broader scope, concentrating on one relatively small 
geographical area with a high density of similar activities would not be fit for purpose. 
Therefore, it was a difficult task to set out criteria of the population. The next three 
sections outline the steps taken to perform this task.   
 
5.5.5 Choosing a sample frame  
Researchers who carry out small business surveys face serious challenges and 
major hindrances (Vulliamy et al., 1990). The selection of a suitable sample frame is 
the earliest challenge researchers tend to experience in conducting entrepreneurship 
research. An inclusive list of businesses with up-to-date contact information is 
particularly hard to find (Jay and Schaper, 2003; Westhead et al., 2005b). It is even 
more demanding when the sampling frame is going to be narrowed by firm size, 
sector, location or other determinants. Curran and Blackburn (2001) stressed the 
missing register for small businesses in the UK. Furthermore, having access to a list 
does not necessarily mean that the information content of the list is adequate for the 
researcher to be able to reach the participants of the survey (Jay and Schaper, 2003).  
For this study, the researcher was fortunate enough to have access to the 
database of two local taxation bureaus in Beijing and the list of businesses they hold 
in their systems was the most comprehensive of its kind. The list contained all the 
information needed for the selection criteria, namely, the name, age, main activities, 
contact person, contact telephone number, legal person/owner, address, number of 
 175 
years in trade, and the number of employees at the end of the financial year of all the 
firms that are registered for tax purposes in their territory. Consequently the 
population of the research was clearly defined by applying the sample criteria listed in 
the next section.  
5.5.6 Sample criteria  
The participants were selected based on the following criteria: 
(i) The business must have a minimum 8 employees and a maximum 500 employees; 
(ii) The business must have been in operation for at least three years and be a going 
concern;  
(iii) The respondent must be the owner/founder or final decision-maker of the 
company; 
(iv) The business must be independently or privately owned (Rauch et al., 2005); 
(v) The business must be engaged in activities within the manufacturing or service     
industries4
(vi) The business must be located in Beijing. 
 (Westhead et al., 2005b);  
 
5.5.7 Determining the size of the sample frame 
There are 18 municipal districts in Beijing, some of them have high 
concentrations of clusters of firms operating in very limited business sectors (i.e. 
computer science) and some others have too low a level of business activities that are 
                                                            
4 The exclusion of public services such as public transport/education/hospitals, utilities and government 
agencies was due to the fact that they are supported directly through government spending therefore do 
not fall into the purpose of the research of this paper which relates to the issue of financing SMEs’. 
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suitable for this study (i.e. agricultural districts). In addition, the geographical 
coverage of the districts is not a good indicator of the level of business activities 
which exist in that area in Beijing. With a good local knowledge, the researcher 
therefore deliberately chose two local taxation bureaus to cooperate with, because of 
the relatively balanced mix of businesses (i.e. sector, size) in these two districts.  It 
was then more convenient to determine the sampling frame simply by skimming 
down the complete list of businesses (the study population) held by the authority 
according to the sample criteria. Because of the confidentiality clause the researcher 
had signed with the tax authority, it is unfortunately not possible to reveal the two 
chosen municipal districts for this study nor address more specific issues related to 
these two areas in details.   
Once the small and medium sized enterprises sampling frame from these two 
districts was available, 1200 independently owned firms (the sample) were selected 
randomly (Simple random sampling method used here) and were ready to be surveyed.  
As there is no strict standard or precise number of samples required for a given type 
of study, the researcher had to make a reasonable estimation of the number of 
questionnaires needed to be sent, taking into account the following factors: the type of 
research involved, the hypotheses to be tested, the number of variables, how the 
survey is going to be carried out, the time and financial constrains (McMillan and 
Schumacher, 1989).  The sample cannot be too small and needs to be large enough 
within a manageable scope to ensure the representativeness of the data and the 
generalisability of the findings (Fowler, 1988).   
The following business sectors are covered by the sample: all of the 
manufacturing industries, wholesalers, real estate agencies, mining & quarrying 
sectors, and construction firms; as well as service sectors, but excluding any public 
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services such as public transport/education/hospitals, utilities and government 
agencies due to the fact that they are supported directly through government spending. 
They, therefore, do not fall within the compass of the research of this paper which 
relates to SMEs’ financing issues.  
 
5.5.7.1 The reason for using simple random sampling 
Simple random sampling is a fair way to select a sample and it is simple to 
accomplish (Qi, 2001; Zhuang, 2007). Because of the fairness in the sampling process, 
it is reasonable to generalise the results from the sample back to the whole population. 
In terms of how this method is practiced in this study, the whole list of the sampling 
frame was recorded in Excel and then the function =RAND() was run and then the 
columns were sorted in the order from lowest to the highest random number. Finally 
the first 1200 companies in this sorted random list were identified. The drawback of 
this method is the omission of consideration of the subgroups/subcategories in the 
population. For this reason, simple random sampling is not the most statistically 
sophisticated method of sampling and although not used, the researcher thinks, for 
completeness of the methodology, it is worth mentioning the alternative method of 
sampling here as well – Stratified Random Sampling.   
Stratified random sampling, also called proportional or quota random 
sampling, is particularly useful when the study needs to address key subgroups of the 
population, especially the key subgroups, which are small minority groups. The way 
stratified random sampling works is that the population is divided into homogeneous 
subgroups before a simple random sample is drawn from each defined subgroup. The 
difficulty associated with this method is that the more superior statistical precision 
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than simple random sampling can only be achieved if the groups/strata are indeed 
homogeneous. Thus the variability is reduced by stratification.    
Because the population the researcher gathered from the taxation bureaus was 
already a well mixed dataset, there was no need to divide the dataset into subgroups as 
the SME sector is already a subgroup of the whole list of companies in its own right. 
The researcher believes that the variability in the population was also acceptable. 
Simple random sampling was much simpler and cost efficient to run and the sample 
selection fitted the purpose of the study.  
Once the access problem was resolved, the sampling process for this study 
was not a hugely complicated matter to deal with. Moving onto the data collection 
stage of the field work, the structure of the survey questionnaire is outlined in the next 
section.  
 
5.5.8 The data collection instruments  
5.5.8.1 Structured questionnaire 
Due to the relatively large sample required to analyse the problem of access to 
finance SMEs face in Beijing and the number of variables which are to be obtained 
from the survey would suggest a lengthy questionnaire, and the use of a structured 
questionnaire rather than unstructured. Indeed, from a practical point of view, 
structured questionnaires are much easier to analyse and much more suitable for 
quantitative research that require gathered datasets to be conveniently transferred into 
descriptive statistics and inferential statistics at a later point of time. This was 
tempered against the possibility of open-ended and unstructured questionnaires which 
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allow potentially more detailed information and explanations to be unfolded.  
However, with open-ended and unstructured questions there is the risk of respondents 
not completing such questions. 
Gill and Johnson (1997) suggested three principles to follow when 
constructing a questionnaire; they are the focus, the wording and the structure. By 
adhering to these three principles, the researcher should be able to perceive that: (i) 
the questionnaire is comprehensive and this is to say that all the issues to be addressed 
and the hypotheses to be tested are actually covered in the questionnaire; (ii) the 
intention of the study is clear, so that all participants that are interested in the topic 
would be inclined to respond; (iii) the wording is clear, straightforward, reader 
friendly and gives a professional impression, therefore the risk of questions being 
misunderstood is kept to the minimum and also the quality of the responses is 
controlled as far as possible. The wording and the structure of the questionnaire were 
even more important for this particular study, as the postal survey method does not 
generally offer a high response rate and the survey questionnaire was designed in 
English first, then translated into Chinese, and finally back-translated into English. 
Even slight wording differences can confuse the respondent and so lead to wrong 
interpretations of the question (www.socialresearchmethods.net). In other words, the 
terminology needs to be understandable and the questionnaire needs to be as friendly 
as possible and as easy to fill in as possible when it is presented to participants.  
The placement of the questions was also a major part of the design process. 
The opening questions are generic questions to put the respondent at ease and get the 
ball rolling. Wherever possible, sensitive questions (i.e. on profitability, the amount of 
loan sought, amount of loan sought obtained, etc.) are not clustered together, as doing 
so could potentially put people off and reduce the response rate even further. The 
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researcher attempted to place difficult or uncomfortable topics after a rapport with the 
respondent was established and proper transition was prepared for the respondent to 
move onto these sensitive subjects. Important questions are intentionally placed in 
earlier parts of the questionnaire just in case the respondents leave the later parts 
blank. Some of these questions were asked twice in different formats to allow for 
cross-checking and to ensure consistency.    
In terms of the type of questions constructed, dichotomous questions (i.e. 
Yes/No, True/False, Agree/Disagree questions) were widely used.  Nominal questions 
in the forms of single choice or multiple choice questions also played a major part in 
the survey.  Ordinal questions that asked participants to rank order their preferences 
were kept to a minimum as this type of question is difficult to understand by the 
participants and in a postal survey, the administrator does not have the opportunity to 
verify any ambiguities.  Finally, open-end questions were avoided as they are difficult 
to assess and quantify and can make the already long questionnaire feel even longer.  
The questionnaire was seven pages long and arranged in three sections, being 
‘information about your character and the business’, ‘innovation and performance’ 
and ‘financing’. There were 50 questions in total. The researcher had strictly followed 
the golden rule of survey research, that is: “Do unto your respondents as you would 
have them do unto you!” (www.socialreserachmethods.net).  
The next section provides information about the measures that were included 
in the survey which is further separately discussed with respect to the dependent 
variables, independent variables, control and demographic variables. 
 
 
 181 
5.6 Measures 
 
5.6.1 Dependent variables 
Financing difficulties confronted by small business entrepreneurs in Beijing 
are the target observation of this study and the assessments made centred around this 
issue and the study delivers findings that fulfill the research objectives.  
 
5.6.1.1 Credit rationing and financial constraints 
First of all, a distinction between credit rationing and financial constraints is 
worth making. Empirical findings which draw the readers’ attention to these two 
subjects will then be self-explanatory. Although these two phrases appear to be both 
talking about business financing problems, their meanings and viewpoints differ. For 
the purpose of this study, a firm is said to be credit rationed if, at the prevailing rate of 
interest, it seeks to access a larger amount of credit, but has to settle for less or none 
(Guiso, 1998).  However, a credit constraint “occurs when borrower’s request for a 
loan were completely turned down, obtained only a smaller amount or the borrower 
decided not to apply or requested less than they had wished to borrow because they 
believe they would not get that amount” (Fletschner, 2008 pp.675). Clearly, in such 
circumstances, loan providers are literally rationing credit on some basis other than 
price. ‘Financial constraints’ in simple terms mean frictions that hamper the firm’s 
ability to invest, or in other words, the factors that prevent the firm from funding all 
desired investment projects. You could also say that the firm which is financially 
constrained needs extra finance. Thus it becomes apparent that credit rationing is a 
phenomenon and financial constraints are a set of elements.  
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Previous empirical studies have shown that access to finance is one of the 
major constraints to small business’s expansion, growth and development (Steel and 
Webster, 1992; Levy, 1993; Pissarides, 1999; Okoh and Ping, 2000; European 
Commission, 2002; Van Eeden et al., 2003). In the questionnaire, respondents were 
asked “How much additional finance did you seek and what proportion of this did you 
obtain?” By examining the percentage of finance sought obtained, the degree of credit 
rationing was recorded. In addition, the credit rationing phenomenon was assessed by 
way of questioning the number of times the respondent approach various finance 
providers (not limited to banks only) for finance and the number of times the 
application was successful. Furthermore, respondents were presented with a set of 
possible occurrences to their credit application(s) corresponding to the same set of 
sources of finance as the previous table and they were asked to indicate whether they 
were successful by receiving full amount, reduced amount or none. Whether or not a 
firm was financially constrained was indicated by a Yes/No question asking if the 
entrepreneur had been seeking finance in the previous three years.  
  
5.6.2 Independent variables 
5.6.2.1 Innovation measures 
In terms of our focus on innovation, and despite its having been the subject of 
substantial research over the years, we note a disappointing lack of consensus in 
defining and operationalising innovation. In analysing innovation, researchers have 
variously focused upon input measures (e.g. R&D expenditure or the number of 
qualified scientists or engineers - see Mairesse and Mohnen, 2004 as a typical 
example) and output measures (such patents or new product/process introductions – 
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see Freel and Robson, 2004). More recently, this latter focus has been broadened to 
include a wider set of innovation domains (such as work, supply, markets, 
administration, and distribution - see Guan and Ma, 2003). It may be the case that the 
magnitude of credit constraint is influenced by the type of innovation firms engage in 
(or, indeed, by the measure of innovation which researchers adopt).  
Accordingly, in this study the researcher has applied multiple measures of 
“innovativeness” including; R&D expenditure as a proportion of turnover; and, 
separately, innovation introductions with respect to seven domains: product, process, 
work, supply, markets, administration and distribution. With regards to the seven 
domains of innovation adopted in this study, the participants were give a choice of 
three answers, being ‘no innovation’ (coded as ‘1’), ‘innovation new to firm’ (coded 
as ‘2’) and ‘innovation new to industry’ (coded as ‘3’), to represent ‘non-
innovativeness’, ‘incremental innovation’ and ‘novel innovation’ respectively for 
each single domain.   
 
5.6.3 Control variables and demographic variables 
5.6.3.1 Education 
The Entrepreneurs’ level of education is “a key constituent of the human 
capital needed for business success” (Storey, 1994 pp.129). Even though some people 
may argue that entrepreneurs are a ‘special breed’ and education for them can often be 
replaced by qualification by experience (QBE). In many real life situations, the 
education level helps entrepreneurs to assess uncertainties better and to acquire 
necessary skills to develop their business. Davidsson and Honig (2003) asserted that 
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education can stimulate the generation of ideas and so individuals can cope better 
with problems. The ability to learn and to think individually is not to be under-
estimated.  
Educational achievement has long been used as a proxy for the entrepreneur’s 
human capital (Becker, 1975). Eight different levels of education were presented to 
respondents in the form of a Yes/No question and they were required to tick all the 
boxes that applied. The levels were middle school or less, high school, 
technical/vocational/apprenticeship, diploma, bachelors degree, professional 
qualification (i.e. in accountancy/law), masters degree or above and others. 
Respondents who reported ‘yes’ to one category were coded ‘1’ and those who 
reported ‘no’ were coded ‘0’.  
 
5.6.3.2 Previous experience in business 
Another well-used proxy for the entrepreneur’s human capital was his/her 
previous experience in business. In this survey, the number of years in business was 
collected as indicator to this variable (Becker, 1975). Although how much people can 
learn from experience is hard to quantify and varies by person, evidence shows that an 
individual’s work experience enhances their ability to access information and finance 
(Boden and Nucci, 2000). Years of running a business in China would also show to 
some degree the number of connections the entrepreneur would build in his/her social 
network, as without connections, it is impossible to carry on doing business in China.  
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5.6.3.3 Family business  
Chinese families have a much tighter tie than families in Western countries. The fact 
that one of the family members becomes an entrepreneur means that this business 
soon becomes a family matter and so the family acts as the “oxygen” that feeds the 
fire of entrepreneurship for society (Rogoff and Heck, 2003). As a special group of 
business and a common form of entrepreneurship in China, family business ownership, 
management and performance are important issues for enterprise sustainability. The 
definition of a family business the researcher used was that at least one member of the 
family had to be employed in the business. This fact was then cross-checked by 
asking participants to report the percentage of the business that was owned altogether 
by him/her and his/her family members.  Whether or not the businesses are family 
businesses is also in part capturing part of the social capital ties of the entrepreneurs.  
However, 5.6.3.12 covers Social capital in more depth. 
 
5.6.3.4 Foreign direct investment involvement  
As the world has stepped into the globalization era, in the last two decades of 
economic reforms, China has progressively opened its door to the outside world 
through trade and foreign direct investment (Tseng and Zebregs, 2002).  China had 
taken an increasingly important role as “the world factory” and became the largest 
foreign direct investment (FDI) recipient, surpassing the USA for the first time in 
2002.  
The availability of funding to the private sector is considered a vital factor to 
achieve economic growth and so attracting FDI, to an extent, accomplishes some of 
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the needs of businesses (Na and Lightfoot, 2006).  Not only can FDI can bring capital, 
but successful cooperation with a foreign venture can also enhance technology, 
marketing and management skills of the Chinese counterparts which proves to be a 
win-win scenario (Cheng and Kwan, 2000).  According to the United Nations, FDI 
can provide an important private financing source and is a crucial complement to 
national and international development efforts (UN 2002; Nunnenkamp, 2004). The 
respondents were required to report whether or not they receive FDI and if ‘yes’, what 
percentage of the capital was from FDI.  
 
5.6.3.5 Sector 
In the questionnaire, respondents were asked ‘What does your business 
make/provide?’ as an open-ended question. In addition, from the taxation bureau’s 
database, main business activity/sector was also recorded; however, this was not as 
precise as the answers provided by the participants. The sector was not coded and was 
recorded faithfully according to respondents’ answers. 
 
5.6.3.6 Size of the firm 
Many researchers have reported that small firms are being credit rationed and 
disadvantaged because of their size, and that the size of a business determines the 
source of finance the entrepreneur has access to, at start-up and other stages of the 
business cycle (Aryeetey et al., 1994; Nissanke, 2001; Hernandez-Trillo et al., 2005; 
Kutsuna and Honjo, 2006). The number of employees was chosen as the parameter 
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for the size of the business in this study. Respondents were asked to report the number 
of employees in their business as at the year end of 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006.  
 
5.6.3.7 Employment growth 
By following the size of the firm, employment growth in 2004, 2005 and 2006 
can be calculated by absolute (t2-t1) measures (Davidsson and Wiklund, 2000).   
 
5.6.3.8 Gender 
The gender of the final decision maker in the firm may make a difference 
when the firm is seeking finance. Female entrepreneurs encounter difficulties in 
raising external finance, particularly from banks (Birley et al., 1987; Van Uxem and 
Bais, 1996), which lead them to be more reliant upon personal funds.  Having said 
that, research shows that females generally use smaller amounts of finance than males 
(Carter and Rosa, 1998); hence, although they tend to utilise restricted personal funds, 
they may not be as financially constrained as people think in reality, but this needs to 
be tested.  
That female-owned businesses are disadvantaged over access to resources is a 
generally accepted observation (Carter and Rosa, 1998). Various reasons account for 
this phenomenon, notably the lack of collateral which can be offered by female 
entrepreneurs (Zeller, 1994; Baden, 1996), the fact that women tend to enter low-
income service sectors (Van Uxem and Bais, 1996; Carr et al., 2000; Van Straveren, 
2001), the lack of relevant experience (Cooper et al., 1994), and the lack of 
knowledge and information about sources of finance, products and services 
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(Kashuliza and Kydd, 1996; Atieno, 2001). Male respondents were coded ‘1’ and 
female respondents were coded ‘0’.    
 
5.6.3.9 Age of the entrepreneur 
Knowledge and experience accumulate with the advancement of age and 
generally older entrepreneurs are more experienced in business (Aldrich, 1999).  The 
experience referred to includes business ownership (Bates, 1990; Cooper et al., 1994), 
information processing, management skills, and financing skills, which all represent 
elements constituting  the entrepreneur’s human capital, which will increase with age 
until the person is middle-aged before diminishing over time (Cressy, 1996). This is, 
in fact, part of the ageing process.   
Entrepreneurs were asked to indicate their exact age in the survey, as this was 
a straightforward easy question to answer. Having records of the exact age will give 
more flexibility to the researcher at a later date, if she needs to group and possibly 
regroup the sample taken into account of the changes in results by moving the range 
of the age groups.  
  
5.6.3.10 Relative role model 
Individuals with parent(s) as owners of a business are more likely to follow in 
their footsteps by owning their own business (Curran et al., 1991).  Parent(s) acted as 
relative role models for the entrepreneur. Characteristics associated with 
entrepreneurs with a relative role model are usually demonstrated as being risk averse, 
possessing a fear of loosing control of their business and of being protective of the 
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family’s reputation and company’s independence (Sonnenfeld and Spence, 1989; 
Neubauer and Lank, 1998; Romano et al., 2001). Respondents were asked to answer a 
dichotomous question to indicate whether they had had family members involved in 
business in the past.  
 
5.6.3.11 Age of business 
Generally speaking, the longer the business has been trading, at a profit, the 
easier it is for the firm to gain access to external finance. Start-up businesses are often 
more severely impeded by the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems resulting from information asymmetry and caused by a lack of proven track 
record (Huyghebaert, 2003; Huyghebaert and Gucht, 2007). This may seem to be 
common sense, yet evidence shows that older businesses possessing good track 
records tend to have more retained profit/reserves, and are therefore less likely to be 
financially constrained and so less likely to apply for external finance (Hall et al. 
2004).  Anyway, the age of the business is a determinant for SMEs’ access to finance 
(Abor and Biekpe, 2006). The age of a business was measured by the year in which 
the business was established and then the response was cross-checked with the 
taxation bureau’s records.   
 
5.6.3.12 Social capital 
It might be more appropriate to change the terminology of this section to 
‘social networking’ or ‘connections’ as what was observed in the survey offered far 
narrower parameters than what is really captured in the context of social capital. In 
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making this distinction it needs to be noted the difficulties in capturing measures of 
social capital in quantitative research.  In qualitative research the derivation and 
harvesting of social capital measures is easier and more comprehensive, in large part 
because of the interactions which the researchers have with the respondents.  
Obviously, with quantitative research these interactions are not present. 
Coleman (1988 pp. S95) named three forms of social capital: “obligations and 
expectations, information channels, and social norms”. Social capital is fully 
exercised and extremely important in the Chinese context and is a very interesting 
research topic in its own right. What is worth noting is that social capital creates 
human capital (Coleman 1988), thus enhances the performance of entrepreneurs.  
As this study is designated to address financing issues, the social capital 
concept was only lightly touched on, by requesting respondents to indicate whether or 
not they intentionally maintain good relationships with banks and if the answer is 
‘yes’, with how many banks? Although the observation of social capital was restricted 
solely to the relationship with banks, the inclusion of these two questions enabled 
examination of the possible relationship between social capital and credit rationing.  
 
5.7 Piloting and Screening 
 
The draft questionnaire was piloted to obtain feedback from a variety of 
sources, including academics, entrepreneurs, bankers, guarantors and policy makers. 
The aim of conducting the pilot study was to basically test the water and the 
researcher was determined to find any weaknesses in the questionnaire before they 
were formally sent out to the public. The pilot study helped to evaluate how 
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understandable the questionnaire was, to assess how uncomfortable respondents 
would be when asked to give answers to sensitive financial questions and to get an 
idea of how likely the sample would be to respond to the survey. Evaluators were 
asked to pay particular attention to the wording of the questionnaire and recommend 
changes to be made, so that the researcher would be sure that the questionnaire could 
be fully and easily understood by the sample entrepreneurs and the wording was 
friendly and professional.  
Some comments were given by the evaluators regarding the length, form, 
content, and wording of some questions. Modifications and refinements to the 
questionnaire were made accordingly after careful consideration. In general, the 
questionnaire was well received, and the content was highly regarded. The only main 
concern expressed by the evaluators was that the questionnaire was too long. 
Although the researcher managed to shorten the 8 page long original questionnaire to 
the 7 page final version, it was still a lengthy survey by any standard. It was kept to 
that length to ensure the survey could deliver the comprehensiveness of the variables.  
After a successful round of piloting, the postal survey method was used for 
distribution and the collection process was assisted by a series of telephone chases. 
The next section examines these methods. 
 
5.8 Getting the Respondents Back 
 An appropriate survey method or a combination of methods had to be 
designed and administered in order to maximise the response rate, monitor the quality 
of the respondents and to make sure that the field work ran smoothly without 
interruptions. Awareness of the research among respondents was raised after the 
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questionnaires were sent out, but lasts only for so long, so the data collection process 
had to be as efficient as possible.  
Since a postal survey done anonymously was the only method that was both 
practical to do and could protect the confidentiality of respondents’ information, the 
researcher had to bear with the consequences of an usually low response rate 
generated from any postal survey. Deros et al. (2009) achieved a response rate of 
about 19% on their postal survey sent to 350 Malaysian manufacturing SMEs. A 
postal survey sent to 400 manufacturing companies in the UK by Reed et al. (2001) 
received the even lower response rate of 5.5% However, to improve this statistic, 
telephone chases were carried out at post 3 days, post one week and post two weeks 
after the surveys were sent out in the mail. In addition, extra copies of the 
questionnaire were made available for collection at the reception desk in the local 
taxation bureaus and one designated member of staff from the taxation bureau was in 
charge of receiving the completed questionnaires.  
Three batches of surveys, totalling 1200 questionnaires, were sent by post with 
prepaid reply envelopes or collected in person directly from their local taxation 
bureaus in Beijing. The advantages of using this approach included that: (i) the 
handing in of the responses was made as easy as possible for the participants within a 
locality over a reasonable period of time; (ii) opportunities to clarify doubts about 
specific responses were made available on 3 occasions by way of telephone 
conversation; (iii) costs were kept within a manageable level as the researcher could 
handle the majority of the work by herself and only needed selected and trained 
assistance when the telephone chases were carried out; and (iii) because of the 
involvement of the taxation authority, the researcher was able to take advantage of the 
ambiguity, which therefore enhanced the enforcement power of the survey.  
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5.9 Data Presentation and Analysis 
Data analysis is the fermentation process of a research study. No matter how 
fantastic the grapes harvested from the field, it is the fermentation and blending that 
makes the final wine successful. Data analysis is crucial in the sense that if it is not 
performed well enough, the efforts and expenses already put into the designing, 
planning and data collection stages of the research would be wasted. The aim is to be 
able to present the reader with logical and useful results that can then be transformed 
into policy recommendations and hopefully be beneficial to the public. The data 
analysis process for this study involves three major steps; data preparation, descriptive 
statistics and inferential statistics. They are separately addressed in the following three 
sections.   
 
5.9.1 Data preparation  
Data preparation involves checking the accuracy of the data collected, editing 
the data, coding the questions and responses, entering the data into the computer and 
transforming the data into a database format which is then ready to be analysed.  
The responses were screened for accuracy as soon as they were received. In 
social researches, the quality of measurement is a major issue. Questions that were 
asked during the data checking process were: 
(i) Is the handwriting of the respondents recognisable / readable? 
(ii) Are all important questions answered adequately? 
(iii) Are there any obvious discrepancies when the data is cross-checked against 
the database held by the taxation bureaus?   
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Reading every single completed questionnaire was time consuming, yet 
definitely worthwhile. It allowed the researcher to edit, correct and update any 
inconsistencies, irregularities and or abnormal patterns in the data immediately at the 
first available instance. Fortunately, due to the enforcement power of the tax authority 
and the interest raised within the society about the usefulness of this study, all 
responses were more or less completely filled out. Only minor omissions were noticed 
which should not affect the quality of the responses as a whole.     
The data were then coded and inputted in Excel and then transferred to the 
Statistical Package for Social scientists (SPSS) to form the database. The reason for 
using SPSS was that it is one of the most widely used statistical software in social 
sciences and it is simple to convert an Excel database into SPSS. Many features of 
SPSS allow data analysis to be generated automatically and quickly, hence it serves 
the needs of this study very well. Periodic descriptive statistics tables were run to 
ensure any discrepancies and abnormalities were resolved immediately to avoid input 
errors.    
After the data were fully inputted and transformed into the database, original 
returned surveys were stored safely in a data archive.  
 
5.9.2 Basic descriptive statistics for the sample  
Descriptive statistics are used to highlight the basic characteristics of the 
database and present a summary to the reader. The survey was undertaken over the 
period July to December 2007, and a response rate of 37.67% was achieved. Out of 
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the total of 1200 questionnaires distributed, 457 responses were received after a series 
of telephone prompts. However, 5 of these were unusable as the number of employees 
in the businesses was above the 500 employee upper limit. The final sample consisted 
of 261 manufacturing firms and 191 service sector firms, making a total of 452 usable 
datasets.  
In terms of the business sectors of the respondents, the manufacturing firms 
consisted of all of the manufacturing sectors in the 2003 standard industrial 
classification (SIC) between 15-36.  The service sector firms consisted of the 
wholesale trade and repair of motor vehicles (50, 51), land transport (60), real estate 
activities (70), computer and related activities (72), research and development (73), 
and other business activities (74), where the values in parentheses are the 2003 SIC 
codes. Table 5.1 illustrates the relative sectoral distribution of the firms.  
The descriptive statistics presented in this section relate to the full 452 firms 
with returned and usable information.      
The key characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 5.2 were as follows: 
the average size of the firms was 54 employees and the average age of the firms was 8 
years.  Family businesses accounted for 48% of the firms and 52% were non-family 
businesses.  The key types of businesses consisted of registered businesses (45%), 
partnerships (23%) and limited liability (32%).  Exporters made up 25% of the firms 
and non-exporters, 75%.  With regard to the characteristics of the owner-managers: 
79% were male and 21% were female, the average age being 41 years. Of the owners, 
37% had a relative as role model who had run a business before.  In terms of the 
human capital of the owner-managers, 54% had degree level qualifications. 
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5.9.3 Inferential statistics 
 
On the basis of proposed hypotheses and questions set out for this study, 
inferences from the data were made to arrive at summaries of the tested results. 
Appropriate statistical analyses methods were then selected for conducting analysis 
with the objective of gaining an overview of the data, testing the quality of data and 
finding results that either support or reject the null hypotheses (Hussey and Hussey, 
1997; Curran and Blackburn, 2001). 
The later empirical chapters of this thesis present exploratory studies of 
obstacles SMEs face in Beijing, and so, as such, the results are preliminary. In terms 
of the data analysis methods, a combination of cross-tabulations and chi-squared 
statistical techniques combined with OLS, tobit and other more sophisticated 
regression techniques were utilised.  Taken together the combination of investigative 
techniques provides a better picture of the nature of problems small business sector 
experiences, associated with credit rationing, the financing of innovation and other 
barriers to growth in Beijing, and the issues which this rapidly developing nation 
faces.   
 
5.10 Validity and Reliability of Survey Findings 
Reliability is the consistency of your measurement, or how well an instrument 
measures the same subjects the same way each time it is used under the same 
condition. In simple terms, it means the repeatability of your measurement. It is worth 
noting that reliability can only be estimated but not calculated. Validity is the strength 
of our conclusions, inferences or propositions. More formally, Cook and Campbell 
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(1979 pp.37) define it as the "best available approximation to the truth or falsity of a 
given inference, proposition or conclusion." Therefore, validity is to do with the 
fitness of instruments that were adopted in the research to arrive at the findings. It 
may well be argued that validity is more important than reliability for the reason that 
if the instrument does not accurately measure what it is supposed to measure, it is 
simply a wrong decision to use it even if it delivers consistent/reliable measurements.  
If the findings of a research are not reliable and/or not valid, the research is a 
waste of time, effort and resources. How to perform the research successfully at a 
high standard depends on how well prepared the study design was to tackle 
threats/exposures to the reliability and validity of the data and the measurement 
instruments.   
Measurement errors, which consist of two components, random error and 
systematic error, affect reliability and therefore should be controlled Random error 
affects the variability to the data and tends to sum to 0 when the sample is sufficiently 
large. Hence, it is only considered as noise since it does not affect the mean value. In 
contrast, systematic error can be more serious, as it tends to systematically affect 
measurement of the variable across the sample, resulting in either a positive or 
negative shift of the mean value. Systematic error is therefore considered as a bias. To 
reduce measurement errors and strengthen the reliability and validity of the study 
results, the researcher took the following actions. 
First of all, a structured questionnaire was derived on the basis of an extensive 
literature review and from numerous long established, well constructed surveys. The 
questionnaire was structured to ensure consistency and also intentionally included 
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cross-checking questions. The sample frame was then carefully selected to make sure 
a good level of representativeness of the data.  
Secondly, the survey was pilot tested and was amended and justified against 
the feedbacks received from qualified respondents and experts. Thus the consistency 
of the measurement was improved and the testing environment was verified.  
Thirdly, the fact that local taxation bureaus were used as the distribution 
channel for the survey research effectively encouraged the accuracy of the survey 
responses. Moreover, as some of the sensitive information requested in the 
questionnaire is already held by the tax authority, it would be pointless for the 
respondents to give false figures or statements in the answers. As a matter of fact, if 
the entrepreneur decided to send a reply back to the tax authority, he/she would be 
more serious about not making any mistakes in the questionnaire.  
Fourthly, due to the restricted budget, the researcher carried out the majority 
of the fieldwork and all of the data input personally. Although it resulted in a more 
than the anticipated length of time, the requirement for necessary training of helpers 
was kept to a minimum.  Helpers were only involved in the telephone prompts and 
passed all technical questions back to the researcher as soon as they were raised by 
the respondents.  As a result, the quality of the surveyor was consistent and was of the 
highest standard which reasonably could have been achieved.  
Fifthly, the sample frame was randomly selected and the final sample was 
large enough to eliminate random errors which may exist, thus the sample forms a 
good database to base the studies upon. 
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Last but not least, a combination of cross-tabulations and chi-squared 
statistical techniques and, subsequently, OLS and tobit regression techniques were 
employed to investigate the hypotheses. The results obtained from different 
techniques were used to check for consistency.     
To sum up, an unreliable and invalid dataset, affected by systematic 
measurement errors in the system may lead to a false estimation of relationships 
between variables (Davidsson, 2004). The researcher paid particular attention to the 
instruments used in obtaining valid (accurate) and reliable (consistent) measurements 
and strengthened the statistical power of the study to the best of her ability.  
During the period of the fieldwork, some problems and challenges were 
encountered. The next section outlines these difficulties.   
    
5.11 Problems Encountered During the Fieldwork 
• The language problem 
Because the original questionnaire was written in English, to translate into Chinese 
meant the precision of the terminology and wording were rather challenging. Some 
terminologies that are commonly used in Western countries, for instance vocational 
qualifications and some accounting vocabulary, were hard to translate into appropriate 
Chinese words, so that the meaning was correctly transferred. Unfortunately, direct 
translations (translation word by word) do not work in some circumstances. The 
questionnaire had to reflect Chinese culture and common practices and had to 
precisely communicate the meaning of the original questions written in English.  The 
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questionnaire was also then back translated from Chinese to English to ensure that the 
questionnaire was remained.      
 
• To reach the respondents  
The most difficult task the researcher experienced during the whole time of 
her PhD study was to negotiate the most suitable distribution channel through which 
to reach the respondents. This organization had to be influential enough to help boost 
the response rate and had to be willing to cooperate as much as they could. Extensive 
family and personal networks were utilised in securing this crucial sponsor.  
Numerous points of contact were approached and the feasibility of the 
distribution of the survey was discussed with the person with decision making 
authority in each organisation. In total, the researcher spent a considerable period of 
time and approached 5 possible distribution channels, namely the Beijing Local 
Taxation Bureau, the China Association of Industry and Commerce, the China 
Association of Small and Medium Enterprises, the China Construction Bank and the 
China National Investment & Guaranty Co., Ltd.   Some disappointing conversations 
with apparently interested parties only served to make the researcher more determined 
to complete this project.  Finally, cooperation and help were offered by two of the 
local taxation bureaus in Beijing, to assist her all the way to fulfill the toughest part of 
this research, for which the researcher remains eternally grateful. 
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• To secure an acceptable response rate 
Despite benefiting from the backup received from the tax authority, it was still 
necessary to carry out telephone prompts in order to secure an acceptable response 
rate. For a period of 3 complete months, the researcher occupied an office in the 
taxation bureau and had a direct telephone line to keep in touch with the respondents 
and answer any questions and raised concerns. As a result, a form of trust was built up 
between the researcher and the respondents and, in return, more and more completed 
questionnaires were returned to the office. Accessibility and the personal touch were 
felt hugely beneficial to achieve a result of 37.67% response rate. This was an 
impressive result for a project run by a private individual to the majority of previous 
researches on China, most of which did not tackle empirical studies of this scale.    
  
• Reluctance of respondents to share information 
Financing has always been a sensitive topic to answer about, even though 
everyone would admit that it is one of the key issues related to all types of businesses. 
Understandably, the researcher encountered reluctance in the area of questions 
regarding their profitability, their need for finance, the amount of finance obtained 
and the sources of such finance (informal sources in particular). It was mostly during 
the post 3 days telephone prompt that some of the respondents declined to participate 
and did not want to be contacted further.   
Percentages were asked in the questionnaire as opposed to absolute values to 
mitigate the fact that some respondents might give vague or false figures. Observation 
had shown that this technique worked quite well.  There were both benefits and 
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dangers in deriving authority from the tax bureaus to perform the survey. Some might 
find it pointless or be afraid to hide information from the tax office and so just filled 
out the questions which were in fact nothing to do with their tax obligations, whereas 
others were reluctant because of the fear of revealing information which might be 
used against them as grounds for tax evasion charges. Some did not want to share 
their business’ financial information in any way as they believed it was a company 
secret. In the end, the reluctance and hesitation from the respondents were kept at a 
manageable level and they were assured that the questionnaires were completed on a 
voluntary and anonymous basis.  
 
• The need to interpret the questionnaire to some respondents 
Although there were not too many enquiries concerning the need to interpret 
the questionnaire, respondents who had lower levels of education or had no contact 
with academic studies in the past felt some questions were difficult to understand.  
The fact that the researcher had deliberately called the respondents offering assistance 
and was available to answer any questions during working hours for three months 
solved this problem.   
 
5.12 Conclusion 
The main focus of this study was to evaluate the credit rationing phenomena; 
the financial constraints firms suffer with respect to firms involved in innovation in 
particular and also the barriers that hinder the growth of small and medium sized 
enterprises in Beijing.   The research methodology was chosen to fulfill the objective 
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of this study. The rationale for this study was to fill the gaps in empirical research into 
the financing and barriers to growth of Chinese SMEs to contribute to the growing 
knowledge in the field of entrepreneurship in China and to influence policy initiatives 
in small business development. A theoretical framework for the research was built on 
the foundation of relevant finance theories, and the human capital theory.  
Cost-effectiveness and the achieving of an acceptable response rate to ensure 
the validity of the findings resulting from the database were the top priorities when an 
appropriate research strategy was proposed (McNabb, 2004). To control measurement 
errors, the vital instrument used for the study, the questionnaire, was created and the 
survey was undertaken in line with the objectives of the study. The wording of the 
questionnaire was clear and straightforward to answer for Chinese entrepreneurs to 
answer.  A postal survey method combined with a series of 3 telephone prompts were 
believed to be the most promising approach to gather the maximum number of 
respondents as well as protecting the privacy of the taxpayers. A lower sample frame 
bias was achieved by the utilisation of a comprehensive, official and consistent list of 
businesses from a single source. Having a designated office and a direct telephone 
line inside the taxation bureau made it possible for the researcher to be reached easily 
by the respondents and this personal touch was very helpful in building a good 
relationship with respondents, controlling the quality of returned surveys and proved 
to be more cost effective than for instance face-to-face interviews. Although other 
scholars may well have favoured face-to-face interviews instead (Walsh and Wigens, 
2003; Czaja and Blair, 2005), under the circumstances the researcher faced at the time 
of the fieldwork, it was not practical to do interviews for such a large number of 
respondents.  
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For objective, systematic, valid and reliable findings, a quantitative research 
method was adopted for the three empirical chapters presented in later parts of the 
thesis. Qualitative research methods, although not being used for this study, were also 
considered to put in use as complements to empirical results derived from the sample 
in future publications.     
The measurement of the variables for the empirical analysis were grouped into 
dependent, independent, control and demographic variables. The dependent variables 
were examined under the subjects of credit rationing and financial constraints 
respectively. The independent variables included growth, innovation, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and family businesses. The control variables covered the business 
sector, size of the firm and age of the business. The demographic variables included 
general and specific human capital factors of the entrepreneur, namely social capital, 
gender, age of entrepreneur, and relative role models. The above list is however not 
inclusive of all the variables collected as the survey questions had a broader remit to 
facilitate future research papers. 
In total, 452 responses were received from an initial survey of 1200 
entrepreneurs. OLS, tobit and other more sophisticated regression techniques were 
used to analyse the data. Descriptive statistics were presented to summarise the 
key characteristics of the sample.  
The assessment of the reliability and validity of the research findings with 
regards to the actions taken to reduce measurement errors and strengthen the 
statistical power was demonstrated in detail. At the end of the methodology chapter, 
the difficulties that were encountered by the researcher in completing the study were 
also reported.  
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The first five chapters of this study have looked at the originality and 
overview of the study, the theoretical foundations and previous research relating to 
finance, credit rationing and entrepreneurship with particular attention paid to China, 
and also the methodology adopted in gathering data for the empirical investigation. 
Three empirical chapters are to be presented next. The last chapter then concludes the 
research findings, highlights current policy debates and makes relevant 
recommendations to SMEs, practitioners and policy makers.  
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Chapter 6: 
 
Sources of Start-up Finance in Beijing 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The methodology and data gathering techniques were presented in the 
previous chapter.  Chapter 6 is the first of three empirical chapters, which collectively 
test a series of financial related hypotheses, derived in the front-end chapters of the 
dissertation.  The theoretical underpinnings of the dissertation are human capital 
theory, which was discussed in chapter 2, and the theories of finance, which were 
covered in chapter 3.  In this chapter differences between innovators and non-
innovators are the focus of attention.   
More specifically, chapter 6 explores entrepreneurs and the sources of finance 
in Beijing, which were utilised at the start-up stage.  There is a substantial corpus of 
literature to suggest that access to start-up capital is vital for the formation and growth 
of small businesses (Hernandez-Trillo et al., 2005; Curran and Blackburn, 1993).  
Similarly, Schreiner and Woller (2003) are not alone in arguing that a lack of start-up 
capital is a major obstacle to both the development and the growth of small businesses 
(See Van Auken et al., 1996; Basu and Parker, 2001).  There has been a substantial 
amount of research into start-up finance in developed nations – particularly the US, 
UK and mainland European countries, and to a lesser extent in some emerging nations 
such as Ghana and Nigeria where there is a growing body of research.  However, in 
China there are comparatively few studies on start-up finance – especially those 
utilising large scale samples and quantitative methodologies (Au and Kwan, 2009; 
Wu et al., 2008).  Moreover, within such studies the number and range of 
characteristics of the businesses and particularly the entrepreneurs or owner-managers 
is very limited.  This chapter is seeking to make a contribution to addressing this gap 
in the knowledge base.  Start-up businesses in general do not have a proven track 
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record, an established credit history, and often lack collateral to better facilitate the 
obtaining of external finance (Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 2007).  These 
contextual characteristics of start-up businesses can then result in the scenario of 
information asymmetries – adverse selection and also moral hazard, and this in turn 
may influence and have a bearing upon which sources of finance are utilised at the 
start-up stage (Shane and Cable, 2002).  Previous research by Westhead et al. (2003) 
and Westhead et al. (2005b) have shown that, in the UK, characteristics of the 
entrepreneurs – particularly the human capital of entrepreneurial experience - is an 
important factor in the choice of entrepreneur’s start-up capital, as well as the amount 
which is derived from each source of capital at the start-up stage. However, 
comparatively little research has looked at the relationship between a specific form of 
human capital – innovation and start-up finance in China.   
This chapter has the objective of exploring the entrepreneur’s access to start-
up capital, and the influence of innovation in accessing start-up capital in Beijing.  
The theoretical construct utilised is human capital theory which has then been applied 
to cross-tabulation analysis and then multivariate logistic regression analysis.  The 
reader is reminded that the following hypotheses are tested in the chapter. 
 
H1: Entrepreneurs engaged in innovation are more likely to report a higher 
usage of their own savings as a source of finance at start-up compared with 
entrepreneurs not engaged in innovation. 
 
H2: Entrepreneurs engaged in innovation are more likely to report higher 
usage of external sources of finance at start-up compared with entrepreneurs 
not engaged in innovation. 
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The chapter is structured as follows: Section two looks at the use of sources of 
finance at start-up.  This is followed by section three which looks at cross-tabulation 
analysis of innovation and the control characteristics of the business and the 
entrepreneurs against the use of start-up finance.  Section four focuses upon the same 
methodological approach as that pursued in section three but now focused upon the 
mean percentage of start-up finance by source.  Section five takes the analysis further 
by utilising multivariate regression analysis to pursue data regression analysis.  This 
section includes a discussion of the findings and the implications.  In section six, a 
conclusion completes the chapter. 
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6.2 The Use of Sources of Finance at Start-up 
This section provides an overview of the overall general results on: (1) the use 
of start up finance, by source, and (2) the mean percentage amount of finance which 
came from each source at start up.  Each of the sources of finance is examined in turn 
before the cross-tabulation analysis compares the aforementioned with whether or not 
the firms were innovators and the other characteristics of the entrepreneurs and their 
businesses. 
 
6.2.1 Descriptive statistics results 
 
Table 6.1: The use of each source at start-up, and the mean percentage amount 
of finance obtained by source. 
Source Use of each source at 
start-up 
Mean percentage amount 
of finance by source 
Own funds 87.83 60.50 
Partners 29.42 12.76 
Ordinary Shares 30.09 17.70 
Bank loans and overdrafts 3.10 0.60 
Trade credit 1.11 1.14 
Family contributions 14.60 6.08 
Other sources 2.43 1.22 
 
 
Own Funds 
 
The results from Table 6.1 show that the most used source of start-up finance 
was their own savings and this was cited by 87.8% of the entrepreneurs.  Moreover, 
Table 6.1 also serves to show that the mean use of own savings was 60.5% of start-up 
finance.  In other words, on average more than one half of the start-up finance came 
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from own savings, proving it to be the most important source of start-up finance.  The 
research result is consistent with previous research on China, although in this study 
there is a discrepancy with the results of studies on China, and also developing nations 
in Africa.  In part this can be rationalised because the categories here differentiated 
between own savings and partners’ funds.  
Hussain et al. (2006) found that at start-up stage 22.2% of start-up finance 
came from own savings.  In contrast, Lin (2002) in the first of his surveys conducted 
in 1998 found that the majority of the capital employed (in excess of 50% of the total 
assets) came from self-accumulation.  However, in his second survey which was also 
conducted in 1998, he found that 67% of the surveyed SMEs raised their fixed asset 
investments by themselves and 81% had more than 50 per cent self-raised fixed assets 
investment; and, only 3% had their initial fixed-asset investment borrowed from 
financial institutions.  A more comprehensive survey of private enterprises was 
undertaken by the China Industrial and Commercial Union (CICU) and Research 
Commission of Chinese Private Business (RCCPB) which conducted five nationwide 
samplings for 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2002.  They found that private enterprises 
had 65.5% of their start-up capital was self-accumulation (Hussain et al, 2006). The 
most recent of the samplings, in 2002, which overall covered a decade showed that 
self-accumulation had diminished but still accounted for the majority of private sector 
start-up finance (Hussain et al., 2006). 
Empirical studies have also shown that private enterprises in Wenzhou (a 
major city in the Yangtze River Delta) were mainly self-funded or relied on private 
borrowings during start-up (Zhang and Li, 1990; Chen, 2002).  A more recently 
published work by Chen et al. (2006) but covering a slightly earlier period from 2000 
found that the most important source of start-up finance was founding members 
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providing 74.5%.  Given that this included the entrepreneur as well as partners’ funds, 
it is in line with the findings of this new research. 
Aryeetey et al. (1994) found that 67% of small businesses in Ghana mentioned 
own savings as the main source of start-up capital.  It must be noted that within 
African studies the importance of start-up finance does vary.  For example, looking at 
Kenya, Gray et al. (1997) found that most of the small firms indicated that their own 
savings were their main source of start-up capital, and they also found that no 
business had gained start-up capital from a formal source. 
The findings on the owners’ savings in Beijing are generally consistent with 
previous research which has been conducted in developed nations. For example, in the 
US, 47% of small businesses relied upon savings for their principal source of start-up 
finance, and in the UK it was slightly lower at 43% (Dunkelberg and Cooper, 1983).  
However, as with the previous research on African nations the magnitude of the 
importance of own savings for start-up finance does vary.    For example, in Ireland a 
study by Bhaird and Lucey (2006) found that savings was the principle source of 
start-up finance for 51% of firms. In Japan the corresponding figure of 80% has been 
found by Kutsuna and Honjo (2006).  
 
Partners  
Partners were the third most used source of start-up finance and were used by 
29.4% of entrepreneurs, slightly less than one in three entrepreneurs.  The mean 
amount of start-up finance from partners was 12.76%, approximately one eighth of 
the start-up finance.  The partners are shareholders who may or may not be involved 
with the day-to-day management of the business.  The advantage of partners investing 
in the firms is that their contributions to the financing are usually very similar to those 
of a single entrepreneur – typically over a long term duration and of an interest free 
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nature.  Moreover, the partners may also provide the entrepreneur with advice and 
expertise which can be leveraged throughout the life of the business, but especially at 
start-up.  By way of comparison a study by Aryeetey et al. (1994) from Ghana found 
that 7.8% of the businesses used co-investors’ finance at the start-up stage, whilst a 
study from Japan by Kutsuna and Honjo (2006) established that 37% of the sampled 
businesses used co-investors. 
 
Ordinary Shares 
Ordinary shares were issued by 30.1% of businesses as a source of start-up 
finance and, on average, accounted for 17.7% of start-up capital.  Thus, overall 
ordinary shares and partners’ funds at start-up are similar in terms of magnitude with 
the use of ordinary shares narrowly behind partners’ funds as the third most used 
source of start-up capital.  However, when the analysis centres upon the percentage of 
start-up finance from sources the ordinary shares were the second most important 
source with an average of 17.7%.  In other words, ordinary shares accounted for 
slightly less than one fifth of start-up finance. 
The blossoming of the private sector and the emergence of limited liability 
businesses and also the development of the capital markets represent new 
developments in China.  Previous researchers have generally not investigated the 
capital of limited liability businesses as they tended to cover the period of the 1990s 
and the early 2000s.  Subsequently limited liability businesses have massively 
increased in number, but clearly as a source of start-up finance ordinary shares are a 
much lower contribution than the use of owners’ savings.   
 
Family contributions 
At the start-up stage, 14.60% of businesses used family contributions as a 
source of finance.  On average this amounted to 6.08% of the finance at start-up.  
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Hussain et al’s (2006) research was undertaken from December 2005 to February 
2006 in the Eastern region of China and found that 70.1% of start-up finance came 
from the owner’s immediate family.  The large difference from this study could 
perhaps be explained by their comparatively low sample of 32 firms whilst this 
researchers’ study is of 452 firms, more than fifteen times the size of the study by 
Hussain et al. (2006).   
For developed nations, Basu and Parker (2001) have indicated that besides 
bank loans as a source of start-up capital, loans from family members and friends are 
the principle sources of start-up capital.  Curran and Blackburn (1993) found that 
amongst ethnic-owned businesses in the UK, family loans constituted approximately 
15% of start-up capital.  
However, the study by Aryeetey et al. (1994) found that 11% and 5% of 
businesses reported that their main source of start-up capital was gifts and loans from 
friends and relatives, respectively.  Adams (1992) has argued that gifts and loans from 
friends and relatives has been used as sources to help overcome the weak institutional 
and enforcement problems and are therefore ratcheted up because of social pressure 
and reciprocity.   
 
Bank loans and Overdrafts 
Bank loans and overdrafts are not used very often in Beijing for start-up 
businesses.  Indeed, only 3.10% of businesses used these facilities.  On average, bank 
loans and overdrafts accounted for 0.6% of start-up finance.  Several reasons can be 
put forward to explain their low use in Beijing.  Firstly, there is the issue of 
information asymmetry – the adverse selection and moral hazard problems which are 
generally more likely to be severe or acute with regard to start-up businesses 
(Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 2007).  Secondly, the entrepreneurs typically lack a 
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proven and demonstrated track record and evidence of business experience (Nissanke, 
2001; Berger and Udell, 1998).  Thirdly, in China the new businesses typically lack a 
relationship with the banks which, together with the earlier information asymmetries, 
hinders their likelihood of securing bank loans or overdrafts. 
Hussain et al. (2006) found that financial institutions provided 7.7% of start-up 
finance in China.  The research undertaken by the China Industrial and Commercial 
Union (CICU) and Research Commission of Chinese Private Business (RCCPB) 
found that in 1993 21% of start-up finance came from bank loans and rural credit 
cooperatives (Hussain et al., 2006).   
 By way of comparison, in both developed and developing nations the use of 
bank loans and overdrafts varies, but is typically comparatively lower in developing 
nations.  In Mexico the use of bank loans and overdrafts was found to be 0.6% by 
Hernandez-Trillo et al. (2005) and 5% by Heino (2006).  A higher use of bank loans 
and overdrafts at start-up has been found in developing nations; Acs (1985) found that 
28% of American businesses used these sources, Hamilton and Fox (1998) found that 
11% of New Zealand businesses used bank loans and overdrafts, and Kutsuna and 
Honjo (2006) found that the corresponding level of use was 12.5% of businesses.  
 
Trade credit 
Trade credit was used by 1.11% of the businesses and on average trade credit 
represented 1.14% of start-up finance.  The earlier research on China has found that 
trade credit was only a minor contributor.  Chen (2006) included trade credit in his 
‘other’ category of start-up finance, and it accounted for only 2.1% of the total. 
Hussain et al. (2006) only reported initial funds from owners’ savings, owner’s 
immediate family and financial institutions.  In other words, trade credit did not 
feature in Hussain et al.’s (2006) findings. 
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6.3 Crosstabulation Analysis – the Use of Start-up Finance 
Table 6.2 and 6.3 show cross-tabulation analysis of the use of start-up finance 
against innovation and the control variables which relate to the entrepreneurs and the 
businesses.  Each of the sources of finance is examined in turn and the two hypotheses 
are tested using bivariate analysis.  Subsequently, the hypotheses are also tested using 
multivariate analysis. 
 
Own Savings 
At start-up, 89.4% of product innovators and 82.4% of non-product innovators 
used the entrepreneurs’ own savings as did 92.4% of distribution innovators and 
84.7% of non-distribution innovators. With the other types of innovation there were 
no statistically significant differences between innovators and non-innovators and the 
use of own savings at start-up.  Thus, with regard to the use of own savings there is 
mixed evidence in support of hypothesis H1. 
 Two of the control variables were found to be statistically significantly related 
to the use of own funds at start-up at the 0.05 level or better, and these were whether 
or not it was a family business, and the type of business.  Own savings were used by 
93.1% of family and 83.1% of non-family businesses at start-up.  While 76.6% of 
limited liability businesses used own savings. This was much lower than the 93.1% 
found for registered businesses and the 93.2% for partnerships.
 
 
218 
Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics – the use of own funds, partners, and ordinary 
shares at start-up 
 Own 
Funds 
Chi-
Square 
Partn
ers 
Chi-
Square 
Ordinary 
Shares 
Chi-
Square 
n 
All 87.8  29.4  30.1  452 
Manufacturing 88.5 0.262 29.5 0.002 27.6 6.061b 261 
Services 86.9  29.3  33.5  191 
8-19 employees 87.8 2.839 26.1 2.038 31.1 2.185 180 
20-49 employees 90.6  32.0  28.1  128 
50-99 employees 83.3  32.1  34.6  78 
100-199 employees 90.0  27.5  22.5  40 
200-499 employees 84.6  34.6  30.8  26 
1-5 years old 86.5 1.088 27.5 0.741 34.3 2.623 178 
6-9 years old 89.8  31.6  28.2  177 
≥10 years old 86.6  28.9  25.8  97 
Family Business 93.1 10.562a 21.8 11.706a 24.5 6.061b 216 
Non Family Business 83.1  36.4  35.2  236 
Male 88.8 1.476 30.5 1.003 29.7 0.127 357 
Female 84.2  25.3  31.6  95 
18-30 years old  87.2 8.102b 31.9 1.862 42.6 8.111b 47 
31-45 years old 88.8  28.1  29.5  285 
46-55 years old 87.2  34.0  25.5  94 
≥56 years old 80.8  23.1  30.8  26 
Relative Role Model  91.0 2.516 26.3 1.208 24.6 3.861b 167 
No Relative Role Model  86.0  31.2  33.3  285 
Registered Business 93.1 25.417a 20.1 40.882a 24.0 16.294a 204 
Partnership 93.2  54.4  24.3  103 
Limited liability 76.6  24.8  42.8  145 
Degree 87.1 0.205 32.1 1.297 33.0 1.399 209 
No Degree 88.5  27.2  27.6  243 
Exporter 90.1 0.702 36.9 3.998b 25.2 3.999b 111 
Non-Exporter 87.1  27.0  31.7  341 
Innovator – Product 89.8 4.537b 29.4 0.003 30.0 0.002 333 
None 82.4  29.4  30.3  119 
Innovator – Process 89.0 0.327 27.9 0.308 34.9 4.007b 172 
None 87.1  30.4  27.1  260 
Innovator – Work 88.7 0.242 31.5 4.005b 32.5 1.029 203 
None 87.1  27.7  28.1  249 
Innovator – Supply 90.0 1.316 30.0 0.048 32.8 1.028 180 
None 86.4  29.0  28.3  272 
Innovator – Markets 89.0 0.396 31.9 3.999b 31.5 0.619 270 
None 87.0  25.8  28.0  182 
Innovator – 
Administration 
90.4 1.789 36.2 6.352b 28.8 0.225 177 
None 86.2  25.1  30.9  275 
Innovator – Distribution 92.4 6.036b 29.3 0.001 32.1 4.124b 184 
None 84.7  29.5  28.7  268 
R&D Expenditure as 
a % of turnover: None 
83.3 13.588b 30.0 25.665a 25.0 12.502b 60 
1-2% 92.3  29.5  30.8  156 
3-5% 88.1  34.7  21.2  118 
6-10% 76.8  23.2  42.0  69 
11-20% 93.8  31.3  34.4  32 
≥21% 94.1  11.8  47.1  17 
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Partners funds 
Three types of innovation generated statistically significant differences against 
the use of partners’ funds at start-up.  Partner’s funds were used at start-up by 31.5% 
of work innovators and 27.7% of non-work innovators, by 31.9% of market 
innovators and 25.8% of non-market innovators and by 36.2% of administration 
innovators and 25.1% of non-administration innovators.  However, for product, 
process, supply and distribution there were no statistically significant differences 
against the use of partners’ finance at start-up.  Thus, there are mixed results with 
regard to hypothesis H2. 
 At start-up, 21.8% of family businesses and 36.4% of non-family businesses 
used partners’ funds and this was statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  Type of 
business was also highly statistically significantly at the 0.01 level related to the use 
of partners’ funds at start-up.  Partner’s funds were used by 54.4% of partnerships at 
start-up which was more than double the 20.1% of registered businesses and 24.8% of 
limited liability businesses who used partners’ funds at start-up. 
 
Ordinary shares 
Table 2 shows that process innovators and also distribution innovators were 
more likely than their non-innovating counterparts to use ordinary shares at start-up. 
Process innovators (34.9%) and non-process innovators (27.1%) used ordinary shares 
at start-up as did 32.1% of distribution innovators and 28.7% of non-distribution 
innovators.  The other innovation variables are not statistically significantly related to 
the use of start-up finance.  Thus, there is mixed evidence with regard to the 
hypothesis H2. 
 Ordinary shares were used by 27.6% of manufacturing and 33.5% of service 
sector businesses at start-up.  In addition, 24.5% of family and 35.2% of non-family 
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businesses used ordinary shares at start-up.  A total of 42.8% of limited liability 
businesses used ordinary shares at start-up which is substantially more than the 24.0% 
of registered businesses and 24.3% of partnerships. 
 
Bank loans and Overdrafts 
All the innovation variables are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or 
better. Just 3.9% of product and 0.8% of non-product innovators used bank loans and 
overdrafts, while 6.4% of process innovators and 1.1% of non-process innovators 
used bank loans and overdrafts.  A similar pattern emerges for work innovation where 
6.4% of work innovators and 0.4% of non-innovators used these sources.  At start up, 
5.0% of supply innovators and 1.8% of non-supply innovators used bank loans and 
overdrafts as did 4.8% of market innovators and 0.5% of non-market innovators and 
6.2% of administration innovators and 1.1% of non-administration innovators, and In 
addition, 4.9% of distribution and 1.9% of non-distribution innovators used bank 
loans and overdrafts at start-up.  Thus, the evidence for the use of bank loans and 
overdrafts is strongly in support of hypothesis H2.  
Furthermore, 1.2% of entrepreneurs with relative role models and 4.2% of 
entrepreneurs without relative role models used bank loans and overdrafts at start-up 
and this was statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Also using bank loans and 
overdrafts were 4.3% of entrepreneurs with degrees and 2.1% of those without 
degrees. 
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Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics – the use of bank loans and overdrafts, and 
family contributions at start-up 
 Bank Loans & 
Overdrafts 
Chi-Square Family 
contributions 
Chi-Square n 
All 3.10  14.6  452 
Manufacturing 2.3 1.312 16.9 4.877b 261 
Services 4.2  11.5  191 
8-19 employees 1.7 5.714 12.8 21.011a 180 
20-49 employees 3.1  17.2  128 
50-99 employees 2.6  10.3  78 
100-199 employees 7.5  15.0  40 
200-499 employees 7.7  26.9  26 
1-5 years old 2.2 0.998 12.9 0.742 178 
6-9 years old 3.4  15.3  177 
≥10 years old 4.1  16.5  97 
Family Business 2.8 0.141 24.1 29.767a 216 
Non Family Business 3.4  5.9  236 
Male 3.1 0.001 15.1 0.374 357 
Female 3.2  12.6  95 
18-30 years old  6.4 2.114 12.8 1.289 47 
31-45 years old 2.8  15.4  285 
46-55 years old 2.1  14.9  94 
≥56 years old 3.8  7.7  26 
Relative Role Model  1.2 4.656b 29.3 46.145a 167 
No Relative Role Model  4.2  6.0  285 
Registered Business 2.5 0.556 19.6 7.557b 204 
Partnership 3.9  9.7  103 
Limited liability 3.4  11.0  145 
Degree 4.3 3.999b 9.6 7.895a 209 
No Degree 2.1  18.9  243 
Exporter 2.7 0.076 18.9 4.889b 111 
Non-Exporter 3.1  13.2  341 
Innovator – Product 3.9 4.766b 15.3 0.516 333 
None 0.8  12.6  119 
Innovator – Process 6.4 10.062a 14.0 0.094 172 
None 1.1  15.0  260 
Innovator – Work 6.4 13.424a 12.8 0.951 203 
None 0.4  16.1  249 
Innovator – Supply 5.0 5.099b 11.7 4.889b 180 
None 1.8  16.5  272 
Innovator – Markets 4.8 6.609a 14.4 0.013 270 
None 0.5  14.8  182 
Innovator – 
Administration 
6.2 9.419a 11.9 4.003b 177 
None 1.1  16.4  275 
Innovator – Distribution 4.9 4.099b 14.7 0.001 184 
None 1.9  14.6  268 
R&D Expenditure as 
a % of turnover: None 
0 15.220a 16.7 18.650a 60 
1-2% 0.6  11.5  156 
3-5% 3.4  16.9  118 
6-10% 5.8  8.7  69 
11-20% 9.4  28.1  32 
≥21% 11.8  17.6  17 
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Family contribution 
Contrary to our expectations, 11.7% of supply innovators and 16.5% of non-
supply innovators used family contributions and this was statistically significant at the 
0.05 level. Similarly, 11.9% of administration innovators and 16.4% of non-
administration innovators used family contributions and this was statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level.  Thus, the results are not supportive of hypothesis H2. 
 In contrast, 16.9% of manufacturing and 11.5% of service sector businesses 
used family contributions at start-up and this was statistically significant at the 0.05 
level.  In addition, 24.1% of family businesses and 5.9% of non-family businesses 
used family contributions at start-up and this was highly statistically significant at the 
0.01 level.  This result was entirely to be expected, but it was reassuring to find the 
result. 
 Also using family contributions at start up were 29.3% of entrepreneurs with 
role models and 6.0% of entrepreneurs without a relative role model and this was 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  It was also shown that the type of business 
was statistically related to the use of family contributions at the 0.05 level, in that 
19.6% of registered businesses used family contributions at start-up which was 
substantially more than the 11.0% of limited liability businesses and was more than 
double the 9.7% reported for partnerships. 
 The 9.6% of entrepreneurs with degrees and 18.9% of entrepreneurs without 
degrees who used family contributions at start-up was statistically significant at the 
0.01 level.  Evidence showed that 18.9% of exporters and 13.2% of non-exporters 
used family contributions at start-up and this was statistically significant at the 0.05 
level. 
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6.4 Crosstabulation Analysis – the Mean Percentage of Start-up Finance by 
Source 
Table 6.4 and 6.5 show cross-tabulation analysis of the mean percentage of 
start-up funds by source against innovation and the control variables which relate to 
the entrepreneurs and the businesses.  Each of the sources of finance is examined in 
turn and the two hypotheses are tested using bivariate analysis.   
 
Own Savings 
The mean percentage amount of finance from own savings was larger for 
innovating businesses compared to non-innovating businesses and this applied to one 
measure of innovation – the product - and this relationship was statistically significant 
at the 0.01 level.  The mean percentage amount of finance from own savings was 
62.0% for product innovators and 56.2% for non-product innovators.  Thus, for seven 
measures of innovation there was no statistically significant relationship with the 
mean percentage amount of finance from own savings. 
Several of the control variables were found to be statistically significantly 
related to the mean percentage amount of finance from own savings.  This was larger 
for family businesses (67.4%) compared to non-family businesses (54.2%) and this 
relationship was statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  It was also larger for 
registered businesses (70.2%) compared to partnerships (54.4%) and limited liability 
firms (51.3%) and this relationship was statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  The 
size of the business was weakly statistically significantly at the 0.10 level related to 
the mean percentage amount of finance from own savings. 
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Partners 
Only one of the innovation variables –administration innovation - was found 
to be statistically significantly related at the 0.05 level against the mean percentage 
amount of finance from partners’ funds.  More specifically, the mean percentage 
amount of finance from partners’ funds was 16.1% for administration innovators and 
11.6% for non-administration innovators, and this was statistically significant at the 
0.05 level.  The other output measures of innovation as well as the input measure of 
innovation – R&D expenditure - was not systematic ally related to the mean 
percentage amount of finance supplied by partners’ funds.     
Three of the control variables were also found to be statistically significant at 
the 0.10 level, or better.  The contribution towards start-up funds was much larger for 
partnerships (28.3%) compared to registered businesses (8.0%), and limited liability 
businesses (10.3%) and this was highly statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  This 
relationship, whilst expected, was reassuring.  Family businesses (8.5%) had a lower 
mean than was found for non-family businesses (17.8%), and this relationship was 
also statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  A weak statistical significance at the 
0.10 level was found in exporting, and it was larger for exporters (15.8%) compared 
to non-exporters (12.6%).     
  
 
Ordinary shares 
None of the output measures of innovation were statistically significant at the 0.10 
level related to the mean percentage of start-up funds which coming ordinary shares.  The 
input measure of innovation – the percentage of turnover spent on R&D - was however 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.    
Two of the control variables were highly statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
related to the mean percentage amount of finance at start-up from ordinary shares, and these 
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variables were the family business and the type of business.  The mean values were lower for 
family businesses (11.8%) compared to non-family businesses.  Not surprisingly the mean 
was much higher for limited liability businesses (29.0%) compared to registered businesses 
(12.2%) and partnerships (12.8%).  One of the control variables was found to be statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level and that was the relative role model variable.  Those without a 
relative role model (21.1%) had a larger mean than those entrepreneurs who had a relative 
role model (11.9%).  Only one variable was found to be weakly statistically significant at the 
0.10 level and that was exporting.  The non-exporters (19.1%) had a larger mean than that 
reported for the exporters (13.6%). 
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Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics – the mean percentage of start-up funds, by 
source, from own funds, partners, and ordinary shares at start-up 
 Own 
Funds 
Z Partn
ers 
Z Ordinary 
Shares 
Z n 
All 60.5  12.8  17.7  452 
Manufacturing 59.7 -0.847 14.1 -0.404 16.4 -1.278 261 
Services 61.6  12.4  19.5  191 
8-19 employees 63.3 7.818c 11.5 2.861 17.8 2.598 180 
20-49 employees 60.6  15.6  15.4  128 
50-99 employees 54.4  13.5  22.5  78 
100-199 employees 66.4  11.1  14.2  40 
200-499 employees 50.4  18.3  19.8  26 
1-5 years old 58.1 1.399 12.0 0.971 20.1 3.182 178 
6-9 years old 62.3  14.1  16.2  177 
≥10 years old 61.6  14.8  16.1  97 
Family Business 67.4 -3.894a 8.5 -3.763a 11.8 -3.081a 216 
Non Family Business 54.2  17.8  23.1  236 
Male 60.7 -0.036 13.6 -0.848 17.8 -0.181 357 
Female 59.6  12.5  17.5  95 
18-30 years old  54.5 1.603 15.2 1.649 22.8 3.381 47 
31-45 years old 61.1  13.1  16.8  285 
46-55 years old 61.3  14.3  16.3  94 
≥56 years old 62.4  10.2  23.8  26 
Relative Role Model  63.1 -0.946 10.6 -1.471 11.9 -2.412b 167 
No Relative Role Model  59.0  15.0  21.1  285 
Registered Business 70.2 30.238a 8.0 48.204a 12.2 21.083a 204 
Partnership 54.4  28.3  12.8  103 
Limited liability 51.3  10.3  29.0  145 
Degree 59.2 -0.611 15.1 -1.303 19.3 -1.389 209 
No Degree 61.6  12.0  16.4  243 
Exporter 59.1 -0.549 15.8 -1.711c 13.6 -1.712c 111 
Non-Exporter 61.0  12.6  19.1  341 
Innovator – Product 62.0 -3.099a 12.8 -0.211 16.9 -0.355 333 
None 56.2  15.1  20.0  119 
Innovator – Process 60.9 -0.026 11.7 -0.819 19.2 -1.4633 172 
None 60.3  14.4  16.8  260 
Innovator – Work 61.8 -0.661 13.5 -0.507 17.2 -0.539 203 
None 59.5  13.3  18.1  249 
Innovator – Supply 60.8 -0.103 14.3 -0.373 18.3 -0.775 180 
None 60.3  12.8  17.3  272 
Innovator – Markets 59.4 -0.641 13.7 -1.011 17.8 -0.504 270 
None 62.1  12.9  17.7  182 
Innovator – Admin 61.3 -0.321 16.1 -2.311b 15.4 -0.816 177 
None 60.0  11.6  19.2  275 
Innovator – Distribution 62.9 -0.881 12.4 -0.261 16.8 -0.339 184 
None 58.8  14.1  18.3  268 
R&D Expenditure as 
a % of turnover: None 
57.7 4.077 14.8 4.822 19.3 13.606b 60 
1-2% 62.4  13.7  17.3  156 
3-5% 62.7  15.0  10.6  118 
6-10% 53.4  11.2  29.0  69 
11-20% 59.7  12.2  17.0  32 
≥21% 68.3  5.3  20.9   17 
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Table 6.5: Descriptive statistics and ANOVAs – the mean percentage of start-up 
funds, by source, from bank loans and overdrafts, and family contributions  
 Bank loans and 
overdrafts 
Z Family 
contributions 
Z n 
All 0.6  6.1  452 
Manufacturing 0.4 -1.160 7.3 -1.671c 261 
Services 0.9  4.4  191 
8-19 employees 0.4 5.727 6.5 5.309 180 
20-49 employees 0.7  7.2  128 
50-99 employees 0.3  3.5  78 
100-199 employees 1.6  3.8  40 
200-499 employees 1.9  8.6  26 
1-5 years old 0.2 2.070 7.0 0.286 178 
6-9 years old 0.6  5.1  177 
≥10 years old 1.6  6.1  97 
Family Business 0.4 -0.400 10.7 -5.537a 216 
Non Family Business 0.9  1.9  236 
Male 0.7 -0.034 6.0 -0.549 357 
Female 0.6  6.2  95 
18-30 years old  1.4 2.088 4.7 1.350 47 
31-45 years old 0.5  6.1  285 
46-55 years old 0.9  7.2  94 
≥56 years old 0.2  3.5  26 
Relative Role Model  0.1 -1.796c 13.2 -6.926a 167 
No Relative Role Model  1.0  1.9  285 
Registered Business 0.6 0.535 8.2 7.597b 204 
Partnership 0.5  3.5  103 
Limited liability 0.8  5.0  145 
Degree 1.0 -1.389 3.4 -2.890a 209 
No Degree 0.4  8.3  243 
Exporter 0.5 -0.290 6.4 -1.365 111 
Non-Exporter 0.7  5.9  341 
Innovator – Product 0.8 -2.900a 5.9 -0.590 333 
None 0.3  6.6  119 
Innovator – Process 1.2 -3.153a 5.0 -0.451 172 
None 0.3  6.7  260 
Innovator – Work 1.4 -3.666a 4.9 -1.041 203 
None 0.1  7.0  249 
Innovator – Supply 1.1 -1.903c 4.0 -1.908c 180 
None 0.4  7.4  272 
Innovator – Markets 1.0 -2.559b 5.7 -0.233 270 
None 0.1  6.6  182 
Innovator – 
Administration 
1.3 -3.069a 4.2 -1.909c 177 
None 0.2  7.3  275 
Innovator – Distribution 0.9 -1.805c 5.1 -0.163 184 
None 0.5  6.7  268 
R&D Expenditure as 
a % of turnover: None 
0 15.025b 7.9 17.545a 60 
1-2% 0.1  4.8  156 
3-5% 0.9  7.6  118 
6-10% 1.4  4.7  69 
11-20% 1.3  8.0  32 
≥21% 1.5  2.4  17 
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6.5 Regression Data Analysis 
Logistic estimation was used to identify the combination of variables 
associated with the propensity of entrepreneurs to report that a specific source of 
finance was used at the start-up stage across all the six specified sources of finance.  
A base model relating to the control variables relating to the firm and the domestic 
external environment is presented.  Alternative measures of innovation and R&D 
were then added to the base model.  Entrepreneur demographic characteristics and 
other dimensions of human capital were also introduced.   
There is no agreed goodness-of-fit measure relating to multinomial logistic 
regression analysis.  Two commonly used coefficients are reported.  Deviance as 
indicated by the log likelihood coefficient is a ‘badness-of-fit’ measure, and weak 
‘explanatory’ models generally report higher deviance coefficients.  The pseudo R2 
coefficient provides an indication of the ‘explanatory’ power of the model.  While 
similar in principle to the adjusted R2 reported in ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression models, non-OLS regression models generally report lower pseudo R2 
coefficients.  The log likelihood coefficients and the pseudo R2 coefficients are 
reported. 
Table 6.6 provides a key of the variables which have been included in the 
econometric analysis.  Table 6.7 provides a correlation matrix of the variables used in 
this chapter.  There was no evidence to suggest the presence of multicollinearity.  
Thus, the results presented in the chapter should be valid.  
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Table 6.6 Key of variables included in the regression analysis models 
Variables  
1. Sector 1=Manufacturing and 0 =Services 
2. Size The number of employees (log) 
3. Age of Business The age of the business (log) 
4. Family Business 1=Family business and 0=Non-family business 
5. Gender 1=Male and 0=Female 
6. Age of Owner-Manager The age of the entrepreneur (log) 
7. Relative Role Model  1=Relative role model and 0=No relative role model 
8. Registered business 1=Registered business and 0=not a registered business. 
This is the excluded comparison dummy variable. 
8. Limited liability 1= limited liability and 0=not a limited liability.  
Dummy variable type of business and with registered 
business as the excluded comparison type of business. 
9. Partnership 1=partnership and 0=not a partnership.  Dummy 
variable type of business and with registered business 
as the excluded comparison type of business.   
10. Degree 1=Degree and 0=no degree 
11. Exporter 1=Exporter and 0=Non-exporter 
12. Innovator – Product 1=Product innovator and 0=non-product innovator 
13. Innovator – Process 1=Process innovator and 0=non-process innovator 
14. Innovator – Work 1=Work innovator and 0=non-work innovator 
15. Innovator – Supply 1=Supply innovator and 0=non-supply innovator 
16. Innovator – Markets 1=Market innovator and 0=non-market innovator 
17. Innovator – Administration 1=Administration innovation and 0=non-administration 
innovation  
18. Innovator – Distribution 1=Distribution innovation and 0=non-distribution 
innovation 
19. R&D Expenditure as a % 
of turnover: None 
1=No expenditure on R&D and 0=expenditure on 
R&D.  Dummy variable which is the excluded 
comparison dummy.  
20. 1-2% 1=R&D expenditure is 1-2% of turnover and 0=R&D 
expenditure is not 1-2% of turnover. 
21. 3-5% 1=R&D expenditure is 3-5% of turnover and 0=R&D 
expenditure is not 3-5% of turnover. 
22. 6-10% 1=R&D expenditure is 6-10% of turnover and 0=R&D 
expenditure is not 6-10% of turnover. 
23. 11-20% 1=R&D expenditure is 11-20% of turnover and 
0=R&D expenditure is not 11-20% of turnover. 
24. ≥21% 1=R&D expenditure is ≥21% of turnover and 0=R&D 
expenditure is not ≥21% of turnover. 
 
 
230 
Table 6.7: Correlation Matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Sector 1.000          
2. Size 0.087 1.000         
3. Age of Business 0.192a 0.184a 1.000        
4. Family Business 0.002 0.039 0.139a 1.000       
5. Gender 0.009 0.010 0.111b -0.007 1.000      
6. Age of Owner-Manager 0.079 -0.085 0.211a 0.034 0.163a 1.000     
7. Relative Role Model  0.024 -0.010 0.047 0.506a 0.035 0.041 1.000    
8. Type of Business -0.070 0.062 0.088 -0.172a 0.022 0.132a -0.122a 1.000   
9. Degree -0.132a -0.132a -0.134a -0.203a -0.033 -0.240a -0.195a 0.073 1.000  
10. Exporter 0.155a 0.155a -0.002 0.041 -0.072 -0.107b 0.001 0.050 0.120b 1.000 
11. Innovator – Product 0.017 0.017 0.010 0.079 -0.025 -0.113b -0.021 0.084 0.172a 0.096b 
12. Innovator – Process 0.025 0.025 0.002 -0.011 0.002 -0.164a -0.015 0.092 0.059 0.093b 
13. Innovator – Work -0.191a -0.191a -0.004 -0.045 0.018 -0.177a -0.028 0.038 0.126a 0.033 
14. Innovator – Supply -0.018 -0.018 -0.050 -0.027 -0.035 -0.168a 0.023 -0.039 0.052 0.071 
15. Innovator – Markets -0.072 -0.072 -0.113b -0.054 -0.014 -0.180a -0.026 0.043 0.210a 0.217a 
16. Innovator – Administration -0.250a -0.250a -0.041 -0.096b -0.076 -0.161a -0.041 0.068 0.156a 0.079c 
17. Innovator – Distribution -0.057 -0.057 -0.038 -0.008 -0.004 -0.071 0.028 0.062 0.035 0.113b 
18. R&D Expenditure as a % 
of turnover 
0.015 0.165a -0.084 0.014 -0.023 -0.143a -0.069 0.058 0.170a 0.023 
N=384   
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Table 6.7: Correlation Matrix 
Variables 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. Sector         
2. Size         
3. Age of Business         
4. Family Business         
5. Gender         
6. Age of Owner-Manager         
7. Relative Role Model          
8. Type of Business         
9. Degree         
10. Exporter         
11. Innovator – Product 1.000        
12. Innovator – Process 0.313a 1.000       
13. Innovator – Work 0.217a 0.392a 1.000      
14. Innovator – Supply 0.168a 0.256a 0.419a 1.000     
15. Innovator – Markets 0.267a 0.179a 0.306a 0.299a 1.000    
16. Innovator – Administration 0.181a 0.314a 0.524a 0.347a 0.372a 1.000   
17. Innovator – Distribution 0.219a 0.324a 0.402a 0.375a 0.240a 0.452a 1.000  
18. R&D Expenditure as a % of 
turnover 
0.399a 0.359a 0.268a 0.209a 0.238a 0.236a 0.257a 1.000 
N=384 
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6.5.1 Results 
The researcher presents the findings for each of the six dependent variables, in 
turn, below. 
 
Own funds 
Logistic regression analysis is utilized when the dependent variable takes 
values of ‘0’ or ‘1’.  Maximum likelihood estimate models were conducted with 
regard to the dichotomous dependent variable relating to ‘the use of own funds at 
start-up’ (allocated a value of ‘1’) and ‘no use of own funds at start-up’ respondents 
(allocated a value of ‘0’).  Control variables plus the product innovation variable 
relating to the propensity to report the ‘the use of own funds at start-up’ outcome were 
included in Model 1 in Table 2.  The model has a Nagelkerke R2 of 0.177 and is 
significant at the 0.01 level.   The product innovation variable is statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level.  Thus, the evidence supports hypothesis H1. 
In models 2 to 8, product innovation was replaced with each of the other 
measures of innovation, one at a time.  Thus, the independent variables relating to 
process innovation, work, supply, markets, administration, distribution and R&D 
expenditure were individually included in Models 2 to 8, respectively. 
Models 2 to 8 are individually statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  It is 
found that the Nagelkerke R2 ranges from 0.154 in model 2 (where process innovation 
is included) to 0.185 in model 8 (where R&D expenditure is included).   In models 6 
and 7 the administration innovation and the distribution innovation variables are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level, whilst in model 8 two of the R&D 
expenditure dummies, 11-20%, and ≥21% were also highly statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level.  Thus the evidence in models 6, 7 and 8 supports hypothesis H1.  
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However, in models 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8 the innovation variables are not statistically 
significant and this does not support hypothesis H1. 
Several other control variables that relate to the propensity to use own funds at 
start-up are found to be consistently statistically significant in models 1 to 8.  Family 
businesses were more likely than non-family businesses to use own funds at start-up 
and this relationship was statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  Exporting firms 
were more likely than exporters to use own funds at start-up and this relationship was 
highly statistically significant at the 0.01 level, whilst limited liability businesses were 
less likely than registered businesses to use own funds at start-up. 
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Table 6.8: Estimates of a logit regression model of the probability of using own funds at start-up. 
The Odds Ratios 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Sector 
 
1.203 
(0.382) 
1.203 
(0.376) 
1.283 
(0.410) 
1.212 
(0.383) 
1.196 
(0.375) 
1.505 
(0.496) 
1.280 
(0.407) 
1.321 
(0.430) 
Size 0.872 
(0.155) 
0.935 
(0.163) 
0.925 
(0.163) 
0.922 
(0.162) 
0.960 
(0.167) 
0.900 
(0.159) 
0.919 
(0.164) 
0.965 
(0.171) 
Age of 
Business 
1.125 
(0.282) 
1.065 
(0.267) 
1.047 
(0.261) 
1.075 
(0.264) 
1.056 
(0.264) 
1.084 
(0.269) 
1.111 
(0.270) 
1.105 
(0.289) 
Family 
Business 
2.228 
(0.858)b 
2.494 
(0.952)b 
2.531 
(0.968)b 
2.621 
(1.008)b 
2.592 
(0.953)b 
2.690 
(1.038)b 
2.727 
(1.059)b 
2.589 
(0.991)b 
Gender 1.532 
(0.546) 
1.532 
(0.538) 
1.495 
(0.527) 
1.527 
(0.539) 
1.523 
(0.535) 
1.624 
(0.578) 
1.496 
(0.537) 
1.410 
(0.517) 
Age of Owner-
Manager 
1.020 
(0.817) 
1.020 
(0.812) 
1.041 
(0.839) 
1.029 
(0.823) 
0.998 
(0.712) 
1.094 
(0.879) 
0.895 
(0.727) 
0.997 
(0.848) 
Relative Role 
Model  
0.939 
(0.359) 
0.934 
(0.354) 
0.930 
(0.353) 
0.922 
(0.351) 
0.932 
(0.354) 
0.930 
(0.356) 
0.882 
(0.340) 
0.839 
(0.332) 
Limited 
Liability 
0.438 
(0.144)a 
0.406 
(0.144)a 
0.395 
(0.141)a 
0.468 
(0.138)a 
0.426 
(0.135)a 
0.426 
(0.147)a 
0.429 
(0.156)a 
0.424 
(0.156)a 
Partnership 1.089 
(1.332) 
1.179 
(1.358) 
1.107 
(1.372) 
1.106 
(1.372) 
1.085 
(1.339) 
1.134 
(1.343) 
1.175 
(1.315) 
1.138 
(1.343) 
Degree 0.982 
(0.327) 
1.132 
(0.369) 
1.132 
(0.371) 
1.174 
(0.385) 
1.134 
(0.371) 
1.111 
(0.365) 
1.191 
(0.399) 
1.195 
(0.395) 
Exporter 1.579 
(0.343)a 
1.484 
(0.396)a 
1.513 
(0.309)a 
1.525 
(0.317)a 
1.530 
(0.319)a 
1.474 
(0.399)a 
1.499 
(0.341)a 
1.464 
(0.329)a 
Innovator – 
Product 
2.538 
(0.885)a 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Process 
-------- 1.409 
(0.459) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Work 
-------- -------- 1.413 
(0.458) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Supply 
-------- -------- -------- 1.602 
(0.525) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Markets 
-------- -------- ------- -------- 1.045 
(0.312) 
-------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Administration 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 2.209 
(0.380)a 
-------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Distribution 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 2.777 
(0.373)a 
-------- 
R&D (1-2%) 
 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 1.993 
(1.005) 
R&D (3-5%) 
 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 1.635 
(0.803) 
R&D (6-10%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.623 (0.314) 
R&D (11-20%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 2.699 (0.228)a 
R&D (≥21%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 3.849 (0.257)a 
Log likelihood -146.54 -149.48 -149.47 -148.97 -150.02 -147.38 -145.34 -144.95 
Nagelkerke R2 0.177 0.154 0.155 0.159 0.149 0.169 0.187 0.185 
n=452
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Partners 
Maximum likelihood estimate models were conducted with regard to the 
dichotomous dependent variable relating to ‘the use of partners’ funds at start-up’ 
(allocated a value of ‘1’) and ‘no use of partners’ funds at start-up’ respondents 
(allocated a value of ‘0’).  Control variables plus the product innovation variable 
relating to the propensity to report the ‘the use of partners’ funds at start-up’ outcome 
were included in Model 9 in Table 3.  The model has a Nagelkerke R2 of 0.163 and is 
significant at the 0.01 level.   The product innovation variable is not statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level.  Thus, the evidence with regard to product innovation 
does not support hypothesis H2. 
In models 10 to 16 product innovation was replaced in turn with each of the 
other measures of innovation.  Thus, the independent variables relating to process 
innovation, work, supply, markets, administration, distribution and R&D expenditure 
were individually included in Models 10 to 16, respectively. 
Models 10 to 16 are individually statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  The 
Nagelkerke R2 ranges from 0.162 in model 15 (with distribution innovation included) 
to 0.187 in model 16 (with the R&D expenditure dummy variables).   In models 13 
and 14 the markets innovation and the administration innovation variables are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively.  Thus the evidence in 
models 13 and 14 with regard to market and administration innovation supports 
hypothesis H2.  However, in models 10, 11, 12, 15, and 16 the innovation variables 
are not statistically significant and this does not support hypothesis H2. 
Several other control variables are found to be consistently statistically 
significant in models 9 to 16 which relate to the propensity to use own funds at start-
up.  Family businesses were less likely than non-family businesses, and exporters 
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were more likely than non-exporters to use partners’ funds at start-up and both of 
these relationships were statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  Partnerships were 
more likely than registered businesses to use partners’ funds at start-up and this 
relationship was statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 6.9: Estimates of a logit regression model of the probability of using 
partners funds at start-up. The Odds Ratios 
 Model 9 Model 
10 
Model 
11 
Model 
12 
Model 
13 
Model 
14 
Model 
15 
Model 16 
Sector 
 
0.867 
(0.205) 
0.883 
(0.206) 
0.935 
(0.223) 
0.884 
(0.206) 
0.890 
(0.210) 
1.004 
(0.245) 
0.879 
(0.206) 
0.837 
(0.199) 
Size 0.989 
(0.125) 
1.012 
(0.126) 
0.980 
(0.123) 
0.998 
(0.124) 
0.991 
(0.124) 
0.983 
(0.123) 
1.006 
(0.125) 
1.044 
(0.132) 
Age of 
Business 
0.981 
(0.186) 
0.979 
(0.186) 
0.971 
(0.184) 
0.981 
(0.187) 
1.001 
(0.191) 
0.967 
(0.186) 
0.978 
(0.186) 
0.941 
(0.183) 
Family 
Business 
0.438 
(0.121)a 
0.450 
(0.123)a 
0.457 
(0.125)a 
0.452 
(0.124)a 
0.452 
(0.124)a 
0.471 
(0.130)a 
0.449 
(0.123)a 
0.460 
(0.131)a 
Gender 1.219 
(0.347) 
1.221 
(0.348) 
1.197 
(0.342) 
1.222 
(0.348) 
1.192 
(0.339) 
1.258 
(0.360) 
1.218 
(0.347) 
1.270 
(0.369) 
Age of Owner-
Manager 
0.869 
(0.507) 
0.803 
(0.473) 
0.952 
(0.561) 
0.880 
(0.516) 
0.927 
(0.544) 
0.967 
(0.568) 
0.839 
(0.488) 
0.719 
(0.430) 
Relative Role 
Model  
1.265 
(0.350) 
1.250 
(0.345) 
1.244 
(0.343) 
1.243 
(0.342) 
1.243 
(0.343) 
1.228 
(0.341) 
1.251 
(0.345) 
1.249 
(0.354) 
Limited 
Liability 
0.886 
(0.243) 
0.860 
(0.237) 
0.885 
(0.244) 
0.869 
(0.238) 
0.888 
(0.244) 
0.903 
(0.250) 
0.869 
(0.239) 
0.870 
(0.257) 
Partnership 4.049 
(0.417)a 
3.886 
(0.411)a 
4.150 
(0.404)a 
3.984 
(0.444)a 
4.138 
(0.400)a 
4.032 
(0.416)a 
3.931 
(0.412)a 
4.088 
(0.413)a 
Degree 1.007 
(0.248) 
1.030 
(0.250) 
1.019 
(0.248) 
1.034 
(0.251) 
1.000 
(0.245) 
1.001 
(0.245) 
1.030 
(0.250) 
1.094 
(0.209) 
Exporter 1.873 
(0.507)b 
1.870 
(0.505)b 
1.876 
(0.506)b 
1.862 
(0.502)b 
1.758 
(0.482)b 
1.795 
(0.489)b 
1.875 
(0.508)b 
1.804 
(0.499)b 
Innovator – 
Product 
1.193 
(0.321) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Process 
-------- 0.889 
(0.210) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Work 
-------- -------- 1.352 
(0.320) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Supply 
-------- -------- -------- 1.127 
(0.261) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Markets 
-------- -------- ------- -------- 2.380 
(0.326)a 
-------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Administration 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 1.614 
(0.387)b 
-------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Distribution 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.961 
(0.220) 
-------- 
R&D (1-2%) 
 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.923 
(0.345) 
R&D (3-5%) 
 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 1.361 
(0.517) 
R&D (6-10%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.713 (0.316) 
R&D (11-20%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.815 (0.433) 
R&D (≥21%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.186 (0.765) 
Log likelihood -246.32 -246.42 -245.73 -246.41 -245.69 -244.55 -246.53 -242.02 
Pseudo R2 0.163 0.163 0.167 0.163 0.167 0.173 0.162 0.187 
n=384
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Ordinary shares 
Maximum likelihood estimate models were conducted with regard to the 
dichotomous dependent variable relating to ‘the use of funds from ordinary shares at 
start-up’ (allocated a value of ‘1’) and ‘no use of funds from ordinary shares at start-
up’ respondents (allocated a value of ‘0’).  Control variables plus the product 
innovation variable relating to the propensity to report the ‘the use of funds from 
ordinary shares at start-up’ outcome were included in Model 17 in Table 6.10.  The 
model has a Nagelkerke R2 of 0.090 and is significant at the 0.01 level.   The product 
innovation variable is not statistically significant at the 0.10 level, or better.  Thus, the 
evidence with regard to product innovation does not support hypothesis H2. 
In models 18 to 24 product innovation was replaced with each of the other 
measures of innovation, one at a time.  Thus, the independent variables relating to 
process innovation, work, supply, markets, administration, distribution and R&D 
expenditure were individually included in Models 18 to 24, respectively. 
Models 18 to 24 are individually statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  The 
Nagelkerke R2 ranges from 0.090 in models 3, 5 and 7 (where the innovation 
variables are work, markets and distribution, respectively) to 0.128 in model 24.   In 
models 18 and 23, the process innovation and the distribution innovation variables are 
statistically significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.  In model 24, two of 
the R&D expenditure dummy variables, 6-10%, and (≥21%) were statistically 
significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. 
Thus the evidence in models 18, 23 and 24 supports hypothesis H2.  However, 
in the other models in Table 6.10 the innovation variables were not statistically 
significant and this does not support hypothesis H2. 
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Several other control variables are found to be consistently statistically 
significant in models 17 to 24 which relate to the propensity to use ordinary shares at 
start-up.  Family businesses were less likely than non-family businesses, and 
exporting firms were less likely than exporters to use ordinary shares at start-up, and 
both of these relationships were statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The limited 
liability businesses were more likely than the registered businesses to use partners’ 
funds at start up and this relationship was statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 6.10: Estimates of a logit regression model of the probability of using ordinary shares at 
start-up. The Odds Ratios 
 Model 
17 
Model 
18 
Model 
19 
Model 
20 
Model 
21 
Model 
22 
Model 
23 
Model 24 
Sector 
 
0.813 
(0.179) 
0.808 
(0.179) 
0.820 
(0.185) 
0.813 
(0.180) 
0.813 
(0.180) 
0.741 
(0.171) 
0.817 
(0.181) 
 0.809 
(0.184) 
Size 1.012 
(0.125) 
0.979 
(0.120) 
0.993 
(0.122) 
0.984 
(0.121) 
0.999 
(0.121) 
1.018 
(0.125) 
0.995 
(0.121) 
0.949 
(0.118) 
Age of 
Business 
0.836 
(0.149) 
0.840 
(0.150) 
0.838 
(0.192) 
0.843 
(0.151) 
0.842 
(0.151) 
0.844 
(0.151) 
0.841 
(0.151) 
0.898 
(0.165) 
Family 
Business 
0.772 
(0.096)a 
0.759 
(0.092)a 
0.761 
(0.092)a 
0.769 
(0.095)a 
0.761 
(0.092)a 
0.734 
(0.086)a 
0.761 
(0.092)a 
0.694 
(0.092)a 
Gender 0.987 
(0.259) 
0.980 
(0.258) 
0.984 
(0.258) 
0.987 
(0.259) 
0.985 
(0.259) 
0.965 
(0.254) 
0.985 
(0.258) 
0.909 
(0.245) 
Age of Owner-
Manager 
0.460 
(0.259) 
0.526 
(0.298) 
0.482 
(0.273) 
0.501 
(0.283) 
0.477 
(0.268) 
0.425 
(0.241) 
0.476 
(0.267) 
0.514 
(0.295) 
Relative Role 
Model  
0.833 
(0.217) 
0.839 
(0.219) 
0.837 
(0.218) 
0.831 
(0.217) 
0.837 
(0.218) 
0.847 
(0.221) 
0.832 
(0.216) 
0.882 
(0.234) 
Limited 
Liability 
2.397 
(0.098)a 
2.413 
(0.103)a 
2.404 
(0.100)a 
2.399 
(0.099)a 
2.403 
(0.100)a 
2.389 
(0.097)a 
2.405 
(0.101)a 
2.653 
(0.107)a 
Partnership 0.907 
(0.719) 
0.929 
(0.725) 
0.918 
(0.722) 
0.920 
(0.722) 
0.918 
(0.722) 
0.911 
(0.720) 
0.919 
(0.722) 
0.921 
(0.721) 
Degree 1.061 
(0.248) 
1.048 
(0.244) 
1.043 
(0.241) 
1.052 
(0.245) 
1.037 
(0.242) 
1.059 
(0.246) 
1.046 
(0.242) 
0.980 
(0.230) 
Exporter 0.671 
(0.086)a 
0.665 
(0.085)a 
0.673 
(0.087)a 
0.671 
(0.086)a 
0.666 
(0.087)a 
0.687 
(0.091)a 
0.663 
(0.085)a 
0.685 
(0.080)a 
Innovator – 
Product 
0.871 
(0.222) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Process 
-------- 1.328b 
(0.295) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Work 
-------- -------- 1.059 
(0.238) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Supply 
-------- -------- -------- 1.205 
(0.266) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Markets 
-------- -------- ------- -------- 1.057 
(0.244) 
-------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Administration 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.713 
(0.168) 
-------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Distribution 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 1.799 
(0.045)a 
-------- 
R&D (1-2%) 
 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 1.595 
(0.594) 
R&D (3-5%) 
 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.774 
(0.306) 
R&D (6-10%) 
 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 2.263 
(0.939)b 
R&D (11-20%) 
 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 1.812 
(1.323) 
R&D (≥21%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 2.618 (0.311)a 
Log likelihood -262.22 -261.56 -262.33 -262.01 -262.34 -261.32 -262.24 -255.62 
Pseudo R2 0.090 0.094 0.090 0.091 0.090 0.096 0.090 0.128 
n=384   
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Family contribution 
Maximum likelihood estimate models were conducted with regard to the 
dichotomous dependent variables relating to ‘the use of family contribution funds at 
start-up’ (allocated a value of ‘1’) and ‘no use of family contribution funds at start-up’ 
responses (allocated a value of ‘0’).  Control variables plus the product innovation 
variable relating to the propensity to report the ‘the use of trade credit funds at start-
up’ outcome were included in Model 25 in Table 6.11.  The model has a Nagelkerke 
R2 of 0.171 and is significant at the 0.01 level.   The product innovation variable is not 
statistically significant at the 0.10 level or better.  Thus, the evidence on product 
innovation does not support hypothesis H2. 
In models 26 to 32 product innovation was replaced with each of the other 
measures of innovation, one at a time.  Thus, the independent variables relating to 
process innovation, work, supply, markets, administration, distribution and R&D 
expenditure were individually included in Models 26 to 32, respectively. 
Models 26 to 32 are individually statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  In 
Table 6.11 the Nagelkerke R2 ranges from 0.236 in models 26, 29 and 31 (where 
process, markets and distribution innovation are included). 
In models 28, 30 and 32, the supply innovation, the administration innovation 
and the R&D expenditure variables are statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.01 and 
0.10 level, respectively, although it needs to be noted that two of the dummy 
variables, on R&D expenditure relating to 3-5% and 6-10%, were not statistically 
significant.  Thus the evidence in models 28, 30 and 32 supports hypothesis H2.   
Several other control variables were found to be consistently statistically 
significant in models 25 to 32 which relate to the propensity to use family 
contributions at start-up.  Family businesses were more likely than non-family 
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businesses to use family contributions at start-up, as were those entrepreneurs with 
role models and the exporting firms.  
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Table 6.11: Estimates of a logit regression model of the probability of using family contributions 
at start-up. The Odds Ratios 
 Model 
25 
Model 
26 
Model 
27 
Model 
28 
Model 
29 
Model 
30 
Model 
31 
Model 32 
Sector 
 
1.391 
(0.143)a 
1.407 
(0.149)a 
1.355 
(0.139)a 
1.676 
(0.192)a 
1.406 
(0.149)a 
1.338 
(0.138)a 
1.402 
(0.148)a 
1.353 
(0.187)a 
Size 0.964 
(0.165) 
0.998 
(0.168) 
1.004 
(0.170) 
0.992 
(0.154) 
0.991 
(0.166) 
0.994 
(0.167) 
0.991 
(0.166) 
0.987 
(0.171) 
Age of 
Business 
1.276 
(0.336) 
1.278 
(0.336) 
1.282 
(0.337) 
1.270 
(0.296) 
1.278 
(0.336) 
1.291 
(0.339) 
1.278 
(0.336) 
1.243 
(0.345) 
Family 
Business 
1.961 
(0.252)a 
2.027 
(0.272)a 
2.010 
(0.225)a 
2.044 
(0.227)a 
2.029 
(0.247)b 
1.986 
(0.259)a 
2.023 
(0.271)a 
2.192 
(0.253)a 
Gender 1.328 
(0.505) 
1.324 
(0.506) 
1.310 
(0.498) 
1.029 
(0.346) 
1.308 
(0.497) 
1.291 
(0.491) 
1.308 
(0.497) 
1.242 
(0.482) 
Age of Owner-
Manager 
0.381 
(0.294) 
0.358 
(0.278) 
0.359 
(0.277) 
0.365 
(0.220) 
0.379 
(0.292) 
0.353 
(0.273) 
0.355 
(0.289) 
0.346 
(0.351) 
Relative Role 
Model  
4.317 
(0.323)a 
4.208 
(0.382)a 
4.206 
(0.380)a 
4.292 
(0.319)a 
4.215 
(0.326)a 
4.246 
(0.335)a 
4.221 
(0.334)a 
4.590 
(0.356)a 
Limited 
Liability 
0.539 
(0.539) 
0.468 
(0.517) 
0.480 
(0.517) 
0.499 
(0.507) 
0.498 
(0.522) 
0.499 
(0.520) 
0.499 
(0.525) 
0.413 
(0.523) 
Partnership 0.746 
(0.342) 
0.710 
(0.325) 
0.702 
(0.322) 
0.705 
(0.328) 
0.723 
(0.330) 
0.723 
(0.330) 
0.720 
(0.329) 
0.682 
(0.314) 
Degree 0.597 
(0.203) 
0.606 
(0.206) 
0.612 
(0.208) 
0.509 
(0.158) 
0.601 
(0.207) 
0.613 
(0.208) 
0.607 
(0.206) 
0.584 
(0.208) 
Exporter 1.600 
(0.165)a 
1.592 
(0.162)a 
1.571 
(0.156)a 
1.418 
(0.167)a 
1.563 
(0.163)a 
1.595 
(0.165)a 
1.582 
(0.155)a 
1.653 
(0.143)a 
Innovator – 
Product 
1.324 
(0.471) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Process 
-------- 0.887 
(0.275) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Work 
-------- -------- 0.847 
(0.261) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Supply 
-------- -------- -------- 0.649 
(0.085)a 
-------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Markets 
-------- -------- ------- -------- 1.058 
(0.334) 
-------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Administration 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.828 
(0.065)a 
-------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Distribution 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 1.026 
(0.305) 
-------- 
R&D (1-2%) 
 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.437 
(0.218)c 
R&D (3-5%) 
 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.819 
(0.403) 
R&D (6-10%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.495 (0.305) 
R&D (11-20%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 2.350 (0.070)a 
R&D (≥21%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 2.502 (0.030)a 
Log likelihood -155.83 -156.08 -156.01 -158.74 -156.14 -155.98 -156.15 -150.373 
Pseudo R2 0.2387 0.236 0.237 0.248 0.236 0.237 0.236 0.279 
n=384 
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Bank Loans and Overdrafts 
Maximum likelihood estimate models were conducted with regard to the dichotomous 
dependent variable relating to ‘the use of bank loans and overdrafts funds at start-up’ (allocated a value 
of ‘1’) and ‘no use of bank loans and overdrafts funds at start-up’ respondents (allocated a value of ‘0’).  
Control variables plus the product innovation variable relating to the propensity for reporting the ‘the 
use of bank loans and overdrafts funds at start-up’ outcome were included in Model 33 in Table 6.12.  
The model has a Nagelkerke R2 of 0.120 and is significant at the 0.01 level.   The product innovation 
variable is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  Thus, the evidence supports hypothesis H2. 
In models 34 to 40 product innovation was replaced with each of the other measures of 
innovation, one at a time.  Thus, the independent variables relating to process innovation, work, supply, 
markets, administration, distribution and R&D expenditure were individually included in Models 34 to 
40, respectively. 
Models 34 to 40 are individually statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  The Nagelkerke R2 
ranges from 0.127 in model 36 (where supply innovation is included) to 0.214 in model 35 (in which 
work innovation is included).   In models 34 to 39, the seven input measures of innovation are all 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better, and thus the evidence in models 34 to 39 supports 
hypothesis H2.  However, the R&D expenditure dummy variables were all not statistically significant 
and this did not support hypothesis H2.  
Two control variables were found to be consistently statistically significant in models 33 to 40 
which relate to the propensity for the use of bank loans and overdrafts at start-up.  Larger businesses 
were more likely than smaller businesses to use bank loans and overdrafts at start-up and this 
relationship was weakly statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  Entrepreneurs with relative role 
models were less likely to use bank loans and overdrafts at start-up than those entrepreneurs without 
role models and this also was weakly statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 6.12: Estimates of a logit regression model of the probability of using bank loans and 
overdrafts at start-up. The Odds Ratios                                                                                     (n=384)                  
 Model 
33 
Model 
34 
Model 
35 
Model 
36 
Model 
37 
Model 
38 
Model 
39 
Model 40 
Sector 
 
0.564 
(0.333) 
0.550 
(0.341) 
0.574 
(0.471) 
0.540 
(0.318) 
0.641 
(0.386) 
0.590 
(0.495) 
0.577 
(0.346) 
0.552 
(0.393) 
Size 1.693 
(0.526)c 
1.610 
(0.495)c 
1.496 
(0.459)c 
1.629 
(0.502)c 
1.647 
(0.500)c 
1.661 
(0.507)c 
1.713 
(0.512)c 
1.717 
(0.558)c 
Age of 
Business 
1.002 
(0.448) 
1.021 
(0.453) 
0.920 
(0.416) 
1.044 
(0.482) 
1.084 
(0.503) 
1.022 
(0.471) 
1.072 
(0.509) 
1.207 
(0.579) 
Family 
Business 
1.303 
(0.814) 
1.425 
(0.909) 
1.617 
(1.046) 
1.507 
(0.937) 
1.461 
(0.917) 
1.635 
(1.023) 
1.437 
(0.894) 
1.415 
(0.841) 
Gender 0.923 
(0.647) 
0.906 
(0.642) 
0.832 
(0.600) 
1.015 
(0.713) 
0.909 
(0.634) 
1.009 
(0.709) 
1.025 
(0.720) 
0.997 
(0.689) 
Age of Owner-
Manager 
0.773 
(1.164) 
1.197 
(0.871) 
1.108 
(0.728) 
0.843 
(0.836) 
0.750 
(0.884) 
0.844 
(0.807) 
0.884 
(0.886) 
0.843 
(0.890) 
Relative Role 
Model  
0.255 
(0.211)c 
0.245 
(0.181)c 
0.210 
(0.179)c 
0.235 
(0.196)c 
0.240 
(0.200)c 
0.226 
(0.190)c 
0.225 
(0.188)c 
0.277 
(0.188)c 
Limited 
Liability 
0.821 
(0.551) 
0.977 
(0.685) 
0.865 
(0.601) 
0.760 
(0.517) 
0.858 
(0.585) 
0.908 
(0.607) 
0.776 
(0.535) 
0.800 
(0.609) 
Partnership 1.424 
(1.007) 
1.762 
(0.314) 
2.032 
(0.527) 
1.448 
(0.532) 
1.635 
(0.534) 
1.538 
(0.514) 
1.456 
(0.505) 
1.399 
(0.511) 
Degree 1.215 
(0.763) 
1.270 
(0.825) 
1.153 
(0.736) 
1.344 
(0.841) 
1.056 
(0.669) 
1.178 
(0.744) 
1.365 
(0.837) 
1.214 
(0.829) 
Exporter 0.531 
(0.395) 
0.547 
(0.416) 
0.622 
(0.464) 
0.533 
(0.390) 
0.515 
(0.309) 
0.470 
(0.354) 
0.478 
(0.354) 
0.559 
(0.305) 
Innovator – 
Product 
3.295 
(0.563)a 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Process 
-------- 5.987 
(0.103)a 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Work 
-------- -------- 15.551 
(0.359)a 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Supply 
-------- -------- -------- 2.568 
(0.543)a 
-------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Markets 
-------- -------- ------- -------- 8.517 
(0.093)b 
-------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Administration 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 5.085 
(0.544)b 
-------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Distribution 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 2.706 
(0.589)b 
-------- 
R&D (1-2%) 
 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 1.041 
(0.941) 
R&D (3-5%) 
 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 1.211 
(0.922) 
R&D (6-10%) 
 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 2.231 
(0.991) 
R&D (11-20%) 
 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 3.001 
(0.916) 
R&D (≥21%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 3.911 (1.011) 
Log likelihood -156.02 -152.64 -150.84 -155.54 -153.52 -153.58 -155.32 -150.95 
Pseudo R2 0.120 0.182 0.214 0.127 0.172 0.167 0.134 0.209 
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 6.5.2 Discussion and implications  
Key findings 
The use of own funds at start-up  
The bivariate results suggested that with regard to the 8 measures of innovation, 3 of these were 
statistically significantly related to the use of own funds at start-up.  Product innovators and distribution 
innovators were positively statistically significantly related at the 0.05 level to the use of own funds at 
start-up.  The expenditure on R&D dummy variables relating to high levels of expenditure 11-20% and 
≥21% were both statistically significant by way of comparison with the excluded dummy variable of no 
expenditure on R&D.  These dummy variables were both statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The 
multivariate regression results with regard to innovation were consistent with the bivariate results, 
although none of the dummy variables of R&D expenditure were statistically significant. 
Thus, there is mixed support for the first hypothesis that innovators are more likely to use their 
own savings at start-up in comparison to their non-innovating counterparts.   Access to finance has a 
major role in the growth as well as the development of entrepreneurs' businesses (Black and Strahan, 
2002).  At a practical level, a lack of capital may hinder the day-to-day activities of businesses, perhaps 
preventing the maintenance or the replacement of older, inefficient machinery and equipment or 
delaying and preventing the procurement of raw materials which are needed to grow the businesses 
(Van Auken, 2001; Pissarides, 1999).  The innovating firms, thus, are more likely to have to use their 
own funds which, depending upon individual circumstances, may not comprise substantial resources.  
This may in turn hinder the establishment and then the subsequent growth of the business.  
Innovating firms are more likely than non-innovating businesses to be engaging in risky 
activities for which there is a greater possibility of the business encountering difficulties and the 
business ending, where there is, by virtue of the nature of the innovation related expenditures, little 
possibility of recouping such investment. 
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The use of partners’ funds at start-up 
The initial analysis of the cross-tabulations indicated that 4 types of innovation – work, markets, 
administration and R&D expenditure were statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better related to 
the use of partners’ funds at start-up.  The multivariate regression analysis found that two measures of 
innovation were statistically significant at the 0.05 level – markets and administration innovation.  Thus, 
the inclusion of the control variables rendered the relationship between work innovation and R&D 
expenditure and the use of partners’ funds at start-up not statistically significant.  Thus, the results 
provide mixed support for the second hypothesis with regard to the use of partners’ funds at start-up. 
 
The use of ordinary shares at start-up 
Three types of innovation – process, distribution and R&D expenditure - were statistically 
significantly related at the 0.05 level to the use of ordinary shares at start-up in both the bivariate and 
the multivariate regression analysis.  However, as with the findings on partners’ funds at start-up in the 
regression analysis, none of the R&D dummy variables were statistically significant at the 0.01 level or 
better. 
 
The use of family contributions at start-up 
The bivariate and the multivariate regression confirmed that supply, administration and R&D 
expenditure were statistically related to the use of family contributions at start-up at the 0.05 level, or 
better.  As with the findings on the use of ordinary shares and partners’ funds at start-up not all of the 
R&D dummy variables were statistically significant.  
 
The use of bank loans and overdrafts at start-up 
The greatest number of innovation variables which were statistically significantly related to a 
source of start-up finance was found with regard to the use of bank loans and overdrafts.  All seven of 
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the output measures of innovation related to the use of bank loans and overdrafts were statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level, or better. 
Thus, overall there are results which provide mixed support for hypotheses H1 and H2.  A 
number of reasons account for these results.  For many small businesses, especially at the start-up stage, 
access to finance is a major challenge and they often fund their innovative ideas by resorting to their 
own savings, as well as the retained earnings of the businesses once they are up and running.  Secondly, 
because in the majority of small businesses there is either a single person or a very small management 
team, by definition the majority of the innovative ideas are only with the entrepreneur. If any 
misfortune happened to the entrepreneur then that could also be terminal for the business. Consequently, 
potential backers are less likely to be receptive to such funding requests from small innovating 
businesses, and thus the innovating businesses seek finance from other sources, and thus have a higher 
probability of applying for external finance from a variety of sources compared to their non-innovating 
counterparts.  Thirdly, in Beijing, and indeed throughout China, the system of property rights and the 
legal system do not offer protection to the lenders of finance to small businesses.  There is a long 
history in China of borrowers absconding and defaulting upon loan finance, and/or of misappropriating 
the finance and assets of a business.  Moreover, the legal system in China is very slow and cumbersome, 
which renders the recovery of loans extremely difficult; indeed an absconding business person could go 
to ground in another city away from Beijing, in what is a country covering a huge land mass (Zhu, 2002; 
Zhou and Zheng, 2004). In the face of the difficulty in enforcing contracts this does result in the high-
risk types of businesses, such as innovators, being more likely to apply for external finance.  
The results presented in this chapter serve to confirm the pecking order theory of small business 
finance in Beijing.  The theory suggests that entrepreneurs will have a preference for utilising own 
savings rather than taking on debt, a preference for debt finance rather than external equity finance 
(Giudici and Paleari, 2000; Swinnen et al., 2005). This is explained by the argument that self financing 
from own savings is not as costly as external sources of finance, combined with the fact that the 
entrepreneur has more knowledge of the innovations taking place in their products or services 
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compared to the less informed external potential providers of finance.  However, debt finance in 
comparison to external equity is not as costly, and will allow the entrepreneur to continue to run the 
business without a dilution of ownership and an absence of a perceived interference from the providers 
of the external equity.   
The comparatively new re-establishment of property rights has made the sense of ownership so 
strong that small business owner-managers consider their ventures as their siblings rather than business 
entities. Traditionally in China there is a particular reluctance and unwillingness embedded in owners’ 
minds to make recourse to external equity providers, due to fears of losing their say in the business, and 
to protect the locus of control over their properties.  Moreover, there are substantial costs and great 
difficulties in pursuing access to external equity and this is especially the case for innovative small 
businesses. In an environment where there is a lack of protection for intellectual property rights, 
innovative ideas could easily be copied leaving innovators with an incredibly short span of time to 
recoup the cost involved in inventive projects before a profit can be realised. Apparently, innovative 
SMEs are the most financially vulnerable among all innovators in this super competitive marketplace. 
As a result, it is a highly technical and subjective task to estimate the value of an innovative small 
business, which in turn could end up creating a dispute between the owner-manager and the equity 
provider in terms of the proportion of the stake in exchange for the amount of finance. Rather than 
seeking external equity providers, the small business community members would instead be more 
likely to take on board individual investors and make them a partner in the business.  The partnership 
relationship is also more likely to be pursued compared to the institutional investor external equity 
route because the partner would be more likely to bring skills, knowledge and experience which will 
then be at the disposal of the incumbent entrepreneur and the existing team. More importantly, the 
enhancement of the social capital (Guanxi network) by introducing a strong business partner is very 
attractive to the entrepreneur and, in most cases, will affect the financial outcomes of the investment 
project, in addition to the direct money injection from this new partner (Park and Luo, 2001). And so, 
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such a route is more often perceived by Chinese business people to involve less interference and to 
bond or tie the partner to the business and the common goal of making profits.  
The cross-tabulations and also the regression analysis found that several of the control variables 
were also found to be important and have strong relationships with the use of start-up finance.  
Exporting businesses were found to be more likely than non-exporting businesses to have used own 
funds, partners, ordinary shares and family contributions.  Exporting also represents a specific form of 
human capital.  Depending upon the views of a potential provider of finance they are more likely to 
perceive exporting firms as a slightly less insecure potential borrower than an innovating business, but 
still a high risk business.  The exporters have a better knowledge of their exports as well as the external 
business environment where they sell goods and services compared to the lenders of finance, and this 
asymmetric information is problematic.  This can restrict entrepreneurs’ access to finance (Binks et al., 
1992). 
It is difficult enough for business people in Beijing to make customers provide payment quickly 
and within one month of receipt of the goods (Tan, 2006). However, exporting businesses whilst 
enjoying the benefit of increased production and increased growth possibilities, also expose the 
exporting businesses to potential cash-flow problems and difficulties.  Payment from the customers in 
the importing countries can be a lot slower than domestic payments.  Such customers can cite a need to 
check the quality of the products received, and this has increased more recently in the wake of various 
scandals about the quality of Chinese manufactured goods and food products (Bapuji and Beamish, 
2007; Lu, 2008). A delay of between 30-90 days to check the quality and consistency of the products 
and services can thus occur (Buatsi, 2002).  Unfortunately, the need to check the quality may be 
combined with communication problems and other difficulties, as well as some customers wanting to 
see what they can get away with in delaying payment, and this can all result in late or uncertain 
payments.  
Sector had comparatively little systematic relationships with the use of start-up finance.  Indeed 
manufacturing businesses were more likely than service sector businesses to have used family 
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contributions at start-up.  Whilst the age of the business was not statistically significant in any of the 
regression models, family businesses were more likely to use their own funds and family contributions, 
and less likely to use partners’ finance and ordinary shares. Family ties are at the core of the concentric 
circles of Chinese people’s connections and they are particularly useful to younger firms (Zhu and 
Warner, 2000). At start-up stage of the business, contributions from family and friends are cheap and in 
most cases free to the entrepreneur. In Chinese culture, the older generation almost feels obliged to help 
younger family members to start a new career and generally are not looking for a return in money terms 
from the loan (Lee, 1996; Basu and Parker, 2001). It is also worth noting that the information 
asymmetry problem is much less profound in the setting of asking for loans from close relatives 
(Casson, 2003).   
The size of the firm was not statistically significant in any of the regression models with the 
sole exception of bank loans and overdrafts.  Larger sized businesses were more likely to use bank 
loans and overdrafts at start-up than smaller sized businesses.  The general lack of a statistically 
significant relationship between size and sources of finance is interesting and is in contrast to other 
studies of developed and developing nations where size was found to be important (Blanc, 1997; Steel 
and Webster, 1991; Aryeetey et al., 1994). 
The gender of the entrepreneur was not found to be related to the use of sources of finance at 
start-up in any of the models.  The business community in Beijing has a long history of women being 
involved in running businesses, and with the re-emergence of private enterprises women have been 
active from the beginning. Whilst some studies of developed nations and emerging nations have found 
that women encounter difficulties in accessing start-up finance (Verheul and Thurik, 2001; Robson and 
Obeng, 2008) the women in Beijing appear to be no less disadvantaged than their male counterparts.  
The age of the entrepreneurs was not statistically related to any of the models of start-up finance.  
Thus, in Beijing when the data is analysed in a multivariate context the young entrepreneurs in Beijing 
are not more likely (or less likely) to use specific sources of finance compared to middle aged or older 
entrepreneurs.  This set of results is interesting and contrasts with previous research in developing and 
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developed nations where younger entrepreneurs because of a lack of a track record can be rendered less 
able to secure external finance at start-up compared to older entrepreneurs with a business history 
(Robb and Wolken, 2002; Timmons, 1994), and a greater extent of assets which can be utilised as 
collateral (Hall et al., 2004).  In such circumstances, the previous research has found that younger 
entrepreneurs were then more likely to use their own savings at start-up (Robb and Wolken, 2002; 
Timmons, 1994). 
 Having a relative model was found to be positively related to the use of family contributions 
but negatively related to the use of bank loans and overdrafts.  Previous research by Curran and 
Blackburn (1993) and Bates (1997) noted that family borrowings at start-up was prevalent among 
businesses owned by ethnic minorities in the UK, and amongst Asian immigrant entrepreneurs in the 
US. Given the strong ties within the Beijing business community, it is not entirely surprising that those 
businesses which had relative role models were more likely to use family contributions.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
In this, the first of three empirical chapters, the researcher has explored the sources of start-up 
finance of small businesses in Beijing, using a new bespoke survey.  The research focussed upon 
testing two hypotheses.  The findings suggest that entrepreneurs with innovating businesses are more 
likely to use both internal sources of finance and external sources of finance than entrepreneurs with 
non-innovating businesses.  These findings were not uniformly consistent with regard to the type or 
facet of innovation against the sources of start-up finance, but the results did show that innovation was 
an important factor.  This notwithstanding, other human capital elements of the entrepreneurs and their 
businesses were found to be important, as well as other control characteristics relating to the business 
and the entrepreneurs. 
Own funds have been found to be the most important source of start-up finance, used by 
87.83% of entrepreneurs, and representing on average 60.5% of start-up finance.  Besides own savings, 
the research has also found that 30.09% and 29.42% of entrepreneurs used ordinary shares and partners 
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as sources of start-up finance, respectively. Correspondingly, these two sources of start up finance on 
average accounted for 17.70% and 12.76% of start-up finance.   
Family contributions were used by 14.60% of entrepreneurs and this source represented on 
average 6.08% of start-up finance, whilst bank loans and overdrafts, as well as trade credit, were used 
by comparatively few entrepreneurs and contributed only small amounts to start-up finance.  
More specifically, the results were supportive of hypothesis H1 that entrepreneurs engaged in 
innovation are more likely to report a higher usage of their own savings as a source of finance at start-
up compared with entrepreneurs not engaged in innovation.  There was also support for the hypothesis 
H2 that entrepreneurs engaged in innovation were more likely to report a higher level of usage of 
external sources of finance at start-up compared with entrepreneurs not engaged in innovation.  In the 
overall conclusion chapter the researcher returns to address and develop the implications of the findings 
of this chapter, individually, and in conjunction with the findings from the other two chapters.   
In the following chapter the research moves to exploring and testing three hypotheses on: the 
percentage of money received from that source, the amount of money sought, and the amount of money 
received.  As with this chapter, in the next chapter human capital theory and, in particular, the specific 
form of human capital pertaining to innovation are again the centre of attention.  The following chapter 
will be concerned with businesses which have sought finance, rather than the full sample including 
those who have and have not sought finance.  It will be the final econometric chapter in which the 
analysis looks at the characteristics of firms seeking finance. 
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Chapter 7: 
Applications and Success in Accessing Finance and Awareness of Sources of 
Finance 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate the funding environment for 
innovative and non-innovative small enterprises in the Beijing area of China. Calls 
have been made for more studies of small firms in developing countries (Naudé, 
2010), and especially China (Li et al., 2008).  There have been studies of 
entrepreneurs and small business in Beijing (See Wright et al. 2008; Dai and Liu, 
2009) particularly centred upon returnee entrepreneurs, but studies of finance and 
innovation are less common.  Moreover whilst the benefits of innovation for 
economic growth are rarely understated, it is commonly thought that ‘…a strict 
reliance on a market system will result in underinvestment in innovation, relative to 
the socially desirable level’ (Martin and Scott, 2000, p. 438). Innovation projects are 
by their very nature speculative, requiring resource commitments in advance of 
anticipated revenues. In addition, this implied risk is compounded by a number of 
related factors: limited scrap and resale value of innovation ‘assets’; unresolved 
technical and target (or market) uncertainties; and, appropriation concerns (see, for 
instance, Tylecote, 1994; Symeonidis, 1996; Baldwin et al., 2002). Assuming that 
firms exploit innovations through their own output, small firms are likely to be at a 
particular disadvantage. In many instances, the ability of expected sales to meet initial 
costs is marginal at best (Cohen, 1995). Additionally, whilst large firms may build 
portfolios of innovation projects, diversifying to obtain more stable cash flows and 
reduce risks (Giudici and Paleari, 2000), small firms are, more often, constrained to 
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develop single (or a small number of) research projects that require considerable 
funding relative to turnover base. In short, investment in innovation is risky and, all 
other things being equal, risks are greater for smaller firms. The primary consequence 
is that ‘…there is bound to be some discrimination against investment in inventive 
and research activities’ (Arrow, 1971, p. 153). Recent empirical work has shown such 
discrimination to be most marked in the small firm sector (e.g. Freel, 2007). 
In light of these observations, most developed economies have advanced a 
pot-pourri of policy instruments to ameliorate the financial constraints apparently 
faced by small firms generally and innovative small firms specifically5
Drawing upon data provided by 452 respondents to a postal survey 
administered between July and December 2007, this paper begins filling the gap.  An 
. Many of these 
have been the subject of academic evaluation (e.g. Audretsch et al., 2002; North et al., 
2001), while many more studies have explored, broadly, the funding concerns of 
innovative small firms (e.g. Freel, 1999; Giudici and Paleari, 2000; Oakey, 2003; 
Mueller and Zimmermann, 2009). However, whilst studies of the financing of smaller 
enterprises in developed economies are widespread (if disappointingly inconclusive), 
studies in developing economies are far less common. This is consistent with Bruton 
et al’s (2008) lament on the relative dearth of research into entrepreneurship in 
emerging economies, such as China.  China’s recent startling growth (and, in 
particular, the growth of core Eastern cities) throws this lacuna into sharper relief. 
Whilst there is evidence of a growing interest in high-technology industry 
development (Ning, 2007) and measurable developments in the Chinese venture 
capital industry, there has been limited primary research directly addressing the 
funding activities and aspirations of innovative ventures. 
                                                 
5 Examples of innovation specific programmes include: the SBIR program in the United States; the 
SMART award scheme in the UK; elements of the NRC-IRAP programme in Canada. 
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earlier version of the chapter was presented at the 2008 Babson conference (Robson et 
al., 2008b).  This paper has been subsequently revised and developed and is currently 
under consideration by the Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development.  In 
this chapter, hypotheses H3, H4 and H5 are tested, and the reader is reminded of these 
hypotheses below:  
H3: Innovative ventures will possess a greater likelihood of having applied for 
external funding compared to non-innovating ventures. 
 
H4: Innovative ventures will possess a greater likelihood of having been 
refused access to external finance compared to non-innovating ventures. 
 
H5: The non-innovative ventures are less likely to be aware of the availability 
of, and to complete applications for, risk capital compared to innovators. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows.  Section 2 details the overall levels of 
applications for external finance – by source, and bivariate analysis against the 
characteristics of the firms and the entrepreneurs.  Section 3 looks at whether the 
firms were successful in their applications for external finance – by source, and then 
develops bivariate analysis against innovation, and the firm’s and owner-manager’s 
characteristics.  Section 4 applies a similar approach to sections 2 and 3 but with 
regard to the levels of awareness of external sources of finance.  Thereafter the 
chapter looks at regression analysis on applications for external finance, being 
successful in these applications, and then the awareness of sources of finance, by 
source.  Finally, concluding remarks are outlined to complete the chapter. 
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7.2 Empirical Findings 
Applications for external finance 
 The percentage of the entrepreneurs applying for each of the external sources 
of finance is shown in the first row across Table 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3.  It shows that 
14.85% of firms applied for bank overdrafts, 41.15% of firms applied for long-term 
bank finance, and 57.96% of firms applied for short-term bank finance.  In the case of 
banking sources of finance, the relatively greater importance of short-term bank 
finance compared to bank overdrafts can be explained by the fact that the bank 
overdrafts are still a relatively new type of financial product or source of finance in 
China. Following initiatives from the People’s Bank of China (the Chinese central 
bank) and clearer instructions concerning the clearing process, commercial banks in 
China recently launched a range of new financial products in order to overcome the 
obstacles to financing brought about by difficulties with overdraft facilities 
experienced by SMEs since 2008.  
Partners and working shareholders were popular sources to apply to for 
finance.  Slightly more than two out of five firms (43.14%) applied for finance from 
partners and working shareholders. Given the close relationship of partners and 
working shareholders with their firms, it is natural that firms should turn to them to 
source external finance.  It would be expected that the partners and working 
shareholders would look favourably upon requests for finance, and offer this backing 
at favourable rates – especially compared to banks and other sources of finance. 
Three sources of finance applied to by less than one in five of the firms were 
factoring and invoice discounting firms, equity, and grants.  More specifically, 
16.81% of firms applied to factoring and invoice discounting firms, 17.92% applied to 
equity sources, and 9.73% of firms applied for grants.  Each of these three sources of 
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finance is still comparatively new and under-developed in China.  Factoring and 
invoice discounting firms are still scarce on the ground in Beijing, and Chinese firms 
may feel that the divulging of information to third parties is also too high a price to 
pay for extra finance.  Also, as indicated in the front-end chapters of the dissertation, 
the provision of equity finance is not very good in China. There remains, moreover, a 
great deal of scepticism about utilising equity finance and also a fear of losing control 
of the business, or at the least having to divulge information and allow external 
sources to have a say in the strategy and/or the day-to-day running of the business.  
Grants, too, are still a comparatively new phenomenon in China. The Chinese 
government has set up funding institutions focusing on the needs of various groups, 
for instance the establishment of the InnoFund (Innovation Fund fro Small 
Technology-based Firms) by the State Council in 1999, to help small innovative firms 
overcome the start-up capital barrier and to foster innovative research activities. 
Grants are offered both to research personnel who have a track record of scientific 
achievements and to businesses to subsidise new product developments. Temporary 
grants or subsidies are made available in special circumstances, i.e. local 
governments’ support during a financial crisis to compensate firms for not making 
any redundancies.  
 
7.2.1 Crosstabulation analysis 
The reader is reminded that hypothesis H3 revolved around the notion that 
innovators would possess a significantly greater likelihood of having applied for 
external finance in comparison to the non-innovative businesses. Table 7.1 presents 
the proportion of firms applying for external finance, against their innovation activity 
and the control variables relating to the entrepreneurs and the firms.  
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Innovation activity is captured by the same eight measures that were utilised in 
the previous chapter. Storey (1994 pp.194) holds that “innovation (is) associated with 
more rapid growth within small firms”. Innovation has an undeniable impact upon the 
two performance parameters, namely a firm’s profitability and a firm’s growth. 
Innovators appear to experience superior performance when compared to their less 
innovative peers. According the the Ministry of Science and Technology of China, 
more than 65% of patents filed since 1990 have been by SMEs, and so it is logical to 
infer that SMEs are responsible for the majority of technological innovation in the 
country. However, innovative small enterprises often lack the means to develop, by 
being, in particular, financially constrained, thus access to capital is desperately 
required to facilitate innovative and commercially appealing projects from their early 
stages of development.  
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Bank overdraft, short-term and long-term bank loans 
The results in Table 7.1 show that innovation was strongly statistically 
significantly at the 0.10 level, or better, related to the applications for the three types 
of bank finance. Bank overdrafts were applied for by 20.35% of process innovators 
compared to 11.43% of non-process innovators and this was statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level. There was a stronger statistical significance at the 0.01 level between 
process innovation and long-term bank finance with 51.16% of process innovators 
and 35.00% of non-process innovators applying for this. 
 Overdrafts from the bank were sought by 18.23% of work innovators and 
12.05% of non-work innovators and this was statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  
Furthermore, 53.20% of work innovators and 31.33% of the non-work innovators 
applied for long-term bank finance, and this relationship was highly statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. 
 Supply innovators applied in greater numbers than non-supply innovators for 
all three measures of bank finance and the relationships were statistically significant 
at the 0.10 level, or better. Market innovators reported higher levels of applications 
for short-term bank finance than non-market innovators and this relationship was 
weakly statistically significant at the 0.10 level, but market innovation was not related 
to the applications for bank overdrafts or long-term bank finance. 
 Admin innovation was statistically significantly related at the 0.05 level to the 
applications for both overdrafts and long-term bank finance.  Bank overdrafts were 
sought by 19.21% of admin innovators compared to 12.00% of non-innovators, while 
46.89% of admin innovators and 37.45% of non-innovators applied for long-term 
bank finance. 
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 Interestingly, product innovation was related at the 0.01 level of significance 
to longer term bank finance.  Product innovators (44.7%) and non-product innovators 
(31.09%) applied for long-term bank finance. However, product innovation was not 
statistically significantly related at the 0.10 level, or better, to the other two sources of 
bank finance.  
Distribution innovation was highly statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
related to the applications for both bank overdrafts and long-term bank finance, and 
weakly at the 0.10 level related to applications for short-term bank finance.  In all 
three cases more distribution innovators than non-innovators applied for finance from 
the bank. 
 R&D expenditure was weakly statistically significant at the 0.10 level to each 
of the three bank related sources of external finance. Firms spending larger amounts 
of resources on R&D and captured by the three dummy variables of 6-10%, 11-20% 
and ≥21% reported higher numbers of applications for bank overdrafts compared to 
those spending lower amounts on R&D and falling into the groups 0%, 1-2% and 3-
5%.  In the case of short-term bank finance, 31.67% of firms who spent no money on 
R&D applied for short-term bank finance and this was roughly half the level of 
applications for each of the other categories of firms who spent money on R&D.   
A similar, but stronger pattern was found for R&D expenditure and 
applications for long-term bank finance.  This was most striking with only 23.3% of 
firms who did not spend money on R&D applying for long-term bank finance which 
was less than one third of the 76.47% of firms who spent ≥21% of their turnover on 
R&D. 
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Thus, the evidence presented in Table 7.1 indicates that innovating firms 
having applied in greater numbers than their non-innovating counterparts for bank 
finance, and this evidence is supportive of hypothesis H3. 
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Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics – applications for external finance by source 
 Bank’s 
Overdraft 
χ2 Bank Loan 
(≧2 years) 
χ2 Bank Loan  
(< 2 years) 
χ2 n 
All 14.82  41.15  57.96  452 
Manufacturing 14.94 0.007 42.91 0.791 60.92 2.213 261 
Services 14.66  38.74  53.93  191 
8-19 employees 15.56 8.427c 29.44 18.946a 48.89 14.021a 180 
20-49 employees 11.72  46.88  64.06  128 
50-99 employees 10.26  47.44  56.41  78 
100-199 employees 20.00  50.00  72.50  40 
200-499 employees 30.77  61.54  73.08  26 
1-5 years old 10.67 6.018b 34.27 6.666b 60.11 0.639 178 
6-9 years old 19.77  43.50  55.93  177 
≥10 years old 13.40  49.48  57.73  97 
Family Business 12.50 6.768b 42.13 0.164 58.80 0.117 216 
Non Family Business 16.95  40.25  57.20  236 
Male 14.01 0.890 40.06 0.840 57.70 0.048 357 
Female 17.89  45.26  58.95  95 
18-30 years old  27.66 9.212b 57.45 7.503c 65.96 7.513c 47 
31-45 years old 13.33  40.00  56.49  285 
46-55 years old 15.96  40.43  57.45  94 
≥56 years old 3.85  26.92  61.54  26 
Relative Role Model  13.17 0.571 44.31 1.093 64.07 4.054b 167 
No Relative Role Model  15.79  39.30  54.39  285 
Registered Business 17.65 5.566c 38.24 5.535c 56.37 5.599c 204 
Partnership 11.65  35.92  65.05  103 
Limited liability 13.10  48.97  55.17  145 
Degree 15.79 0.288 43.06 0.587 58.85 0.126 209 
No Degree 13.99  39.51  57.20  243 
Exporter 15.32 0.028 45.95 1.397 76.58 20.918a 111 
Non-Exporter 14.66  39.59  51.91  341 
Innovator – Product 13.45 0.243 44.74 6.748a 60.06 2.279 333 
None 15.32  31.09  52.10  119 
Innovator – Process 20.35 6.715b 51.16 11.494a 57.56 0.019 172 
None 11.43  35.00  58.21  260 
Innovator – Work 18.23 3.38c 53.20 22.100a 55.67 0.800 203 
None 12.05  31.33  59.84  249 
Innovator – Supply 20.56 7.785a 58.89 38.865a 63.33 3.538c 180 
None 11.03  29.41  54.41  272 
Innovator – Markets 15.93 0.646 44.07 2.367 61.11 2.725c 270 
None 13.19  36.81  53.30  182 
Innovator – Admin 19.21 4.433b 46.89 3.961b 58.19 0.006 177 
None 12.00  37.45  57.82  275 
Innovator – Distribution 21.20 9.982a 54.35 22.319a 63.30 3.405c 184 
None 10.45  32.09  54.65  268 
R&D Expenditure as 
a % of turnover: None 
15.00 9.886c 23.33 9.999c 31.67 9.908c 60 
1-2% 12.18  39.74  66.03  156 
3-5% 11.02  41.53  62.71  118 
6-10% 20.29  49.28  52.17  69 
11-20% 18.75  43.75  65.62  32 
≥21% 35.29  76.47  52.94  17 
n=452 c p < 0.10; b p < 0.05; a p < 0.01  
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Many of the control variables were also statistically significantly related to the 
applications for one of the three types of bank finance.  Larger sized firms applied in 
greater numbers for all three types of finance and these relationships were statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level for short-term and long-term bank finance, and weakly 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level with regard to bank overdrafts.  Younger firms, 
established for 1-5 years of applied for bank overdrafts and long-term bank finance in 
substantially fewer numbers than older firms and both of these relationships were 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  Older entrepreneurs of ≥56 years of age 
applied in smaller numbers for bank overdrafts (3.85%), and long-term bank finance 
(26.92%), than the younger age groups of entrepreneurs and these relationships were 
statistically significant at the 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
Greater numbers of registered businesses (17.65%) compared to partnerships 
(11.65%) and limited liability firms (13.10%) applied for bank overdrafts.  
Substantially more limited liability firms (48.97%) applied for long-term bank finance 
than did registered businesses (38.24%), and partnerships (35.92%).  For the type of 
business variable, this was weakly statistically significant at the 0.10 level for both of 
the aforementioned sets of results. 
Over three quarters of exporting firms (76.58%) applied for short-term bank 
finance compared to just over half of non-exporting firms (51.91%) and this 
relationship was highly statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  
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Equity finance  
The results in Table 7.2 show that innovation was strongly statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level, or better, relating to the applications for equity finance.  
Indeed all seven output measures of innovation and also the input measure of 
innovation – R&D expenditure - were statistically significant at the 0.10 level, or 
better. 
Almost three times as many product innovators (21.62%) as non-product 
innovators (7.56%) applied for equity finance. This type of financial support was also 
applied for by 24.14% of work and 12.85% of non-work innovators, by 22.96% of 
market innovators and 10.44% of non-market innovators and by 27.12% of admin 
innovators and 12.00% of non-admin innovators. In each case, the relationship was 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  The three other input measures of innovation 
– process, supply, and distribution - were weakly statistically significant at the 0.10 
level, and there was less than 10% difference in seeking equity finance between 
innovators and non-innovators.  The input measure of innovation, R&D expenditure, 
was also weakly statistically significant at the 10% level; 6.67% of firms with no 
spending on R&D applied for equity finance which was much lower than the 15.38% 
of applications by those firms spending 1-2% of turnover on R&D. This, in turn, was 
lower than the 19.49% found in firms spending 3-5% on R&D.  The highest reported 
applications for equity finance were by firms spending ≥21% of their turnover on 
R&D, which totalled 64.17%. 
Thus, the bivariate analysis shows that innovating firms are applying for 
equity finance in greater numbers than non-innovating firms and this evidence is 
highly supportive of hypothesis H3. 
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Four control variables were also found to be statistically significantly related 
to applications for equity finance.  Entrepreneurs with degrees (21.53%) and exporters 
(23.42%) applied in greater numbers than those without degrees (14.81%) and non-
exporters (16.13%), and both of these relationships were statistically significant at the 
0.10 level.   There was a clear correlation between the increased age of the 
entrepreneur and the declined applications for equity finance and this was highly 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. A total of 38.30% of entrepreneurs aged 18-
30 years made applications for equity finance and this was more than twice the 
number applying reported by those aged 31-45 years (17.89%).  Applications for 
equity finance declined further to 11.70% of those entrepreneurs aged 46-55 years of 
age, and the lowest figures came from those entrepreneurs aged ≥56 years of age 
(3.85%).  The gender of the entrepreneur was also highly statistically significant at the 
0.01 level with regard to applications for equity finance, with 23.16% of women and 
16.53% of men applying. 
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Table 7.2: Descriptive statistics – applications for external finance by source 
 External 
Equity 
χ2 Grants χ2 Factoring/ 
Invoice 
Discounting 
χ2 n 
All 17.92  9.73  16.81  452 
Manufacturing 17.24 0.194 12.64 5.949b 17.60 0.290 261 
Services 18.85  5.76  15.71  191 
8-19 employees 14.44 7.434 8.33 15.075a 10.56 15.782a 180 
20-49 employees 17.97  7.03  17.19  128 
50-99 employees 21.79  11.54  17.95  78 
100-199 employees 15.00  7.50  32.50  40 
200-499 employees 34.62  30.77  30.77  26 
1-5 years old 18.54 0.183 8.43 1.117 19.66 1.956 178 
6-9 years old 18.08  9.60  14.12  177 
≥10 years old 16.49  12.37  16.49  97 
Family Business 15.74 1.336 7.41 5.951b 15.74 0.341 216 
Non Family Business 19.92  11.86  17.80  236 
Male 16.53 19.243a 9.24 0.466 16.53 0.100 357 
Female 23.16  11.58  17.89  95 
18-30 years old  38.30 19.240a 14.89 11.820b 29.79 11.044b 47 
31-45 years old 17.89  7.72  17.89  285 
46-55 years old 11.70  12.77  8.51  94 
≥56 years old 3.85  11.54  11.54  26 
Relative Role Model  16.77 0.240 10.78 3.422c 16.17 0.079 167 
No Relative Role Model  18.60  9.12  17.19  285 
Registered Business 18.14 0.071 8.82 1.831 16.18 5.693c 204 
Partnership 18.45  7.77  10.68  103 
Limited liability 17.24  12.41  22.07  145 
Degree 21.53 3.336c 10.05 0.043 17.70 0.220 209 
No Degree 14.81  9.47  16.05  243 
Exporter 23.42 3.029c 13.51 3.112c 20.72 1.606 111 
Non-Exporter 16.13  8.50  15.54  341 
Innovator – Product 21.62 11.780a 12.61 11.923a 19.82 8.169a 333 
None 7.56  1.68  8.40  119 
Innovator – Process 25.00 9.462c 17.44 18.771a 20.35 2.480 172 
None 13.57  5.00  14.65  260 
Innovator – Work 24.14 9.685a 14.29 8.687a 21.18 5.027b 203 
None 12.85  6.02  13.25  249 
Innovator – Supply 21.67 2.854c 12.78 3.153c 23.33 9.089a 180 
None 15.44  7.72  12.50  272 
Innovator – Markets 22.96 11.592a 11.85 3.421c 20.00 4.866b 270 
None 10.44  6.59  12.09  182 
Innovator – Admin 27.12 16.734a 12.43 2.405 20.90 3.479c 177 
None 12.00  8.00  14.18  275 
Innovator – Distribution 21.74 3.077c 13.59 5.242b 20.65 3.680c 184 
None 15.30  7.09  14.18  268 
R&D Expenditure as 
a % of turnover: None 
6.67  3.33  5.00  60 
1-2% 15.38 10.999c 7.69 11.233c 17.31 10.800c 156 
3-5% 19.49  12.71  23.73  118 
6-10% 18.84  11.59  17.39  69 
11-20% 18.75  12.50  12.50  32 
≥21% 64.71  17.65  11.76  17 
n=452 c p < 0.10; b p < 0.05; a p < 0.01  
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Grants, Factoring/ Invoice Discounting, and Partners and Working 
Shareholders 
The bivariate results in Table 7.2 and 7.3 showed consistently that the 
innovators applied for grants, factoring and invoice discounting firms, and partners in 
greater numbers than their non-innovating counterparts, and that these relationships 
were statistically significant at the 0.10 level or better.  Indeed across the 
aforementioned three sources of finance, only two exceptions where the relationships 
were not statistically significant at the 0.10 level, or better, were firstly administration 
innovation and applications for grants, and secondly process innovation and factoring 
and invoice discounting firms. 
Thus, the evidence in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 shows that with regard to grants, 
factor invoicing and discount firms, and firms with partners and working shareholders 
innovators generally applied in greater numbers than the non-innovating firms, and 
this evidence is supportive of hypothesis H3. 
Several of the control variables were also statistically significant at the 0.10 
level or better.  Applications were made by 12.64% of manufacturing firms and 
5.76% of service sector firms for grants, and 39.08% of manufacturing firms and 
48.69% of service sector firms to partners for finance, and both of these relationships 
were statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
The size of firm was statistically significantly at the 0.01 level related to 
applications for factoring and invoice discounting firms, with 10.56% of firms with 8-
19 employees reporting the lowest number of applications. This was approximately 
one third of the 32.50% of firms with 100-199 employees and the 30.77% of firms 
with 200-499 employees. 
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Applications to partners and working shareholders for finance were made by 
50.85% of non-family businesses and that was much higher than the 34.72% reported 
by family businesses and this relationship was statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  
The age of the entrepreneurs was statistically significantly at the 0.05 level or 
better related to applications to factoring and invoice discounting firms, to partners 
and working shareholders and for grants.  In all three cases it was entrepreneurs of 18-
30 years of age who applied for the sources in the greatest numbers compared to the 
older age groups.   
The type of business was weakly statistically significant at the 0.10 level in the 
applications to factoring and invoice discounting firms, and to partners and working 
shareholders. 
Entrepreneurs with degrees applied in greater numbers to partners and 
working shareholders compared to those without degrees and this relationship was 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  Responses show that 49.76% of 
entrepreneurs with degrees compared to 37.45% of entrepreneurs without degrees 
applied to partners and working shareholders for finance. Possible explanations for 
these findings are firstly, entrepreneurs with university degrees or higher tend to be 
the younger generation of entrepreneurs, as education opportunities are much better 
for them compared to the generation of entrepreneurs who started their businesses in 
1970s.  The characteristics of younger owner-managers have become quite different 
from their older peers, as time has moved on. For instance, well-educated, young 
owner-managers will find themselves less bound to the traditional Chinese values and 
may not see being outright owners of their company as crucial as did the older 
generation, therefore they are more prepared to lose some control of the firm in 
exchange for resources. In addition, there is an increasing number of ‘returnee 
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entrepreneurs’ (Wright et al., 2008) who are very well educated and have an open 
mind about involving partners who can work with them to achieve business 
advancement.  Thirdly, the introduction of business partners and / or working 
shareholders could effectively complement the entrepreneur by adding managerial 
skills, knowledge of the industry, social networking and financial resources.  
Exporting showed a weakly positive statistical significance related to 
applications for grants, with 13.51% of exporters and 8.50% of non-exporters putting 
in grant applications. In spite of the prolonged period of Chinese trade surplus to the 
developed countries, Chinese exporting industries are highly clustered in low value-
added manufacturing sectors that do not involve hiring skilled labour (i.e. product 
assembly for manufacture of electronic goods, mass production of soft toys, clothes 
and shoe making). Government policy has a clear tendency to promote innovation and 
grants that are released to the private sector are often for recognised inventive projects, 
whereas low skilled labour work does not warrant government support. Unfortunately, 
this is the hard reality Chinese exporters have to face. The profit margin for their sales 
is usually very low so that without the tax rebate the Chinese customs promises to pay 
after the goods are shipped overseas, they stand little chance of being in the money. 
Therefore, there are only going to be a small number of exporters who are aware and 
able to take advantage of the government financial support schemes. 
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Table 7.3: Descriptive statistics – applications for external finance by source 
 Partners/ Working 
Shareholders 
χ2 No External 
Applications 
χ2 n 
All 43.15  15.04   452 
Manufacturing 39.08 4.152b 14.18 0.364 261 
Services 48.69  16.23  191 
8-19 employees 42.22 1.714 24.44 21.945a 180 
20-49 employees 42.19  10.16  128 
50-99 employees 48.72  10.26  78 
100-199 employees 37.50  5.00  40 
200-499 employees 46.15  3.85  26 
1-5 years old 51.12 7.718b 13.48 7.887b 178 
6-9 years old 37.29  18.64  177 
≥10 years old 39.18  11.34  97 
Family Business 34.72 11.955a 17.59 2.102 216 
Non Family Business 50.85  12.71  236 
Male 43.14 0.144 15.97 1.130 357 
Female 43.16  11.58  95 
18-30 years old  61.70 7.857b 6.38 7.443c 47 
31-45 years old 42.11  13.68  285 
46-55 years old 38.30  22.34  94 
≥56 years old 38.46  19.23  26 
Relative Role Model  39.52 1.415 16.17 0.262 167 
No Relative Role Model  45.26  14.39  285 
Registered Business 40.20 5.699c 18.63 5.707c 204 
Partnership 47.57  14.56  103 
Limited liability 44.14  10.34  145 
Degree 49.76 6.943a 9.57 9.117a 209 
No Degree 37.45  19.75  243 
Exporter 46.85 0.824 3.60 15.067a 111 
Non-Exporter 41.94  18.77  341 
Innovator – Product 44.74 6.991a 10.81 17.736a 333 
None 38.66  26.89  119 
Innovator – Process 56.40 19.884a 9.30 7.163a 172 
None 35.00  18.57  260 
Innovator – Work 54.68 20.058a 8.37 12.826a 203 
None 33.73  20.48  249 
Innovator – Supply 49.04 4.842b 8.33 10.540a 180 
None 38.97  19.49  272 
Innovator – Markets 50.00 12.858a 10.37 11.466a 270 
None 32.97  21.98  182 
Innovator – Admin 55.93 19.403a 7.91 11.587a 177 
None 34.91  19.64  275 
Innovator – Distribution 49.46 5.045b 9.24 8.182a 184 
None 38.81  19.03  268 
R&D Expenditure as 
a % of turnover: None 
36.67 19.887a 30.00 17.396a 60 
1-2% 42.31  14.10  156 
3-5% 38.14  15.25  118 
6-10% 50.72  13.04  69 
11-20% 56.25  3.12  32 
≥21% 52.94  0  17 
n=452 c p < 0.10; b p < 0.05; a p < 0.01  
  
 
272 
No External Applications 
The last column of results shown in Table 7.3 deals with responses reporting 
no applications for finance. Fewer of the innovators made no applications for finance 
compared to the innovators and that these relationships were highly statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level for all output measures of innovation as well as the input 
measure of innovation, being R&D expenditure.  In each case the percentage of 
innovators not applying for finance was more than double that of non-innovating 
firms.  Thus, these results are consistent with the earlier findings on applications for 
each of the named sources of finance against innovation.  This set of results is 
supportive of hypothesis H3. 
Six of the control variables related to not applying for external finance were 
also found to be statistically significant at the 0.10 level or better and these were the 
size of the firm, the age of the firms, the age of the entrepreneur, the holding of a 
degree, the export activity, and the type of the business.  More specifically, it was 
found that smaller firms compared to larger sized firms, the mid age firms aged 6-9 
years; older entrepreneurs aged 46-55 and ≥56 compared to younger entrepreneurs 
were not applying for external finance in the greatest numbers.  This situation also 
applied to those without degrees, non-exporting firms and registered businesses.  
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7.3 Success – Full or Reduced Amount Received 
In the results shown in Table 7.4, the percentage values relate to those 
entrepreneurs or firms who were successful and received either the full amount or a 
reduced amount of the finance which they were seeking from each source.   
Consequently the number of firms reported in each cell varies, as the research is only 
dealing with firms who applied to a source of finance. 
The reader needs to be reminded that unfortunately information is not 
available upon the amount of external finance which was asked from each specific 
named source, nor how much was received specifically from each named source.  In 
chapter 8, the researcher looks at the overall amount of finance which was requested, 
and the overall amount of finance which was received. 
The information presented in Table 7.4, despite the above caveats, is very 
important and interesting in understanding the financing of SMEs in Beijing. No other 
similar study has presented this information from a large scale sample of SMEs in 
China, and has also had information on the characteristics of the businesses and the 
owner-managers.  There are previous analyses from the Cambridge researchers, Alan 
Hughes and Andy Cosh, but their research looked at Britain.  
The extent to which the firms received the full amount of external finance 
required varied hugely from source to source. Grants (6.82%), bank overdrafts (7.47%) 
and external equity (8.64%) were offered to the lowest proportions of firms receiving 
the full requested amount of external finance, and indeed was less than one in ten.
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Table 7.4: Successful applications for external finance of those applying, by source 
 Bank 
overdraft
Model 9 
Bank 
Loan (≧
2 years)  
Model 10 
Bank Loan  
(< 2 years) 
Model 11 
External 
Equity 
Model 12 
Grants 
Model 13 
Factoring/ 
Invoice 
Discounting 
Firms Model 
14 
Partners/ 
Working 
shareholders 
Model 15 
Full Amount 7.47 16.76 15.65 8.64 6.82 30.26 46.15 
Reduced 
Amount 
19.40 38.92 62.98 20.99 34.09 38.16 43.08 
No Finance 73.13 44.62 21.37 70.37 49.09 31.58 10.77 
Full or Reduced 
Amount 
26.87 55.38 78.63 29.63 40.91 68.42 89.23 
n 67 185 262 81 44 76 195 
The n values are the number of entrepreneurs who applied to each named source of finance. 
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Long-term (16.76%) and short-term (15.65%) bank finance was provided to 
substantially greater proportions of firms receiving the full amount of finance sought. 
These results are disappointing and show the true picture of the extent of financial 
constraints SMEs have to suffer. Since banks represent the most ordinary formal 
source of finance, the awareness among business people of either long-term or short-
term bank loans is high. Furthermore, in general, banks deal with the widest possible 
range of clientele in terms of money matters, therefore they are not only better 
equipped with risk assessment techniques, but also are in the position to help 
businesses in many situations when other financers cannot. Whilst factoring or 
invoice discounting firms provided full funding to 30.26% of applicants, as far as this 
source of finance is concerned, an established business relationship (i.e. a number of 
previous dealings) with the factoring company is quite important and the money is 
almost certainly loaned for a short period of time and must be backed by a genuine 
purchase order (normally from overseas). 
Firms with partners and working shareholders received the full amount in 
46.15% of applications.  This set of results with regard to the full amount received 
appears largely a function of the strong relationship between partners and working 
shareholders and the firms.  Both sides should know each other very well and they 
both should also have a good knowledge and understanding of the businesses and how 
they are doing. 
Looking at the reduced amount of external finance received by source, it is 
interesting that bank overdrafts were again near the bottom in terms of proportions of 
firms with this outcome.  Indeed, 19.40%, slightly under 1 in 5 firms, received a 
reduced amount of finance from bank overdraft applications.  This was largely 
explained by the nature of grants in China where a reduced amount of finance being 
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awarded is more the norm. It would also be interesting to compare the performance of 
firms who received the full amount against firms who only received a reduced amount 
of the finance they requested, hence finding a way to discover how efficiently 
financial resources were allocated.  
Similarly, 20.99% of firms approaching external equity providers received a 
reduced amount of finance.  Whilst the above value is slightly higher than that found 
for bank overdrafts, this again represents a source of finance which is only offering a 
reduced amount of finance to slightly more than one in five firms.  Moreover, the 
number of firms approaching external equity, at 81, is not an insubstantial number and 
reinforces the fact that the relative and absolute success rate with external equity 
providers in Beijing is not very encouraging. 
Long-term bank loans (38.92%) and factoring or invoice discounting firms 
(38.16%) both gave reduced amounts of finance to slightly less than two out of five of 
the applications. These results show the conservative nature of finance providers 
when approving long-term loans by offering reduced amounts rather than the full 
amount applied for. For both banks and factoring or invoice discounting firms, 
relationship lending is a vital if not the only solution to secure a long-term loan in 
China.  
Putting together the full or reduced amounts of finance arguably gives a better 
benchmark in gauging the relative success of applications for external finance. 
Responses showed that 89.23% of firms applying to partners or working shareholders 
received the full or a reduced amount of finance.  Thus, nearly nine out of ten firms 
were totally successful or had some amount of success from applying to partners or 
working shareholders. 
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In addition, 78.63% of firms applying for short-term bank finance received the 
full or a reduced amount of the finance sought, so, more than three quarters of firms 
applying for short-term bank finance were totally successful or had some measure of 
success in securing this.  Thereafter there is an approximate 10% reduction in firms 
receiving the full or a reduced amount of finance, being 68.42% from factoring or 
invoice discounting firms. 
Of firms turning to bank loans, 55.38% received either the full or a reduced 
amount of finance. Thus, for bank loans the proportion of totally or partially 
successful firms is slightly more than one in two. 
Grants of the full or reduced amount were received by 40.91% of firms 
applying. This result can firstly be explained by the relative newness of grants and 
government interventions to actively assist private sector firms in China.  Secondly, 
the pots of money and the number of schemes or types of grant assistance are still 
relatively modest – especially in comparison to western countries such as the UK.   
Looking at external equity and bank overdrafts, the proportion of firms 
receiving the full or a reduced amount of finance is low in absolute and also in 
relative terms compared to the other sources of finance at 29.63% and 26.87%, 
respectively.  Whilst both of these are new sources of finance and new channels for 
the firms to utilise, they are both substantially lower than the other sources of finance. 
The row in Table 7.4 headed No Finance offers a stark corollary of the full or 
the reduced amount of finance received.  At one extreme are partners and working 
shareholders who offered no finance to only 10.77% of firms – around one in ten 
firms, whilst at the other extreme there is external equity, and bank overdrafts which 
provided no finance to 70.37% and 73.13% of firms respectively.  Putting the 
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information differently, the external equity providers and bank overdrafts are typically 
going to provide no finance to the vast majority of firms.     
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7.3.1 Full or Reduced Finance by Source 
The previous section 7.3 has provided an overview of the outcomes of 
applications for finance, by source.  Attention now centres upon looking at each of the 
sources of finance and exploring the extent to which innovation was, or was not, 
related systematically related to the firms having favourable outcomes.  In the cross-
tabulations the yardstick utilised is whether the firm received the full amount or a 
reduced amount of finance, by source.  In this section the term ‘successful’ means that 
either the full or a reduced amount of finance was received. 
 
Bank overdrafts, short-term and long-term bank loans 
The hypothesis H4 was that innovative ventures will possess a greater 
likelihood of having been refused access to external finance compared to non-
innovating ventures.  In other words, the rate of success of innovators will be lower 
than that of non-innovators.  The results however with regard to bank overdrafts, and 
short-term and long-term bank-loans are counter to our predictions and showed that 
the innovators were more likely to be successful than the non-innovators. 
In Table 7.5, 33.33% of product innovators and 6.25% of non-product 
innovators, and 33.33% of distribution innovators and 17.86% of non-distribution 
innovators were successful in their applications for bank overdrafts, and these 
relationships were both statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  This pattern is also 
reflected in the input measure of innovation, R&D expenditure, where the firms with 
the greater levels of turnover devoted to R&D were more likely to have been 
successful in their application for a bank overdraft. 
It was found that 59.73% of product innovators and 37.84% of non-product 
innovators, and 62.50% of process innovators with 48.98% of non-process innovators 
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were successful on their applications for long-term bank finance, as 64.15% were of 
supply innovators and 43.75% of non-supply innovators. In these three cases the 
relationships were statistically significant at the 0.05, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.  
Applications from 61.11% of work innovators and 47.44% of non-work innovators 
were successful for long-term bank finance although the relationship was only weakly 
statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
With regard to the relationship between innovation and short-term bank loans, 
these are much weaker than was found for the other two bank sources.  Indeed, there 
was only one statistically significant relationship between the output measure of 
innovation and successfully securing short term bank finance and that was for 
distribution innovation, and this was only significant at the 0.10 level. 
Successful applications for bank overdrafts from 30.77% of manufacturing 
firms and 21.43% of service sector firms showed this relationship was statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level.  The size of the firms was positively statistically 
significantly related to the successful applications for both long-term and short-term 
bank finance and in both cases the relationships were highly statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level. 
The successful access to long-term bank finance was statistically significantly 
at the 0.05 level related to the age of the businesses.  Here, 42.62% of firms aged 1-5 
years old, 58.44% of firms aged 6-9 years old, and 66.67% of firms aged ≥10 years 
old were successfully able to access long-term bank finance. 
In addition, 61.05% of non-family businesses and 49.45% of family 
businesses were successful in accessing long-term bank finance and this relationship 
was also statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Responses showed that 86.99% of entrepreneurs with degrees and 71.22% of 
those without degrees were able to successfully secure short-term bank finance and 
this relationship was statistically significant at the 0.01 level, with 85.88% of 
exporters and 75.14% of the non-exporters also being able to access short-term bank 
finance.  
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Table 7.5: Descriptive statistics – Successful accessing, either full or reduced 
amount, of those applying for external finance by source 
 Bank’s 
Overdraft 
n χ2 Bank Loan (≧
2 years) 
n χ2 
All 26.87 67  55.38 186  
Manufacturing 30.77 39 19.443a 52.68 112 6.844b 
Services 21.43 28  59.46 74  
8-19 employees 25.00 28 1.684 33.96 53 18.978a 
20-49 employees 33.33 15  56.67 60  
50-99 employees 37.50 8  62.16 37  
100-199 employees 12.50 8  70.00 20  
200-499 employees 25.00 8  87.50 16  
1-5 years old 21.05 19 0.479 42.62 61 6.784b 
6-9 years old 28.57 35  58.44 77  
≥10 years old 30.77 13  66.67 48  
Family Business 22.22 27 0.496 49.45 91 6.831b 
Non Family Business 30.00 40  61.05 95  
Male 26.00 50 0.075 53.85 143 0.586 
Female 29.41 17  60.47 43  
18-30 years old  46.15 13 6.563c 51.85 27 6.665c 
31-45 years old 18.42 38  53.51 114  
46-55 years old 26.67 15  57.89 38  
≥56 years old 100 1  85.71 7  
Relative Role Model  36.36 22 1.504 44.59 74 5.782b 
No Relative Role Model  22.22 45  62.50 112  
Registered Business 25.00 36 14.252a 51.28 78 14.328a 
Partnership 66.67 12  54.05 37  
Limited liability 5.26 19  60.56 71  
Degree 24.24 33 5.807b 61.11 90 0.554 
No Degree 29.41 34  50.00 96  
Exporter 23.53 17 0.129 54.90 51 0.006 
Non-Exporter 28.00 50  55.76 135  
Innovator – Product 33.33 51 5.884b 59.73 149 5.749b 
None 6.25 16  37.84 37  
Innovator – Process 31.43 35 0.777 62.50 88 5.998b 
None 21.88 32  48.98 98  
Innovator – Work 29.73 37 0.334 61.11 108 3.428c 
None 23.33 30  47.44 78  
Innovator – Supply 32.43 37 1.303 64.15 106 7.679a 
None 20.00 30  43.75 80  
Innovator – Markets 30.23 43 0.693 57.14 119 0.417 
None 20.83 24  52.24 67  
Innovator – Admin 29.41 34 0.228 61.45 83 2.234 
None 24.24 33  50.49 103  
Innovator – Distribution 33.33 39 3.999b 60.00 100 1.871 
None 17.86 28  50.00 86  
R&D Expenditure as 
a % of turnover: None 
11.11 9 19.776a 50.00 14 17.636a 
1-2% 21.05 19  37.10 62  
3-5% 30.77 13  61.22 49  
6-10% 28.57 14  79.41 34  
11-20% 33.33 6  64.29 14  
≥21% 50.00 6  53.85 13  
 c p < 0.10; b p < 0.05; a p < 0.01   
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Table 7.6: Descriptive statistics – Successful accessing, either full or reduced 
amount, of external finance by source 
 Bank Loan  
(< 2 years) 
n χ2 External 
Equity 
n χ2 
All 78.63 262  29.63 81  
Manufacturing 79.87 159 0.375 26.67 45 0.426 
Services 76.70 103  33.33 36  
8-19 employees 61.36 88 24.423a 11.54 26 11.340b 
20-49 employees 87.80 82  21.74 23  
50-99 employees 84.09 44  52.94 17  
100-199 employees 86.21 29  50.00 6  
200-499 employees 94.74 19  44.44 9  
1-5 years old 75.70 107 0.926 30.3 33 0.812 
6-9 years old 80.81 99  25.0 132  
≥10 years old 80.36 56  37.5 116  
Family Business 77.95 127 0.067 29.41 34 0.001 
Non Family Business 79.26 135  29.79 47  
Male 78.64 206 0.004 28.81 59 0.069 
Female 78.57 56  31.82 22  
18-30 years old  58.06 31 6.885c 22.22 18 1.208 
31-45 years old 83.23 161  31.37 51  
46-55 years old 77.78 54  36.36 11  
≥56 years old 75.00 16  0 1  
Relative Role Model  79.44 155 0.071 25.00 28 0.439 
No Relative Role Model  78.06 107  32.08 53  
Registered Business 75.65 115 2.323 27.03 37 0.222 
Partnership 85.07 67  31.58 19  
Limited liability 77.50 80  32.00 25  
Degree 86.99 123 9.655a 28.89 45 0.027 
No Degree 71.22 139  30.56 36  
Exporter 85.88 85 3.942b 42.31 26 11.402b 
Non-Exporter 75.14 177  23.64 55  
Innovator – Product 79.50 200 0.384 30.56 72 0.266 
None 75.81 62  22.22 9  
Innovator – Process 74.75 99 1.424 30.23 43 0.016 
None 80.98 163  28.95 38  
Innovator – Work 76.99 113 0.316 34.69 49 3.509c 
None 79.87 149  21.88 32  
Innovator – Supply 78.07 114 0.037 33.33 39 0.495 
None 79.05 148  26.19 42  
Innovator – Markets 78.18 165 0.052 37.10 62 12.068a 
None 79.38 97  5.26 19  
Innovator – Admin 79.61 103 0.098 35.42 48 1.892 
None 77.99 159  21.21 33  
Innovator – Distribution 84.35 115 3.993c 27.50 41 0.172 
None 74.15 147  31.71 40  
R&D Expenditure as 
a % of turnover: None 
73.68 19 18.129a 50.00 4 6.425 
1-2% 78.64 103  16.67 24  
3-5% 70.27 74  39.13 23  
6-10% 91.67 36  15.38 13  
11-20% 90.48 21  50.00 16  
≥21% 77.78 9  36.36 11  
n=452 c p < 0.10; b p < 0.05; a p < 0.01   
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 Equity 
Two types of innovation were found to be statistically related to the accessing 
of equity finance – work innovation and market innovation and these were statistically 
significant at the 0.10 and 0.01 level, respectively.  Access to equity finance was 
successful by 34.69% of work innovators and 21.88% of non-work innovators, and 
37.10% of market innovators and 5.26% of non-market innovators.  Thus, the results 
with regard to equity finance and innovation are not supportive of hypothesis H4. 
Two of the control variables were found to be statistically significant at the 
0.05 level related to the accessing of equity finance and they were exporter firms and 
the size of the firm.  Whereas 42.31% of exporters and 23.64% of non-exporters 
accessed equity finance, only 11.54% of firms with 8-19 employees were able to 
secure equity finance but the success rate increased substantially as the firm size 
increased, to 21.74% of firms with 20-49 employees and 52.94% of those with 50-99 
employees. There was a decrease to 44.44% for firms with between 200-499 
employees. 
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Grants, Factoring/ Invoice Discounting, and Partners 
Table 7.7 presents the cross-tabulations of successfully accessing either the 
full or a reduced amount of external finance from the sources of grants, and factoring 
or invoice discounting firms, and Table 7.8 presents corresponding values for partners 
and working shareholders. 
Work innovation firms were more likely to be successful in accessing finance 
from grants than non-work innovation firms, and this relationship was highly 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  However, non-supply innovators were more 
likely to be successful in accessing grants finance compared to the supply innovators 
and this relationship was also statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  More 
specifically, 34.78% of supply innovators and 47.62% of non-supply innovators were 
successful in financing grants, with this pattern of results also being found for 
distribution innovation and being statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  Grant 
applications from 28.00% of distribution innovators and 57.89% of non-distribution 
innovators were successful. Thus, there is evidence in support of hypothesis H4 with 
regard to accessing finance from grants. 
However, innovation was not statistically significantly related to the accessing 
of factor or invoice discounting firms with regard to any of the eight measures of 
innovation.  Thus, the evidence with regard to factor or invoice discounting firms is 
not supportive of hypothesis H4. 
Two types of innovation were statistically significantly related to the 
successful accessing of finance from partners or working shareholders and these were 
supply innovation and distribution innovation which were statistically significant at 
the 0.10 and 0.05 levels, respectively.  In both cases, the innovators were more 
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successful than the non-innovators; this was counter to our expectations, and clearly 
not supportive of hypothesis H4. 
Several of the control variables were found to be statistically significant in 
Tables 7.6 and 7.7.  Family businesses were less likely to be successful in gaining 
financial support from grants, but more successful in accessing factor or invoice 
discounting firms for finance.  The age of the owner-managers was statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level or better, in backing from accessing grants, factor or 
invoice discounting firms, and partners or working shareholders.  Success was 
positively related to firm age with regard to factoring or invoice discounting firms, 
and also with partners and working shareholders; but, it was negatively related to 
grants. 
The success of 52.38% of degree holders was greater than 30.43% of non-
degree holders in accessing grants finance, and this relationship was statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. 
Exporters were more likely to be successful in accessing finance from grants, 
but exporters were less likely to be successful in regard to finance from factoring or 
invoice discounting firms, compared with the non-exporting firms.  
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Table 7.7: Descriptive statistics – Successful accessing, either full or reduced 
amount, of external finance by source 
 Grants n χ2 Factoring/ Invoice 
Discounting 
n χ2 
All 40.91 44  68.42 76  
Manufacturing 42.42 33 0.125 71.74 46 0.594 
Services 36.36 11  63.33 30  
8-19 employees 46.67 15 0.576 47.37 19 8.011c 
20-49 employees 33.33 9  63.64 22  
50-99 employees 44.44 9  78.57 14  
100-199 employees 33.33 3  84.62 13  
200-499 employees 37.50 8  87.50 8  
1-5 years old 40.00 15 0.637 57.14 35 8.112c 
6-9 years old 35.29 17  76.00 25  
≥10 years old 50.00 12  81.25 16  
Family Business 37.50 16 3.995b 70.59 34 3.997b 
Non Family Business 42.86 28  66.67 42  
Male 39.39 33 0.125 67.80 59 0.554 
Female 45.45 11  70.59 17  
18-30 years old  57.14 7 7.87b 50.00 14 19.119a 
31-45 years old 54.55 22  68.63 51  
46-55 years old 8.33 123  87.50 8  
≥56 years old 33.33 18  100 3  
Relative Role Model  50.0 26 0.776 48.15 27 7.966a 
No Relative Role Model  34.62 18  79.59 49  
Registered Business 38.89 18 1.483 72.73 33 0.516 
Partnership 25.00 8  63.64 11  
Limited liability 50.0 18  65.62 32  
Degree 52.38 21 19.711a 67.57 37 0.024 
No Degree 30.43 23  69.23 39  
Exporter 46.67 29 12.554a 65.22 23 3.999b 
Non-Exporter 37.93 15  69.81 53  
Innovator – Product 40.48 2 0.004 69.70 66 0.378 
None 50.00 42  60.00 10  
Innovator – Process 40.00 30 0.032 68.57 35 0.001 
None 42.86 14  68.29 41  
Innovator – Work 44.83 29 13.540a 67.44 43 0.044 
None 33.33 15  69.70 33  
Innovator – Supply 34.78 23 13.748a 73.81 42 1.262 
None 47.62 21  61.76 34  
Innovator – Markets 40.62 32 0.004 66.67 54 0.266 
None 41.67 12  72.73 22  
Innovator – Admin 40.91 22 0.000 67.57 37 0.024 
None 40.91 22  69.23 39  
Innovator – Distribution 28.00 25 3.993b 68.42 38 0.000 
None 57.89 19  68.42 38  
R&D Expenditure as 
a % of turnover: None 
50.00 2 5.046 100 3 6.914 
1-2% 66.67 12  62.96 27  
3-5% 33.33 15  71.43 28  
6-10% 25.00 8  83.33 12  
11-20% 25.00 4  25.00 4  
≥21% 33.33 3  50.00 2  
n=452 c p < 0.10; b p < 0.05; a p < 0.01 
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Table 7.8: Descriptive statistics – Successful accessing, either full or reduced 
amount, of external finance by source 
 Partners/ Working 
Shareholders 
n χ2 
All 89.23 195  
Manufacturing 88.24 102 0.221 
Services 90.32 93  
8-19 employees 84.21 76 8.015c 
20-49 employees 90.74 54  
50-99 employees 94.74 38  
100-199 employees 93.33 15  
200-499 employees 91.67 12  
1-5 years old 91.21 91 0.937 
6-9 years old 86.36 66  
≥10 years old 89.47 38  
Family Business 86.67 75 0.838 
Non Family Business 90.83 120  
Male 89.61 154 0.110 
Female 87.80 41  
18-30 years old  79.31 29 15.283a 
31-45 years old 91.67 120  
46-55 years old 86.11 36  
≥56 years old 100 10  
Relative Role Model  87.88 66 0.190 
No Relative Role Model  89.92 129  
Registered Business 85.37 82 2.203 
Partnership 91.84 49  
Limited liability 92.19 64  
Degree 90.38 104 0.309 
No Degree 87.91 91  
Exporter 90.38 52 0.098 
Non-Exporter 88.81 143  
Innovator – Product 88.59 149 0.269 
None 91.30 46  
Innovator – Process 88.66 97 0.066 
None 89.80 98  
Innovator – Work 88.29 111 0.238 
None 90.48 84  
Innovator – Supply 93.26 89 2.764c 
None 85.85 106  
Innovator – Markets 88.89 135 0.053 
None 90.00 60  
Innovator – Admin 92.93 99 2.863 
None 85.42 96  
Innovator – Distribution 94.51 91 4.940b 
None 84.62 104  
R&D Expenditure as 
a % of turnover: None 
90.91 22 2.750 
1-2% 89.39 66  
3-5% 84.44 45  
6-10% 88.57 35  
11-20% 94.44 18  
≥21% 100 9  
n=452 c p < 0.10; b p < 0.05; a p < 0.01  
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7.4 Awareness 
Tables 7.9 to 7.11 show the levels of awareness of the sources of external 
finance.  The levels of awareness are approaching 100%, or full awareness, for bank 
loans, both short duration (99.34%) and long term duration (98.89%), as well as of 
partners or working shareholders (94.69%). The level of awareness of bank overdrafts 
was high at 83.41%, but is clearly substantially less than that of bank loans of either 
short or long term duration. 
The level of awareness of factor invoicing and discounting firms was lower 
than debt finance and was 77.21%, so slightly more than three quarters of all 
entrepreneurs. Typically, exporting firms use factoring companies more frequently as 
the payment period for an order placed in another country is usually much longer, 
hence these firms often have to work with a tighter working capital and have to realise 
cash from unsettled invoices at a discounted rate. Therefore, it is understandable that 
the actual needs of businesses in different sectors are reflected in the level of 
awareness of the sources of finance and it is anticipated that the bank loan would be 
the most obvious source of finance in the first place.  
The level of awareness of grants was approaching three quarters of 
entrepreneurs (74.75%).  This result is interesting and shows that whilst this source of 
finance is relatively new, roughly three out of four owner-managers were aware of 
grants. Both central and local governments have facilities set aside to support small 
businesses, especially innovative ones.  Although it is good to know that government 
grants are well known in the private sector, the eligibility criterion for the fund can be 
difficult to meet and sometimes it is arguable whether it is worthwhile to alter 
investment projects to fit the requirements set out by the authorities. There is also a 
debate on how far the amount of the grant will lead the project on and after the grant 
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is exhausted, which sources of finance would be most suitable to take the project into 
the next stage.  
The lowest level of awareness was for equity finance, with only 61.9%, or six 
out of ten, of owner-managers being aware of it. The corollary is that approaching 
four out of ten firms are not aware of equity finance.  Whilst all sources of finance are 
not equally appropriate for all firms at all points in time, a lack of awareness of any of 
them is a handicap.  In other words, if a firm is unaware of a source then it may be 
losing out and this may place such a firm at a disadvantage in relation to other firms. 
 
 
7.4.1 Crosstabulations 
In this section in Tables 7.9 to 7.11 the analysis focuses upon exploring the levels of 
awareness of each source of finance.  Hypothesis H5 relates to risk capital so 
accordingly external equity capital awareness is analysed first, rather than the three 
types of bank finance which were tested first in section 7.3.2 and 7.2.2. 
 
Equity Finance 
The hypothesis H5 suggested that there would be a lower level of awareness of 
equity finance by the non-innovators compared to the innovators.  For five of the 
types of innovation the non-innovators had a lower awareness of equity finance 
compared to the innovating firms which was statistically significant at the 0.10 level, 
or better.  The five types of innovation which were statistically significant at the 0.10 
level or better were product, process, supply, administration and distribution.  In each 
case the non-innovators were approximately 10% less aware of equity finance 
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compared to the innovators with the exception of distribution innovation where the 
difference was 13%.  Thus, the evidence in Table 7.9 supports hypothesis H5. 
Three other control variables were found to be statistically significant at the 
0.1 level or better, related to the level of awareness of equity.  Of these, 67.46% of 
entrepreneurs with degrees were aware of equity finance which was substantially 
more than the 57.20% reported by entrepreneurs with no degrees. Moreover, 70.27% 
of exporters and 59.24% of non-exporters were aware of equity finance.  The age of 
the entrepreneurs was highly statistically significant at the 0.01 level related to the 
level of awareness of equity finance.  The level of awareness was highest for 
entrepreneurs at 65.61% for those aged 31-45 years old, and was lowest at 50.00% for 
the oldest group of entrepreneurs who were ≥ 56 years old. 
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Table 7.9: Descriptive statistics – awareness of external finance by source 
 External 
Equity 
χ2 n 
All 61.95  452 
Manufacturing 62.45 0.067 261 
Services 61.26  191 
8-19 employees 57.22 8.977c 180 
20-49 employees 62.50  128 
50-99 employees 65.38  78 
100-199 employees 67.50  40 
200-499 employees 73.08  26 
1-5 years old 63.48 1.443 178 
6-9 years old 63.28  177 
≥10 years old 56.70  97 
Family Business 60.19 0.545 216 
Non Family Business 63.56  236 
Male 62.46 0.193 357 
Female 60.00  95 
18-30 years old  55.32 14.883a 47 
31-45 years old 65.61  285 
46-55 years old 57.45  94 
≥56 years old 50.00  26 
Relative Role Model  62.28 0.012 167 
No Relative Role Model  61.75  285 
Registered Business 60.78 2.125 204 
Partnership 67.96  103 
Limited liability 59.31  145 
Degree 67.46 5.020b 209 
No Degree 57.20  243 
Exporter 70.27 4.324b 111 
Non-Exporter 59.24  341 
Innovator – Product 64.56 3.677c 333 
None 54.62  119 
Innovator – Process 68.60 5.221b 172 
None 57.86  260 
Innovator – Work 64.53 1.045 203 
None 59.84  249 
Innovator – Supply 67.22 3.531c 180 
None 58.46  272 
Innovator – Markets 63.70 0.878 270 
None 59.34  182 
Innovator – Admin 68.36 5.078b 177 
None 57.82  275 
Innovator – Distribution 70.11 8.770a 184 
None 56.34  268 
R&D Expenditure as 
a % of turnover: None 
61.67 6.413 60 
1-2% 57.69  156 
3-5% 62.71  118 
6-10% 63.77  69 
11-20% 62.50  32 
≥21% 88.24  17 
                n=452 c p < 0.10; b p < 0.05; a p < 0.01  
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Bank overdrafts, short-term and long-term bank loans 
Innovation was not found to be statistically significant with regard to the 
levels of awareness for the three types of bank finance. There were only two 
exceptions to this statement.  Bank overdrafts were known by 79.31% of work 
innovators and 86.75% of non-work innovators and this result was statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level.  However, 100% of supply innovators and 98.16% of 
non-supply innovators were aware of long-term bank finance, and this was found to 
be weakly statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
Rather, it was control variables which were found to be statistically significant 
at the 0.10 level or better, related to the levels of awareness of the three types of bank 
finance. Of these, 85.82% of manufacturing firms and 80.10% of service sector firms 
were aware of bank overdrafts and this was weakly statistically significant at the 0.10 
level.  Younger businesses aged 1-5 years reported the lowest awareness of bank 
overdrafts at 77.53%, substantially less than the 86.44% awareness for 6-9 years old 
businesses and the 88.66% reported by businesses ≥10 years old, and this was 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  Registered businesses found lower levels of 
awareness (79.41%) for bank overdrafts compared to partnerships (87.38%) and 
limited liability (86.21%). 
Unsurprisingly, there was only one statistically significant difference between 
the control variables and the short-term and long-term bank loans given the very high 
levels of awareness for these sources.  This was that only 93.62% of younger 
entrepreneurs, the 18-30 year olds, were aware of long-term bank loans which was 
less than the complete awareness reported for the three older age groups. 
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Table 7.10: Descriptive statistics – awareness of external finance by source 
 Bank’s 
Overdraft 
χ2 Bank Loan 
(≧2 years) 
χ2 Bank Loan  
(< 2 years) 
χ2 n 
All 83.41  98.89  99.34  452 
Manufacturing 85.82 3.000c 98.85 0.011 99.23 0.010 261 
Services 80.10  98.95  99.48  191 
8-19 employees 83.89 9.999c 98.33 3.745 98.89 4.142 180 
20-49 employees 85.94  99.22  100  128 
50-99 employees 75.64  100  100  78 
100-199 employees 92.50  100  97.5  40 
200-499 employees 76.92  96.15  100  26 
1-5 years old 77.53 7.556b 98.31 1.025 98.88 1.245 178 
6-9 years old 86.44  99.44  99.44  177 
≥10 years old 88.66  98.97  100  97 
Family Business 85.65 1.501 98.61 0.302 99.07 0.431 216 
Non Family Business 81.36  99.15  99.58  236 
Male 82.91 0.299 98.88 0.003 99.44 0.276 357 
Female 85.26  98.95  98.95  95 
18-30 years old  78.72 13.883a 93.62 13.73a 98.88 1.245 47 
31-45 years old 83.16  99.30  99.44  285 
46-55 years old 88.30  100  100  94 
≥56 years old 76.92  100  100  26 
Relative Role Model  86.23 1.522 98.8 0.020 99.40 0.017 167 
No Relative Role Model  81.75  98.95  99.30  285 
Registered Business 79.41 5.999c 99.02 0.146 99.51 3.615 204 
Partnership 87.38  99.03  98.06  103 
Limited liability 86.21  98.62 1.400 100 0.202 145 
Degree 83.25 0.007 99.52  99.18  209 
No Degree 83.54  98.35  99.52  243 
Exporter 81.08 0.575 98.20 0.651 100 0.983 111 
Non-Exporter 84.16  99.12  99.12  341 
Innovator – Product 82.58 0.621 98.80 0.104 99.40 0.076 333 
None 85.71  99.16  99.16  119 
Innovator – Process 82.56 0.145 98.84 0.013 99.42 0.029 172 
None 83.93  98.93  99.29  260 
Innovator – Work 79.31 4.469b 98.52 0.465 99.01 0.578 203 
None 86.75  99.20  99.60  249 
Innovator – Supply 81.11 1.139 100 3.346c 99.44 0.053 180 
None 84.93  98.16  99.26  272 
Innovator – Markets 81.48 1.797 98.52 0.863 99.26 0.060 270 
None 86.26  99.45  99.45  182 
Innovator – Admin 82.49 0.178 99.44 0.779 99.44 0.043 177 
None 84.00  98.55  99.27  275 
Innovator – Distribution 82.07 0.403 99.46 0.898 99.46 0.068 184 
None 84.33  98.51  99.25  268 
R&D Expenditure as 
a % of turnover: None 
78.33 5.273 98.33 1.471 98.33 0.701 60 
1-2% 83.97  99.36  100  156 
3-5% 87.29  98.31  99.15  118 
6-10% 78.26  98.55  98.55  69 
11-20% 81.25  100  100  32 
≥21% 94.12  100  100  17 
n=452 c p < 0.10; b p < 0.05; a p < 0.01  
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Grants, Factoring/ Invoice Discounting, and Partners 
There was only one instance of innovation being statistically significantly 
related to the level of awareness of grants, and that was for administration innovation 
(Table 7.11).  In this instance, 78.91% of non-innovators were aware of grants 
compared to 68.36% of innovators and this was statistically significant at the 0.05 
level.  Innovation, as examined by the eight measures was not statistically related at 
the 0.10 level, or better, to the level of awareness of factoring and invoice discounting 
firms, and partners and working shareholders. 
The size of the business was statistically related to the level of awareness of 
both factoring and invoice discounting firms, and to partners and working 
shareholders, and in both cases the relationship was weakly statistically significant at 
the 0.10 level. 
The age of the entrepreneur was related to the awareness of factoring and 
invoice discounting firms and this was statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  The 
awareness of this latter source was lowest for those entrepreneurs aged ≥56 years old. 
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Table 7.11: Descriptive statistics – awareness of external finance by source 
 Partners/ 
Working 
SHs 
 Grants Χ2 Factoring/ 
Invoice 
Discounting 
χ2 n 
All 94.69  74.75  77.21  452 
Manufacturing 94.25 0.235 77.78 2.946 79.69 2.161 261 
Services 95.29  70.68  73.82  191 
8-19 employees 92.22 8.917c 72.22 1.366 73.33 9.059c 180 
20-49 employees 96.09  76.56  79.69  128 
50-99 employees 100  75.64  71.79  78 
100-199 employees 90.0  75.00  87.50  40 
200-499 employees 96.15  80.77  92.31  26 
1-5 years old 96.63 2.322 74.72 0.016 74.16 2.882 178 
6-9 years old 93.79  74.58  81.36  177 
≥10 years old 92.78  75.26  75.26  97 
Family Business 93.52 1.130 74.54 0.013 79.66 1.683 216 
Non Family Business 95.76  75.00  74.54  236 
Male 94.12 1.108 73.67 1.108 77.59 0.138 357 
Female 96.84  78.95  75.79  95 
18-30 years old  91.49 2.152 57.45 13.753a 72.34 13.987a 47 
31-45 years old 95.79  77.89  77.89  285 
46-55 years old 93.62  78.72  80.85  94 
≥56 years old 92.31  57.69  65.38  26 
Relative Role Model  92.81 0.466 74.25 0.039 78.44 0.228 167 
No Relative Role Model  95.79  75.09  76.49  285 
Registered Business 95.59 1.096 72.55 1.364 74.51 1.675 204 
Partnership 95.15  78.64  80.58  103 
Limited liability 93.10  75.17  78.62  145 
Degree 96.65 2.971c 74.64 0.043 78.47 0.345 209 
No Degree 93.00  74.90  76.13  243 
Exporter 94.59 0.011 77.48 0.568 79.28 0.357 111 
Non-Exporter 94.72  73.90  76.54  341 
Innovator – Product 94.59 0.023 75.98 0.961 77.48 0.051 333 
None 94.96  71.43  76.47  119 
Innovator – Process 95.35 0.236 73.26 0.341 79.65 0.939 172 
None 94.29  75.71  75.71  260 
Innovator – Work 93.60 0.878 73.40 0.372 79.31 0.922 203 
None 95.58  73.90  75.50  249 
Innovator – Supply 95.00 0.057 77.22 0.947 80.56 1.900 180 
None 94.49  73.16  75.00  272 
Innovator – Markets 94.81 0.021 72.96 1.172 76.67 0.114 270 
None 94.51  77.47  78.02  182 
Innovator – Admin 94.35 0.070 68.36 6.352b 77.97 0.094 177 
None 94.91  78.91  76.73  275 
Innovator – Distribution 95.11 0.108 76.09 0.282 78.80 0.447 184 
None 94.40  73.88  76.12  268 
R&D Expenditure as 
a % of turnover: None 
91.67 3.544 75.00 3.156 75.00 1.570 60 
1-2% 93.59  71.79  75.64  156 
3-5% 95.76  79.66  77.12  118 
6-10% 97.10  76.81  79.71  69 
11-20% 93.75  68.75  84.38  32 
≥21% 100  70.59  76.47  17 
n=452 c p < 0.10; b p < 0.05; a p < 0.01   
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7.5 Regression Results and Discussion 
In investigating the proposals for requests for finance it needs to be noted that 
clearly the quality of the applications will vary. In these circumstances it is necessary 
for the characteristics of the firms and their owner-managers to be controlled for in 
our investigation of the financing of innovation within Beijing. To that purpose, in 
order to better establish whether innovation was the driving force in explaining 
differences in the rates of applications for external finance, multivariate logistic 
regression analysis was performed and the results are shown in Table 7.12.  
The regression results in Table 7.12 relate to the dichotomous logit model for 
applied for finance, by source.  In this model, applied for finance, by source (the 
dependent variable) takes the value of ‘1’ if the business has applied for finance and 
‘0’ otherwise.  The explanatory (or independent) variables which were developed in 
the first empirical chapter and which have been explored in the bivariate relationships 
earlier in this chapter are again utilised.  The reader is again reminded that in 
estimating the coefficients of Logit, the maximum likelihood procedure is used.  In 
presenting the results the researcher has reported the odds ratios and the standard 
errors are in parentheses.  Interpreting Logit regression output in terms of odds rather 
than probabilities confers certain advantages.  Most important among these is that exp 
(β) is a single summary statistic for the partial effect of a given predictor on the odds, 
controlling for other predictors in the model.  Logit is simply the log of the odds of 
being in one versus another category of the dependent variable.  The odds ratio 
associated with each coefficient is presented in Table 7.12.  The odds ratio is a 
multiplicative coefficient which means that "positive" effects are greater than 1 while 
"negative" effects lie between 0 and 1.  The odds ratio is the number by which one 
would multiply the odds of a business experiencing access to finance for each one unit 
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increase in the independent variable.  An odds ratio greater than 1 indicates that the 
odds of a business recording an application for finance from a named source increases 
when the independent variable increases.  An odds ratio of less than 1 indicates that 
the odds of a business reporting an application for finance from a named source 
decreases when the independent variable increases, while estimates close to 1 indicate 
no effect on the odds. Table 7.12 presents the estimated odds ratios associated with 
the different explanatory variables.  The chi-square statistic for the joint impact of all 
the explanatory variables on the dependent variable is significant at the 0.05 level, or 
better, in all of the models and accordingly to save space the chi-square statistics are 
not reported. 
As with previous studies of credit rationing (Freel, 2007), it is acknowledged 
that the selection of variables is unlikely to be perfect. This notwithstanding, the 
questionnaire, in addition to predominantly focusing upon finance and innovation, 
included a range of questions about the firms generally, and also questions relating to 
the backgrounds of the owner-managers.  These have been explored earlier in the 
chapter at the bivariate or crosstabulation level of analysis.  In this part of the chapter 
the method of analysis moves from bivariate to multivariate. 
Firstly, in the regression models attention centres upon the innovative 
characteristics of the firms. The results of the multivariate regression results reported 
in Table 7.12 are consistent with the earlier cross-tabulation results reported in Tables 
7.1 to 7.3. Taken together it is clear that innovative firms are more likely to apply for 
sources of external finance.  
  In Table 7.12 the measure of innovation included in the models is product 
innovation.  Each of the models in 7.12 was then re-estimated replacing product 
innovation with process innovation; and, then again until all eight measures of 
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innovation had been tested.  In Table 7.13 the odds rations for each separate measure 
of innovation are reported.  Additionally, the log likelihood and the Nagelkerke R2 for 
each model are reported.  This approach was followed to synthesise the results in a 
more digestible format for the reader. 
 
Bank overdrafts, short-term and long-term bank loans 
Process, work, supply, administration and distribution innovators were more 
likely than their non-innovating counterparts to have applied for bank overdrafts at the 
0.10 level, or better. 
Product, process, work, supply, administration and distribution innovators 
were more likely in comparison with their corresponding non-innovating firms to 
have applied for long-term bank finance at the 0.10 level, or better. 
Supply, markets and distribution innovators were more likely compared to the 
non-innovating firms with regard to those three types of innovation to have applied 
for short-term bank finance at the 0.10 level or better. 
Thus, with regard to the three types of bank finance the results of the 
multivariate regression models are very supportive of hypothesis H3. 
Attention centres upon the control variables in the models.  Whilst it may be 
the case that larger firms have greater amounts of capital it would still be expected 
that they would be more likely to apply for finance, and that they would be more 
likely to receive finance than smaller sized firms. Larger sized firms were more likely 
than smaller sized firms to have applied for bank loans, of two years or more duration 
at the 1% level or better.  However, the size of firm was not statistically significant at 
the 0.10 level, or better, with regard to bank loans of less than two years duration, or 
with bank overdrafts in the multivariate regression models shown in Table 7.12.  Thus, 
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whilst size had been important in the bivariate analysis, in the multivariate context the 
inclusion of the full set of variables renders the relationship neutralised. 
Next, attention focuses upon the age of the firms. It would be expected that 
younger firms would be more likely to apply for finance because they needed the 
resources to develop their business activities; but, that the younger firms would be 
less likely than older firms to be successful in accessing finance because of their lack 
of an established track record. However, examination of the regression results showed 
that the age of the business was positively statistically related to the applying for bank 
overdrafts and bank loans of a two year or greater duration, and these were 
statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.01 level, respectively. This result would be 
counter to the expectations of Western scholars and it simply suggests that social 
capital plays a vital role in bank lending decision-making processes and since younger 
firms have not yet been able to build solid (or close enough) entrepreneur-bank 
relationships, it is harder for younger firms to have access to bank loans of any 
duration. In the Chinese context, the relationship lending is utilised to its full extent, 
not just aimed at overcoming the information asymmetry problem, but rather at 
networking skills which are fundamental in the Chinese culture of business conducts. 
Family businesses would be less likely than non-family businesses to seek 
finance because they would not like to risk losing autonomy of their businesses or 
having to divulge details about their business activities to the agents to whom finance 
requests were made. Family business background is of particular interest within the 
Chinese ideological context because it is fair to say that connection is inevitable in 
almost everything Chinese people do. In terms of financing, family wealth has always 
been a useful source of finance to small businesses which are typified by their lack of 
financial support from elsewhere (Pistrui et al., 2001). Traditionally, family ties are 
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incredibly important in Chinese culture and it is often evinced as financial support. 
However, in terms of the likelihood of successfully accessing finance, family 
businesses may or may not be more likely than non-family businesses to be successful.  
The results show that family businesses were less likely than non-family businesses to 
have applied for bank overdrafts at the 0.01 level. 
The older the owner, the less likely the expectation that they would apply for 
finance, as they are more likely to have accumulated experience and resources and 
thus have a less strong need to seek further finance. However, older owners would be 
expected to be more likely to successfully access finance if they applied, as they are 
more likely to provide a strong case for finance. The regression results showed that 
older owners were indeed less likely to have applied for bank loans of a long term 
duration at the 1% level. A statistically significant relationship at the 5% level was 
also found between the age of the owner-managers with bank overdrafts. 
Having a role model of a member of the family who has run a business before 
may influence the application for finance and the possibility of success. If there is a 
role model, an owner-manager may be more willing to make applications for finance 
because they are imbibed with greater information and awareness of which sources 
are available and how they can be utilised for the benefit of the firms.  But, with 
regard to the likelihood of being successful, there are mixed expectations – a relative 
having been in business may be positive or negative depending upon the previous 
track record of the relative and their reputation with financial providers. Turning to 
the results in Table 7.12, those businesses where there was a relative role model were 
more likely to apply for short term bank loans. 
Information was available about the type of businesses and dummy variables 
included for limited liability companies and also partnerships, and the excluded 
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comparison dummy variable was registered businesses. The type of business shows in 
part the risk profile of the owners of the business. We had mixed expectations for how 
the type of business would influence access to finance.  
Partnerships compared to limited liability firms were less likely to apply for 
bank loans of longer durations, but were more likely to apply for bank loans of a 
shorter duration – although this result was significant at the 10% level.  
Registered businesses compared to limited liability firms were more likely to 
apply for bank overdrafts, and less likely to apply for long duration bank loans. 
In order to be successful in foreign markets, exporters must have clear 
competitive advantages (i.e. substantially lower costs of goods, considerably higher 
quality versus price, unique knowledge such as patented products), otherwise, local 
firms almost always have better knowledge and understanding of their own market, in 
which it could be hard to compete (McDougall and Oviatt, 1996). Moreover, as the 
world’s factory, it is clear that those firms which export clearly possess attributes 
different from non-exporters. We had mixed expectations on the likelihood of 
exporters seeking external finance. On the one hand, exporters may be more likely to 
apply for external finance because of a desire to expand the firms’ market share and 
develop other new markets. This is tempered against the possibility that the firm 
which already exports may be more successful and have generated the necessary 
capital which reduces the possibility of seeking external finance, although, clearly 
these are matters of conjecture. This notwithstanding, it would be expected that those 
firms which were exporters would be less likely to be successful if they applied for 
external finance. Many of the arguments which were outlined earlier about innovating 
firms also apply to exporters.  Interestingly, our results found that exporters were 
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more likely than non-exporters to have applied for bank loans of less than a two year 
duration and this relationship was statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 
Equity 
5 out of 7 of the output measures of innovation were statistically significantly 
related to the applying for equity finance, and this was at the 0.05 level or better 
(Table 7.13).  The input measure of innovation as represented by a series of dummy 
variables to capture R&D expenditure were also predominantly statistically significant 
at the 0.10 level or better.  Thus, with regard to equity finance, the results are very 
supportive of hypothesis H3. 
Only one of the control variables was statistically significantly related to the 
applying for equity finance and that was the age of the owner-manager which was 
positively statistically significant at the 0.05 level (Table 7.12). 
 
Grants, Factoring/ Invoice Discounting, and Partners 
All of the output measures of innovation were positively statistically 
significantly related to the applying for finance through grants, factoring and invoice 
discounting firms, and from partners and working shareholders at the 0.10 level or 
better, with the two exceptions of administration innovation against grants, and 
process innovation against factoring and invoice discounting firms which were not 
statistically significant at the 0.10 level or better (Table 7.13).  The input measure of 
innovation, R&D expenditure, was found to be statistically significantly related to the 
applications to partners and working shareholders, and factoring and invoice 
discounting firms at the 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively. 
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A dummy variable was incorporated into the model to capture the sectoral 
background of the firms. It was expected that manufacturing firms would be more 
likely than service sector firms to have applied for finance (Westhead and Storey, 
1997), and also to be less likely to have been successful, because of their need for 
larger amounts of capital. Sector was found to be statistically significant at the 0.10 
and 0.05 level, respectively, for applications for grants and to partners or working 
shareholders. 
Several other control variables were also statistically significant at the 0.10 
level, or better.  Older firms were more likely to have applied for grants than younger 
firms and this relationship was weakly statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  The 
non-family businesses were more likely to have applied for grants, and also the 
partners and working shareholders compared to the family businesses and both of 
these relationships were highly statistically significant at the 0.01 level.   
Older entrepreneurs were less likely than younger entrepreneurs to have 
applied to factoring and invoice discounting firms, and also to partners and working 
shareholders.  
Those entrepreneurs with role models were more likely than the entrepreneurs 
with relative role models to have applied for grants.  
Limited liability companies and also partnerships were less likely than 
registered businesses to have applied to factoring and invoice discounting firms and 
these relationships were statistically significant at the 0.10 and 0.05 levels, 
respectively.
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Table 7.12: Logit regression model of the probability of applying for external 
finance by source of finance.  
 Bank 
overdraft
Model 1 
Bank 
Loan (≧
2 years)  
Model 2 
Bank Loan  
(< 2 years) 
Model 3 
External 
Equity 
Model 4 
Grants 
Model 5 
Factoring/ 
Invoice 
Discounting 
Firms Model 6 
Partners/ 
Working 
shareholders 
Model 7 
Sector 
 
1.010 
(0.290) 
1.035 
(0.219) 
1.136 
(0.236) 
0.831 
(0.223) 
1.867 
(0.726)c 
1.075 
(0.301) 
0.691 
(0.084)b 
Size 1.163 
(0.177) 
1.369 
(0.158)a 
1.154 
(0.135) 
1.068 
(0.153) 
1.266 
(0.231) 
1.558 
(0.231)a 
0.973 
(0.111) 
Age of 
Business 
1.391 
(0.113)a  
1.680 
(0.298)a 
1.040 
(0.178) 
1.180 
(0.247) 
1.615 
(0.456) 
1.069 
(0.228) 
0.850 
(0.144) 
Family 
Business 
0.300 
(0.097)a 
0.844 
(0.206) 
0.772 
(0.185) 
0.613 
(0.190) 
0.296 
(0.129)a 
0.782 
(0.248) 
0.492 
(0.117)a 
Gender 0.814 
(0.261) 
0.803 
(0.201) 
0.985 
(0.246) 
0.716 
(0.213) 
0.677 
(0.269) 
1.103 
(0.360) 
1.104 
(0.271) 
Age of Owner-
Manager 
0.191 
(0.136)b 
0.230 
(0.125)a 
0.605 
(0.320) 
0.215 
(0.143)b 
1.202 
(1.046) 
0.090 
(0.064)a 
0.358 
(0.188)c 
Relative Role 
Model  
0.991 
(0.329) 
1.414 
(0.346) 
1.726 
(0.418)b 
1.185 
(0.368) 
2.176 
(0.891)b 
1.055 
(0.333) 
1.253 
(0.303) 
Limited 
Liability 
0.653 
(0.213) 
1.554 
(0.370)c 
0.902 
(0.213) 
0.841 
(0.256) 
1.050 
(0.407) 
1.512 
(0.455) 
1.133 
(0.268) 
Partnership 0.594 
(0.220) 
0.934 
(0.249) 
1.543 
(0.411) 
1.086 
(0.358) 
0.790 
(0.375) 
0.636 
(0.248) 
1.389 
(0.359) 
Degree 0.919 
(0.271) 
0.942 
(0.210) 
0.906 
(0.200) 
1.063 
(0.297) 
0.793 
(0.291) 
0.667 
(0.193) 
1.213 
(0.261) 
Exporter 0.879 
(0.298) 
0.902 
(0.227) 
2.710 
(0.727)a  
1.364 
(0.414) 
1.203 
(0.477) 
0.870 
(0.281) 
1.272 
(0.315) 
Innovator – 
Product 
0.940 
(0.466) 
 1.403 
(0.045)a  
1.300 
(0.305) 
3.162 
(0.231)b 
8.405 
(0.303)b 
1.992 
(0.075)a 
2.005 
(0.080)a 
Log likelihood -182.09 -287.24 -292.14 -198.60 -127.35 -186.14 -294.62 
Nagelkerke R2 0.088 0.111 0.089 0.098 0.153 0.132 0.083 
Notes The Odds ratios are reported with the standard errors in parentheses. n=452 c p 
< 0.10; b p < 0.05; a p < 0.01 
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Table 7.13: Logit regression models of the probability of applying for external 
finance by source of finance.  
 Bank 
overdraft
Model 1 
Bank Loan 
(≧2 years)  
Model 2 
Bank Loan  
(< 2 years) 
Model 3 
External 
Equity 
Model 4 
Grants 
Model 5 
Factoring/ 
Invoice 
Discounting 
Firms Model 6 
Partners/ 
Working 
shareholders 
Model 7 
Innovator – 
Product 
0.940 
(0.466) 
 1.403 
(0.045)a  
1.300 
(0.305) 
3.162 
(0.231)b 
8.405 
(0.303)b 
1.992 
(0.075)a 
2.005 
(0.080)a 
Log likelihood -182.09 -287.24 -292.14 -198.60 -127.35 -186.14 -294.62 
Nagelkerke R2 0.088 0.111 0.089 0.098 0.153 0.132 0.083 
Innovator – 
Process 
1.795 
(0.505)b 
1.635 
(0.343)b 
0.843 
(0.178) 
1.859 
(0.485)b 
3.980 
(1.459)a 
1.055 
(0.283) 
2.428 
(0.513)a 
Log likelihood -180.90 -284.96 -292.29 -200.86 -126.75 -187.62 -286.28 
Nagelkerke R2 0.104 0.121 0.088 0.082 0.158 0.120 0.129 
Innovator – 
Work 
1.392 
(0.401)a 
2.273 
(0.487)a 
0.768 
(0.163) 
1.866 
(0.503)b 
2.945 
(1.083)a 
1.287 
(0.357) 
2.237 
(0.472)a 
Log likelihood -181.45 -280.13 -291.88 -201.05 -129.48 -187.50 -287.80 
Nagelkerke R2 0.093 0.147 0.090 0.081 0.132 0.123 0.120 
Innovator – 
Supply 
1.798 
(0.505)b 
3.359 
(0.721)a 
1.321 
(0.277)c 
1.253 
(0.326) 
1.658 
(0.563) 
1.668 
(0.450)c 
1.429 
(0.293)c 
Log likelihood -180.86 -270.80 -291.67 -203.40 -133.11 -186.15 -293.40 
Nagelkerke R2 0.104 0.195 0.092 0.065 0.102 0.132 0.088 
Innovator – 
Markets 
1.131 
(0.337) 
1.205 
(0.262) 
1.174 
(0.249)b 
2.208 
(0.664)a 
1.864 
(0.712) 
1.465 
(0.442) 
1.776 
(0.383)a 
Log likelihood -182.02 -287.20 -292.30 -200.05 -132.66 -187.12 -291.69 
Nagelkerke R2 0.089 0.109 0.088 0.088 0.106 0.126 0.100 
Innovator – 
Administration 
1.628 
(0.470)c 
1.326 
(0.288)c 
0.912 
(0.198) 
2.379 
(0.642)a 
1.813 
(0.640)c 
1.353 
(0.379) 
2.016 
(0.430)a 
Log likelihood -180.69 -286.70 -292.62 -198.52 -132.76 -187.35 -289.90 
Nagelkerke R2 0.099 0.111 0.086 0.099 0.105 0.124 0.110 
Innovator – 
Distribution 
2.354 
(0.657)a 
2.497 
(0.521)a 
1.242 
(0.255)a 
1.416 
(0.361) 
2.072 
(0.698)b 
1.401 
(0.373) 
1.455 
(0.294)c 
Log likelihood -177.32 -287.60 -291.94 -202.83 -131.75 -187.13 -293.43 
Nagelkerke R2 0.124 0.160 0.090 0.069 0.114 0.126 0.090 
R&D (1-2%) 
 
0.842 
(0.390) 
2.284 
(0.853)b 
3.626 
(1.250)a 
2.578 
(1.420)c 
2.647 
(2.129) 
3.790 
(2.539)b 
1.281 
(0.432) 
R&D (3-5%) 
 
0.708 
(0.346) 
2.209 
(0.840)b 
3.360 
(1.190)a 
3.370 
(1.975)b 
4.000 
(3.172)c 
5.417 
(3.620)b 
1.080 
(0.378) 
R&D (6-10%) 1.500 
(0.752) 
3.291 
(1.375)a 
2.332 
(0.913)b 
3.311 
(2.072)c 
3.802 
(3.200) 
3.256 
(2.318)c 
1.859 
(0.717) 
R&D (11-20%) 1.301 
(0.800) 
2.604 
(1.310)c 
3.528 
(1.727)b 
2.859 
(2.045) 
4.149 
(3.883) 
1.911 
(1.628) 
2.087 
(0.996) 
R&D (≥21%) 3.513 
(2.386)c 
10.910 
(0.512)a 
2.124 
(1.290) 
8.117 
(0.334)a 
9.894 
(1.069)a 
1.660 
(1.671) 
1.591 
(0.969) 
Log likelihood -187.94 -279.75 -284.12 -192.95 -130.93 -182.32 -292.78 
Nagelkerke R2 0.119 0.149 0.132 0.136 0.122 0.158 0.093 
Notes The Odds ratios are reported with the standard errors in parentheses. n=452 c p 
< 0.10; b p < 0.05; a p < 0.01 
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Regression Results – Success, Reduced or Full Amount 
Maximum likelihood estimation models were again conducted with regard to the 
dichotomous dependent variable relating to a successful outcome – either the full or a 
reduced amount of finance received by the firms from a specific source.  Table 7.14 
presents the models where product innovation is included in addition to the firm and 
owner-manager’s characteristics which have been also used throughout the 
dissertation.  In Table 7.15 the condensed summary regression results are reported 
from re-running each of the models presented in Table 7.14 with each of the other 
seven measures of innovation. 
 The Nagelkerke R2 values for bank overdrafts range from 0.188 for the model 
including administration innovation to 0.298 for the model with product innovation.  
Healthy Nagelkerke R2 values are also found for long-term bank loans, external equity, 
grants, and factoring and invoice discounting firms.  Lower Nagelkerke R2 values are 
found for short-term bank loans which ranged from 0.150 for the product, supply and 
also administration models in Table 7.15 to 0.182 in the model where R&D 
expenditure dummies were included.  The lowest Nagelkerke R2 values were found 
for model 15 which dealt with partners and working shareholders.  More specifically 
the models with process innovation, and also market innovation had Nagelkerke R2 
values of 0.07.  Each of the models was overall statistically significant at the 0.01 
level and consequently those statistics are not additionally reported in the tables in 
save space. 
 The hypothesis H4 predicted that the innovative ventures would possess a 
greater likelihood of having been refused access to external finance in comparison to 
the non-innovating ventures.  The logit models estimated in Tables 7.14 and 7.15 each 
have successful applications as the dependent variables so if the results were 
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consistent with hypothesis H4 we would expect the odds ratios on the innovation 
dummy variables to be less than one and to be statistically significant.  However, in 
most instances where innovation is found to be statistically significant the magnitude 
of the innovation odds ratios was substantially greater than one.  More specifically, in 
model 9 which dealt with bank overdrafts the product and also distribution innovation 
variables are both highly statistically significant at the 0.01 level, and the odds ratios 
were 7.9 and 8.6, respectively. 
In model 10, which looks at the likelihood of success in applying for long-
term bank loans the product, process and supply innovation variables were 
statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.10 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  Again the odds 
ratios are all well above one.  In contrast, for short-term bank finance only one 
innovation variable – distribution - was found to be weakly statistically significant at 
the 0.10 level. 
Model 12 presented the results for applications for external equity and here, 
market innovators was statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  The odds ratio for 
market innovators was 5.9, and again this magnitude is counter to our predictions.  
Again, the innovating firm has a higher probability of being successful in comparison 
to the non-innovating firms. 
In model 13 the dependent variable was success in applications for grants.  
One measure of innovation – distribution innovation - was found to be statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level, and the odds ratio was 0.06 which is consistent with 
hypothesis H4.  This was the sole example where a measure of innovation in the 
regression models was consistent with hypothesis H4. 
In model 14 which was concerned with factoring or invoice discounting firms 
none of the measures of innovation were found to be statistically significant at the 
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0.10 level, or better.  Lastly, model 15 reported the results for applying to partners or 
working shareholders.  In mode 15 supply innovation and distribution innovation 
were found to be statistically significant at the 0.10 and 0.05 levels, respectively.  The 
odds ratios were found to be 2.6 and 3.5 for supply and distribution innovation. 
Thus, overall the regression results reported in Tables 7.14 and 7.15 found 
evidence which was not supportive of hypothesis H4 when the research is explored 
using a multivariate regression model. 
Several of the control variables were found to be systematically statistically 
significantly related to the probability of being successful in applications for finance.  
Sector was found to be weakly statistically significantly related to the success of 
applications for long-term bank finance, while manufacturing firms were less likely to 
be successful than service sector firms in their applications for long-term bank finance.  
Indeed the odds ratio was 0.548. 
The size of the firms was one of the most important variables in the models 
included in Table 7.14, and was positively statistically significant at the 0.10 level or 
better in models for short-term bank finance, external equity, factoring or invoice 
discounting firms and partners or working shareholders.  Thus, larger sized firms are 
more likely to be successful in their applications for 4 out of the 7 sources explored in 
Table 7.14.  Larger sized firms would be expected to have a greater amount of 
resources and a stronger presence than smaller sized firms, 
The age of the firms was only weakly statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
in one model which was related to the success of long-term bank finance.  Thus, on 
the whole, the age of the firms does not appear to matter when decisions are being 
made by the external funding decision makers in response to requests for capital. 
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The family business was found to be an important variable in two models, 
relating to grants and factor or invoice discounting firms, and was statistically 
significant at the 0.01 and 0.10 levels, respectively.  Family businesses were less 
likely than non-family businesses to be successful in applications for grants.  However, 
the opposite was the case for factoring or invoice discounting firms – where the odds 
ratio of family businesses being successful was 2.7. 
Interestingly the gender of the owner-manager was not statistically significant 
in any of the models shown in Table 7.14.  Thus, whether the applicant is a man or a 
woman has no statistically significant bearing upon the likelihood of the external 
funding source being more inclined, or less likely, to provide the full or the reduced 
amount of funding requested across the seven sources of finance which have been 
explored. 
Instead it was the age of the owner-managers which was found to be the most 
important characteristic in helping to explain the probability of firms being successful 
in their applications for external finance.  The age of the owner-manager was found to 
be statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the models of long-term bank finance, 
and factoring or invoice discounting firms, whilst in the models of short-term bank 
finance and grants the age of the owner-managers was weakly statistically significant 
at the 0.10 level.  In all four models which were statistically significant at the 0.10 
level, or better, the age of the owner-managers was positively related to a successful 
application for finance. As discussed before, older owner-managers are more 
experienced and have a much more solid and widespread networking base to consult, 
so that both the information flow and resources flow for their businesses are enhanced. 
Moreover, experienced Chinese entrepreneurs prefer long-term to short-term loans, in 
fact approved bank loans that are backed by a guarantee company are typically lent 
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for 5 to 10 years. Longer term loans typically require a lower cost of capital and offer 
better controllability and certainty to the recipient. However, the overdraft facilities 
are very convenient for experienced entrepreneurs to manage their cash flow and 
quickly carry out transactions of smaller amounts when necessary. 
Having a relative role model was found to be negatively related to successful 
applications for long-term bank loans, and to factoring or invoice discounting firms at 
the 0.01 level in both cases. A relative role model is often a member of the family, 
thus the owner-manager’s family is also very likely to be involved in business. In this 
case, financial support to the new starter is more likely to be available from family 
members very cheaply. Therefore, the firm will be less financially constrained and the 
successfulness of loan applications will not be as crucial to entrepreneurs who have 
family ties in the business context, as these external financiers tend not to be the 
entrepreneur’s last source of access to finance. 
In the multivariate regression models, the legal status of the firms was found 
to not be an important variable and was not statistically significant in any of the 
models, with one exception. It is then fair to say that the legal status of a firm does not 
influence the success of gaining access to finance in China. The choice of which 
corporation business vehicle to use is more directed by different tax treatments of 
each form of cooperation rather than considerations of access to finance.  
Having a degree was found to be important in two models – successful 
applications for bank overdrafts, and short-term bank loans, where the degree variable 
was statistically significant at the 0.05 level in both models.  Interestingly, those with 
degrees were less likely to be successful in applications for bank overdrafts, but were 
more likely to have success in their applications for short-term bank loans, compared 
to those without degrees. One possible explanation for this result is that better 
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educated owner-managers are more capable of drafting a presentable business plan to 
the loan officer; however they may lack negotiation skills when it comes to overdraft 
account applications which are not normally based on written documents. Thus the 
providers of external finance do not appear to be swayed one way or the other in most 
cases for most sources of finance. 
The exporting variable was found to be statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
in one model relating to factoring or invoice discounting firms.  Exporters were less 
likely to be successful compared to the non-exporters in their applications for finance 
from factoring or invoice discounting firms.  Clearly, the perception of the factoring 
or invoice discounting firms is that the exporters by virtue of operating in markets 
beyond China carry an extra risk. However, without recording the overall number of 
applications made by exporters vs. non-exporters, and the proportion of the 
applications that were successful, it is not possible to give a conclusive judgement to 
the cause of this result. 
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Table 7.14: Logit regression models of successful applications for external 
finance by source  
 Bank 
overdraft
Model 9 
Bank 
Loan (≧
2 years)  
Model 
10 
Bank Loan  
(< 2 years) 
Model 11 
External 
Equity 
Model 
12 
Grants 
Model 
13 
Factoring/ 
Invoice 
Discounting 
Firms Model 
14 
Partners/ 
Working 
shareholders 
Model 15 
Sector 
 
3.027 
(0.879) 
0.548 
(0.200)c 
1.186 
(0.399) 
0.238 
(0.876) 
0.886 
(0.817) 
1.140 
(0.578) 
0.966 
(0.445) 
Size 0.886 
(0.371) 
1.981 
(1.400) 
1.848 
(0.393)a 
1.737 
(0.549)c 
0.704 
(0.302) 
1.474 
(0.836)b 
1.688 
(0.480)c 
Age of 
Business 
1.110 
(0.970) 
1.667 
(0.502)c 
0.801 
(0.233) 
1.723 
(0.793) 
0.855 
(0.445) 
0.916 
(0.516) 
0.997 
(0.388) 
Family 
Business 
0.482 
(0.537) 
0.692 
(0.286) 
0.851 
(0.342) 
0.961 
(0.613) 
0.385 
(0.043)a 
2.693 
(1.176)c 
1.044 
(0.564) 
Gender 1.356 
(1.438) 
0.751 
(0.308) 
0.959 
(0.384) 
0.401 
(0.283) 
0.884 
(0.913) 
0.615 
(0.507) 
1.104 
(0.603) 
Age of Owner-
Manager 
1.920 
(0.044) 
4.663 
(0.071)a 
3.480 
(2.543)c 
0.688 
(0.809) 
2.111 
(0.130)c 
3.999 
(0.356)a 
3.554 
(0.442) 
Relative Role 
Model  
2.316 
(1.467) 
0.541 
(0.022)a 
1.394 
(0.565) 
0.402 
(0.305) 
0.899 
(0.449) 
0.135 
(0.092)a 
0.889 
(0.504) 
Limited 
Liability 
0.245 
(0.298) 
1.276 
(0.496) 
0.863 
(0.331) 
0.618 
(0.445) 
1.229 
(0.877) 
0.670 
(0.483) 
1.597 
(0.938) 
Partnership 3.717 
(0.269)a 
1.400 
(0.642) 
1.667 
(0.740) 
0.917 
(0.706) 
0.908 
(0.667) 
0.440 
(0.410) 
1.684 
(1.075) 
Degree 0.093 
(0.108)b 
0.991 
(0.366) 
2.490 
(0.915)b 
0.578 
(0.375) 
2.001 
(0.855) 
0.977 
(0.670) 
0.995 
(0.478) 
Exporter 1.153 
(1.273) 
0.813 
(0.333) 
1.231 
(0.505) 
2.802 
(2.087) 
1.076 
(0.545) 
0.330 
(0.144)b 
0.886 
(0.483) 
Innovator – 
Product 
7.866 
(0.156)a 
2.636 
(0.149)a 
0.903 
(0.348) 
4.507 
(2.818) 
0.156 
(1.223) 
0.543 
(0.589) 
0.666 
(0.401) 
Log likelihood -142.47 -216.58 -245.13 -184.05 -150.46 -182.30 -126.04 
Nagelkerke R2 0.298 0.254 0.150 0.231 0.251 0.213 0.073 
n 67 186 56 81 44 76 195 
Notes The Odds ratios are reported with the standard errors in parentheses. n=452 c p 
< 0.10; b p < 0.05; a p < 0.01 
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Table 7.15: Logit regression models of successful applications (full or reduced) 
for external finance by source 
 Bank 
overdraft
Model 9 
Bank Loan 
(≧2 years)  
Model 10 
Bank Loan  
(< 2 years) 
Model 11 
External 
Equity 
Model 
12 
Grants 
Model 
13 
Factoring/ 
Invoice 
Discounting 
Firms Model 
14 
Partners/ 
Working 
shareholders 
Model 15 
Innovator – 
Product 
7.866 
(0.156)a 
2.636 
(0.149)a 
0.903 
(0.348) 
4.507 
(2.818) 
0.156 
(1.223) 
0.543 
(0.589) 
0.666 
(0.401) 
Log likelihood -142.47 -216.58 -245.13 -184.05 -150.46 -182.30 -126.04 
Nagelkerke R2 0.298 0.254 0.150 0.231 0.251 0.213 0.073 
Innovator – 
Process 
2.297 
(1.806) 
1.827 
(0.649)c 
0.617 
(0.209) 
0.561 
(0.338) 
1.077 
(1.034) 
0.970 
(0.600) 
0.813 
(0.399) 
Log likelihood -156.90 -219.70 -243.19 -185.18 -152.06 -182.36 -126.37 
Nagelkerke R2 0.196 0.236 0.161 0.215 0.211 0.212 0.070 
Innovator – 
Work 
2.206 
(1.832) 
1.220 
(0.437) 
0.824 
(0.294) 
1.348 
(0.821) 
1.618 
(1.709) 
0.712 
(0.507) 
0.701 
(0.375) 
Log likelihood -156.39 -221.62 -245.02 -185.44 -151.80 -182.34 -126.10 
Nagelkerke R2 0.200 0.224 0.151 0.211 0.217 0.212 0.073 
Innovator – 
Supply 
2.195 
(1.860) 
3.019 
(1.098)a 
0.967 
(0.334) 
1.117 
(0.635) 
0.400 
(0.336) 
1.266 
(0.909) 
2.559 
(1.368)c 
Log likelihood -156.51 -213.16 -245.21 -185.61 -150.86 -181.13 -123.21 
Nagelkerke R2 0.200 0.274 0.150 0.208 0.241 0.231 0.101 
Innovator – 
Markets 
2.477 
(2.238) 
1.278 
(0.466) 
0.716 
(0.253) 
5.939 
(0.311)a 
0.229 
(0.247) 
0.524 
(0.409) 
0.802 
(0.453) 
Log likelihood -157.32 -221.53 -244.42 -178.52 -150.84 -181.67 -126.40 
Nagelkerke R2 0.193 0.225 0.154 0.310 0.242 0.223 0.070 
Innovator – 
Administration 
1.788 
(1.582) 
1.375 
(0.489) 
0.916 
(0.331) 
1.191 
(0.745) 
0.508 
(0.551) 
1.146 
(0.806) 
2.238 
(1.164) 
Log likelihood -157.75 -221.25 -245.19 -185.52 -151.87 -182.39 -124.04 
Nagelkerke R2 0.188 0.226 0.150 0.210 0.216 0.211 0.093 
Innovator – 
Distribution 
8.642 
(0.789)a 
1.688 
(0.589) 
1.867 
(0.650)c 
0.437 
(0.276) 
0.060 
(0.067)b 
1.272 
(0.840) 
3.448 
(2.020)b 
Log likelihood -151.96 -219.82 -241.52 -183.84 -144.46 -182.38 -121.57 
Nagelkerke R2 0.234 0.235 0.170 0.235 0.291 0.212 0.117 
R&D (1-2%) 
 
1.784 
(3.104) 
0.971 
(0.668) 
1.121 
(0.704) 
0.065 
(0.103) 
1.113 
(0.887) 
0.885 
(0.766) 
0.801 
(0.729) 
R&D (3-5%) 
 
1.909 
(3.435) 
2.403 
(1.685) 
0.721 
(0.456) 
0.383 
(0.540) 
0.889 
(0.765) 
0.808 
(0.665) 
0.522 
(0.470) 
R&D (6-10%) 2.299 
(2.160)b 
5.053 
(3.845)b 
3.087 
(2.600) 
0.068 
(0.115) 
0.553 
(0.532) 
0.907 
(0.812) 
0.543 
(0.555) 
R&D (11-20%) 4.015 
(2.511)b 
3.244 
(2.856) 
1.993 
(1.916) 
0.543 
(0.871) 
0.664 
(0.543) 
0.442 
(0.397) 
1.282 
(1.709) 
R&D (≥21%) 1.747 
(3.977) 
1.804 
(1.580) 
0.831 
(0.896) 
0.194 
(0.331) 
0.885 
(0.743) 
0.745 
(0.699) 
0.941 
(1.011) 
Log likelihood -153.69 -208.65 -239.14 -178.69 -145.95 -174.00 -123.13 
Nagelkerke R2 0.221 0.299 0.182 0.308 0.301 0.236  0.102 
n 67 186 56 81 44 76 195 
Notes The Odds ratios are reported with the standard errors in parentheses.  c p < 0.10; 
b p < 0.05; a p < 0.01  
  
 
315 
Awareness of Sources of External Finance 
 The bivariate analysis had found that several of the characteristics of the 
owner managers and the firms were statistically significant at the 0.10 level or better 
with regard to the seven sources of finance, albeit less than were found in the models 
of applications for finance, and successful applications for finance, by source.  For 
two of the sources of finance – long-term and short-term finance - the levels of 
awareness were approaching 100% which rendered multivariate regression analysis 
impractical.  Accordingly, in Table 7.16 the odds ratios are presented from the 
multivariate regression models of five sources of finance, rather than the seven 
sources which have been explored in the previous regression sections of the chapter. 
 The most striking feature of Table 7.16 is the very few instances where the 
characteristics of the owner-managers or the businesses were statistically significant 
at the 0.10 level, or better, related to the probability of the firms being aware of the 
sources of finance.  Table 7.16 presents the result with product innovation included as 
the measure of innovation.  Product innovation was not statistically significant at the 
0.10 level or better in any of the models.  When product innovation was replaced in 
turn with each of the other types of innovation, none of the measures of innovation 
were found to be statistically significant.  Accordingly, the view was taken not to 
report the tabulation of the odds ratios of the other measures of innovation as there are 
no statistically significant relationships.  Thus, the results in the multivariate 
regression models show that whether or not a firm is an innovator, is not 
systematically related to the firms being aware of risk capital sources, or any of the 
other sources of finance.  Thus, the regression results present evidence which is not 
supportive of hypothesis H5. 
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Instead it was the control variables which were found to be more important variables 
in explaining awareness of sources of finance.  Larger sized firms were more likely 
than smaller sized firms to be aware of factoring or invoice discounting firms, and 
also partners or working shareholders, and these relationships were both weakly 
statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  It is intuitive to realise that in general more 
opportunities are available to larger firms thus the owner-managers are expected to be 
more experienced in more fields and circumstances than owner-managers of smaller 
firms. The level of awareness is partly determined by the level of experience and 
knowledge of business of the entrepreneur. 
 Family businesses were less likely than non-family businesses to be aware of 
factoring or invoice discounting firms, and again this relationship was also only 
weakly statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
 Whether the firm was in the manufacturing or service sector, the age of the 
business, and whether or not the firm exported goods and services were not 
statistically significant at the 0.10 level or better. Neither were the characteristics of 
the owner-managers – gender, age, having a relative role model, or possessing a 
degree. Despite these findings, it does not necessarily lead to the belief these factors 
are not relevant to the level of awareness of external sources of finance. Because of 
the limitations of this research project and the fact this is only an exploratory study, it 
is more prudent to seek more evidence in further researches in this area before adding 
comments and possible explanations.   
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Table 7.16: Logit regression models of awareness of external finance by source 
The Odds Ratios 
 Bank 
overdraft
Model 
16 
External 
Equity 
Model 
17 
Grants 
Model 
18 
Factoring/ 
Invoice 
Discounting 
Firms Model 
19 
Partners/ 
Working 
shareholders 
Model 20 
Sector 
 
1.452 
(0.395) 
1.057 
(0.219) 
1.396 
(0.320) 
1.308 
(0.310) 
1.052 
(0.485) 
Size 0.862 
(0.128) 
1.098 
(0.127) 
1.026 
(0.131) 
1.278 
(0.176)c 
1.597 
(0.430)c 
Age of 
Business 
1.680 
(0.369) 
0.847 
(0.144) 
0.977 
(0.183) 
1.141 
(0.223) 
0.496 
(0.193)c 
Family 
Business 
1.337 
(0.422) 
0.831 
(0.197) 
0.983 
(0.259) 
0.624 
(0.170)c 
0.995 
(0.539) 
Gender 0.709 
(0.238) 
1.149 
(0.283) 
0.705 
(0.202) 
1.047 
(0.293) 
0.510 
(0.329) 
Age of Owner-
Manager 
1.027 
(0.720) 
1.013 
(0.531) 
1.651 
(0.961) 
0.803 
(0.487) 
2.285 
(2.516) 
Relative Role 
Model  
1.316 
(0.429) 
1.197 
(0.286) 
0.974 
(0.258) 
1.457 
(0.405) 
0.592 
(0.308) 
Limited 
Liability 
1.770 
(0.560)c 
0.858 
(0.201) 
1.051 
(0.273) 
1.148 
(0.311) 
0.562 
(0.276) 
Partnership 1.792 
(0.599)c 
1.391 
(0.370) 
1.386 
(0.409) 
1.310 
(0.400) 
0.965 
(0.574) 
Degree 1.342 
(0.382) 
1.363 
(0.299) 
0.996 
(0.241) 
1.061 
(0.269) 
1.718 
(0.891) 
Exporter 0.773 
(0.243) 
1.451 
(0.373) 
1.110 
(0.312) 
0.933 
(0.272) 
0.666 
(0.359) 
Innovator – 
Product 
0.751 
(0.243) 
1.427 
(0.332) 
1.281 
(0.330) 
0.964 
(0.260) 
0.752 
(0.389) 
Log likelihood -193.56 -292.09 -251.58 -236.75 -87.45 
Nagelkerke R2 0.229 0.312 0.319 0.287 0.154 
Notes: N=452 in all models. The Odds ratios are reported with the standard errors in 
parentheses.  c p < 0.10; b p < 0.05; a p < 0.01   
 
 
 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has investigated the funding environment of innovative and non-
innovative firms in the Beijing area of China and has tested three hypotheses.  Craig 
et al (2008, P 346) argued that “[a] particular area of concern for policymakers is 
whether small businesses have access to adequate credit” and this credit is necessary 
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to fuel and sustain growth and development.  The evidence was consistent with the 
first hypothesis that was tested in the chapter, H3, that innovative ventures are more 
likely to have applied for external finance than non-innovators.  
The strength of the findings was clear from both the cross-tabulation analysis 
and also the multivariate logit models, and across all the sources of finance.  This was 
reinforced by the result that 10.81% of product innovators and 26.89% of non-product 
innovators had made no external applications for finance.  In other words, nine out of 
ten product innovators had made one or more application for finance, and 
approximately three out of four of the non-product innovators had made one or more 
application for external finance.  
The analysis of the multivariate regression models showed that innovation was 
not the only characteristic of the firms or the owner-managers which was related to 
applying for external finance. In general, applications for external finance was 
positively related to larger and older firms, exporters, and negatively related to owner-
managers’ age and it being a family business. Thus, cultural concerns and the desire 
to maintain control of firms without the necessity to reveal detailed financial 
information to external sources still represents a barrier which needs to be overcome. 
In contrast to the first hypothesis, H3, the results were not very supportive of 
the second hypothesis, H4, which was tested in the chapter. However, given that 
innovators were more likely to be successful in securing finance from banks, either in 
the form of bank overdrafts or longer term bank loans, this has clear implications for 
policy. Given the need for the Chinese government to prolong the period of economic 
advancement and development, there is a need to harness the resources and the 
potential of innovative firms, and the results suggest that the banks are surprisingly 
receptive to innovative ventures.  Instead the results and the strong positive 
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relationships between the age of the owner-managers and also the size of the firms 
with the probability of submitting successful applications and receiving either the full 
or the reduced amount, suggest that the banks need to be encouraged to overhaul their 
appraisal systems and their criteria, and given the relationship of the Chinese 
government to the banks this is possible.  Clearly, the younger owner-managers and 
those running the smaller sized firms are adversely placed in comparison to the older 
owner-managers and the larger sized firms.  
Normally, state-owned commercial banks only release loans for enterprises 
with at least an AA rating, which is almost impossible for the majority of small and 
medium sized enterprises. In addition, some state-owned banks even stipulate that 
they will not consider a loan application for less than 3 million Yuan which far 
exceeds the amount that small and medium sized enterprises generally need. A 
nationwide credit assessment system especially for small and medium sized 
enterprises was proposed in 2001 without much constructive action having taking 
place up to that point. A clear intention to improve the information processing and 
transmission of the credit situation of small and medium sized enterprises from the 
authorities is promising. Hopefully, forward-looking owner-managers will see the 
incentive of building a sound credit reputation for its positive influence on future 
borrowings from the formal banking system. 
Chen (2002) showed that loans granted in the first half of 2000 by banks in 
Leqing County in Zhejiang Province, of which 91.4 percent of loans totalling 478 
million Yuan were short-term loans (less than one year). In Mei and Tan’s (2002) 
book, the authors summarised the proportion of working capital to fixed assets among 
loans to SMEs provided by some banks in Shanghai were as follows: Industrial and 
Commercial Bank – 82:18; Communications Bank – 95:5; Pudong Development 
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Bank – 80:20; City Cooperative Bank – 92:8. In addition, 60 percent of total loans are 
limited to six months. Previous empirical research reached a significant conclusion 
that the loan structure for Chinese SMEs was mainly concentrated on working capital 
loans, therefore short-term rather than long-term (Wang 2004). Yet, it does not say 
that SMEs do not need long-term capital for fixed asset investment to enhance growth. 
So, further investigation from the owner-managers’ side is essential. 
The evidence in the cross-tabulations compared to the regression models 
provided a contrasting picture of support for the third hypothesis, H5.  The cross-
tabulation analysis found that for equity finance, the awareness of these sources was 
statistically related to innovation activity – product, process, supply, administration 
and distribution.  In the regression models there was no statistically significant 
difference between innovators and non-innovators in their awareness of equity finance 
and this evidence is not supportive of hypothesis H5. 
Colombo and Grilli (2007, P25) indicated that “as it has long been recognized 
in the economic literature, capital markets are a driving force for economic 
development.”  In China the capital markets are slowly evolving, but for all sources of 
external finance the lack of information transparency is an inherent disease of Chinese 
firms which needs to be overcome.  This lack of information transparency is directly 
related to their treatment by the tax system, and indeed reflects the background of 
certain groups of owner-managers. There are restrictions in the registration under 
different forms of incorporation (Garcia-Fontes, 2005). Thus, misrepresentation of 
cash-flows, depreciation and stock valuation happens all the time. It is a common 
practice of owner-managers to keep several sets of accounts for different purposes (i.e. 
one for the taxman, one for bankers and one for themselves). For every reason, 
outsiders will not trust firms’ published materials for monetary decisions. The 
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information problem makes both debt and equity financing extremely challenging to 
SMEs. But equally the disadvantage of publishing the true and fair view of the firm 
will obviously outweigh the advantage they gain in the financial market, otherwise, a 
collective movement of owner-managers to reveal firms’ real performance would 
have happened under finance pressures. 
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Chapter 8: 
The Financing of Small Firms in Beijing, China: Exploring the Extent of Credit 
Constraints 
 
8.1. Introduction  
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are frequently viewed as an 
engine of economic growth, job creation and greater prosperity (Wennekers and 
Thurik, 1999; Reynolds et al., 1994). The innovative capability of SMEs is seen as a 
crucial driver of sustainable competitive advantage (Nieto and Santamaria, 2010) and 
though much of the evidence for this is drawn from the industrialised economies of 
North America and Europe, it is thought to hold for developing as well as developed 
economies. A call for more research on entrepreneurship and small business in China 
has been made by Li and Matlay (2006).  In China, policy towards SMEs has 
developed in line with the growing importance of SMEs to the Chinese economy 
(China Private Enterprises Year Book 2004-2006, Wang and Gu, 2005) 6
                                                 
6 Song (2006) estimated that, by the end of 2005, there were in excess of 42 million SMEs in China. 
. Recent 
estimates suggest that SMEs are now responsible for approximately 75% of the 
workforce in cities and towns (US Embassy Report 2002; Hussain et al 2006) and 
75% of new jobs (Zou, 2006). In Beijing, the focus of this study, approximately 
965,773 private enterprises were registered in the city as of June 2006 - representing 
82.92% of all firms. Excluding micro firms, 278,918 SMEs represents the population 
of SMEs in Beijing (China Private Enterprises Year Book 2004-2006 p. 210, p.217). 
The Chinese government recognises that a vibrant SME sector has become central to 
the expansion and stability of the economy (Beijing Development and Reform 
Commission, SME Office, 2007; Jia, 2006). Currently, policy seems aimed at 
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promoting SMEs in selected niche sectors as a means of developing supply chains and, 
through this, supporting existing large firms (Ning, 2007).7
As SMEs become the increasing focus of Chinese industrial policy, so 
discussions on access to finance become common. In the rhetoric of western political 
and academic debate, access to external finance is typically identified as the major 
constraint to small firm’s growth and development (Blumberg and Letterie, 2008). In 
standard accounts, banks assign high-risk status to small firms’ credit proposals and, 
accordingly, make fewer loans at the margin. Often, small firms propose investment 
projects that are difficult for financial institutions to evaluate and monitor, and are led 
by entrepreneurs with short, or egregious, credit histories and limited collateral. Under 
these circumstances, banks minimize problems of adverse selection and moral hazard 
by rationing credit on some basis other than price. 
 In many respects, this is a 
volte-face from the policies adopted in the late 1950s, during the Great Leap Forward, 
and again in the 1960s and 1970s as part of the Cultural Revolution, which saw 
widespread appropriation of private sector resources by the State.  
Though this argument is most commonly made with reference to developed 
economies, it has also been made within emerging or transitional economies such as 
China (Chow and Fung, 2000). However, in both contexts, the evidence for 
widespread rationing of credit to small firms is, at best, scant. For instance, Oakey 
(2007, p. 224) suggests that “there appears to be a growing consensus that overall, the 
United Kingdom capital market for SMEs functions adequately”. However, he also 
notes that “there persists a sentiment that particular niches of the demand side of this 
market are not operating efficiently”. Possible gaps are believed to exist in the 
financing of early stage technology firms specifically, and in innovative firms more 
                                                 
7 The Small and Medium Size Firm Promotion Law of the People Republic of China promulgated at 
the 9th Standing Committee Meeting of the National People’s Congress, 29 June 2002. See Ning 2007. 
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generally (SBS 2004/05). It is not difficult to imagine why such firms encounter 
problems: evidence has long shown that the returns on inventions are highly skewed, 
with failure a common outcome. Indeed, one recent study of Canadian independent 
inventors (Åstebro, 2003) found that 93% of inventive projects failed to reach the 
market and, of the small percentage which did reach the market, only 40% achieved 
positive returns.  
Consequently, the focus of this chapter is both broad and narrow. Broadly, and 
given limited evidence on the extent of financial constraints faced by small firms in 
developing economies, the objective is to investigate the demand and supply of credit 
using a sample of 384 SMEs (which applied for external finance) in Beijing, China. 
Practically, we explore variations in entrepreneur and firm-level characteristics by: (i) 
the amount of external finance sought, (ii) the amount of external finance received, 
and (iii) the ratio of ‘sought’ to ‘received’ external finance. In this way, our research 
questions are concerned with understanding which ‘types’ of firms seek most bank 
finance, and which are most successful.  
More narrowly, and to pursue this broad agenda, we place particular emphasis 
upon the role of innovation in decisions on borrowing and lending. Here, we are able 
to take a wider view of innovation than is common in similarly motivated and 
designed studies. Whilst many scholars of innovation and entrepreneurship are happy 
to identify the influence of Joseph Schumpeter (in particular his 1912 Theory of 
Economic Development), many appear content with a narrower technical product and 
process conception of innovation than appeared in this classic work. Such 
‘technicalist’ views of innovation are likely to leave much innovation activity 
‘hidden’ (NESTA, 2006) and serve to inappropriately set aside large parts of most 
economies, such as many service activities (including those within manufacturing 
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firms). Accordingly, the researcher’s study was designed to allow a more 
comprehensive reckoning, one which is more faithful to Schumpeter’s earlier work. 
To this end, innovations may be in: (i) products, (ii) processes, (iii) work practices or 
workforce organisation, (iv) supply and supplier relations, (v) markets and marketing, 
(vi) administration and office systems, and (vii) product distribution. These various 
domains of innovation are likely to signal varying degrees of technical, market and, 
ultimately, financial uncertainty and risk.  An earlier version of this chapter was 
presented at the 2010 INBAM conference (See Robson et al., 2008b).  Only 16 papers 
were selected for the Small Business Economics stream of the INBAM conference.  
The conference paper has subsequently been revised and it is one of only 7 papers 
being taken forward for consideration for publication in Small Business Economics 
(Wang et al. 2010) (See Appendix 8.1 for the short-listing letter).    
The reader is reminded that this chapter is focusing upon firms who are 
seeking finance (384 firms), rather than the full sample which was analysed in chapter 
six (452 firms).  Appendix 8.2 and 8.3 show the industry group of the 384 firms 
analysed in this chapter, and the mean summary statistics.  The reader is also 
reminded that the following hypotheses which had been developed in the front-half of 
the dissertation are tested in this chapter. 
 
H6: The innovative ventures will have a lower percentage of money received 
from that sought compared to the non-innovating ventures. 
 
H7: The innovative ventures’ amount of money sought will be higher than that 
sought by non-innovating ventures. 
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H8: The innovative ventures’ amount of external finance obtained will be 
lower than the corresponding value for non-innovating ventures. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section two introduces the empirical 
findings at the general level.  Section three presents the bivariate analysis between the 
innovation and control characteristics of the businesses and entrepreneurs against our 
three sets of access to finance measures.  Section four shows the multivariate 
regression analysis – tobit regression models of the percentage of finance received 
from that sought, and OLS regression models of the amount of money sought, and the 
amount of money received.  Section five presents a discussion of the analysis and the 
key findings.  Finally, in section six a conclusion completes the chapter  
 
8.2 Empirical Findings 
This section provides an overview of the overall general results of: (1) the 
percentage of the money received from that sought, (2) the amount of money sought, 
and (3) the amount of money obtained.  Each of these three access to finance issues is 
examined in turn at a general level before the cross-tabulation analysis compares the 
aforementioned with whether or not the firms were innovators and other 
characteristics of the entrepreneurs and their businesses.  The hypotheses are tested in 
relation to the cross-tabulations and, later in the chapter, in a multivariate regression 
context. 
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8.2.1 Descriptive statistics results 
Initially, in order to have a better feel and understanding of: (1) the percentage 
of the money received from that sought, (2) the amount of money sought, and (3) the 
amount of money obtained, a set of descriptive statistics – means and standard 
deviations - are reported.   
Overall, on average the firms seeking external finance received 65.86% of the 
finance which they were seeking.  Thus, firms on average received approximately two 
thirds of the finance which they seek.  The average amount of external finance sought 
was 951,892 yuan which approximates to $126,792 (based on an exchange rate of 1 
yuan = $0.1332, calculated at October 1st 2007).  The average amount of external 
finance received was 579,044 yuan which approximates to $77,129. 
The three main aspects of finance were then tested against the innovation 
measures which form the centre of the hypothesis testing, together with the control 
variables of the other characteristics of the businesses and the owner-managers, for 
which it would be logical to expect possible relationships. 
 
8.3 Crosstabulation Analysis 
8.3.1 Crosstabulation analysis – the percentage of the money received from that 
sought 
 
Overall, on average the firms seeking external finance received 65.86% of the 
finance which they were seeking (Table 8.1).  For the seven types of innovation there 
were no statistically significant differences between the percentage of the money 
received and that sought.  However, R&D expenditure was highly statistically related 
to the proportion of external finance received from that sought. This relationship was 
  
 
328 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  Firms which spent zero money on R&D 
received 76.67% of the finance which they sought which was substantially more than 
the 62.15% for firms with 1-2% R&D expenditure levels, which in turn was well 
above the 53.24% reported for firms with the highest levels of R&D expenditure.   
Thus, the evidence is not supportive of hypothesis H6 that innovating firms would 
receive a smaller proportion of the finance sought than the non-innovating businesses.  
 Several of the control variables were statistically significantly related to the 
proportion of the finance received from that sought.  Sector, type of business and 
exporting activity were shown to be statistically significantly related to the proportion 
of external finance received from that sought.   Manufacturing firms received 67.7% 
of the finance which they sought which was more than the 63.2% obtained by service 
sector firms and this relationship was weakly statistically significant at the 10% level.  
Registered businesses received 62.6% of the finance sought which was less than the 
67.8% reported by partnerships, and 68.7% acquired by limited liability businesses.  
This relationship was weakly statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  The non-
exporters received 67.6% of the finance sought compared to the 61.5% reported by 
exporters and this was statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  
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Table 8.1: Descriptive statistics and ANOVAs – the percentage of external finance which was obtained, 
by those businesses seeking external finance. 
 Mean S.D N F df 
All 65.86 25.120 384   
Sector - Manufacturing 67.700 23.965 224 2.87c 1 
Services 63.288 26.740 160   
8-19 employees 67.48 28.080 136 0.962 4 
20-49 employees 64.66 22.570 115   
50-99 employees 65.36 25.448 70   
100-199 employees 69.55 25.575 38   
200-499 employees 58.40 17.954 25   
1-5 years old 67.90 25.184 154 0.832 2 
6-9 years old 64.58 25.683 144   
≥10 years old 64.36 24.533 86   
Family Business 64.764 24.339 178 0.63 1 
Non Family Business 66.811 25.977 206   
Gender – Male 65.460 25.106 300 0.35 1 
Female 67.298 25.718 84   
18-30 years old  62.45 27.356 44 1.124  
31-45 years old 65.54 25.058 246   
46-55 years old 66.51 24.419 73   
≥56 years old 74.52 24.995 21   
Relative Role Model  64.807 24.436 140 0.38 1 
No Relative Role Model  66.467 25.687 244   
Registered Business 62.615 25.906 166 2.48c 2 
Partnership 67.784 24.317 88   
Limited liability 68.710 24.633 130   
Degree 64.846 25.254 189 0.60 1 
No Degree 66.846 25.210 195   
Exporter 61.449 25.753 107 4.59b 2 
Non-Exporter 67.567 24.847 277   
Innovator – Product 64.754 25.034 297 2.54 1 
None 69.644 25.626 87   
Innovator – Process 65.417 25.444 156 0.08 1 
None 66.168 25.115 228   
Innovator – Work 65.108 25.939 186 0.32 1 
None 66.571 24.568 198   
Innovator – Supply 65.248 24.164 165 0.17 1 
None 66.324 26.031 219   
Innovator – Markets 64.942 25.452 242 0.87 1 
None 67.430 24.828 142   
Innovator – Administration 65.356 23.952 163 0.11 1 
None 66.235 26.161 221   
Innovator – Distribution 67.431 24.068 167 1.14 1 
None 64.654 26.061 217   
R&D Expenditure as a % of turnover: None 76.67 29.148 42 19.443a 5 
1-2% 62.15 24.464 134   
3-5% 66.28 25.690 100   
6-10% 68.83 23.259 60   
11-20% 67.10 20.647 31   
≥21% 53.24 23.779 17   
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8.3.2 Crosstabulation analysis – the amount of money sought  
In Table 8.2 it can be seen that the average amount of external finance sought 
was 951,892 yuan which approximately equates to $126,792.  The ANOVA results 
for the seven types of innovation show that it is clear that innovators sought 
substantially more money than non-innovators and that this was statistically 
significant at the 5% level or better in all cases with the exception of product 
innovation.  Looking in greater detail, the results show that the process innovators and 
distribution innovators sought 60% and 66% more finance, respectively, than their 
non-innovating counterparts.  However, for work, supply, markets and administration 
innovation the innovators sought more than double the external finance compared to 
the corresponding non-innovators.  Looking at the input measure of innovation – the 
R&D expenditure as a proportion of turnover - it is clear that firms with 6-10% of 
expenditure on R&D sought the most money but there was no evidence of a 
statistically significant relationship. 
Thus, overall the results of the bivariate analysis are very supportive of the 
hypothesis H7 that the innovating businesses would seek more finance than their non-
innovating business counterparts. 
 Looking at the control variables it is clear that within the characteristics of the 
businesses only two sets of variables were statistically significant at the 5% level – 
sector and exporting (Table 8.2).  Manufacturing businesses sought less finance than 
their service sector counterparts.  Exporters sought more finance than the non-
exporters, by a magnitude approaching 50%. 
With regard to the control variables relating to the characteristics of the 
entrepreneurs, two variables were found to be statistically significant. Possessing a 
degree was weakly statistically significant at the 10% level, and the age of the 
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entrepreneur was highly statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  Those entrepreneurs 
with degrees sought substantially more money than those without degrees.  The two 
youngest age groups of entrepreneurs – those aged 18-30 and 31-45 years old - sought 
substantially more finance than the two older age groups of entrepreneurs aged 46-55 
and ≥ 56 years old.    
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Table 8.2: Descriptive statistics and ANOVAs – the amount of external finance which was sought, by 
those businesses seeking external finance.                                             (NB: Values are for per 1,000)                               
 Mean S.D n F df 
All 951.892 2043.449 384   
Manufacturing 779.689 1780.525 224 5.03b 1 
Services 1192.975 2347.720 160   
8-19 employees 434.048 1292.213 136 12.420a 4 
20-49 employees 751.398 1480.574 115   
50-99 employees 1286.357 2637.067 70   
100-199 employees 1282.632 1406.761 38   
200-499 employees 3252.000 4008.129 25   
1-5 years old 760.416 1383.436 154 1.645 2 
6-9 years old 974.846 2298.330 144   
≥10 years old 1256.333 2514.420 86   
Family Business 850.360 1633.495 178 0.82 1 
Non Family Business 1039.621 2341.123 206   
Male 980.215 2119.60 300 0.26 1 
Female 850.738 1752.335 84   
18-30 years old  1047.227 2139.353 44 7.700a 3 
31-45 years old 1050.400 2262.435 246   
46-55 years old 616.986 1197.661 73   
≥56 years old 762.381 1292.626 21   
Relative Role Model  1027.834 1962.444 140 0.30 1 
No Relative Role Model  908.318 2091.233 244   
Registered Business 1047.259 2324.365 166 1.01 2 
Partnership 681.846 1447.565 88   
Limited liability 1012.915 2002.189 130   
Degree 1144.63 2443.907 189 3.33c 1 
No Degree 765.084 1544.188 195   
Exporter 1219.579 2139.408 107 5.11b 1 
Non-Exporter 848.489 1999.536 277   
Innovator – Product 1020.918 2131.821 297 1.50 1 
None 716.251 1697.537 87   
Innovator – Process 1223.812 2584.662 156 4.70b 1 
None 765.842 1548.603 228   
Innovator – Work 1470.471 2674.799 186 24.67a 1 
None 464.741 952.386 198   
Innovator – Supply 1431.421 2536.115 165 16.58a 1 
None 590.603 1480.657 219   
Innovator – Markets 1195.151 2382.279 242 9.48a 1 
None 537.323 1169.423 142   
Innovator – Administration 1394.188 2376.395 163 13.71a 1 
None 625.673 1690.919 221   
Innovator – Distribution 1226.165 2331.104 167 5.38a 1 
None 740.815 1767.771 217   
R&D Expenditure as a % of turnover: None 892.429 1877.266 42 7.304a 5 
1-2% 841.699 1571.214 134   
3-5% 880.388 1765.788 100   
6-10% 1311.967 3119.426 60   
11-20% 1058.065 2736.376 31   
≥21% 923.529 732.956 17   
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The amount of external finance obtained  
Next, attention focuses upon the descriptive statistics and ANOVAs for the 
amount of external finance which was obtained.  Overall, on average the amount of 
external finance which was received was 579,044 yuan which is roughly $77,129.  As 
with the results from Table 8.2, the results presented in Table 8.3, show the 
importance of innovation and finance.  More specifically in Table 8.3 it is apparent 
that 6 of the 7 types of innovation were statistically related to the amount of external 
finance which was received at the 5% level or better.  Indeed, the only type of 
innovation which was not statistically significant at the 0.10 level, or better, was 
product innovation – a similar pattern from Table 8.2.  Process innovators on average 
received 743,355 yuan compared to 466,621 yuan for non-process innovators.  
Distribution innovators received 755,638 on average whilst the non-distribution 
innovators received 443,140.  For the other types of innovation which were 
statistically significant, the innovators received more than double the amount received 
by the non-innovators.  Interestingly, again the R&D expenditure was not statistically 
significantly related to the amount of external finance which was received.  
Thus, the bivariate results are not supportive of hypothesis H8.  Instead, the 
innovative businesses are able to secure more finance than their non-innovating 
business counterparts.  
Again, looking at the control variables relating to the characteristics of the 
businesses and the entrepreneurs, two variables are statistically significant.  The sector 
and also the holding of a degree were both statistically significant at the 5% level and 
suggested that service sector firms received 75% more external finance than 
manufacturing firms, and that those with degrees obtained 63% more external finance 
than those own-managers who did not possess a degree.
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Table 8.3: Descriptive statistics and ANOVAs – the amount of external finance which was obtained, by 
those businesses seeking external finance.                                            (NB: Values are for per 1,000) 
 Mean S.D N F df 
All 579.044 1316.347 384   
Sector - Manufacturing 440.886 972.456 224 6.00b 1 
Services 772.466 1668.247 160   
8-19 employees 265.042 860.243 136 8.571a 4 
20-49 employees 490.643 1085.394 115   
50-99 employees 812.932 1818.480 70   
100-199 employees 752.579 813.375 38   
200-499 employees 1775.200 2252.255 25   
1-5 years old 486.602 985.273 154 0.928 2 
6-9 years old 589.444 1506.481 144   
≥10 years old 727.167 1484.703 86   
Family Business 519.571 1113.730 178 0.68 1 
Non Family Business 630.433 1469.908 206   
Gender – Male 502.511 979.206 300 0.36 1 
Female 600.473 1396.887 84   
18-30 years old  570.148 1194.932 44 0.774 3 
31-45 years old 646.187 1480.647 246   
46-55 years old 385.975 848.360 73   
≥56 years old 482.298 681.375 21   
Relative Role Model  644.149 1283.295 140 0.54 1 
No Relative Role Model  541.689 1236.116 240   
Registered Business 648.170 1621.689 166 1.40 1 
Partnership 373.645 722.938 88   
Limited liability 629.815 1179.314 130   
Degree 719.84 1651.586 189 4.29b 1 
No Degree 442.580 859.927 195   
Exporter 704.224 1356.364 107 1.34 1 
Non-Exporter 530.689 1299.826 277   
Innovator – Product 616.992 1350.872 297 1.09 1 
None 449.498 1189.124 87   
Innovator – Process 743.355 1608.627 156 4.13b 1 
None 466.621 1060.85 228   
Innovator – Work 875.948 1698.975 186 19.22a 1 
None 300.134 704.757 198   
Innovator – Supply 868.486 1685.578 165 14.48a 1 
None 360.971 892.013 219   
Innovator – Markets 715.146 1517.465 242 7.11a 1 
None 347.096 827.614 142   
Innovator – Administration 852.884 1514.80 163 12.63a 1 
None 377.072 1109.225 221   
Innovator – Distribution 755.638 1537.177 167 5.38b 1 
None 443.140 1101.747 217   
R&D Expenditure as a % of turnover: None 662.274 1455.235 42 0.442 5 
1-2% 484.885 884.870 134   
3-5% 559.941 1274.284 100   
6-10% 769.875 1956.277 60   
11-20% 611.652 1623.960 31   
≥21% 495.000 444.754 17   
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8.4 Regression Data Analysis 
Taken together the analysis of the summary statistics and ANOVAs suggests 
that for all types of innovation, with the exception of product innovation, the 
innovators sought more finance and also received more external finance than the non-
innovators, but that R&D expenditure is not related to the amount of money sought or 
received.  Where possible it is desirable to use multivariate regression analysis to test 
hypotheses. The multivariate regression analysis allows us to see whether innovation 
is or is not important whilst simultaneously including control variables which, based 
on theory and past empirical research, it would be logical to include.   
 
Regression Results 
Table 8.4 provides a key of the variables which have been included in the 
econometric analysis.  Table 8.5 provides a correlation matrix of the variables used in 
this chapter.  There was no evidence to suggest the presence of multicollinearity.  
Thus, the results presented in the chapter should be valid.  
It is important, where possible, to test hypotheses using multivariate analysis 
as this allows several possible relationships to be explored simultaneously. The values 
produced for the incremental innovation and also the novel innovation for the seven 
types of innovation, product/service and/or process innovation, and the five other 
types of innovation form the focus of the econometric analysis, together with 
expenditure on R&D.  
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Table 8.4: Key of Variables included in the regression analysis models 
Variables  
1. Sector 1=Manufacturing and 0 =Services 
2. Size The number of employees (log) 
3. Age of Business The age of the business (log) 
4. Family Business 1=Family business and 0=Non-family business 
5. Gender 1=Male and 0=Female 
6. Age of Owner-Manager The age of the entrepreneur (log) 
7. Relative Role Model  1=Relative role model and 0=No relative role model 
8. Registered business 1=Registered business and 0=not a registered business. 
This is the excluded comparison dummy variable. 
8. Limited liability 1= limited liability and 0=not a limited liability.  
Dummy variable type of business and with registered 
business as the excluded comparison type of business. 
9. Partnership 1=partnership and 0=not a partnership.  Dummy 
variable type of business and with registered business 
as the excluded comparison type of business.   
10. Degree 1=Degree and 0=no degree 
11. Exporter 1=Exporter and 0=Non-exporter 
12. Innovator – Product 1=Product innovator and 0=non-product innovator 
13. Innovator – Process 1=Process innovator and 0=non-process innovator 
14. Innovator – Work 1=Work innovator and 0=non-work innovator 
15. Innovator – Supply 1=Supply innovator and 0=non-supply innovator 
16. Innovator – Markets 1=Market innovator and 0=non-market innovator 
17. Innovator – Administration 1=Administration innovation and 0=non-administration 
innovation  
18. Innovator – Distribution 1=Distribution innovation and 0=non-distribution 
innovation 
19. R&D Expenditure as a % 
of turnover: None 
1=No expenditure on R&D and 0=expenditure on 
R&D.  Dummy variable which is the excluded 
comparison dummy.  
20. 1-2% 1=R&D expenditure is 1-2% of turnover and 0=R&D 
expenditure is not 1-2% of turnover. 
21. 3-5% 1=R&D expenditure is 3-5% of turnover and 0=R&D 
expenditure is not 3-5% of turnover. 
22. 6-10% 1=R&D expenditure is 6-10% of turnover and 0=R&D 
expenditure is not 6-10% of turnover. 
23. 11-20% 1=R&D expenditure is 11-20% of turnover and 
0=R&D expenditure is not 11-20% of turnover. 
24. ≥21% 1=R&D expenditure is ≥21% of turnover and 0=R&D 
expenditure is not ≥21% of turnover. 
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Table 8.5: Correlation Matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Sector 1.000          
2. Size 0.068 1.000         
3. Age of Business 0.166a 0.220a 1.000        
4. Family Business -0.009 0.032 0.135a 1.000       
5. Gender -0.026 0.013 0.078 -0.013 1.000      
6. Age of Owner-Manager 0.071 -0.074 0.222a 0.035 0.105b 1.000     
7. Relative Role Model  0.004 -0.005 0.036 0.300 0.034 0.070 1.000    
8. Type of Business 0.030 0.083c 0.073 -0.157a 0.015 0.139a -0.129b 1.000   
9. Degree -0.129b 0.199a -0.150a -0.226a 0.004 -0.218a -0.215a 0.088c 1.000  
10. Exporter 0.160a 0.321a -0.012 0.063 -0.079 -0.089c -0.001 0.040 0.097c 1.000 
11. Innovator – Product -0.016 0.212a -0.002 0.091c 0.030 -0.088c -0.055 0.049 0.147a 0.045 
12. Innovator – Process 0.131 0.127b 0.007 0.007 0.014 -0.168a -0.010 0.065 0.045 0.065 
13. Innovator – Work -0.239a 0.121b 0.017 -0.044 0.072 -0.160a -0.020 0.027 0.088c -0.010 
14. Innovator – Supply -0.024 0.110b -0.055 -0.026 0.014 -0.153a 0.031 -0.052 0.029 0.047 
15. Innovator – Markets -0.078 0.130b -0.155a -0.067 0.025 -0.147a -0.025 0.078 0.172a 0.211a 
16. Innovator – Administration -0.268a 0.093c -0.040 -0.101b -0.004 -0.121b -0.038 0.074 0.114b 0.054 
17. Innovator – Distribution -0.068 0.054 -0.030 -0.004 0.045 -0.031 0.045 0.052 0.019 0.099c 
18. R&D Expenditure as a % 
of turnover 
-0.015 0.119b -0.096c 0.016 0.015 -0.135a -0.070 0.037 0.143a -0.020 
N=384   
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Table 8.5: Correlation Matrix 
Variables 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. Sector         
2. Size         
3. Age of Business         
4. Family Business         
5. Gender         
6. Age of Owner-Manager         
7. Relative Role Model          
8. Type of Business         
9. Degree         
10. Exporter         
11. Innovator – Product 1.000        
12. Innovator – Process 0.296a 1.000       
13. Innovator – Work 0.151a 0.397a 1.000      
14. Innovator – Supply 0.105b 0.246a 0.401a 1.000     
15. Innovator – Markets 0.230a 0.183a 0.300a 0.273a 1.000    
16. Innovator – Administration 0.125b 0.309a 0.495a 0.308a 0.353a 1.000   
17. Innovator – Distribution 0.211a 0.323a 0.380a 0.374a 0.237a 0.437a 1.000  
18. R&D Expenditure as a % of 
turnover 
0.353a 0.344a 0.218a 0.220a 0.220a 0.197a 0.223a 1.000 
N=384  
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The percentage of money received from that sought 
Tobit regression analysis is utilized when the dependent variable takes values 
which are a constrained set of values.  Given that the percentage of money received 
from that sought is by definition from 0 to 100%, this renders it necessary to utilize a 
tobit regression model.  Tobit estimate models were conducted with regard to the 
dependent variable relating to ‘the proportion of external finance which was 
obtained’.  Control variables plus the product innovation variable relating to the 
propensity to report the ‘the proportion of external finance which was obtained’ was 
included in Model 1 in Table 8.6.  In this table the best fit approach was followed.  
The model has a Nagelkerke R2 of 0.156 and is significant at the 0.01 level.   The 
product innovation variable is not statistically significant at the 0.10 level, or better.  
Thus, the evidence does not support hypothesis H6. 
In models 2 to 7, the product innovation variable was replaced one at a time 
with the following innovation variables – process, work, supply, markets, 
administration and distribution, respectively.  In model 8, the product innovation 
variable was replaced with five dummy variables of R&D expenditure as a proportion 
of turnover: 1-2%, 3-5%, 6-10%, 11-20%, and >=21%, where the excluded 
comparison group was no expenditure on R&D. 
Models 2 to 8 are also individually statistically significant at the 0.01 level.   
With regard to Models 2 to Model 7, a similar set of regression results were 
obtained.  The Nagelkerke R2 values are all around 0.15.  The results do not support 
hypothesis H6. 
In contrast, in model 8 the R&D expenditure dummy variables are all 
statistically significant and appear with negatively signed coefficients. In contrast, the 
input measure of innovation, R&D expenditure which was included as a set of dummy 
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variables, showed that those firms which spent money on R&D were less likely to 
receive a higher proportion of the external finance sought compared to those firms 
which spent zero on R&D.  Freel (2007) found that firms which had spent more on 
R&D were less successful in receiving their sought finance, but his findings were 
statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Several of the control variables were consistently statistically significant in 
models 1 to 8.  Manufacturing sector firms were more likely to receive a higher 
proportion of the funds which they were seeking than service sector firms. This 
relationship was statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  The exporters were less 
likely than the non-exporters to receive a greater proportion of the funds they were 
seeking, and this also was statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  In other words, the 
non-exporters were the type of firms who were more likely to receive a greater 
proportion of the funds they were seeking.  A third control variable, the limited 
liability dummy was statistically significant at the 0.05 level.   The limited liability 
businesses were more likely than the registered businesses to receive a greater 
proportion of the finance they were seeking.  However, the other control variables 
included in the model were not statistically significant.  Thus, possessing a degree or 
having a relative role model or being a partnership (compared to a registered business) 
were not systematically and statistically related to the proportion of external finance 
which was obtained.  Additionally, the other control variables of size of the firm, age 
of the business, family business, gender and age of the entrepreneur which are not 
included in the final best fit models in Table 8.6 were also found to not be statistically 
related to the proportion of external finance sought which was obtained.
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Table 8.6: Estimates of a best fit tobit model of the proportion of external finance which was obtained, by 
those businesses seeking external finance. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Sector 
 
0.065 
(0.030)b 
0.065 
(0.030)b 
0.069 
(0.030)b 
0.065 
(0.032)b 
0.065 
(0.032)b 
0.068 
(0.033)b 
0.063 
(0.032)b 
0.065 
(0.031)b 
Relative Role 
Model  
-0.023 
(0.033) 
-0.022 
(0.032) 
-0.022 
(0.033) 
-0.022 
(0.033) 
-0.022 
(0.033) 
-0.022 
(0.032) 
-0.024 
(0.033) 
-0.015 
(0.032) 
Limited 
Liability 
0.074 
(0.035)b 
0.073 
(0.035)b 
0.072 
(0.035) b  
0.072 
(0.035)b 
0.073 
(0.036)b 
0.073 
(0.036)b 
0.070 
(0.035)b 
0.075 
(0.035)b 
Partnership 0.050 
(0.040) 
0.055 
(0.400) 
0.055 
(0.040) 
0.054 
(0.040) 
0.055 
(0.040) 
0.056 
(0.039) 
0.057 
(0.039) 
0.062 
(0.039) 
Degree -0.012 
(0.032) 
-0.018 
(0.032) 
-0.019 
(0.032) 
-0.018 
(0.032) 
-0.018 
(0.032) 
-0.018 
(0.032) 
-0.019 
(0.032) 
-0.015 
(0.032) 
Exporter -0.082 
(0.035)b 
-0.083 
(0.035)b 
-0.083 
(0.035)b 
-0.083 
(0.035)b 
-0.082 
(0.035)b 
-0.082 
(0.035)b 
-0.087 
(0.034)b 
-0.075 
(0.035)b 
Innovator – 
Product 
-0.052 
(0.037) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Process 
-------- -0.007 
(0.031) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Work 
-------- -------- -0.003 
(0.032) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Supply 
-------- -------- -------- -0.010 
(0.031) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Markets 
-------- -------- ------- -------- -0.007 
(0.033) 
-------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Administration 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -0.008 
(0.032) 
-------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Distribution 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -0.033 
(0.031) 
-------- 
R&D (1-2%) 
 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -0.190 
(0.054)a 
R&D (3-5%) 
 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -0.157 
(0.060)a 
R&D (6-10%) 
 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -0.130 
(0.061)b 
R&D (11-20%) 
 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -0.140 
(0.069)b 
R&D (≥21%) 
 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -0.287 
(0.085)a 
Constant 
 
0.693 
(0.046)a 
0.657 
(0.039)a 
0.657 
(0.042)a 
0.659 
(0.042)a 
0.659 
(0.042)a 
0.659 
(0.041)a 
0.641 
(0.040)a 
0.798 
(0.056)a 
Log likelihood -134.92 -135.89 -135.91 -135.86 -135.89 -135.88 -135.36 -127.73 
Pseudo R2 0.1564 0.1497 0.1495 0.1499 0.1497 0.1497 0.1533 0.2067 
n=384
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The Amount of Money Sought  
However, whilst the overall amount of finance which is received compared 
with that sought is important there is a need to take the analysis further and dissect it 
to see whether innovating firms seek more finance than non-innovators, and also the 
extent to which the aforementioned firms receive more finance than non-innovators.  
Attention now centres upon the amount of money sought. 
The amount of money sought was used as the dependent variable in a model 
which was estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression techniques.  
Control variables relating to the amount of external finance which was sought, by 
those businesses seeking external finance, together with the product innovation 
variable were included in Model 9 in Table 8.7.  The model has an R2 of 0.318 and is 
significant at the 0.01 level.  With regard to Model 9, those firms who introduced 
product innovation sought more external finance compared to the non-product 
innovation firms but this was not statistically significant.  Thus, the results in Model 9 
are not consistent with hypothesis H7. 
 In models 10 to 15 the product innovation variable was replaced one at a time 
with the following innovation variables – process, work, supply, markets, 
administration and distribution respectively.  In model 16, the product innovation 
variable was replaced with five dummy variables of R&D expenditure as a proportion 
of turnover: 1-2%, 3-5%, 6-10%, 11-20%, and >=21%, and where the excluded 
comparison group had no expenditure on R&D. 
Models 10 to 16 are individually statistically significant at the 0.01 level.   
In model 10 in which product innovation is replaced with process innovation 
the R2 value is 0.316.  In model 10, those firms who introduced process innovation 
also sought more external finance compared to the non-process innovation firms.  
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However, as with model 9 the innovation variable in model 10 is not statistically 
significant.  Again the results are not supportive of hypothesis H7. 
 In models 11 to 15 the R2 values are all comparatively healthy and ranged 
from 0.3213 (model 13, market innovation included) to 0.3498 (model 12, supply 
innovation included).  In models 11 to 15 a different pattern of results for the 
innovation variables was found compared to the results in models 9 and 10.  More 
specifically, in models 11 to 15 work, supply, markets, administration and also 
distribution appeared with positively signed coefficients and were all statistically 
significant at the 1% level, with the sole exception of markets which was statistically 
significant at the 10% level.  The results in models 11 to 15 are all supportive of 
hypothesis H7.  In contrast, in model 16 none of the R&D expenditure dummy 
variables are statistically significant and that result is not supportive of hypothesis H7. 
Looking at the control variables, it is clear that several are statistically 
significant at the 5% level, or better.  Larger sized businesses, non-family businesses 
and those owners who had a relative role model were more likely to seek greater 
amounts of external finance.  Manufacturing firms were less likely than service sector 
firms to seek larger amounts of external finance as were partnerships compared to 
extended sole proprietorships businesses. 
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Table 8.7: Estimates of the natural log of the amount of external finance which was sought, by those 
businesses seeking external finance.  
 Model 9 Model 
10 
Model 
11 
Model 
12 
Model 
13 
Model 
14 
Model 
15 
Model  
16 
Sector 
 
-0.574 
(0.142)a 
-0.573 
(0.412)a 
-0.456 
(0.145)a 
-0.562 
(0.139)a 
-0.554 
(0.143)a 
-0.444 
(0.147)a 
-0.542 
(0.142)a 
-0.559 
(0.144)a 
Size 
 
0.795 
(0.078)a 
0.807 
(0.077)a 
0.782 
(0.076)a 
0.774 
(0.075)a 
0.799 
(0.077)a 
0.792 
(0.076)a 
0.804 
(0.076)a 
0.810 
(0.077)a 
Age of 
Business 
0.093 
(0.117) 
0.088 
(0.117) 
0.061 
(0.116) 
0.107 
(0.114) 
0.113 
(0.117) 
0.080 
(0.115) 
0.094 
(0.116) 
0.095 
(0.118) 
Family 
Business 
-0.380 
(0.164)b 
-0.350 
(0.162)b 
-0.320 
(0.159)b 
-0.318 
(0.151)b 
-0.337 
(0.161)b 
-0.397 
(0.161)b 
-0.335 
(0.160)b 
-0.381 
(0.164)b 
Gender 
 
-0.111 
(0.166) 
-0.105 
(0.166) 
-0.151 
(0.164) 
-0.130 
(0.162) 
-0.122 
(0.165) 
-0.102 
(0.163) 
-0.129 
(0.164) 
-0.084 
(0.167) 
Age of Owner-
Manager 
-0.448 
(0.357) 
-0.453 
(0.362) 
-0.279 
(0.356) 
-0.266 
(0.351) 
-0.411 
(0.357) 
-0.353 
(0.354) 
-0.441 
(0.353) 
-0.399 
(0.361) 
Relative Role 
Model  
0.403 
(0.165)b 
0.388 
(0.165)b 
0.375 
(0.162)b 
0.347 
(0.161)b 
0.378 
(0.164)b 
0.369 
(0.162)b 
0.361 
(0.163)b 
0.381 
(0.165)b 
Limited 
Liability 
-0.051 
(0.161) 
-0.045 
(0.161) 
-0.065 
(0.159) 
-0.019 
(0.156) 
-0.065 
(0.160) 
-0.080 
(0.159) 
-0.068 
(0.159) 
-0.073 
(0.163) 
Partnership 
 
-0.503 
(0.178)a 
-0.515 
(0.178)a 
-0.459 
(0.175)a 
-0.433 
(0.175)b 
-0.501 
(0.178)a 
-0.540 
(0.176)a 
-0.505 
(0.177)a 
-0.548 
(0.180)a 
Degree 
 
0.096 
(0.150) 
0.112 
(0.149) 
0.110 
(0.147) 
0.128 
(0.146) 
0.091 
(0.150) 
0.105 
(0.147) 
0.117 
(0.148) 
0.117 
(0.150) 
Exporter 
 
0.197 
(0.163) 
0.189 
(0.164) 
0.197 
(0.161) 
0.182 
(0.160) 
0.138 
(0.165) 
0.154 
(0.162) 
0.145 
(0.163) 
0.176 
(0.167) 
Innovator – 
Product 
0.162 
(0.170) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Process 
-------- 0.027 
(0.142) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Work 
-------- -------- 0.479 
(0.142)a 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Supply 
-------- -------- -------- 0.604 
(0.137)a 
-------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Markets 
-------- -------- ------- -------- 0.258 
(0.149)c 
-------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Administration 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.459 
(0.144)a 
-------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Distribution 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.375 
(0.137)a 
 
R&D (1-2%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.106 (0.243) 
R&D (3-5%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.155 (0.250) 
R&D (6-10%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -0.090 (0.274) 
R&D (11-20%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -0.054 (0.322) 
R&D (≥21%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.496 (0.398) 
Constant 
 
13.873 
(1.329)a 
13.956 
(1.347)a 
13.184 
(1.327)a 
13.075 
(1.308)a 
13.661 
(1.333)a 
13.408 
(1.319)a 
13.777 
(1.313)a 
13.675 
(1.365)a 
F Test 15.85a 15.74a 17.15a 18.17a 16.11a 17.01a 16.67a 11.98a 
R2 bar 0.3175 0.3159 0.3361 0.3498 0.3213 0.3341 0.3292 0.3146 
n=384 
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The amount of external finance obtained  
In Table 8.8 the analysis of the amount of finance obtained showed that 
innovators were more likely to receive a greater amount of external finance compared 
to non-innovators for the following types of innovation: work, supply, administration 
and also distribution.  In contrast innovators in products, processes and also marketing 
were not found to differ statistically in the amount of finance received.  However, 
R&D expenditure was not statistically related to the amount of finance obtained.  The 
results in Table 8.8 are not supportive of the hypothesis H8. 
The same set of business and owner-manager characteristics found to be 
statistically significant in Table 8.4 are also found in Table 8.7.  Thus, service sector 
firms, larger firms, non-family businesses and owner-managers with a business role 
model were more likely to receive a greater amount of external finance.  Partnership 
businesses were less likely to receive a greater amount of external finance than 
extended sole proprietorship businesses. 
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Table 8.8: Estimates of the natural log of the amount of external finance which was obtained, by those 
businesses seeking external finance. 
 Model 
17 
Model 
18 
Model 
19 
Model 
20 
Model 
21  
Model 
22 
Model 
23 
Model  
24 
Sector 
 
-0.471 
(0.144)a 
-0.471 
(0.144)a 
-0.55 
(0.145)b 
-0.459 
(0.140)a 
-0.453 
(0.144)a 
-0.332 
(0.147)b 
-0.434 
(0.142)a 
-0.497 
(0.142)a 
Size 
 
0.937 
(0.131)a 
0.948 
(0.129)a 
0.909 
(0.129)a 
0.891 
(0.127)a 
0.925 
(0.129)a 
0.915 
(0.128)a 
0.932 
(0.128)a 
0.945 
(0.130)a 
Age of 
Business 
-0.214 
(0.197) 
-0.212 
(0.196) 
-0.246 
(0.196) 
-0.189 
(0.193) 
-0.177 
(0.197) 
-0.228 
(0.194) 
-0.206 
(0.195) 
-0.199 
(0.198) 
Family 
Business 
-0.359 
(0.164)b 
-0.345 
(0.162)b 
-0.312 
(0.160)c 
-0.306 
(0.159)c 
-0.330 
(0.162)b 
-0.291 
(0.160)c 
-0.325 
(0.160)b 
-0.332 
(0.177)b 
Gender 
 
0.176 
(0.279) 
0.185 
(0.279) 
0.123 
(0.278) 
0.142 
(0.274) 
0.150 
(0.279) 
0.180 
(0.277) 
0.142 
(0.278) 
0.163 
(0.282) 
Age of Owner-
Manager 
-0.325 
(0.601) 
-0.404 
(0.608) 
-0.116 
(0.603) 
-0.051 
(0.595) 
-0.246 
(0.600) 
-0.164 
(0.597) 
-0.293 
(0.596) 
-0.213 
(0.606) 
Relative Role 
Model  
0.352 
(0.165)b 
0.343 
(0.164)b 
0.328 
(0.162)b 
0.305 
(0.161)c 
0.334 
(0.164)b 
0.325 
(0.162)b 
0.307 
(0.162)c 
0.308  
(0.163)c 
Limited 
Liability 
0.221 
(0.271) 
0.240 
(0.271) 
0.197 
(0.269) 
0.255 
(0.266) 
0.187 
(0.270) 
0.168 
(0.268) 
0.186 
(0.269) 
0.204 
(0.273) 
Partnership 
 
-0.507 
(0.186)a 
-0.506 
(0.185)a 
-0.433 
(0.183)b 
-0.458 
(0.180)b 
-0.482 
(0.185)b 
-0.501 
(0.181)a 
-0.470 
(0.182)b 
-0.453 
(0.184)b 
Degree 
 
-0.207 
(0.252) 
-0.207 
(0.251) 
-0.207 
(0.250) 
-0.182 
(0.247) 
-0.237 
(0.251) 
-0.214 
(0.249) 
-0.198 
(0.250) 
-0.195 
(0.253) 
Exporter 
 
-0.108 
(0.276) 
-0.106 
(0.275) 
-0.101 
(0.273) 
-0.118 
(0.271) 
-0.188 
(0.279) 
-0.161 
(0.273) 
-0.171 
(0.275) 
-0.179 
(0.281) 
Innovator – 
Product 
0.028 
(0.287) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Process 
-------- -0.177 
(0.239) 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Work 
-------- -------- 0.548 
(0.241)b 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Supply 
-------- -------- -------- 0.840 
(0.232)a 
-------- -------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Markets 
-------- -------- ------- -------- 0.395 
(0.251) 
-------- -------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Administration 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.672 
(0.242)a 
-------- -------- 
Innovator – 
Distribution 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.533 
(0.231)b 
-------- 
R&D (1-2%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.468 (0.409) 
R&D (3-5%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.307 (0.421) 
R&D (6-10%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -0.049 (0.461) 
R&D (11-20%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.404 (0.541) 
R&D (≥21%) -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 0.711 (0.668) 
Constant 
 
12.438 
(2.238)a 
12.766 
(2.262)a 
11.523 
(2.249)a 
11.169 
(2.212)a 
11.936 
(2.243)a 
11.589 
(2.226)a 
12.139 
(2.215)a 
11.753 
(2.295)a 
F Test 15.47a 15.52a 15.97a 16.75a 15.71a 16.22a 15.99a 14.31a 
R2 bar 0.3228 0.3241 0.3348 0.3527 0.3287 0.3406 0.3352 0.3213 
n=384 
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8.5 Discussion and Implications  
Key findings 
The percentage of money received from that sought  
The bivariate results suggested that with regard to the 8 measures of 
innovation only the percentage of turnover spent on R&D dummy variables was 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level, or better; and it was statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level.  The multivariate regression results with regard to innovation were 
consistent with the bivariate results.   
Overall, the results suggest that in China external sources of finance, such as 
the banks, have problems and difficulties in evaluating firms whose projects are 
innovation based.  To the possible external funders there is a perception that if they 
provide firms which are spending money on R&D, considered a high risk group of 
firms, with the sought finance there are no prospects of receiving compensating high 
rewards because they do not usually share in the upside if the innovation proves 
profitable (Mason and Harrison, 2004).  Moreover, in spending capital on R&D, the 
SMEs are generally going to generate either negligible or limited tangible assets, and 
the uncertainty and unpredictability of when the R&D expenditure will prove 
successful and increase turnover mitigates against the likelihood of external funders 
receiving the debt service payments (Oakey and Mukhtar, 1999).  Hence, the greater 
probability of credit rationing to R&D spenders.  Innovation is a much harder measure 
for the possible external providers of capital to assess, hence the lack of statistically 
significant relationships in the bivariate tables and in the regression results in Table 
8.6. 
The results in Table 8.6 also showed that three other factors were more 
important and were statistically significant at the 5% level.  For example, exporters 
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were less likely to receive a greater proportion of their sought finance. Manufacturing 
firms were more likely than service sector firms to achieve a greater proportion of the 
external finance they sought as were limited companies businesses compared to 
extended sole proprietorship.  As the world’s factory, Chinese firms are required to 
enhance their know-how in terms of dealing with unfamiliar markets and fulfil the 
different needs of a widespread customer base.  Exporters could well be operating in 
more risky markets where there has been trialling and experience in the past, and the 
exporters could thus be less credit trustworthy to external providers of finance.  In 
order to be successful in foreign markets, exporters must have clear competitive 
advantages (e.g. substantially lower cost of the goods, considerably higher quality 
versus price, unique knowledge) otherwise local businesses almost always have better 
knowledge and understanding of their own market which could be hard to compete 
with (McDougall and Oviatt, 1996).  In the case of innovating firms and those 
expending resources on R&D, the possibility of protecting unique knowledge through 
patented products is very limited in China, a country where most businesses infringe 
patents and copyrights with alacrity. 
 
The Amount of Money Sought  
The regression results in Table 8.7 demonstrate that innovative firms are more 
likely to seek more external finance than non-innovators and this applied to work, 
supply, markets, administration and distribution types of innovators. However, there 
were no statistically significant differences between product innovators and their non-
innovative counterparts, and between process innovators and their equivalents, with 
respect to the amount of external finance sought.  The input measure of innovation – 
  
 
349 
R&D expenditure - was not statistically significant, and this applied to when R&D 
was captured as a series of dummy variables and also as a continuous variable. 
The regression results also show that whilst process innovation was 
statistically significantly related to the amount of external finance sought at a bivariate 
level of analysis, when the research is taken further to a multivariate regression 
context the inclusion of the control variables renders process innovation no longer 
statistically significant. 
However, the regression results also confirm the findings of the bivariate 
results that, in addition to innovation, there are several control variables which are 
important and were statistically significantly related to the amount of external finance 
sought.  Manufacturers sought less money than service sector businesses, and 
partnerships sought less than registered businesses,  whilst the entrepreneurs with a 
relative role model, the larger sized businesses and the non-family businesses sought 
more money. 
Equally, the models in Table 8.6 showed that several control variables were 
not systematically related to the amount of money sought, neither were the gender or 
age of the entrepreneur. Thus, there was no difference between men and women in the 
amount sought, and similarly whether the entrepreneur was younger or older,. 
 
The Amount of Money Obtained 
In the fifth hypothesis it had been expected that the innovators would receive a 
smaller amount of external finance compared to the non-innovators.  However, in the 
bivariate and also the multivariate regression analysis several types of innovators – 
work, supply, administration and also distribution received a greater amount of 
external finance than their non-innovating counterparts.  This result is difficult to 
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explain.  Perhaps the innovating businesses have been more forceful and persistent 
and this has ultimately overturned some of the prejudices of financial investors. 
 
8.6. Conclusion  
China formally joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 (Ning, 
2007). This has limited the scope for China to intervene to assist particular segments 
or groups of firms. Ding et al. (2008) provide an excellent overview of the science and 
technology policies in China, post 1978, and they chronicle the financial and fiscal 
incentives which have been offered and developed over the years.  The role of the 
Chinese government is to guide the process of liberalisation and, where necessary, 
intervene in the market to assist firms overcome learning costs and coordination 
problems (Chang, 2004; Rodrik, 2004). Whilst in the survey it was found that on 
average the SMEs which sought external finance received 65% of the finance 
requested, the inability to secure finance undoubtedly hinders their growth potential.  
Indeed, as Craig et al (2008: P346) states, “if small businesses face credit rationing, 
the next Google, Microsoft or Starbucks might wither on the vine for want of 
funding”.  
Firstly, attention focuses upon the output measure of innovation and the results 
reported here show that innovators are more likely to apply for greater amounts of 
external finance, and to receive greater amounts of finance than non-innovators. 
Furthermore, when the relative proportion of external finance obtained which was 
sought was examined, it was found that innovative firms are not credit rationed.  
Secondly, when the input measure of innovation was analysed the reverse of 
the output measures of innovation results was discovered. In other words, expenditure 
on R&D was not related to the amount of money sought, or received; but, those firms 
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which spent money on R&D were less likely to receive a higher proportion of the 
external finance they were seeking as proportion of that sought than those firms which 
did not spend money on R&D. So, the input measure of innovation does indeed 
provide some evidence of credit rationing. 
So, interestingly, whilst innovative firms may run a higher risk of loan default 
than their non-innovative counterparts, the innovative firms in our analysis of the 
descriptive statistics suggests that if attention focuses upon output measures of 
innovation they are not necessarily problematic constituents for policy makers in 
Beijing. In contrast, the input measure of analysis – R&D expenditure - does suggest 
that the firms spending money in that area are less likely to be as successful as their 
counterparts without R&D expenditure, and in that regard this does suggest a potential 
problem for policy makers.  As argued earlier SMEs are perceived to be more 
susceptible to default than larger firms, and firms spending money on R&D are more 
prone to default. 
In the overall conclusion chapter the researcher will return to the research 
findings from this chapter to provide an overview of the implications of the chapter 
for theory and for practitioners or policy makers and the small business community in 
Beijing, and China.   
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Chapter 9: 
Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
9.1 Introduction 
Small businesses and entrepreneurs represent potential sources of employment 
creation, alleviators of poverty, a source of taxation revenue and the future large sized 
firms which could help China to sustain her impressive rate of growth in an era of 
private ownership.  This study has used human capital theory to focus upon 
innovators and non-innovators, using a broad set of types or facets of input and output 
measures of innovation to investigate access to finance in Beijing.  Appropriate and 
pertinent theories of finance were drawn upon in the contextualisation in the front end 
chapters, and a total of eight hypotheses have been tested using a new bespoke survey 
and data set which was designed and collected by the researcher.  This data set of 452 
firms, of whom 384 had applied for external finance, allowed the eight hypotheses to 
be tested and for the researcher to make a contribution not only at a theoretical level 
but also at a practical level to our understanding of how entrepreneurs in Beijing from 
innovating and non-innovating businesses have been able to tap into external finance. 
  
9.2 Summary of Empirical Findings 
 
9.2.1 Sources of start-up finance (Chapter 6) 
Chapter six presented findings on the relative levels of use and the importance 
of start-up finance for small businesses and also examined the role of a specific form 
of human capital – innovation in the accessing and using of these sources.  The 
analysis also included other characteristics of the business and the entrepreneurs.  The 
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results found that 87.83% of entrepreneurs indicated that they had used their own 
funds as a source of start-up finance and this was by far the most important source of 
start-up finance.  Indeed, the mean amount of start-up finance from own savings was 
60.50%.  Ordinary shares were used by 30.09% of entrepreneurs at the start-up stage 
and on average this source of finance accounted for 17.70% of start-up finance.  The 
third most used source of start-up finance was partners and this was used by 29.42% 
of entrepreneurs, and on average it accounted for 12.76% of start-up finance.  The 
fourth most used source of finance at start-up was family contributions with 14.60%, 
and on average the family contributions formed 6.08% of start-up capital.  Bank loans 
and overdrafts were only used by 3.10% of entrepreneurs and contributed only 0.60% 
of average start-up finance.  Trade credit was rarely used by entrepreneurs.  Indeed, 
only 1.11% of entrepreneurs used trade credit at start-up and this source similarly 
contributed only a very small percentage of start-up finance at 1.14%, on average.  
 The regression results presented in chapter 6 found evidence to support 
hypothesis H1.  Product innovators, as well as administrative and distribution 
innovators, were found to be more likely than their non-innovating counterparts to 
have used own funds as a source of start-up finance. 
 Additionally, there was evidence to support hypothesis H2.  Market and also 
administration innovators were more likely than their non-innovating counterparts to 
have used partners as a source of start-up finance. Process innovators and distribution 
innovators were more likely than non-process innovators and also non-distribution 
innovators to have used ordinary shares at start-up.  All six of the input measures of 
innovation were found to be more likely to have used bank loans and overdrafts at 
start-up. 
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 The logistic regression models presented and analysed in chapter six showed 
that several other variables were statistically related to the probability of the 
businesses having used own funds at start-up.  Family businesses were more likely 
than non-family businesses, and exporters were more likely than non-exporters to 
have used own funds at the start-up stage.  Family businesses were less likely than 
non-family businesses to have used partners’ funds or ordinary shares, at start-up.  
Exporters were more likely than non-exporters to have used partners’ funds at start-up. 
 
   
9.2.2 Applications and success in accessing finance and levels of awareness of 
sources of finance (chapter 7) 
 
The results presented in chapter seven offers a unique insight into the state of 
access to finance in Beijing.  There is no other similar study which has simultaneously 
utilised a large and robust data set and also looked at the level of access to finance in 
such detail, by source.  The data showed 89.23% of firms applying to partners or 
working shareholders received a full or a reduced amount of finance and 78.23% of 
firms applying for short-term bank finance received the full or a reduced amount of 
finance.  This was ten per cent higher than the corresponding value of 68.42% for 
factoring or invoice discounting firms.  In contrast, only 55.38% and 40.91% of firms 
applying for bank loans and grants, respectively, received either the full amount or a 
reduced amount of finance.  For two sources of finance – external equity and bank 
overdrafts the proportion of firms receiving either a full or a reduced amount of 
finance was very low at 29.63% and 26.87%, respectively. 
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In the regression models which looked at applying for external finance from 
bank overdrafts, short-term and long-term bank loans, there were some strong results.  
Process, work, supply, administration and distribution innovators were more likely 
than their non-innovating counterparts to have applied for bank overdrafts at the 0.10 
level, or better. 
Product, process, work, supply, administration and distribution innovators 
were more likely in comparison with their corresponding non-innovating firms to 
have applied for long-term bank finance at the 0.10 level, or better. 
Supply, markets and distribution innovators were more likely than the non-
innovating firms with regard to those three types of innovation to have applied for 
short-term bank finance at the 0.10 level or better. 
Thus, with regard to the three types of bank finance the results of the 
multivariate regression models are very supportive of hypothesis H3. 
In the regression models which looked at applying for external finance from 
equity, all of the input measures of innovation were statistically significantly related 
to the applying for equity finance, and this was at the 0.05 level or better (Table 8.13).  
The output measure of innovation as represented by a series of dummy variables to 
capture R&D expenditure were also predominantly statistically significant at the 0.10 
level or better.  Thus, with regard to equity finance the results are very supportive of 
hypothesis H3. 
In the regression models which looked at applying for external finance from 
grants, factoring and invoice discounting firms and partners, all of the input measures 
of innovation were positively statistically significantly related to the applying for 
grants, factoring and invoice discounting firms, and partners and working 
shareholders at the 0.10 level or better, with the two exceptions of administration 
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innovation against grants, and process innovation against factoring and invoice 
discounting firms which were not statistically significant at the 0.10 level or better 
(Table 7.13).  The output measure of innovation, R&D expenditure, was found to be 
statistically significantly related to the applications for partners and working 
shareholders, and factoring and invoice discounting firms at the 0.01 and 0.05 level, 
respectively. 
The analysis of the multivariate regression models showed that innovation was 
not the only characteristic of the firms or the owner-managers which was related to 
applying for external finance. In general, applications for external finance was 
positively related to larger and older firms, exporters, and negatively related to owner-
managers’ age and being a family business. Thus, cultural concerns and the desire to 
maintain control of firms and not to reveal detailed financial information to external 
sources still represents a barrier which needs to be overcome. 
The hypothesis H4 predicted that the innovative ventures would possess a 
greater likelihood of having been refused access to external finance in comparison to 
the non-innovating ventures.  The logit models estimated in Tables 7.14 and 7.15 each 
have successful applications as the dependent variables so if the results were 
consistent with hypothesis H4 we would expect the odds ratios on the innovation 
dummy variables to be less than one and to be statistically significant.  However, in 
most instances where innovation is found to be statistically significant, the magnitude 
of the innovation odds ratios was substantially greater than one.  More specifically, in 
model 9 which dealt with bank overdrafts the product and also distribution innovation 
variables are both highly statistically significant at the 0.01 level, and the odds ratios 
were 7.9 and 8.6, respectively. 
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In model 10 which looks at the likelihood of success in applying for long-term 
bank loans the product, process and supply innovation variables were statistically 
significant at the 0.01, 0.10 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  Again the odds ratios are all 
well above one.  In contrast for short-term bank finance only one innovation variable 
– distribution - was found to be weakly statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
Model 12 presented the results for applications for external equity and market 
innovators was statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  The odds ratio for market 
innovators was 5.9, and again this magnitude is counter to our predictions.  Again the 
innovating firm has a higher probability of being successful in comparison to the non-
innovating firms. 
In model 13, the dependent variable was success in applications to grants.  
One measure of innovation – distribution innovation - was found to be statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level, and the odds ratio was 0.06 which is consistent with 
hypothesis H4.  This was the sole example where a measure of innovation in the 
regression models was consistent with hypothesis H7. 
In model 14, was concerned with factoring or invoice discounting firms and 
none of the measures of innovation were found to be statistically significant at the 
0.10 level, or better.  Finally, model 15 reported the results for partners or working 
shareholders.  In this model, supply innovation and distribution innovation were 
found to be statistically significant at the 0.10 and 0.05 levels, respectively.  The odds 
ratios were found to be 2.6 and 3.5 for supply and distribution innovation. 
Thus, overall the regression results reported in Tables 7.14 and 7.15 found 
evidence which was not supportive of hypothesis H4 when the research was explored 
using a multivariate regression model. 
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Given the need for the Chinese government to prolong the period of economic 
advancement and development, there is the corresponding need to tap the resources 
and the potential of innovative firms and the results suggest that the banks are 
surprisingly receptive to innovative ventures.  Instead the results and the strong 
positive relationships between the age of the owner-managers and also the size of the 
firms with the probability of having successful applications and receiving either the 
full or the reduced amount suggest that the banks need to be encouraged to overhaul 
their appraisal systems and their criteria. Given the relationship of the Chinese 
government to the banks this is possible.  Clearly, the younger owner-managers and 
those running the smaller sized firms are adversely placed in comparison to the older 
owner-managers and the larger sized firms.  
The evidence in the cross-tabulations compared to the regression models 
provided a contrasting picture of support for the fifth hypothesis, H5.  The cross-
tabulation analysis found that for equity finance the awareness of these sources was 
statistically related to innovation activity – product, process, supply, administration 
and distribution.  The most striking feature of Table 7.16 is the very few instances 
where the characteristics of the owner-managers or the businesses were statistically 
significantly at the 0.10 level, or better, related to the probability of the firms being 
aware of the sources of finance.  Table 7.16 presents result with product innovation 
included as the measure of innovation.  Product innovation was not statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level or better in any of the models.  When product innovation 
was replaced in turn with each of the other types of innovation, none of the measures 
of innovation were found to be statistically significant.  Accordingly, the view was 
taken not to report the tabulation of the odds ratios of the other measures of 
innovation as there are no statistically significant relationships.  Thus, the results in 
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the multivariate regression models show that whether a firm is an innovator, or is not 
an innovator, is not systematically related to the firms being aware of risk capital 
sources, or any of the other sources of finance.  Thus, the regression results present 
evidence which is not supportive of hypothesis H5. 
 
9.2.3 The financing of small firms in Beijing, China: Exploring the extent of 
credit constraints (chapter 8) 
 
Overall, on average the firms seeking external finance received 65.86% of the 
finance which they were seeking.  Thus, firms on average received approximately two 
thirds of the finance which they sought.  The average amount of external finance 
sought was 951,892 yuan which approximated to $126,792 (based on an exchange 
rate of 1 yuan = $0.1332, calculated at October 1st 2007).  The average amount of 
external finance received was 579,044 yuan which approximated to $79,126. 
The bivariate results suggested that with regard to the 8 measures of 
innovation only the percentage of turnover spent on R&D dummy variables was 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level, or better against the percentage of money 
received from that sought and this was statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  The 
tobit regression techniques were used to investigate the percentage of money received 
from that sought and to test hypothesis H6.  The multivariate regression results with 
regard to innovation were consistent with the bivariate results.  Taken together the 
results suggest that in Beijing the external sources of finance such as banks have 
difficulties evaluating projects which are innovation based.   
The regression results in Table 8.7 demonstrate that innovative firms are more 
likely to seek more external finance than non-innovators and this applied to work, 
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supply, markets, administration, and distribution types of innovators. However, there 
were no statistically significant differences between product innovators and their non-
innovative counterparts, and between process innovators and their non-innovative 
equivalent, with respect to the amount of external finance sought.  The input measure 
of innovation – R&D expenditure - was not statistically significant, and this applied to 
when R&D was captured as a series of dummy variables and also as a continuous 
variable. 
In the eighth hypothesis it had been expected that the innovators would receive 
a smaller amount of external finance compared to the non-innovators.  However, in 
the bivariate and also the multivariate regression analysis several types of innovators 
– work, supply, administration and also distribution - received a greater amount of 
external finance than their non-innovating counterparts.  This result is difficult to 
explain.  Perhaps the innovating businesses have been more forceful and persistent 
and this has ultimately overturned some of the prejudices of financial investors. 
 
9.3 Theoretical and Practical Implications of the Findings of the Study 
 
This study has endeavoured to provide a contribution at both the theoretical 
level and the practical level to our understanding of the financing of small businesses 
in Beijing.  A large scale empirical survey was undertaken with co-operation from 
certain Tax Offices in Beijing to extend our knowledge of entrepreneurship and 
finance using human capital theory and theories of finance such as pecking order 
theory and agency theory. 
 Whilst there is a very substantial body of research on entrepreneurship and 
finance from developed nations such as the UK and the US there is a lack of such 
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studies concerning China, particularly studies which have employed large scale data 
sets and then utilised econometric techniques.  Moreover, previous studies have also 
generally lacked a meaningful set of characteristics of the entrepreneurs and their 
businesses which can allow more rigorous analysis of which variables are drivers in 
explaining access to finance in China. 
Overall, the findings provide support for the pecking order theory and 
confirmed that SMEs at start-up stage rely heavily on internally generated funds 
which include the owner’s personal savings, and capital raised from business partners 
and / or shareholders. Financing is also received from close relatives and friends 
which makes this source of capital the next on the list of the pecking order. In line 
with previous studies, bank loans is by far the widest used external source of finance 
and almost 100% of the sample respondents are fully aware of this form of financing. 
Even without conclusive investigation, the increasing awareness and use of bank 
financing shown in this study compared to previous research still suggest that the 
environment of the Chinese financial market is in fact improving. 
The present study contributed some controversial but meaningful evidence to 
the issue of the financing of innovative firms in Beijing. Findings suggest that 
innovators are more likely to apply for greater amounts of external finance and also to 
receive greater amounts of finance than non-innovators. If the relative proportion of 
sought finance obtained is taken into consideration, this study has found no evidence 
of innovative firms being more credit rationed than their non-innovative peers. Yet, 
the fact that R&D expenditure has a negative impact on the successfulness of 
obtaining finance exposes the existence of possible hidden problems. Broadly 
speaking, the implications of such findings in the light of policy-making suggest 
current regulations addressing the credit rationing problems associated with 
  
 
362 
innovative firms have been proven to be effective. However, as far as the small 
businesses sector is concerned, the persistence of credit rationing can only do harm to 
the development of this thriving but vulnerable sector of the economy,   
Moreover, social networking is demonstrated to be a vital and distinctive 
feature of the customs and practices of doing business in China. Findings show that 
older owner-managers with a greater level of business experiences, higher attainments 
in education, more social capital to utilise and better financing skills are more likely to 
take advantage of a variety of sources of finance. Younger entrepreneurs who have a 
relative role model could also potentially benefit from the widened social circle 
through family ties. The findings of this study imply the need to highlight the 
important role played by relationship lending, in situations not limited to obtaining 
finance from banks and factoring companies.   
The findings again reinforced the necessity for Chinese policy makers and 
practitioners to put appropriate measures in place to resolve the access to finance 
problem confronted by the SME sector. Financing constraint is a serious issue that 
hinders both current development of the Chinese private sector and the long-term 
strategic planning of the country’s economy as a whole. The regulator would need 
cooperation from all stakeholders, in particular the entrepreneurs and finance 
providers, to be able to examine and re-examine current obstacles faced by small 
businesses and to propose feasible solutions in this ever-changing global economic 
climate. In the following section, the researcher proposes a few practical 
recommendations to address some of the problems related to financing that are raised 
in the research findings. 
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9.4 Recommendations 
9.4.1 Increasing the level of awareness 
The Chinese Government needs to increase the level of awareness and 
understanding of equity finance in Beijing and China by entrepreneurs as a whole, but 
especially those entrepreneurs without degrees, the non-exporting firms, the non-
innovators, and entrepreneurs at both ends of the age spectrum – those aged 18-30 and 
also those aged ≥56 years old. 
Additionally, the Chinese Government should raise the level of general 
understanding of bank overdrafts, but especially targeting young firms aged 1-5 years, 
and registered businesses.  
The level of awareness and understanding of grants needs to be raised.  Whilst 
the questionnaire did not differentiate between local and national grants it would be 
prudent for the national and local government to better publicise and disseminate the 
availability of grants and assistance and how to qualify for and apply for such grants.  
Not only does the overall headline level of awareness need to be raised but also it 
needs to be targeted at the young entrepreneurs of 18-30 years of age and also the 
older entrepreneurs aged ≥56 years old. 
More specifically, the Chinese Government should aim to heighten the level of 
awareness of equity finance from the reported 62%, of bank overdrafts from 83%, of 
grants from 75% and of factoring and invoice discounting from 77%.  The level of 
awareness of equity finance should have a target of 80% over a one year period and 
towards 90% over a three year period.  Equity finance is one of the potentially more 
complicated and difficult types of finance to convey to Chinese entrepreneurs, 
especially when considering with the entrepreneurs’ reluctance to contemplate, let 
alone apply for equity finance.  But, as a method of providing finance and of 
  
 
364 
continuing China’s impressive growth record, the awareness of equity finance needs 
to rise. Also a policy consideration for the Chinese government should be to improve 
the level of awareness of grants, from 75% to 85% over a one year period and 90% 
plus over a three year period.  Provided that the number of grants available, and 
particularly the branding of such grants and agencies providing the grants remains 
constant then, this would provide a stronger environment to achieve the objectives.  
However, factoring and invoice discounting types of products are a comparatively 
straightforward type of finance and the level of awareness should be increased from 
77% to 85% over a one year period, and to 90% plus over a three year period. 
 
9.4.2 Sources of finance utilised 
Equity finance can offer an alternative route for businesses in China instead of 
the more traditional term debt finance from banks.  It is recommended that the 
Chinese Government provides workshops and seminars on equity finance as a 
practical measure to increase the level of awareness and understanding of equity 
finance.    
Such workshops would need to have at least one presenter who has had 
practical experience of using equity finance. 
It is also recommended that the Chinese Government should aim to increase 
the level of awareness and understanding of bank overdrafts, grants and factoring and 
invoice discounting which could also be facilitated in seminars and workshops.  Not 
all types of finance are going to be appropriate at all times in a businesses’ life.  
However, a lack of knowledge about the aforementioned forms of finance has, this 
researcher believes, possibly hindered Beijing businesses’ capacity to apply for and 
then secure finance and to operate more effectively.  
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The Chinese Government should contemplate commissioning a ‘Types of 
Finance Available in Beijing for Business’ document which presents and explains in 
simple layman’s language what is involved with the full range of the varied types of 
finance.  This should include plenty of easily understandable examples and case 
studies so that the businesses could clearly see what each of the different types of 
finance can contribute to their own business, and the benefits as well as the limitations 
or consequences of utilising specific types of financial sources. 
Such a document could initially be focused upon the city of Beijing and some 
carefully selected regions of China.  If the policy initiative was well received then the 
scheme could be rolled out to each of the other provinces of China. 
The Chinese Government also should consider the commissioning of a 
companion document ‘Understanding Public Sector Support for Businesses in 
Beijing’ which in layman’s terms would outline the range of public sector sources of 
grants, as well as more broadly, the full range of national and local sources of advice 
and assistance so that the business community becomes better informed.  Such a 
document would need to be regularly updated and it would then serve as a way of 
businesses in Beijing to keep abreast of what is available. 
It is also recommended that the Chinese Government websites, such as China 
International Cooperation Association of Small and Medium Enterprises 
(http://www.chinasme.org.cn/) and the information platform set up by the Beijing 
Government for SMEs (http://www.bjsme.gov.cn/), should provide access to the 
‘Types of Finance Available in Beijing for Business’ and ‘Understanding Public 
Sector Support for Businesses in Beijing’ documents are clearly signposted and that 
they can be easily downloadable. 
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9.4.3 Reduce the amount of information asymmetry 
 
The front-end chapters of the dissertation showed that there is a substantial 
theoretical and also empirical corpus of scholarly research which has shown that 
information asymmetries can cause problems for entrepreneurs seeking to access 
external finance.  The three empirical chapters of the dissertation have confirmed that 
information asymmetries are indeed a problem in Beijing.  In order for the 
information asymmetry problem in Beijing to be alleviated there are several measures 
which the Chinese government could contemplate. 
 Firstly, there needs to be a more complete and full return of information 
pertaining to revenues generated and to existing borrowings.  This information 
gathering needs to be not just mandatory, but actively enforced by regulators. 
 Secondly, Chinese business people need to be more willing to volunteer 
information to others outside of their businesses.  Whilst there is a culture of retaining 
information within the family and a reluctance to divulge information there needs to 
be a sea change in the attitude of the entrepreneurs.  This is because mandatory 
enforcement of information disclosure can only go so far, even in China. 
Thirdly, the pace of reform of the property rights system, and in particular the 
increase of enforcement of property rights and the legal framework to gain restitution 
needs to be rapidly increased.  This would then serve lender and borrower alike.  But, 
a system in which business people can misappropriate or abscond with financiers’ 
money is not conducive to finance flowing to entrepreneurs and their businesses. 
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9.5 Contributions 
This study has sought to make several contributions.  Firstly, this research has 
added to both the theoretical and the empirical foundations of entrepreneurial finance 
of Beijing, one area of an emerging or developing nation of China, whereas previous 
research has instead been generally grounded within a North American and European 
context.   Then guided by insights from the well established human capital theory, the 
researcher has tested linkages between the specific facets of human capital – 
innovation, and the control variables of the entrepreneur’s human capital and the 
firm’s resource profile, and a series of finance related hypotheses.  The finance areas 
which were investigated included: the propensity of the Beijing respondents to utilise 
specific sources of finance at the start-up stage, and also their levels of awareness of 
sources of capital; the amount of finance sought, the amount of finance received, and 
the proportion of finance sought which was received.  This was also balanced with an 
investigation of whether entrepreneurs were able to access finance per se, and from 
which specific sources of finance.  
Secondly, the dissertation has offered new insights relating to the contributions 
made by innovating firms to address barriers to the accessing and acquisition of 
external finance.  This included a good range of types or facets of innovation which 
capture output measures of innovation, as well as R&D expenditure as an input 
measure of innovation.  This has allowed the researcher to have a better insight into 
the extent and the nature of how innovation can hinder entrepreneurs’ access to 
finance. 
Thirdly, the researcher has made an empirical contribution by gathering a 
unique large scale data set of 452 entrepreneurs and using a combination of cross-
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tabulations and advanced econometric techniques to test eight hypotheses related to 
access to finance in Beijing. 
This notwithstanding the undertaking of the research for this dissertation has 
been a long journey and now standing back and looking at the project there are clearly 
limitations which need to be acknowledged, as well as to identify the implications of 
this researchers contributions and findings for development in future studies. 
 
9.6 Limitations of the study and implications for further research 
The bulk of the empirical contribution of the dissertation has revolved around 
the primary data of the responses of entrepreneurs in the Beijing area of China, which 
was harvested through a carefully crafted questionnaire.  Doubt could be raised about 
the wider validity of the selected dependent and independent variables which were 
used in chapters six to eight.  However, the researcher undertook steps to minimize as 
far as possible the common method bias (Krishnan et al., 2006) and this included 
providing the entrepreneurs with anonymity, the careful development of the questions 
and their piloting to minimize statement ambiguity, as well as the translation of the 
questionnaire from English to Chinese, and then the back-translation to ensure that the 
questions were as robust as humanly possible.  Additionally, all of the variables were 
included in a principal components analysis.  The Harman one-factor test (Podsakoff 
et al., 2003) suggested that there was no evidence of a common method bias.  
Moreover, other studies have argued that individual respondents can offer and provide 
reliable information about their businesses (Westhead and Storey, 1997; Westhead et 
al., 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; Wright et al., 2008).  To respect the Chinese business 
culture, the provision of information about social capital was not sought in this study 
because of the recognized unwillingness of respondents to divulge such details.  
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This study has gathered the responses from entrepreneurs from only one 
region of China, Beijing, and clearly in the generalizing on the state of finance there 
could be dangers.  Beijing has a number of distinct differences from other regions of 
China, being the capital of China and as such is at the heart of this large nation’s 
government. There are several top universities located in Beijing and the most famous 
ones include Tsinghua University, Peking University and Renmin University.  Beijing 
offers plentiful human capital resources and financing channels to market entrants and 
is the most important base for business incubators and science parks which are keen to 
promote new innovative ventures in China.   
Whilst this researcher has raised policy issues for the Chinese government it is 
clear that in order for policy makers and practitioners to develop the most appropriate 
and beneficial policies towards entrepreneurs in other regions of China, particularly 
pertaining to innovation policies, further research must be conducted on each of 
China’s regions.  Because regional policies and regulations can vary, it is sensible to 
conduct future studies on regions that receive special policy attention, such as the five 
special economic zones (namely ShenZhen, Zhuhai, ShanTou, XiaMen and HaiNan), 
in the central part of China and the western parts of China. This notwithstanding, 
given that Beijing has a population of approximately 260,000 businesses and a human 
population of 16 million people, it is clear that with 452 respondents the confidence 
interval of the results obtained from the researcher’s study is 4.61 which is well within 
accepted limits (Freel and Robson, 2004). 
However, future studies should clearly roll out the survey to the other areas of 
China.  Whilst this study placed an upper limit of 500 employees to partly allow better 
comparisons with previous western studies it would be interesting to raise this limit to 
reflect the fact that the official definition of SMEs in China is up to 3000 employees. 
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Additionally, whilst this study was large at 452 firms it would be important to further 
increase the sample of respondents to allow the results to be meaningfully broken out 
by detailed standard industrial classifications. 
The quantitative research, whilst providing robust statistical information, can 
only go so far in understanding the nature of access to finance in Beijing.  In order to 
be able to more completely tell the story of access to finance in Beijing there is clearly 
a need to also undertake qualitative research using detailed case studies and 
interviews. 
To further advance the research in entrepreneurship and to catch up with the 
pace of globalisation, it is intriguing to look beyond China and to investigate the 
similarities and differences between emerging nations. More specifically, India, which 
is seen as the most comparable competitor of China, plays an equally important role in 
the current global economy and it would be very interesting to explore and compare 
obstacles faced by SMEs in both countries, in particular, the access to finance (Ahya 
and Gupta, 2010).  
Like China, India has enjoyed substantial economic growth for more than two 
decades. Access to finance remains the toughest challenge for small businesses in 
both countries. Notwithstanding the desperate needs of financing from the private 
sector, it is suspected that the development of an efficient and well-functioning 
financial market falls far behind the speed and extent of the economic growth in the 
emerging markets in general. Hence, this is a worthy subject for further studies and a 
comparative study between the financial systems of China and India against the extent 
of financing difficulties encountered by SMEs could be fruitful.  
Furthermore, it is also interesting to see how beneficial it would be to have a 
better designed and enforced institutional setting which can improve the financing 
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environment for SMEs. China is still in the transitional stage from a socialist system 
to a market-based system and there is insufficient legal protection for investors. In 
contrast, India has a judicial system set up by the British (based on English common 
law) for more than 200 years and has had a democratic government in power since 
1949. It is believed that having a stricter and more sophisticated legal environment 
should make access to finance easier for SMEs that are genuinely good in terms of 
their innovativeness and potential to grow, because of the protections in place to 
safeguard investors’ and lenders’ capital. In addition, India is a step ahead of China in 
standardizing lending to small businesses, having the Fair Practices Code issued by 
the Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) (www.sidbi.com). All 
financial institutions are able to follow the code in order to ensure loan applications, 
appraisals and disbursements procedures are clarified and standardised. Thus, SIDBI’s 
rich experiences in lending to SMEs can be transferred to other finance providers and 
the willingness to approve loan applications made by SMEs would be enhanced 
(Allen et. al., 2009). However, at present in China, state-owned banks, which lack the 
intention to promote SMEs and suffer severe information problems, still dominate the 
financial market.  
Further research on China and comparative studies embracing more emerging 
nations (i.e. India, South East Asia and South Africa) are extremely valuable, not only 
from the policy-making point of view, but also for the benefit of the whole SME 
community, which is seen as the engine driving the economic development for the 
future. All in all, a combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods, if 
possible, would be most useful in delivering meaningful results for policy makers and 
practitioners.   
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This survey is prepared to gain a better understanding of the problems faced by small 
businesses in China. 
 
 
 
 
All the information which you provide will be kept confidential and anonymous, and 
will be used only for academic research. 
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SECTION A 
INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR CHARACTER AND THE BUSINESS 
 
A1. Please indicate whether you are:              Male            Female  
   
A2. What is your age? 
 
A3. What is your position in the company? 
 
A4. Which of the following educational qualifications do you have? 
  (Please circle appropriate box/es).  
        
Middle School or less Yes No 
High School Yes No 
Technical / Vocational / Apprenticeship Yes No 
Diploma Yes No 
Bachelors degree Yes No 
Professional qualification (i.e. Accountancy/Law) Yes No 
Masters degree or above Yes No 
Others (Please specify) Yes No 
 
A5. What motivated you to start the business? (Please circle appropriate box/es).  
  
Desire to work for oneself Yes No 
Due to redundancy Yes No 
Frustration in previous employment Yes No 
Wish to accumulate wealth Yes No 
An excellent opportunity presented itself Yes No 
Relative in business Yes No 
Previous experiences prepared me Yes No 
Others (Please specify) Yes No 
 Yes No 
   
A6a. Have you had any previous experience in business?  Yes No 
 
A6b. If “Yes”, please specify for how long?  
 
A7a. Has any member of your family been involved in business in the past?  Yes No 
 
A7b. Is this business related to your current business activities?  Yes No 
 
A8. In which year did you establish your business? 
 
A9. What percentage of the business is owned by you and your family?  
 
A10a. Is there any Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in your business? Yes No 
 
A10b. If “Yes”, what percentage of your capital is from FDI? 
 
A11. What does your business make / provide? 
 
A12. Is your company a subsidiary of another company? Yes No 
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A13. Is your company a holding company of other firms? Yes  No 
 
   A14. Do you currently employ any member of your family in the business?   Yes No 
 
A15. During the last three years, which of the following factors listed below, do you perceive 
as hindering or limiting your ability to meet your business objectives?   
(Please circle the appropriate number in each row). 
 
Factor Not 
Important 
Limitation 
Moderately 
Important 
Limitation 
Important 
Limitation 
Crucial 
Limitation 
Finance: 
Inadequate access to debt finance 1 2 3 4 
Inadequate access to equity finance 1 2 3 4 
Interest rates too high 1 2 3 4 
Do not have collateral to secure bank loan 1 2 3 4 
Difficult to meet loan criteria 1 2 3 4 
Inadequate family finance 1 2 3 4 
 
Market: 
Inadequate demand 1 2 3 4 
Too many competing firms 1 2 3 4 
Competition from imported goods 1 2 3 4 
High advertising costs 1 2 3 4 
Inadequate market research 1 2 3 4 
 
Managerial/ Technical Know-how: 
Shortage of skilled labour  1 2 3 4 
Access to new technology 1 2 3 4 
Inadequate financial skills 1 2 3 4 
Inadequate management skills 1 2 3 4 
Inadequate marketing skills 1 2 3 4 
 
Inputs 
High cost of local raw materials 1 2 3 4 
High cost of imported raw materials 1 2 3 4 
Inadequate supply of raw materials 1 2 3 4 
High cost of replacing old equipment 1 2 3 4 
Poor quality of local raw materials 1 2 3 4 
Poor quality of imported raw materials 1 2 3 4 
 
Economic/Regulatory  
High rate of inflation 1 2 3 4 
High pressure for Yuan to appreciate 1 2 3 4 
High various taxes and duties 1 2 3 4 
Registration / Licensing / Red tape 1 2 3 4 
Corruption 1 2 3 4 
 
Infrastructure 
High cost of utility charges 1 2 3 4 
Lack of industrial sites 1 2 3 4 
High transport costs 1 2 3 4 
Low quality of electricity / water supply 1 2 3 4 
Poor telecommunication networks 1 2 3 4 
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A16. What is the type of legal organisation of your business? 
(Please circle appropriate box).  
 
Registered sole proprietorship 1 
Partnership 2 
Private limited liability 3 
Others (Please specify) 4 
 
A17. What percentage of the business is owned by other people; and who are they?  
 
A18. Where do you sell your products? Please indicate the percentage of sales in each 
market.  (Please circle appropriate box/es).  
 
Type of Market 
 
Do you sell in this type of market? Percentage of Sales 
Local market Yes No  
National market Yes No  
South East Asia market Yes No  
International market- Europe Yes No  
International market- US Yes No  
Others (Please specify) Yes No  
Total   =100% 
 
 
A19. How much is the registered capital of your firm? 
 
A20. Has your company got limited liabilities? Yes No 
 
A21. Please provide the following information of your firm.  
 
 Year 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 
No. of employees     
Fixed assets after depreciation     
Sales     
Profit before taxation     
Long-term investments     
Short-term debts     
Debentures     
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SECTION B INNOVATION AND PERFORMANCE  
 
Innovation is concerned with the application of new ideas.  Often these ideas take the form of new 
products and services or new production processes.  However, innovation may also refer to new 
work practices and workforce organisation, to new sources of supply or materials (or new ways of 
working with key suppliers), to the exploitation of new markets or means of reaching those markets 
(including innovations in marketing, selling and distribution) and to new administration and office 
systems.  In the following section we would like you to tell us about innovation introduced into your 
business.  Unless otherwise specified, the term innovation should be taken to encompass any of the 
categories described above.  However, innovations should involve substantive changes.   
 
 
B1. In which area(s) of the business have you carried out innovation(s)?  
(Please circle the appropriate response on each line). 
 
 No 
Innovation  
Innovation 
new to firm 
Innovation new 
to industry 
In products or services 1 2 3 
In production processes (including storage) 1 2 3 
In work practices, or workforce organisation 1 2 3 
In supply and supplier relations 1 2 3 
In markets and marketing 1 2 3 
In administration and office systems 1 2 3 
In products or services distribution 1 2 3 
 
B2. Approximately what percentage of your firm’s annual turnover was spent on research and 
development (R&D) and innovation related activities (e.g. marketing, design, better production 
capabilities) during the last 3 years? If zero, please indicate nil. 
 
 2004__________ 2005__________ 2006__________ 
 
B3. What were the main reasons for introducing innovations in the last 3 years?  
(Please circle the appropriate answer in each row). 
 
Reasons Not 
Important 
Moderately 
Important 
Important Crucial 
To comply with legislation/regulation 1 2 3 4 
To respond to competition 1 2 3 4 
To meet a specific customer request 1 2 3 4 
To enter a new market 1 2 3 4 
To diversify the business 1 2 3 4 
To maintain sales revenue/market share 1 2 3 4 
To increase sales revenue/market share 1 2 3 4 
As a result of standardisation (e.g. BS, ISO) 1 2 3 4 
Other (Please specify) 1 2 3 4 
 
B4. Who are your main competitors?  (Please circle appropriate box(es)).  
 
No competitors Yes No 
Firms in the local market Yes No 
Firms in the national market Yes No 
Firms in international markets– South East Asia Yes No 
Others (Please specify) Yes No 
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SECTION C FINANCING 
 
C1. What are the main sources of funding for your business?  Please specify the percentage of funds 
in your business which comes from each of the sources listed below. 
     
Sources of funds 
 
Present (%) Start-Up (%) 
Own funds   
Partner(s) contribution   
Ordinary shares   
Bank loan / overdraft   
Trade credit   
Family contribution   
Others (Please specify)   
Total 100% 100% 
 
 
C2. Have you been seeking finance in the past three years? Yes No 
 
C3. What was the purpose(s) of raising funds?  
 
Fund new project/product line Yes No 
Innovation Yes No 
Purchase equipment Yes No 
Payoff previous loans Yes No 
Solve insolvency problems/ 
working capital shortage Yes No 
Other (Please specify) Yes No 
 
 
C4. For each of the following, please indicate if you consider them as a potential source of external 
finance, if you approached them in the last three years and whether the approach resulted in an offer 
of additional finance.  
(Please circle the appropriate answer in each row). 
 
Source of Finance Not 
aware of 
this as a 
source of 
finance 
Did not 
approach 
this source 
for finance 
Approached 
but no 
finance was 
offered to 
me 
Approached 
but was 
offered less 
than full 
amount sought 
Approached 
and was 
offered the 
full amount 
sought 
Family and friends 1 2 3 4 5 
Bank’s Overdraft 1 2 3 4 5 
Bank Loan (≧2 years) 1 2 3 4 5 
Bank Loan (< 2 years) 1 2 3 4 5 
Venture Capital Firms 1 2 3 4 5 
Business Angels/Private investors 1 2 3 4 5 
Hire Phurchase/Leasing Firms 1 2 3 4 5 
Factoring/Invoice Discounting Firms 1 2 3 4 5 
Foreign Direct Investment  1 2 3 4 5 
Grants 1 2 3 4 5 
Informal Creditors 1 2 3 4 5 
Partners/Working Shareholders 1 2 3 4 5 
Other (Please specify) 1 2 3 4 5 
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C5. Please provide details of each of source of finance listed below.  
(Please circle as appropriate and leave the cell empty if not relevant).  
 
Source of Finance No. of 
times 
approached 
No. of 
times 
succeeded 
Average 
time of 
negotiation 
Guarantor 
required? 
Collaterals 
involved? 
Family and friends    Yes No Yes No 
Bank’s Overdraft    Yes No Yes No 
Bank Loan (≧2 years)    Yes No Yes No 
Bank Loan (< 2 years)    Yes No Yes No 
Venture Capital Firms    Yes No Yes No 
Business Angels/Private investors    Yes No Yes No 
Hire Phurchase/Leasing Firms    Yes No Yes No 
Factoring/Invoice Discounting Firms    Yes No Yes No 
Foreign Direct Investment     Yes No Yes No 
Grants    Yes No Yes No 
Informal Creditors    Yes No Yes No 
Partners/Working Shareholders    Yes No Yes No 
Other (Please specify)    Yes No Yes No 
 
C6. How much additional finance did you seek and what proportion of this did you 
obtain? 
Amount sought RMB Percentage obtained % 
 
C7. Do you consider informal creditors an alternative source of 
finance? 
Yes No 
 
C8. What do you think are the characteristics of an informal banking system?  
(Please circle the appropriate answer in each row). 
 
Characteristics Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
agree 
Costly/Expensive 1 2 3 4 
Quick access 1 2 3 4 
Troublesome 1 2 3 4 
Not trustworthy 1 2 3 4 
Common practice 1 2 3 4 
Other (Please specify) 1 2 3 4 
 
C9. When you seek finance, which factor is of the most concern?  
(Please circle one answer in each row). 
 
Factors Not 
concerned 
Moderately 
concerned 
Concerned Crucially 
concerned 
Speed of getting the money 1 2 3 4 
Rate of interest 1 2 3 4 
Terms of the loan 1 2 3 4 
Relationship with the lender 1 2 3 4 
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C10a. Does the owner-manager have good relationships with banks? Yes No 
 
C10b. If “Yes”, please state with how many banks? 
 
C11. Would you use up retained profits and personal funds before 
seeking external finance? Yes No 
 
C12a. Have any Venture Capitalists approached you before? Yes No 
 
C12b. If “Yes”, please name them. 
 
C12c. Have you considered inviting Venture Capitalists to join the 
business? 
Yes No 
 
C13a. Are you planning to be listed on the stock exchange? Yes No 
 
C13b. What would be your main purpose of listing? (Please tick only one). 
Raising funds  
Better reputation  
Increase competitiveness  
Seeking expansion  
Under pressure from competitors  
 
C13c. Would equity financing be considered before debt financing? Yes No 
 
C13d. For companies raising equity finance only: please provide the following 
information. 
 
Amount of management time to raise finance (no. of 
days) 
Days 
Cost of raising the finance (% of amount raised) % 
% of equity relinquished  % 
Location of equity provider (Main town or city)  
 
C14. Do you have plans to expand the business over the next three years? 
 (Please tick the 
relevant boxes) 
By what percentage do you plan to 
grow the business over the next 3 
years? 
In terms of sales? Yes No % 
In terms of employment? Yes No % 
 
C15. Please indicate how likely it is that you will be able to raise the capital required 
to finance your growth over the next 3 years? (Please circle one answer in each row). 
 
 Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Retained earnings 1 2 3 4 
Loan finance (banks) 1 2 3 4 
Equity capital 1 2 3 4 
Grants 1 2 3 4 
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C16. If equity capital is required, please indicate how likely it is that you will consider 
using the sources stated below? (Please circle one answer in each row). 
 
 Very 
unlikely 
Unlikely Likely Very 
likely 
Founders and management 1 2 3 4 
Family and Friends 1 2 3 4 
Other private individuals (Business angels) 1 2 3 4 
VC funds 1 2 3 4 
Informal financial institutions  1 2 3 4 
Stock market 1 2 3 4 
Sale of firm to another company 1 2 3 4 
Other sources (please specify) 1 2 3 4 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION ----  Jia Wang 
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Appendix 5.2 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
University of Durham 
 
 
企业研究中心 
 
 
 
 
 
中国中小企业问卷调查 
 
2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
本问卷意在更好的了解中国中小企业面临的问题 
 
 
 
所有您提供的信息都将会是保密的和匿名的，只可用以学术用途。 
谢谢！ 
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第一部分 - 关于您个人和您公司的情况 
 
          注：如无特别注明问卷中的“您”代表企业负责人 
A1.您的性别：          
 
A2. 您的年龄： 
 
A3.填写此问卷的人在本公司的职务： 
  
A4. 请用下表说明您的教育水平。(请圈注所有适当的选项).    
初中或以下 是 否 
高中 是 否 
技工或学徒 是 否 
大专 是 否 
大学本科 是 否 
拥有专业资格 （例：会计师，律师、、、） 是 否 
硕士或以上 是 否 
其它(请具体指明__________) 是 否 
 
A5. 什么是您组建这间公司的原动力？(请圈注所有适当的选项).  
希望自己当老板 是 否 
由于失业 是 否 
在以前的工作中受挫或对工作的不满 是 否 
希望积累财富 是 否 
因为有一个极好的机会出现 是 否 
因为有亲戚在生意上的支持 是 否 
有充足的经验和经历做支持 是 否 
其它(请具体指明__________) 是 否 
   
A6a. 请问您是否有与现在工作相关的工作经验？  有 没有 
A6b. 如果您选择“是”，请问大概是多长时间？ 
 
A7a. 请问您的亲属是否有参与您以往的生意？  是 否 
A7b.请问您目前的生意是否与以往的有关？  是 否 
 
A8. 您目前的这家公司是在哪一年建立的? 
 
A9. 请问您的公司的所有权有百分之几是由您个人或家庭成员所控制？ 
 
A10a. 您的公司是否有外商直接投资？ 是 否 
A10b. 如果“是”，请问有百分之几的资本是由外商提供的？ 
 ％ 
A11. 您的公司的经营项目或所制造的产品是什么？ 
A12. 您的公司是其它公司的子公司吗？ 是 否 
A13. 您的公司是其他公司的母公司吗？ 是 否 
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  A14. 现在有没有您的亲属在您的公司里工作？  有 没有 
 
A15. 在过往的三年里，您认为以下哪些因素以何种程度阻碍或限制了您的企业
商业目标的实现？（请选择每一行一个您认为最适当的数字）. 
因素 很小或 
没有影响 
一般程度 
的影响 
很大程度 
的影响 
至关紧要 
的影响 
资金方面: 
缺乏贷款途径 1 2 3 4 
有困难通过股票来融资 1 2 3 4 
所获得资金的利息过高 1 2 3 4 
贷款时无法提供所要求的抵押品 1 2 3 4 
难以达到获得贷款批准的要求 1 2 3 4 
家里不能提供足够的资金 1 2 3 4 
市场方面: 
市场需求不足 1 2 3 4 
参与竞争的企业太多 1 2 3 4 
来自于进口货品的竞争 1 2 3 4 
广告费用过高 1 2 3 4 
进行的市场调查不够充分 1 2 3 4 
管理方面: 
缺乏高技术工人 1 2 3 4 
获取新技术的途径有限 1 2 3 4 
缺乏融资，筹资技巧 1 2 3 4 
缺乏管理技巧 1 2 3 4 
缺乏市场开拓及销售技巧 1 2 3 4 
投入方面: 
原料成本过高 1 2 3 4 
缺乏原料供应渠道 1 2 3 4 
更换原有旧机械的成本过高 1 2 3 4 
经济及政府方面: 
通货膨胀率过高 1 2 3 4 
人民币的升值压力较大 1 2 3 4 
缴纳的各种税费过高 1 2 3 4 
申请各种许可证及执照比较麻烦 1 2 3 4 
相关管制部门存在腐败行为 1 2 3 4 
基础设施方面: 
电,水等能源费用过高 1 2 3 4 
缺少工业用地 1 2 3 4 
交通运输成本过高 1 2 3 4 
电,水等能源的供应较差 1 2 3 4 
通讯网络不畅通 1 2 3 4 
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A16. 请问您的公司的法律形式是什么？(请只圈注一个最适当的选项). 
私营企业 1 
合伙制企业 2 
个人有限责任公司 3 
其它(请具体指明_____) 4 
 
A17. 您的公司有百分之几是由其他人（除您个人和与您有亲属关系以外的人）
所有? 请简略提供这些所有者与您的关系。 
 
A18. 您的公司的产品或服务的销售市场是哪里？请将销售额的大致百分比也填
写在表格需要处。(请圈注所有适当的选项). 
市场 您的商品是否销往
该市场或您是否服
务于该市场？ 
占总销售额百分比 
当地市场 （以省为单位） 是 否 ％ 
其他中国地区市场 是 否 ％ 
东南亚市场 是 否 ％ 
国际市场（欧洲） 是 否 ％ 
国际市场（北美） 是 否 ％ 
其它(请具体指明_________) 是 否 ％ 
总计   =100% 
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第二部分 – 创新与发展状况 
创新是一项新理念的实施. 它可以是一种新的产品,一种新的服务方式或是一个
全新的生产流程. 从广意上来说创新同样可以是新的供货渠道,或是一种新的与
供货商打交道的方式. 当然新市场的开拓及使用新的市场销售策略或是更新原
有的办公管理系统都可以说是一种创新. (除非进行特别说明, 创新涵盖了上述
我们所有的举例. 创新可以说就是一项实实在在的改变.) 
 
B1. 您的企业有过哪些创新, 这些创新是哪种程度上的(请在您认为恰当的答案
上画圈) 
 没有创新 对本企业的创新 对本行业的创新 
在产品或服务方面 1 2 3 
在生产程序方面(包括货品的存储) 1 2 3 
在职工组织和调动职工积极性方面 1 2 3 
在货源及与供货商的关系方面 1 2 3 
在市场及销售方面 1 2 3 
在企业管理及办公系统方面 1 2 3 
在货品或服务发送方面 1 2 3 
 
B2. 请给出在过去3年中您的公司用于进行研发及创新的费用占年营业额的百
分比? 
 2004_________ 2005__________ 2006 ________ 
B3. 令您的企业在过去三年中有所创新的主要原因有哪些? (请在您认为恰当的答案
上画圈) 
原因 不重要 比较重要 重要 非常重要 至关重要 
为了遵守法律规章及行业要求 1 2 3 4 5 
为了更好地参与竞争 1 2 3 4 5 
为了达到客户的要求 1 2 3 4 5 
为了能够进入新的市场 1 2 3 4 5 
为了使得经营多样化 1 2 3 4 5 
为了保障销售收入及市场份额 1 2 3 4 5 
为了增加销售收入及市场份额 1 2 3 4 5 
为了达到某一质量标准 (例如BS, 
ISO) 1 2 3 4 5 
其它(请具体指明_________) 1 2 3 4 5 
 
B4. 您认为谁是您的主要竞争对手? (请圈注所有适当的选项).   
没有竞争对手 是 否 
本地区(省内)的企业 是 否 
围内的企业 是 否 
亚洲国家的企业 是 否 
其它(请具体指明_________) 是 否 
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第三部分 – 筹资与融资    
C1. 您的企业的主要资金来源是什么? 请给出相应来源所占企业资金的百分比. 
 
资金来源 百分比(%) 起始资金 (%) 
自有资金   
合伙人   
股东参股   
银行贷款或透支   
供货商提供的信用额度   
家庭成员   
其它(请具体给出_________)   
总数 100% 100% 
 
C2. 您在过去三年中是否有寻求过资金? 是 否 
 
C3. 您需求资金的目的是什么? 
开发新的产品或生产线 是 否 
创新 是 否 
购买机械设备 是 否 
偿还以前的债务 是 否 
解决资金周转问题 是 否 
其它(请具体给出_________) 是 否 
 
C4. 对下列给出的各项, 请告诉我们您是否认为它是一种潜在的资金来源? 另
外您在过去三年中是否通过它筹集到过资金.(请在您认为恰当的选项上画圈) 
 
资金来源 从未意识
到这是一
种资金来
源 
没有尝试
过用这种
方式筹集
资金 
虽尝试过,但
没能成功地通
过这种方式筹
集到资金 
通过这种方式
筹集到过资
金, 但少于筹
集目标全额 
通过这种方
式筹集到过
资金, 并筹
到全额 
家人或朋友 1 2 3 4 5 
银行透支 1 2 3 4 5 
银行贷款(大于等于2年期) 1 2 3 4 5 
银行贷款 (小于2年期) 1 2 3 4 5 
风险投资基金 1 2 3 4 5 
创业天使或个人投资者 1 2 3 4 5 
租购融资或租赁融资 1 2 3 4 5 
应收帐款,质押贷款或票据贴现 1 2 3 4 5 
外商直接投资 1 2 3 4 5 
政府拨款或扶持 1 2 3 4 5 
地下钱庄 1 2 3 4 5 
公司合伙人或股东 1 2 3 4 5 
其它(请具体给出_____) 1 2 3 4 5 
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C5. 请提供有关C4中列出的资金来源的有关细节 (如有不相关项请留空). 
资金来源 尝试筹
资次数 
成功筹
资次数 
平均商议
持续时间 
有无担保人参与 有无抵押品支持 
家人或朋友    有 无 有 无 
银行透支    有 无 有 无 
银行贷款(大于等于 2年
期) 
   有 无 有 无 
银行贷款 (小于2年期)    有 无 有 无 
风险投资基金    有 无 有 无 
创业天使或个人投资者    有 无 有 无 
租购融资或租赁融资    有 无 有 无 
应收帐款质押贷款 
或发票贴现 
   有 无 有 无 
外商直接投资    有 无 有 无 
政府拨款或扶持    有 无 有 无 
地下钱庄    有 无 有 无 
公司合伙人或股东    有 无 有 无 
其它(请具体给出_____)    有 无 有 无 
 
C6. 您的筹资和融资目标总金额是多少, 您实际获得的资金占目标融资总金额的百分比
是多少? 
目标总金额 人民币 所获得的百分比 % 
C7. 您是否将地下钱庄作为资金的来源之一? 是 否 
 
C8. 下列哪些特点你认为是地下钱庄所有的? (请在您认为合适的答案上画圈) 
特点 非常不认同 不认同 认同 非常认同 
费用高 1 2 3 4 
效率高 1 2 3 4 
容易产生不必要的麻烦 1 2 3 4 
不可信赖 1 2 3 4 
已被普遍接受 1 2 3 4 
 
C9. 当您需要资金时,下列哪一选项是您认为最关注的?(请在您认为适当的选项
上画圈) 
关注事项 不关注 有一些关注 关注 非常关注 
得到资金的快慢 1 2 3 4 
支付所借资金的利息 1 2 3 4 
还款时间的长短 1 2 3 4 
与债权人的关系 1 2 3 4 
 
C10a. 您的企业是否和银行之间有很好的关系 是 否 
C10b.如果是的话, 请您给出和多少家银行有很好的关系? 
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C11. 您是否会在用光了企业自留利润和个人资金之后才会考虑使用外
部资金? 是 否 
 
C12a. 是否有风险投资基金曾经接触过您? 是 否 
 
C12b.如果“有”请您给出它们的名字. 
 
C12c. 您是否考虑过让风险投资基金加入到您的企业 
是 否 
 
C13a. 您是否考虑过将您的企业上市? 是 否 
 
C13b.什么是您打算将企业上市的主要原因? (请仅选择一项) 
融资  
提升企业知名度  
增强企业竞争力  
寻求企业扩张  
因为竞争对手的压力  
 
C13c. 您在上市融资之前是否会先考虑使用债务融资(例:贷款)? 
是 否 
 
C13d. 此问题仅需要已上市的企业回答: 请您给出以下信息 (大概即可) 
作为企业管理者您投入到上市这一事件的时间(天数) 天 
融资成本占所融资总金额的百分比  % 
准备上市流通的股份占总股份的百分比  % 
在哪一个证券交易所上市   
 
C14. 您是否有计划在未来的三年内扩张企业的规模? 
扩张方向 (请在您认为适当
的选项后打勾) 
以百分比计算未来三年
您的成长目标是多少? 
增加营业额 是 否 % 
雇佣更多的员工 是 否 % 
 
C15. 您预期在未来三年您会以下列哪一种方式来进行筹资或融资用于企业的扩
张?  
(请对每一种筹资或融资方式仅给出一种可能性) 
方式 非常不可能 不太可能 有可能 非常有可能 
企业自留利润 1 2 3 4 
银行贷款 1 2 3 4 
股本融资 1 2 3 4 
政府拨款 1 2 3 4 
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C16. 如果您将进行股本融资, 请您从以下选项中选出可能的股本融资方式. 
(请对每一种股本融资方式仅给出一种可能性) 
 
股本融资方式 非常不可能 不太可能 有可能 非常有可能 
企业创立者及管理层 1 2 3 4 
家人或朋友 1 2 3 4 
私人投资者(例如创业天使) 1 2 3 4 
风险投资基金 1 2 3 4 
底下钱庄 1 2 3 4 
股票市场 1 2 3 4 
向其它公司出售部分企业所有权 1 2 3 4 
其它方式(请具体给出________) 1 2 3 4 
 
 
非常感谢您对本次问卷调查的支持与合作 
 
 
 
 
 
 
437 
 
Appendix 8.1: Letter short-listing the paper for Small Business Economics  
 
________________________________________ 
From: Domingo.Ribeiro@uv.es [Domingo.Ribeiro@uv.es] 
Sent: 07 July 2010 12:48 
To: Robson, Paul J 
Cc: thurik@ese.eur.nl; pacosole@telefonica.net; domingo.ribeiro@uv.es 
Subject: INBAM 2010-Small Business Economics Track 
 
Dear Paul 
 
After a very successful INBAM 2010 conference which introduced a new 
model of communication between prospective producers of scientific 
papers and the editorial staff of several leading journals, it is now 
time to select the best material. 
 
In this process we consulted many eminent advisors since choices are 
of great importance for both sides. In the case of "Small Business 
Economics" we selected 7 out of 16 papers. We are happy to announce 
that your paper "The Financing of Small Firm Innovation in China" is 
one of these 7 papers. For this choice editors of 
several of the journals joined forces and wrote the "INBAM 
suggestions for paper submissions to Journals" of which we attach the 
SBE version. We now ask you to work up your paper according these 
guidelines and send in the next version before September 1. You may 
want to do so in a very serious fashion because this version of your 
paper will then enter the referee process of SBE. Possibly some of 
your papers might not be accepted in this process. 
 
At this moment we do not guarantee acceptance but we feel that if - 
in a joint effort - we manage to improve the set of selected papers, 
a very interesting special issue of SBE may be brought out. In a 
later stage you will receive instructions where to send the next 
version of your paper. 
 
With best wishes 
 
David Audretsch (Editor SBE) 
Roy Thurik (Associate Editor SBE) 
Francisco Sole-Parellada (guest editor SBE-for-INBAM 2010) 
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Appendix Table 8.2: Relative Sectoral Distribution of Firms 
Activity SIC 2003 Number of 
Respondents 
Food Products, Beverages & Tobacco 15, 16 9 
Textiles/Wearing apparel/Leather  17, 18 19 63 
Wood/Paper 20, 21 4 
Publishing & Printing  22 5 
Chemicals/ Rubber & Plastics/ Non-metallic minerals 24, 25, 26 47 
Metals/ Metal Fabrication 27, 28 39 
Machinery & equipment NEC 29 19 
Office machinery/ Electrical machinery/ Precision 
instruments/ Radio, Television and Communication 
Equipment/ Precision instruments 
30, 31, 32, 33 11 
Motor Vehicles  34 8 
Furniture 36 19 
Manufacturing Total  224 
   
Wholesale Trade; Repair of Motor Vehicles 50, 51 65 
Land Transport 60 5 
Real Estate Activities 70 14 
Computer and Related Activities 72 25 
Research and Development 73 8 
Other Business Activities 74 43 
Services Total  160 
   
Response Total  384 
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Appendix Table 8.3: Descriptive statistics and ANOVAs.  
 Mean S.D n 
Control Variables 
Sector - Manufacturing 
 
41.67% 
  
224 
Services 58.33%  160 
Size 57.943 73.279 384 
Age of Business 7.776 6.054 384 
Entrepreneur Social Capital 
Family Business 
 
46.35% 
  
178 
Non Family Business 53.65%  206 
Demographic Characteristics 
Sex – Male 
 
78.12% 
  
300 
Female 21.88%  84 
Age of Owner-Manager 40.508 8.174 384 
Relative Role Model  36.46%  140 
No Relative Role Model 63.54%  244 
Type of Business 
Registered Business 
 
43.23% 
  
166 
Partnership 22.92%  88 
Limited liability 33.85%  130 
General Human Capital 
Degree 
 
49.22% 
  
189 
No Degree 50.78%  195 
Specific Human Capital 
Exporter 
 
27.86% 
  
107 
Non-Exporter 72.14%  277 
Innovator – Product 77.34%  297 
None 22.66%  87 
Innovator – Process 40.62%  156 
None 59.38%  228 
Innovator – Work 48.44%  186 
None 51.56%  198 
Innovator – Supply 42.97%  165 
None 57.03%  219 
Innovator – Markets 63.02%  242 
None 36.98%  142 
Innovator – Administration 42.45%  163 
None 57.45%  221 
Innovator – Distribution 43.49%  167 
None 56.51%  217 
R&D Expenditure as a % of turnover: 
None 10.94% 
  
42 
1-2% 34.90%  134 
3-5% 26.04%  100 
6-10% 15.63%  60 
11-20% 8.07%  31 
≥21% 4.43%  17 
n=384 
 
